Deliberating Animal Values: a Pragmatic—Pluralistic Approach to Animal Ethics

Debates in animal ethics are largely characterized by ethical monism, the search for a single, timeless, and essential trait in which the moral standing of animals can be grounded. In this paper, we argue that a monistic approach towards animal ethics hampers and oversimplifies the moral debate. The value pluralism present in our contemporary societies requires a more open and flexible approach to moral inquiry. This paper advocates the turn to a pragmatic, pluralistic approach to animal ethics. It contributes to the development of such an approach in two ways. It offers a pragmatist critique of ethical monism in animal ethics and presents the results of a qualitative study into the value diversity present in the different ways of thinking about animals in the Netherlands. Carefully arranged group discussions resulted in the reconstruction of four distinctive moral value frameworks that may serve as instruments in the future process of moral inquiry and deliberation in the reflection on animal use.     

Animal Rearing as a Contract?

Can animals, and especially cattle, be the subject ofmoral concern? Should we care about their well-being?Two competing ethical theories have addressed suchissues so far. A utilitarian theory which, inBentham's wake, extends moral consideration to everysentient being, and a theory of the rights orinterests of animals which follows Feinberg'sconceptions. This includes various positions rangingfrom the most radical (about animal liberation) tomore moderate ones (concerned with the well-being ofanimals). Notwithstanding their diversity, theseconceptions share some common flaws. First, as anextension of primarily anthropocentric theories (aboututility or rights) they still participate in the flawsof the original setting. Second, extending them tonon-human beings raises the problem of the borderwhich is to be drawn between what can be included inthe purview of moral consideration and what is leftoutside. Third, such theories are not able to distinguishbetween an ethics of wildlife and an ethics ofdomestic life, which too often leads to preposterousstatements. We would like to argue (i) that we should distinguishbetween environmental ethics (concerned withpopulations, species, biotic communities) and animalethics (where animals are taken into consideration individually);(ii) that individualist animal ethics are not relevantfor animal rearing; (iii) that animal rearing is a hierarchicalrelationship which rules are to be found in the fiction of a domesticcontract. Hence, we would like to construct a new conception ofthe ethics of the relation between men and the cattlethey breed based on the idea of a domestic contract.Our main assumption is Mary Midgleys's anthropologicalassumption, according to which human communities,since the Neolithic age, have always included variousanimals, so that relations of sociability have alwaysexisted between human beings and animals within thedomestic community (a mixed community). In order tospecify the hierarchical and non-egalitarian, butinclusive reciprocal obligations and relations insidesuch a community, we will elaborate on the notion ofa ``domestic contract'', an implicitly assumedidea traced back to Lucretius and whichwe will follow up to the physiocrats and Adam Smith.We will show that such an idea relies upon theassumption of communication between cattle farmer andanimals, of shared experience and exchanges betweenthe two parties. We will then show how modern factory,or battery animal farming, can be seen as unilaterallybreaking this domestic contract, forsaking ourduties towards domestic animals.     

The Edge of “Animal Rights”

A central task of environmental ethics, which have been arising since 1960s, is to extend the objects of moral concern beyond the individuals of Homo sapiens. (Here, it involves the issue of the boundary of environmental ethics. In a narrow sense, an environmental ethic must grant moral concern to holistic environmental objects (such as ecosystems). On the other hand, if we broadly define the environmental ethic as an ethic that shows moral concern not limited to Homo sapiens and its individuals only, then, these “generalized” environmental ethics include Peter Singer’s “animal liberation” and Tom Regan’s “animal rights”. In this article, the term “environmental ethic” refers to an environmental ethic in a generalized sense.) All the objects deserving moral concern constitute the moral community. The trajectory and boundary of this extension are different among different schools. Compared to other schools, Tom Regan’s “animal rights” has a relatively smaller moral community, making it more “conservative” at first sight. Meanwhile, the rights view, like other schools, faces the question regarding the edge of moral concern. This question consists of two sub-questions: (1) where is the boundary of the moral community and (2) how ought we to treat the objects of moral concern near the boundary? Given the closeness of Regan’s theory to traditional ethics (regarding the boundary of the moral community), this study is mainly focused on analyzing the edge of moral concern within the framework of the theory of animal rights. Further, I investigate the similarities and differences in the boundary of moral concern among various schools of environmental ethics. The comparative analysis demonstrates a subtle relation between science and moral philosophy, and reveals a similar form of a metaphysical premise adopted by all environmental ethics. This research helps to clarify the moral concern of environmental ethics, which is an essential prerequisite for establishing a new ethic, and therefore helps to consolidate the reference of environmental ethics to environmental management.     

