Terminating links between emission trading programs

Links between emission trading programs are not immutable, as highlighted by New Jersey׳s exit from the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative in 2011. This raises the question of what to do with existing permits that are banked for future use—choices that have consequences for market behavior in advance of, or upon speculation about, delinking. We consider two delinking policies. One differentiates banked permits by origin, the other treats banked permits the same. We describe the price behavior and relative cost-effectiveness of each policy. Treating permits differently generally leads to higher costs, and may lead to price divergence, even with only speculation about delinking.     

Environmental policy à la carte: Letting firms choose their regulation

Under uncertainty, the optimal choice between price and quantity instruments depends on the technology of the regulated firms, which is often private information. We consider an environmental policy that delegates the prices-versus-quantities decision to the firms by offering them the choice between an emissions tax and permit trading. Such an approach is currently used in Swiss climate policy. We provide a detailed characterization of the optimal policy and show that this approach reduces expected social costs compared to a pure tax or permit-trading regime. We demonstrate that an optimal allocation of firms to instruments can be achieved despite substantial informational constraints, and that all firms gain from the introduction of the instrument choice compared to optimally designed single-instrument policies. Furthermore, we discuss the conditions under which this approach is likely to be preferable to a hybrid regulation.     

Tax versus emissions trading scheme in the long run

In this paper we compare the performance of emission taxes and tradable permits under free market entry when firms face idiosyncratic ex ante cost uncertainty. We show that under auctioned permits insufficient entry occurs, while under a linear emission tax scheme, depending on parameters, market entry can be either excessive or insufficient. Our long-run analysis thus contrasts with Spulber׳s (1985) equivalence result and also modifies Weitzman׳s result in favor of an ETS in that the superiority of a tax over an ETS is not guaranteed, even when the Weitzman condition favors a tax. We also show that an ETS is superior to a tax scheme when the entry cost is low and the magnitude of uncertainty/asymmetric information and the size of the output market are large.     

Directing technical change from fossil-fuel to renewable energy innovation: An application using firm-level patent data

In this paper we provide an analysis of directed technical change in the sector of electricity generation. We rely on patent data in fossil-fuel (FF) and renewable energy (REN) technologies for 5471 European firms over the 1978–2006 period. The novelty of our approach is in the focus on firm׳s heterogeneity in driving technological change. We make a distinction between small specialized firms, which innovate in only one type of technology, and large mixed firms, which innovate in both technologies, to analyse how REN patents can replace FF ones at the sector level both through a shift in innovation activities within existing firms and through firms׳ entry and exit. We use zero-inflated count data estimation techniques to identify the factors that affect specialized versus mixed firms׳ patenting behaviour both at the intensive (i.e., levels of innovation) and extensive (i.e., technological entry) margins. We further investigate the implications of our firm-level estimations for reducing the gap between REN and FF innovation at the aggregate level. We establish two key findings: (1) a decrease in the FF-REN technology gap mainly comes about through technological entry of specialized REN firms following an increase in REN market size; (2) increases in FF prices, FF market size, and FF knowledge stocks all increase the technology gap by increasing mixed firms FF innovation rates. An important implication of our results is that policies aimed at increasing REN innovation should focus on helping small firms to start and sustain innovation in the long-run.     

Tell the truth or not? The montero mechanism for emissions control at work

We experimentally test the truth-telling mechanism proposed by Montero (2008) for eliciting firms' abatement costs. We compare this mechanism with two well-known alternative allocation mechanisms, free and costly allocation of permits at the Pigouvian price. Controlling for the number of firms and the firms' maximal emissions, we find that, in line with the theoretical predictions, firms over-report their maximal emissions under free allocation of permits and under-report these under costly allocation of permits. Under Montero's mechanism, by contrast, firms almost always report their maximal emissions truthfully. However, in terms of efficiency, the difference between Montero's mechanism and costly allocation disappears with industries including more than one firm.     

Environmental policies and productivity growth: Evidence across industries and firms

This paper investigates the impact of changes in environmental policy stringency on industry- and firm-level productivity growth in a panel of OECD countries. To test the strong version of the Porter Hypothesis (PH), we extend a neo-Schumpeterian productivity model to allow for effects of environmental policies. We use a new environmental policy stringency (EPS) index and let the effect of countries׳ environmental policies vary with the pollution intensity of the industry and with the countries’ and firms’ technological advancement. A tightening of environmental policy is associated with a short-term increase in industry-level productivity growth in the most technologically-advanced countries. This effect diminishes with the distance to the global productivity frontier, eventually becoming insignificant. For the average firm, no evidence of PH is found. However, the most productive firms see a temporary boost in productivity growth, while the less productive ones experience a productivity slowdown.     

Corporate governance and green innovation

We study the relationship between corporate governance and firms׳ environmental innovation. Exploiting changes in antitakeover legislation in the US, we show that worse governed firms generate fewer green patents relative to all their innovations. This negative effect is greater for firms with a smaller share of institutional ownership, with a smaller stock of green patents, and with more binding financial constraints. Investigating regulatory and industry variations, we also find more pronounced effects for firms operating in states with lower pollution abatement costs, and in sectors less dependent on energy inputs. Overall, our results suggest that ineffective corporate governance may constitute a major obstacle to environmental efficiency.     

