| 环境治理博弈复杂性与演化均衡稳定性分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 陶建格,薛惠锋,韩建新,张朝阳,刘春江.环境治理博弈复杂性与演化均衡稳定性分析[J].环境科学与技术,2009,32(7). |
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| 作者姓名： | 陶建格 薛惠锋 韩建新 张朝阳 刘春江 |
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| 作者单位： | 西北工业大学自动化学院,陕西,西安,710072 |
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| 摘 要： | 根据系统工程和环境经济学相关理论,环境治理博弈具有限理性、自主性、动态性、经济性等特点,针对当前环境治理博弈研究中完全信息、静态决策和理性决策等的局限性,文章运用演化博弈理论方法,建立了一个环境治理博弈的演化博弈均衡模型,分析了参与博弈主体的动态演变过程。研究结果表明,环境治理状况的演化方向与双方博弈的支付矩阵相关,同时与系统初始状态相关。并得出监管成本、处罚力度,以及企业的社会责任是影响环境治理状况演变的关键因素。
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| 关 键 词： | 环境治理 有限理性 演化博弈 |
Complexity and Evolutionary Stability Analysis in Environmental Pollution Treatment Games |
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| TAO Jian-ge,XUE Hui-feng,HAN Jian-xin,ZHANG Chao-yang,LIU Chun-jiang.Complexity and Evolutionary Stability Analysis in Environmental Pollution Treatment Games[J].Environmental Science and Technology,2009,32(7). |
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| Authors: | TAO Jian-ge XUE Hui-feng HAN Jian-xin ZHANG Chao-yang LIU Chun-jiang |
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| Institution: | School of Automation;Northwestern Polytechnical University;Xi'an 710072;China |
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| Abstract: | Based on theory of system engineering and environmental economics,environmental pollution treatment games is characterized with bounded rational,self-determination,dynamic and economic system.In view of the limitations in studying environmental pollution treatment by complete information,static decision-making and rational decision-making methods,an evolutionary game model of environmental pollution treatment based on evolutionary game theory was established to analyze its dynamic evolutionary procedure.Res... |
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| Keywords: | environmental pollution treatment bounded rational evolutionary game |
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