Animal Abolitionism and ‘Racism without Racists’

Abolitionism is an animal rights' philosophy and social movement which has recently begun to grow. It has been largely contested but the criticisms directed at it have usually been articulated outside academia. In this article, I wish to contend that one of the criticisms directed at abolitionism—that it contains racist implications—is correct. I do this by defending the idea that abolitionism engages in what Eduardo Bonilla-Silva classifies as ‘racism without racists’—an unintentional and subtle form of racism. I present three ways in which abolitionism may be considered racist and then address some possible objections to my view.     

Intrinsic Value and Direct Duties: From Animal Ethics towards Environmental Ethics?

Three types of concern for animal welfare are widelyheld: Animals should feel well, they should function well, andthey should lead natural lives. The paper deals with a well-knownanswer to the question of why such concerns are morallyappropriate: Human beings have direct duties towards animals,because animals are beings that can flourish, the flourishing ofanimals is intrinsically or inherently valuable, and that whichis conducive to their flourishing is a legitimate object of moralconcern. Looking for a tenable conception of direct dutiestowards animals, the following questions are discussed: Whatshould we take it to mean that ``animal flourishing isintrinsically or inherently valuable?'' Under what conditions doesa living being's ability to flourish create direct duties towardsthis being? Is awareness or sentience required for there to bedirect duties towards a living being? Does such a requirementimply that moral concerns for animals would be limited to theirfeeling well, or does it also give way to having moral concernsfor their functioning well and leading natural lives? Can onetake into account considered judgements that claim that towardsdifferent animals we have moral duties that differ in kind and/orstrength? If environmental ethics cannot be based on theconception of direct duties here discussed, should one draw adistinction between duties towards ourselves, our fellow humanbeings, or animals, and duties regarding plants, or collectiveentities such as populations, species, and ecosystems?     

The Danube Region—On Stream with Animal Welfare Assessment in the Last 35 Years: A Review of Research on Animal Welfare Assessment in a Multi-lingual Area in Europe

This review presents first ever literature survey on historical development of farm animal welfare indicators and assessment in the Danube region. This area, encompassing European Eastern countries and the Balkans, is to a large extent heterogeneous in terms of culture and language. However, international (English) publications were disproportionally small compared to the amount of research institutions and animal welfare activities present in the region. Therefore, the authors aimed at investigating the published literature, focusing on country level and on native languages. Data were collected for the 1980–2015 period referring to scientific papers published in international and national journals, papers and abstracts in proceedings of the international and national conferences, reviews, monographs, short communications, Ph.D., Master and Graduation theses. Welfare assessment of all farm animal species was observed including fish. Over 180 papers were in line with the preselected index. Data collected showed that publishing dynamics grew rapidly towards the last decade. Most of the studies were focused on animal welfare indicators such as stress, injuries and mutilations, behaviour, body condition and management practices. Cattle, chickens, pigs and sheep were the predominant species investigated. The study revealed that experts from the region were greatly involved in the studies of animal welfare indicators and assessment, contributing to development of the currently most widely used animal welfare assessment protocols, thus having an important role in animal welfare research and protection.     

Response to “The Problem of the Question About Animal Ethics” by Michal Piekarski

In this brief article we reply to Michal Piekarski’s response to our article ‘Facing Animals’ published previously in this journal. In our article we criticized the properties approach to defining the moral standing of animals, and in its place proposed a relational and other-oriented concept that is based on a transcendental and phenomenological perspective, mainly inspired by Heidegger, Levinas, and Derrida. In this reply we question and problematize Piekarski’s interpretation of our essay and critically evaluate “the ethics of commitment” that he offers as an alternative.     