A Model of Intertemporal Emission Trading, Banking, and Borrowing

This paper provides a general treatment of emission trading, banking, and borrowing in an intertemporal, continuous-time model. Using optimal-control theory, the decentralized behavior of firms is shown to lead to the least-cost solution attainable under joint-cost minimization. Explicit solutions for the time paths of emissions and permit prices are derived when firms are allowed to both bank and borrow and when firms are only allowed to bank emission permits. The policy implications of emission banking and borrowing are discussed.     

Risk aversion and CO2 regulatory uncertainty in power generation investment: Policy and modeling implications

We consider a simulation of risk-averse producers when making investment decisions in a competitive energy market, who face uncertainty about future regulation of carbon dioxide emissions. Investments are made under regulatory uncertainty; then the regulatory state is revealed and producers realize returns. We consider anticipated taxes, grandfathered permits and auctioned permits and show that some anticipated policies increase investment in the relatively dirty technology. Beliefs about the policy instrument that will be used to price carbon may be as important as certainty that carbon will be priced. More generally, a failure to consider risk aversion may bias policy analysis for the power sector.     

Optimal policy instruments for externality-producing durable goods under present bias

When consumers exhibit present bias, the standard solution to market failures caused by externalities—Pigouvian pricing—is suboptimal. I investigate policies aimed at externalities for present-biased consumers. Optimal policy includes an instrument to correct the externality and an instrument to correct the present bias. Either instrument can be an incentive-based policy (e.g. a tax on fuel economy) or a command-and-control policy (e.g. a fuel economy mandate). Under consumer heterogeneity, a command-and-control policy may dominate an incentive-based policy. Calibrated to the US automobile market, simulation results suggest that the second-best gasoline tax is 3–30% higher than marginal external damages. The optimal price policy includes a gasoline tax set about equal to marginal external damages and a fuel economy tax that increases the price of an average non-hybrid car by about $550–$2200 relative to the price of an average hybrid car.     

Optimal environmental policy for waste disposal and recycling when firms are not compliant

We investigate a model that considers disposal and recycling activities after the consumption of products. In the field, the deposit–refund (D–R) policy has been considered as an ideal policy for internalizing disposal costs, which can result in the realization of the first-best policy. However, the possibility of firms' illegal disposal has been neglected. We introduce a monitoring cost to prevent firms from disposing of collected residuals illegally and induce the second-best D–R policy. We find that the relation between the monitoring problem for firms and the price of the recycling market brings about a variation in the optimal level of the refunds (which is typically smaller than the first-best level). Further, we investigate an alternative policy that requires producers to take-back residuals and show how this policy works equivalently to the second-best D–R policy by applying the theory of the tradable rights market.     

Green,greener, greenest: Eco-label gradation and competition

This paper analyzes two common features of markets in which eco-label programs certify that products are “green”: gradation—single programs offering multiple certification standards (e.g., platinum, gold, silver)—and competition—multiple programs vying to certify to their respective standards. We find that, depending on whether programs are sponsored by industry, environmental groups, or a government, they have strikingly different incentives to grade or compete. Industry sponsors are indifferent about both; environmentalist sponsors optimally grade or compete with other environmentalist sponsors only if consumer preferences for green consumption are skewed in a specific way; and government sponsors׳ decisions depend on the relative importance of private vs. public benefits generated by the green market. We find also that it is no accident that green markets frequently have an environmentalist program competing with an industry one. For each of the cases examined, our analysis is consistent with casual empirical evidence.     

On optimal audit mechanisms for environmental taxes

We consider the auditing problem of an environmental enforcement agency with fixed audit resources: How to decide which firms to audit after having observed the firms' taxable emissions reports. The goal of the agency is to implement the socially efficient emissions level. The audit mechanism is the agency's sole choice variable, while other variables such as the tax rate on emissions and the fine for non-compliance are determined by other governmental actors. The fines and budget of the agency are constrained in such a way that the common random audit mechanism fails to implement socially efficient emissions. Assuming perfect information among the firms, we derive an optimal audit mechanism capable of implementing the socially efficient emissions level. The optimal audit mechanism creates a contest exploiting the strategic interdependencies between the firms, where the probability of winning (not being audited) for each firm depends on costly efforts (their taxable emissions reports).     

The social welfare implications of industry self-auditing

The Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA's) audit policy authorizes reduced penalties for firms that voluntarily undertake compliance audits and then correct and report any discovered violations to the agency. While the EPA claims the policy is a success, this paper joins a growing literature in questioning that claim. A game-theoretic model of the audit policy is developed where the goal of enforcement is remediation and the agency is unable to commit to a pre-announced inspection policy. Self-auditing is beneficial because it permits both self-reporting and self-policing to occur; however additional costs are imposed on firms. Self-auditing is more likely to be socially beneficial when the damages caused by violations are large. The current audit policy explicitly excludes violations that result in serious actual or potential harm. When violations are small, as most current disclosures under the audit policy are, firm self-auditing is likely to increase social costs.     

