CSR codes and the principal-agent problem in supply chains: four case studies |
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Authors: | Francesco Ciliberti Job de HaanGerard de Groot Pierpaolo Pontrandolfo |
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Institution: | a Polytechnic of Bari, Department of Environmental Engineering and Sustainable Development (DIASS), via de Gasperi, 74123 Taranto, Italy b Tilburg University, Department of Organization and Strategy, Tilburg, The Netherlands c Tilburg University, Development Research Institute (IVO), Tilburg, The Netherlands |
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Abstract: | The benefits of corporate social responsibility (CSR) affect the entire supply chains a firm participates in. However, not every firm is in a position to force the implementation of CSR in its supply chains as some, especially small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), lack the necessary power. Chain directors can implement it acting as a principal, whereas the other chain members can act as agents.In the principal-agent framework, two main problems occur due to information asymmetry: adverse selection and moral hazard. This paper examines how a code of conduct (i.e. Social Accountability 8000) can help address the principal-agent problem, for SMEs, between chain directors and partners. The research method involves four case studies on CSR practices as implemented by Italian and Dutch SMEs within their supply chains. |
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Keywords: | Corporate social responsibility Codes of conduct Agency theory Supply chain management Small- and medium-sized enterprises |
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