| 基于博弈视角的鄱阳湖流域经济协调机制及路径选择 |
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| 引用本文： | 吕添贵,吴次芳,陈美球,陆张维,韩昊英,方明. 基于博弈视角的鄱阳湖流域经济协调机制及路径选择[J]. 自然资源学报, 2014, 29(9): 1465-1474. DOI: 10.11849/zrzyxb.2014.09.002 |
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| 作者姓名： | 吕添贵 吴次芳 陈美球 陆张维 韩昊英 方明 |
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| 作者单位： | 1. 浙江大学公共管理学院, 杭州310029;2. 江西农业大学/江西省鄱阳湖流域农业生态工程技术研究中心, 南昌330045;3. 浙江农林大学环境与资源学院, 浙江临安311300 |
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| 基金项目： | 国家社科基金重大项目（14ZDA039）；国家社会科学基金重点项目（13AZD012）；江西省“赣鄱英才555工程”项目；国家自然科学基金项目（51278526）；浙江省自然科学基金项目（LQ13D010003）。 |
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| 摘 要： | 鄱阳湖流域上中下游区位差异导致的内部发展不平衡阻碍了流域经济一体化进程。研究采用博弈模型在计算鄱阳湖流域内部经济博弈损益矩阵的基础上，剖析了博弈纳什均衡、 组织结构选择以及非合作博弈内在原因；同时提出了流域经济协调机制构建框架，构建了组织结构效率帕累托最优的政策优化路径，为实现流域上中下游地区社会经济均衡发展提供了决策依据。结果表明：①流域经济发展过程中出现“搭便车”现象不仅是由于上中下游是寻求自身相对利益最大化的理性主体，非合作选择还受到利益诉求差异、合作层次制约和资源环境的内在约束；②从“主体非合作”状态到“全主体合作”整体效益逐渐提升，最终实现鄱阳湖流域经济整体与个体效率的帕累托最优；③博弈合作组织演进方向和流域上中下游整体目标取向实现路径正好相反，而个体合作策略选择与收益水平非同步且交叉互动，组织合作架构易处于非稳定状态；④组织结构缺乏有效的内生动力与自我强化驱动机制，必须借助外部动力以保证组织“合作状态”的稳定性。
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| 收稿时间： | 2013-07-05 |
| 修稿时间： | 2013-11-28 |
Study on Path Selection of Economic Coordination Mechanismin Poyang Lake Basin Based on Game Theory |
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| L,#,Tian-gui,WU Ci-fang,CHEN Mei-qiu,LU Zhang-wei,HAN Hao-ying,FANG Ming. Study on Path Selection of Economic Coordination Mechanismin Poyang Lake Basin Based on Game Theory[J]. Journal of Natural Resources, 2014, 29(9): 1465-1474. DOI: 10.11849/zrzyxb.2014.09.002 |
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| Authors: | L&# Tian-gui WU Ci-fang CHEN Mei-qiu LU Zhang-wei HAN Hao-ying FANG Ming |
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| Affiliation: | 1. College of Public Administration, Zhejiang University, Hangzhou 310029, China;2. Jiangxi Agricultural University, Jiangxi Provincial Research Center for Agricultural Ecology of Poyang Lake Watershed, Nanchang 330045, China;3. College of Environmental and Resource Sciences, Zhejiang Agriculture and Forestry University, Lin'an 311300, China |
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| Abstract: | The location differences among the upper, middle and lower Poyang Lake Basincaused the inner unbalanced development leads to hindering the process of the basin's economicintegration. In this study, the matrix of economic game profit and loss was calculated basedon the game model of the Poyang Lake Basin, and then the Nash equilibrium of game theory,organization's structure and the inner reason of non-cooperation were analyzed. Meanwhile,itput forward the framework of coordination mechanism of the basin's economy, and also constructedthe policy path optimizing organizational structure efficiency of Pareto optimum, so asto provide the decision-making basis for the socio-economic equilibrium development among the upper,middle and lower Poyang Lake Basin. The results showed that: 1) The phenomenonof "hitchhike" in the process of basin economic development is a relatively rational subject notonly because the locals are seeking their own maximization-benefit, but the noncooperation isalso influenced by the different interests, co-operational levels and inner restraint of resourcesenvironment. 2) The overall benefits are gradually improved from the state of "non-cooperation" to "full cooperation" , and finally reaching the target of Pareto optimum of the whole andthe individual economic efficiency of the Poyang Lake Basin. 3) The evolution direction of cooperationorganization is opposite to the goal way of the whole basin's way. Additionally,which is non synchronous presentation of interactive between the choice of cooperation strategyand the individual income level while the cooperation structure is easy to be in a non-steadystate; 4) It is obvious that the organization structure is still lack of the effective internal impetusand self-reinforcing mechanism,those need the help of external force so as to ensure the stability of organization in the Poyang Lake Basin. |
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