The environment as a factor of production

This paper uses firm-level data about electric utilities to develop an empirical model of how electric utilities use and bank SO₂ pollution permits under the Acid Rain Program. The empirical model considers emissions, fuels, and labor as variable inputs with quasi-fixed stocks of permits and capital. Consequently, substitution possibilities between the environment and other production factors can be measured and tested. The results reveal substantial substitution between emissions, permit stocks, capital, fuel, and labor. The empirical findings also indicate that firms bank permits primarily as a hedge against uncertainty and for other firm-specific reasons. Overall, the results suggest that cap-and-trade approaches can reduce the cost of meeting environmental goals by providing a mechanism for addressing regulatory and market risks and by signaling an appropriate price for factor use, especially irreversible capital investments.     

The environment as a factor of production

This paper uses firm-level data about electric utilities to develop an empirical model of how electric utilities use and bank SO₂ pollution permits under the Acid Rain Program. The empirical model considers emissions, fuels, and labor as variable inputs with quasi-fixed stocks of permits and capital. Consequently, substitution possibilities between the environment and other production factors can be measured and tested. The results reveal substantial substitution between emissions, permit stocks, capital, fuel, and labor. The empirical findings also indicate that firms bank permits primarily as a hedge against uncertainty and for other firm-specific reasons. Overall, the results suggest that cap-and-trade approaches can reduce the cost of meeting environmental goals by providing a mechanism for addressing regulatory and market risks and by signaling an appropriate price for factor use, especially irreversible capital investments.     

Green clubs

This paper treats programs in which firms voluntarily agree to meet environmental standards as “green clubs”: clubs, because they provide non-rival but excludable reputation benefits to participating firms; green, because they also generate environmental public goods. The model illuminates a central tension between the congestion externality familiar from conventional club theory and the free-riding externality familiar from the theory on private provision of public goods. We compare three common program sponsors—governments, industry, and environmental groups. We find that if monitoring of the club standard is perfect, a government constrained from regulating club size may prefer to leave sponsorship to industry if public-good benefits are sufficiently low, or to environmentalists if public-good benefits are sufficiently high. If monitoring is imperfect, an important question is whether consumers can infer that a club is too large for its standard to be credible. If they can then the government may deliberately choose an imperfect monitoring mechanism as a way of regulating club size indirectly. If they cannot then this reinforces the government's preference for delegating sponsorship.     

Comparing policies to confront permit over-allocation

Instability in cap-and-trade markets, particularly with respect to permit price collapses, has been an area of concern for regulators. To that end, several policies, including hybrid price-quantity mechanisms and the newly introduced “market stability reserve” (MSR) systems, have been introduced and even implemented in some cases. I develop a stochastic dynamic model of a cap-and-trade system, parameterized to values relevant to the European Union׳s Emission Trading System (EU ETS) to analyze the performance of these policies aimed at adding stability to the system or at least at reducing perceived over-allocations of permits. Results suggest that adaptive-allocation mechanisms such as a price collar or MSR can reduce permit over-allocations and permit price volatility in a more cost-effective manner than simply reducing scheduled permit allocations. However, it is also found that the performance of these adaptive allocation policies, and in particular the MSR, are greatly affected by assumed discount rates and policy parameters.     

Environmental policy with upstream pollution abatement technology firms

This paper examines how the existence of an upstream abatement technology sector affects optimal environmental policy. We explore whether the policy should be especially stringent in order to spur a successful export industry based on abatement technology. Furthermore, we investigate if a stringent policy can be used to increase competition in the upstream sector. Our point of departure is a three-stage game between a government in a country with a polluting downstream industry, and a limited number of upstream firms supplying abatement technologies. The government moves first, and may use its environmental policy strategically to influence the behavior of the upstream technology firms. We find that an especially stringent environmental policy towards the polluting downstream sector may be well founded, as it increases competition between the technology suppliers, leading to lower abatement costs. However, to our surprise, an especially stringent environmental policy is not a particularly good industrial policy with respect to developing successful new export sectors based on abatement technology.     

The effect of competition on toxic pollution releases

We examine how competition affects toxic industrial releases, using five years of data from thousands of facilities across hundreds of industries. Our main result indicates that competition reduces toxic releases at the facility level. On average, each percentage-point reduction in the Herfindahl Index (HHI) results in a nearly two-percent reduction in a facility׳s toxic releases. At the same time, we find no evidence that competition increases aggregate pollution. Further analysis sheds some light on the mechanisms through which firms reduce pollution releases due to increased competition. In particular, we find suggestive evidence that this relationship is due to both reduced output and increases in abatement. We find no evidence that our result is driven by: consumer aversion to pollution, regulations changing with competition, or technologies introduced by new firms. Taken together, our results indicate that competition may be good, at least for public health in areas near polluting facilities, and fail to provide support for the hypothesis that competition leads to more socially undesirable behavior.