农地整理后期管护制度绩效研究：影响路径及中介效应分析

基于湖北省4个地区的568份农户调研数据，借鉴SCP范式构建了“制度结构 管护行为 制度绩效”研究框架，采用结构方程模型分析了农地整理后期管护制度绩效的影响路径，并利用中介效应模型测度了制度结构对其绩效的影响效应，试图为管护制度的完善和制度绩效的提升提供一定的理论依据。研究表明：（1）利用结构方程模型和线性回归模型验证了SCP范式的有效性，制度结构不仅直接作用于制度绩效，也可通过管护行为间接作用于制度绩效，且间接作用大于直接作用。（2）制度结构中，非正式制度类变量贡献更大；管护行为中，角色内行为类变量路径系数更高。影响声誉、破坏劝阻、主体选择等测量变量对制度结构、管护行为、制度绩效的总效应最大，效应值分别为0.56、0.79、0.84。（3）管护文件覆盖区域与管护合同签订区域及全部实证区域中管护行为的中介效应均显著，且管护合同签订区域管护行为的中介效应高于管护文件覆盖区域。因此，建议重视非正式制度的激励与约束作用，逐步引导村民形成积极参与管护的惯例；加大管护基础工作的执行力度，尤其是对项目设施破坏行为进行及时劝阻，避免“破窗效应”；引入市场机制，推进管护主体选择方式多元化。

Influence Path and Mediating Effect of Performance of Supervision and Maintenance Institution for Rural Land Consolidation

This paper analyzes the influence path and effect of institutional performance of supervision and maintenance for rural land consolidation project by borrowing structure conduct performance paradigm, based on 568 questionnaires in Hubei province. It aims to provide the useful support for the perfection of the institution and improvement of institutional performance. Methodically, structural equation model and mediating effects model are employed. The main results are as follows. Firstly, the proposed SCP model is verified. The institutional structure could not only affect institutional performance directly but also indirectly through the supervision and maintenance behavior, and the indirect effect is greater than the direct one. Secondly, contributions of the informal institution variables are greater in the institutional structure, while the path coefficients of in role behaviors variables are higher in supervision and maintenance behavior. Furthermore, reputation influence, destruction discourage, subject selection play the most important roles in the institutional structure, supervision and maintenance behavior, institutional performance respectively, with the effect values of 0.56, 0.79 and 0.84. Lastly, the mediating effect of supervision and maintenance behavior is significant in the studied areas, including document area and contract area. Moreover, the mediating effects of contract area is higher than the document area. In conclusion, we should pay more attention to the incentive and restraint function of informal institution, and guide the villagers to form the tradition of actively participating in supervision and maintenance gradually. Thus, the enforcement of infrastructure of supervision and maintenance should be strengthened, especially preventing destruction of facilities timely to avoid the “broken window effect”. Also, the market mechanism should be introduced to promote the diversification of subject selection procedure.