| Abstract: | ABSTRACT: The Environmental Protection Agency administers a construction grant program to encourage abatement of wastewater pollution by sharing with municipalities the costs of wastewater treatment facilities. The enabling legislation (P.L. 92–500) specifies that EPA's cost share will be 75% of construction costs. It further requires municipalities to collect user fees from industrial users of the facilities to repay that part of the federal grant allocable to the treatment of industrial wastewater. The municipality must return half of the user fees collected to the U.S. Treasury; the municipality is allowed to retain the remaining half. Retention by municipalities of these user fees lowers their effective cost shares and results in the following consequences: (1) a bias for municipalities to select certain kinds of abatement techniques regardless of whether or not they are the least-cost techniques from the national perspective; (2) a bias for municipalities to select larger-than-optimal scales of abatement facilities; (3) a hidden federal subsidy to industry; and (4) grants that favor industrial communities. This article examines the legislative and regulatory requirements for user charges, derives the algebraic expressions for calculating the real federal, municipal, and industrial cost shares with user fees; computes municipal cost shares for selected values of the determinant factors; evaluates efficiency and other consequences of current user fee arrangements; and concludes that the efficiency distortions brought about by the impacts of user fees on cost sharing could be eliminated by requiring that all user fees collected from industry against the federal cost share be returned to the U.S. Treasury. |