Farmer’s Response to Societal Concerns About Farm Animal Welfare: The Case of Mulesing

The study explored the motivations behind Australian wool producers’ intentions regarding mulesing; a surgical procedure that will be voluntarily phased out after 2010, following retailer boycotts led by People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals. Telephone interviews were conducted with 22 West Australian wool producers and consultants to elicit their behavioral, normative and control beliefs about mulesing and alternative methods of breech strike prevention. Results indicate that approximately half the interviewees intend to continue mulesing, despite attitudes toward the act of mulesing being quite negative. This indicates that attitudes alone are unlikely to be good predictors of this goal directed behavior. Most respondents believed mulesing was more effective and involved less cost, time, and effort than the currently available alternatives to prevent breech strike. Further, they felt relatively little social pressure, as they believed few consumers were concerned about mulesing. However, they noted that if consumer sentiment changed they would likely change their practices. Thus, attitudes are likely to be only one of several factors influencing intentions to change farm practices to address societal concerns about animal welfare. Further, mulesing appears to be goal-directed behavior, suggesting that other factors depicted by the Model of Goal-directed Behavior (MGB; Perugini and Bagozzi In: Br J Soc Psychol, 40: 79–98, 2001) may be worth exploring in this context. Finally, these results provide insight into how policy makers may influence farmers to change practices in response to societal pressure for improving farm animal welfare.     

Inspiring Respect for Animals Through the Law? Current Development in the Norwegian Animal Welfare Legislation

Over the last years, Norway has revised its animal welfare legislation. As of January 1, 2010, the Animal Protection Act of 1974 was replaced by a new Animal Welfare Act. This paper describes the developments in the normative structures from the old to the new act, as well as the main traits of the corresponding implementation and governance system. In the Animal Protection Act, the basic animal ethics principles were to avoid suffering, treat animals well, and consider their natural needs and instincts. In addition, a principle for balancing our duties towards animals with the needs and interests of humans was expressed by the formulation “unnecessary suffering.” These principles (only with slightly different formulations) are retained in the new act. The novelty of the new act is shown by its explicit intention to promote respect for animals and its recognition of animals’ intrinsic value. Whereas intrinsic value is only given a symbolic function, the notion of respect is intended to have practical consequences. One interpretation of respect for animals is taking the animal’s integrity—and not only welfare—into account. Another is to see the introduction of respect as a call to animal keepers to provide animals with welfare exceeding the minimum requirements. In several respects, the legal system now seems to leave more responsibility to the individual animal keeper—and to citizens in general. I argue that if the authorities really do want to promote respect for animals, they must at the same time initiate activities to achieve this. In my perspective the challenge is to provide adequate measures to achieve in practice the intended respect for animals expressed in the new act.     

A Critique of FAWC’s Five Freedoms as a Framework for the Analysis of Animal Welfare

The Brambell Report of 1965 recommended that animals should have the freedom to stand up, lie down, turn around, groom themselves and stretch their limbs. The Farm Animal Welfare Council (FAWC) developed these into the Five Freedoms, which are a framework for the analysis of animal welfare. The Five Freedoms are well known in farming, policy making and academic circles. They form the basis of much animal welfare legislation, codes of recommendations and farm animal welfare accreditation schemes, and are the foundation of the Welfare Quality^® assessment scheme. The Five Freedoms are also extensively employed for the education of veterinary and animal welfare science students. Hence they have proven to be of great practical utility. In this paper, the Five Freedoms framework is examined in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions for the analysis of animal welfare. Overall, the Five Freedoms are judged to be individually necessary and jointly sufficient as a framework for the analysis of animal welfare. FAWC has recently criticized the Five Freedoms for concentrating on negative aspects of welfare. However, it is shown here how the satisfaction of the Five Freedoms should lead to good welfare, from the animal’s point of view. The Five Freedoms are formulated as ideals of animal welfare. This has significant advantages that have likely contributed to their impact. However, the ideality of the Five Freedoms means that the framework is without power to determine what a satisfactory level of animal welfare is, in an ethical sense.     

Citizens’ Views on Farm Animal Welfare and Related Information Provision: Exploratory Insights from Flanders,Belgium

