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地方政府土地违法:财政激励还是引资激励?
引用本文:张绍阳,刘琼,欧名豪.地方政府土地违法:财政激励还是引资激励?[J].中国人口.资源与环境,2017(8):115-121.
作者姓名:张绍阳  刘琼  欧名豪
作者单位:南京农业大学公共管理学院,南京,210095
基金项目:国家自然科学基金项目“土地约束性指标管控政策的选择性执行及其治理研究”(71673141)
摘    要:地方政府的土地利用行为及动机是理解我国土地违法问题的关键。现有研究重点关注了地方政府土地违法的财政激励而忽视了引资激励,无法解释地方土地违法中涉及大量工业用地的现象。本文立足现行的分税制及官员晋升考核体制,从理论上分析了财政激励和引资激励对地方政府土地违法行为的影响及其差异,并据此提出研究假说:(1)财政激励和引资激励都是地方政府土地违法的重要驱动因素。(2)地方政府在土地财政和土地引资上的目的不同导致二者的违法收益及风险存在差异,这使得引资激励的驱动作用可能更强。然后,基于2008—2014年的省际面板数据,构建计量模型对研究假说进行了实证检验,结果表明:在全国层面,财政激励和引资激励都对地方政府的土地违法行为存在显著正向影响,且后者的作用更强。在东、中、西部的区域层面,东、中部地区的土地违法主要受引资激励影响,财政激励的作用并不显著;而西部地区的土地违法则受财政激励和引资激励的共同影响,且后者的作用更强。这一结果意味着,相对于财政激励,引资激励是驱使地方政府土地违法的更重要因素。由此,在土地违法问题的治理上,除了针对地方政府面临的财政激励进行财政体制改革,更重要的是针对引资激励开展官员绩效考核改革。

关 键 词:土地违法  财政激励  引资激励  地方政府  区域差异

Land law violations of local governments: fiscal incentive or investment attraction incentive?
ZHANG Shao-yang,LIU Qiong,OU Ming-hao.Land law violations of local governments: fiscal incentive or investment attraction incentive?[J].China Polulation.Resources and Environment,2017(8):115-121.
Authors:ZHANG Shao-yang  LIU Qiong  OU Ming-hao
Abstract:Local governments' behavior and incentive of land utilization is the key factor to understand China's land law violations.The existing research emphasizes more on fiscal incentive of local governments' land law violations while ignoring the investment attraction incentive,it can't explain the phenomenon of plenty of industrial land involved in land law violations of local governments.Based on the existing tax-sharing system and official promotion evaluation system,This paper theoretically analyzes influence and difference of fiscal incentive and investment attraction incentive for land law violations of local governments,and proposes the research hypothesis:①Fiscal incentive and investment attraction incentive are important driving factors to land law violations of local governments.② Different purposes of local governments on land finance and land investment attraction shall lead to the difference in illegal incomes and risks,which will drive investment attraction incentive more significant to land law violations.Then,by using the inter-provincial panel data from 2008 to 2014,it establishes econometric model to empirically test the research hypothesis.The results show that:From the national level,fiscal incentive and investment attraction incentive are both significant positive factors to land law violations of local govemments,and the later is more marked.From the different region level,the eastern and middle areas of land law violations are mainly driven by investment attraction incentive,fiscal incentive has no significant influence,the western area is driven by fiscal incentive and investment attraction incentive together;in addition the role of the latter is more significant.This result means that investment attraction incentive is the more important factor that leads to land law violations of local governments than fiscal incentive.Therefore,in terms of the governance of land law violations,besides focusing on financial system reform,it also needs to strengthen land use index evaluation to reform performance evaluation of official promotion.
Keywords:land law violations  fiscal incentive  investment attraction incentive  local governments  regional differences
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