| 企业环境污染与政府控制监控 |
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| 引用本文： | 王艳,杨忠直.企业环境污染与政府控制监控[J].环境保护科学,2005,31(4):51-53. |
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| 作者姓名： | 王艳 杨忠直 |
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| 作者单位： | 北京大学经济学院,北京,100871;黑龙江省建工集团,哈尔滨,150000;上海交通大学管理学院,上海,200052 |
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| 摘 要： | 从政府监控的角度,采用博弈论的方法对企业环境污染的行为进行了分析。根据模型的不同假设前提,构造了单阶段和多阶段的博弈模型,得出博弈双方的均衡战略,以及某些关键因素(如政府对企业的惩罚系数及监督成本,企业环境污染行为的收益等)对博弈双方的影响,提出了减少企业污染行为发生的建议。
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| 关 键 词： | 环境污染 监控 分析 |
| 收稿时间： | 2004-07-28 |
| 修稿时间： | 2004-07-28 |
Enterprises' Environmental Pollution and Government's Supervision |
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| Wang Yan;Yang ZhongZhi.Enterprises' Environmental Pollution and Government's Supervision[J].Environmental Protection Science,2005,31(4):51-53. |
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| Authors: | Wang Yan;Yang ZhongZhi |
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| Abstract: | The Enterprises' Pollution Supervision is analyzed by using the game theory.The models of one-stage game and multistage games are established,which are based on the different hypothesis.And the equilibrium strategy is deduced.Some key factors' impaction on the two parts including the mulct coefficient that government punishes enterprise,supervision cost and profits gained by pollution are also discussed.The suggestions to reduce the behaviour of enterprises' pollution are set forth. |
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| Keywords: | Environmental Pollution Supervision Analysis |
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