The results of two independent empirical studies with Flemish citizens were combined to address the problem of a short fall of information provision about higher welfare products. The research objectives were (1) to improve our understanding of how citizens conceptualize farm animal welfare, (2) to analyze the variety in the claimed personal relevance of animal welfare in the food purchasing decision process, and (3) to find out people’s needs in relation to product information about animal welfare and the extent to which the current information caters to these needs. The first study consisted of a survey conducted in three consecutive years (2000–2002, n = 521) and was complemented with more recent qualitative data from four focus group discussions (2006, n = 29). Citizens’ conceptualization of farm animal welfare matched reasonably well with those in the scientific literature, although it is clearly influenced by a lower level of practical experience and a higher weight of empathy. In general, respondents indicated that animal welfare was an important product attribute, although it was less important than primary product attributes such as quality, health, and safety. Moral issues, rather than a perception of higher quality, were the main influence on preferences for higher welfare products. At present, higher standards of animal welfare are mostly guaranteed within more general quality assurance schemes. Yet people’s decisions to not choose higher welfare products seems to be related to the perceptual disconnection between eating animal food products and the living producing animals. Respondents generally thought better information provision was required and the present level of provision was strongly criticized. In combination, the findings of both studies help inform the discussion about how citizens can be informed about animal welfare and the preferred content, source, and medium of such information. The paper also provides insights into citizens’ semantic interpretation of the concept of animal welfare (what wordings they use) and the range of relevance that animal welfare has for different groups that, in turn is useful in identifying which segments can be targeted. This can contribute to a more effective valorization of animal welfare as a product attribute.     

Exponential Growth, Animal Welfare, Environmental and Food Safety Impact: The Case of China’s Livestock Production

Developmental states are criticized for rapid “industrialization without enlightenment.” In the last 30 years, China’s breathtaking growth has been achieved at a high environmental and food safety cost. This article, utilizing a recent survey of China’s livestock industry, illustrates the initiating role of China’s developmental state in the exponential expansion of the country’s livestock production. The enthusiastic response of the livestock industry to the many state policy incentives has made China the world’s biggest animal farming nation. Shortage of meat and dairy supply is history. Yet, the Chinese government is facing new challenges of no less a threat to political stability. Production intensification has created a welfare crisis impacting the world’s biggest number of farm animals. The resulting food safety incidents are affecting consumer confidence and health. Untreated waste contributes to the nation’s environmental degradation. Developmental states may have a proud record of growth in the initial stage of industrialization. Their prospects for sustained development have long been questioned. China has come to an important juncture to march towards a sustained development.     

Cross-Cultural Management of Pest Animal Damage: A Case Study of Feral Buffalo Control in Australia’s Kakadu National Park

Government agencies responsible for pest animal management often assume that their views and assumptions about the benefits of control are widely shared, especially if these pests are exotics. This was certainly the case when tens of thousands of feral Asian water buffalo (Bubalus bubalis) were to be culled in Australias Kakadu National Park as part of a national Brucellosis and Tuberculosis Eradication Campaign (BTEC). Implementation of the campaign sparked considerable dispute between officials and aboriginal and non-aboriginal interests about the risks posed by buffalo relative to their value as a potential resource. Drawing upon a variety of written and oral sources relating to the era of buffalo control in Kakadu, this paper critically analyzes the way in which detriment caused by buffalo was appraised and managed under the BTEC program. In particular, the paper focuses the ways in which the BTEC program affected aboriginal people in Kakadu, who view buffalo as a source of customary and economic benefit as well as a source of change on their lands. The paper then considers what lessons can be learned from the BTEC for the development of sensible feral management objectives and strategies. It is argued that effective management of feral animals such as buffalo will require environmental managers to engage with local people and involve them in the definition and management of pest animal damage and methods of control.     

Farmers’ Attitude Towards Animal Welfare Aspects and Their Practice in Organic Dairy Calf Rearing: a Case Study in Selected Nordic Farms

In organic philosophy, the concept of “naturalness” is of major importance. According to the organic interpretation of animal welfare, natural living is considered a precondition for accomplishing welfare and the principal aims of organic production include the provision of natural living conditions for animals. However, respective regulations are lacking in organic legislation. In practice, the life of a calf in organic rearing systems can deviate from being natural, since common practices in dairy farms include early weaning, dehorning, or cow-calf separation soon after birth. This case study explores how calf welfare is approached in six different organic dairy farms and how far the concept of naturalness is implemented. The farms included in this study were located in Norway and Sweden. A semi-structured questionnaire was used for data collection. The interviewed farmers approach the concept of welfare in various ways and state that “naturalness” is an aspect of animal welfare. However, in practice in the calf rearing systems under study, only a few “naturalness” aspects were implemented. Reasons for the observed discrepancy might lie in differing understandings of “naturalness,” in economic restrictions, and in other trade-offs resulting from production system inherent characteristics and in limited regulation concerning provision of natural living aspects.