碳市场发电企业违约分级累进处罚机制研究

在确保减排效率的前提下，以全国碳市场中的发电企业为研究对象，以实现碳市场经济剩余最大化为目标，构建政府和双寡头企业的两阶段动态博弈模型，研究分级累进处罚机制对大型和小型企业发电量、利润的影响，以及在实行分级累进处罚机制的碳市场中经济剩余的实现.算例结果表明：随着罚款系数的增加，违约企业是大型发电企业时，总发电量、企业总利润和经济剩余大幅减少7.47%、15.34%、5.88%；违约企业是小型发电企业时，总发电量小幅减少1.43%，企业总利润小幅减少3.39%或上升0.03%，经济剩余小幅上升0.13%；大型违约企业未参与碳交易时，企业总利润大幅减少16.35%，参与碳交易时，企业总利润小幅减少15.34%；小型违约企业未参与碳交易时，企业总利润大幅减少3.39%，参与碳交易时，企业总利润小幅上升0.03%，分级累进处罚机制能够有效的遏制企业的违约行为.因此，在设计发电行业处罚机制时，应加大处罚力度；设置分级累进处罚机制，分别根据企业规模和碳市场参与度进行分级和累进，并建立有效的监管制度.

Research on graded and progressive punishment mechanism for power generation enterprises in carbon market

Under the consideration of emission reduction efficiency and the purpose of maximizing the economic surplus in the carbon market, a two-stage dynamic game mechanism between the government and duopoly enterprises was constructed, and the effects of graded and progressive punishment mechanism on the power generation, profits of large and small enterprises and economic surplus were studied. The results showed that with the increase of penalty coefficient, if the large power enterprise was defaulted, the total power generation, total profit and economic surplus decreased by 7.47%, 15.34% and 5.88%; if the small power enterprise was defaulted, the total power generation decreased by 1.43%, the total profit decreased by 3.39% or increased by 0.03%, and the economic surplus increased by 0.13%; if the large power enterprise was not participated in carbon trading, the total profit decreased by 16.35%; if it was participated in carbon trading, the total profit decreased by 15.34%; if the small power enterprise was not participated in carbon trading, the total profit decreased by 3.39%; if it was participated in carbon trading, the total profit increased by 0.03%. Therefore, when designing a punishment mechanism for the power generation industry, we should increase the penalties and set up a graded and progressive punishment mechanism, according to the enterprise scale and carbon market participation, and an effective supervision system should be established.