Transboundary Pollution and Absorptive Capacity

The impact of the investment in absorptive capacity on transboundary pollution is studied by considering two countries, each of them regulating a firm. Firms can invest in inventive research and in absorptive research to lower their pollution intensity. The absorptive research enables a firm to capture part of the inventive research made by the other one. We show that by means of adequate emission taxes, original and absorptive research and development (R&D) subsidies, regulators can reach the non-cooperative social optimum. Interestingly, we show that the investment in absorptive research enables non-cooperating regulators to better internalize transboundary pollution. The higher is the learning parameter of absorption, the greater is the proportion of transboundary pollution internalized. Therefore, it is recommended for the international community to make the patent laws more flexible and enabling learning from the research made by others more interesting. Moreover, the investment in absorptive R&D may lead to multiple equilibria necessitating non-cooperating countries to coordinate on an equilibrium, which constitutes an incentive for them to cooperate.