Killing Tigers to Save Them: Fallacies of the Farming Argument

Abstract: The lucrative, illegal trade in tigers (Panthera tigris) remains a major conservation problem. Tiger farming has been proposed as a potential solution, with farmed tigers substituting for wild tigers. At first glance, this argument's logic seems simple: farming will increase the supply of tigers, prices will fall, and poaching will no longer be profitable. We contend, however, that this supply‐side argument relies on mistaken assumptions. First, tiger markets are imperfect, meaning they are dominated by a few producers who control price. Second, consumers prefer wild tigers to farmed tigers and therefore the two are not pure substitutes. In economic terms, products from wild tigers are luxury goods, commanding a price premium. Third, there is no evidence that farmed tigers can be produced or sold more cheaply than wild tigers. In sum, it is unlikely that farming will drive down the price of wild‐caught tigers or decrease profitability for tiger poachers. Rather, tiger farming is more likely to increase aggregate demand for tiger products and stimulate higher levels of poaching.     

Historical spatial reconstruction of a spawning‐aggregation fishery

Aggregations of individual animals that form for breeding purposes are a critical ecological process for many species, yet these aggregations are inherently vulnerable to exploitation. Studies of the decline of exploited populations that form breeding aggregations tend to focus on catch rate and thus often overlook reductions in geographic range. We tested the hypothesis that catch rate and site occupancy of exploited fish‐spawning aggregations (FSAs) decline in synchrony over time. We used the Spanish mackerel (Scomberomorus commerson) spawning‐aggregation fishery in the Great Barrier Reef as a case study. Data were compiled from historical newspaper archives, fisher knowledge, and contemporary fishery logbooks to reconstruct catch rates and exploitation trends from the inception of the fishery. Our fine‐scale analysis of catch and effort data spanned 103 years (1911–2013) and revealed a spatial expansion of fishing effort. Effort shifted offshore at a rate of 9.4 nm/decade, and 2.9 newly targeted FSAs were reported/decade. Spatial expansion of effort masked the sequential exploitation, commercial extinction, and loss of 70% of exploited FSAs. After standardizing for improvements in technological innovations, average catch rates declined by 90.5% from 1934 to 2011 (from 119.4 to 11.41 fish/vessel/trip). Mean catch rate of Spanish mackerel and occupancy of exploited mackerel FSAs were not significantly related. Our study revealed a special kind of shifting spatial baseline in which a contraction in exploited FSAs occurred undetected. Knowledge of temporally and spatially explicit information on FSAs can be relevant for the conservation and management of FSA species.