零星危险化学品快递运输风险博弈分

针对零星危险化学品运输中的安全隐患问题，应用博弈理论构建了政府、快递企业、零星危险化学品托运人的三方博弈模型，对零星危险化学品安全运输问题进行了研究。在求得博弈模型均衡解的基础上，对均衡解进行了深入分析，研究结果表明:政府的最优检查概率与快递企业的安全管理成本正相关，与快递企业发生事故时的损失负相关；快递企业实施安全管理的概率与政府对快递企业的惩罚、快递企业发生事故时政府的损失正相关，与政府的检查成本、托运人选择托运且安全运输时的收益负相关；托运人选择托运的概率与快递企业实施安全管理的成本正相关。最后为有效杜绝零星危险化学品运输事故的发生提出了相应对策。

Game analysis on risk in express transportation of sporadic hazardous chemicals

Considering the problems of potential safety hazard in the transportation of sporadic hazardous chemicals, the game theory was applied to construct a three-party game model of government, express enterprises and shippers of sporadic hazardous chemicals, and the safe transportation problems of sporadic hazardous chemicals were studied. Based on obtaining the equilibrium solution of game model, the equilibrium solution was studied further. The results showed that the optimal supervision probability of government presents a positive correlation with the cost of safety management in express enterprises, while it presents a negative correlation with the loss of express enterprises when accident occurs. The probability of implementing safety management for express enterprises presents a positive correlation with the punishment by government and the loss of government when accident occurs in express enterprises, while it presents a negative correlation with the supervision cost of government and the earning of shippers when they choose to ship under a safe transportation. The probability of choosing to ship for shippers presents a positive correlation with the cost of implementing safety management for express enterprises. At last, the corresponding countermeasures were put forward to effectively avoid the occurrence of transportation accidents for sporadic hazardous chemicals.