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基于进化博弈的生态建筑项目开发商群体行为研究
引用本文:李旭升,陈鑫,石朝锋.基于进化博弈的生态建筑项目开发商群体行为研究[J].资源开发与保护,2013(12):1254-1256,1283.
作者姓名:李旭升  陈鑫  石朝锋
作者单位:西南交通大学经济管理学院,四川成都610031
基金项目:国家自然科学基金项目(编号:71071102).
摘    要:以进化博弈理论为基础,构建了开发商群体在生态建筑项目开发决策中的动态博弈模型,打破了经典博弈理论中参与人完全理性的不合理假定.模型充分讨论了政府激励措施对开发商行为的影响,其结果较好地解释了因信息不对称造成的我国生态建筑项目“市场失灵”现象,为合理引导开发商进行生态建筑项目建设提供了决策依据.

关 键 词:生态建筑  进化博弈理论  开发商群体  市场失灵

Research of Developers Behavior Based on Evolutionary Game Theory in Developing Ecological Buildings
Authors:LI Xu-sheng  CHEN Xin  SHI Chao-feng
Institution:( School of Economics and Management, Southwest Jiaotong University, Chengdu 610031, China)
Abstract:On the basis of evolutionary game theory, this paper constructed a dynamic game model of real estate developers' decision- making in the process of developing ecological architecture projects, and tried to break the unreasonable supposition that participators were totally rational in the classic game theory. This model adequately discussed how government incentives affected the developers' behavior, which explained finally in a better way the "market failure" phenomenon among ecological architectures made by asymmetric information in China and may provide a theoretical basis for the government when reasonably guiding developed to developing ecological architectures.
Keywords:ecological building  evolutionary game theory  developers  market failure
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