On the critique of Beck’s view on risk and risk analysis

Ulrich Beck’s stand on risk and risk analysis has been challenged by many researchers. In this paper we look closer into some of the arguments used, with a main focus on the fundamental analysis carried out by Campbell and Currie. These two authors argue that Beck’s criticisms of the theory and practice of risk analysis are groundless: Beck’s understanding of what risk is, is badly flawed, and he misunderstands and distorts the use of probability in risk analysis. However, the analysis of Campbell and Currie is based on a set of premises, for example that risk is a function of probability and harm, and that risk really exists and one can be wrong about risk. Although such ideas are common, they can be challenged, and in the literature a number of alternative perspectives have been suggested. The purpose of the present paper is to study Beck’s stand on risk analysis and the related critique of Campbell and Currie and others, in view of some of these alternative perspectives on risk. To what extent is the critique then justified? The paper concludes that the case raised against Beck’s view is still strong and relevant, but has to be nuanced with respect to some important issues, for example concerning the distinction between belief and truth when it comes to risk. Allowing for spacious interpretations of some of Beck’s theses, the paper provides strengthened support for Beck’s view on these points.