Negotiating environmental agreements under ratification constraints |
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Institution: | 1. Department of Economics, University of Hamburg, Von Melle Park 5, 20146 Hamburg, Germany;2. Department of Economics, Georgia State University, PO Box 3992, Atlanta, GA 30302, USA;3. NBER, USA;4. Department of Economics, University of Tennessee, 513 Stokely Management Center, Knoxville, TN 37996, USA |
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Abstract: | We analyze the impact of ratification constraints on the optimal terms of international environmental agreements (IEAs). For this, we combine the literature on IEAs with the public choice literature on two-level games. By also incorporating uncertain preferences of the pivotal voter in the ratification stage, we make several important contributions: (i) we contribute to a more realistic modeling of the temporal structure of international agreements, (ii) we show a surprising, yet intuitive non-monotonic relationship between the optimal commitment level and the variance of ratification decisions, (iii) we identify reasons to expect a larger number of countries to join international negotiations than predicted by most of the coalition formation literature based on a representative agent model. Ratification constraints thereby can improve the welfare gains from stable international agreements. |
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Keywords: | International environmental agreement Coalition formation Ratification Two-level games Uncertainty Minimum participation threshold |
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