Role of competition in phytoplankton population for the occurrence and control of plankton bloom in the presence of environmental fluctuations

Termination of harmful algal blooms (HABs) and coexistence of phytoplankton–zooplankton populations are of great importance to human health, ecosystem, environment, tourism and fisheries. In this paper, we propose a three component model consisting of non-toxic phytoplankton (NTP), toxin producing phytoplankton (TPP) and zooplankton (Z). The growth of zooplankton species is assume to reduce due to toxic chemicals released by TPP population. We have extended the model proposed by Chattopadhyay et al. [Chattopadhyay, J., Sarkar, R.R., Pal, S., 2004. Mathematical modelling of harmful algal blooms supported by experimental findings. Ecol. Comp. 1, 225–235] by including competition terms between TPP and NTP. We observe the effect of competition factors both in the presence and absence of the environmental fluctuation. From our field as well as model analysis we observe that competition helps in the coexistence of the species, but if the effect of competition is very high on the TPP population, it results in planktonic bloom. It is shown that the coexistence equilibrium loses its stability when the competition coefficient crosses a critical value and resulting Hopf-bifurcation around the positive equilibrium depicting oscillations phenomena of the populations.     

Corruption, political competition and environmental policy

This paper examines the interplay between corruption, political competition, environmental policy and environmental outcomes. An important feature of the model, which has been neglected in the existing literature, is that corruption may occur at different levels of government, such as the payment of bribes to politicians who determine policies, or bureaucrats who administer environmental regulations. We analyse the relationship between political competition and environmental outcomes in a model of stratified corruption and identify the benefits and limits of political competition. Our results suggest that while political competition may yield policy improvements, it cannot eliminate corruption at all levels of government.     

Strategic pollution control and capital tax competition

In an analytical model of symmetric countries with mobile capital and local or transboundary pollution we investigate whether competition in emissions taxes (or emissions caps) and capital taxes leads to efficient outcomes when governments act strategically. When they have capital taxes and emissions caps at their disposal, they refrain from taxing capital and set their caps inefficiently lax [efficient] for transboundary [local] pollution. When they have the option to tax capital and emissions, capital is subsidized [untaxed] and emissions taxes are inefficiently low [efficient] for transboundary [local] pollution. In case of transboundary pollution emissions caps are Pareto-superior to emissions taxes. That holds regardless of whether the environmental policy is applied as stand-alone policy or combined with capital tax competition.     

Transitional politics: emerging incentive-based instruments in environmental regulation

This paper proposes a positive theory of environmental instrument choice. We study a democratic society that seeks to lower the level of pollution from industrial sources to a pre-specified target. The target can be implemented by one of three instruments: [S]: uniform emission standards; [P]: tradeable permits; and [T]: emission taxes. The conflict of interest between special-interests, representing polluters, and the electorate is resolved by an elected politician. We characterize when each of the three policy instruments is chosen in political equilibrium and show that the transition, observed in many countries, from [S] to either [P] or [T] can be understood as a natural consequence of increasingly ambitious environmental targets.     

Is Chinese trade policy motivated by environmental concerns?

This paper analyses whether China's export VAT rebates and export taxes are driven by environmental concerns. Since China struggles to enforce environmental regulation, trade policy can be used as a second-best environmental policy. In a general equilibrium model it is possible to show that the second-best export tax increases in a product's pollution intensity. The empirical analysis investigates whether the export tax equivalent of partial VAT rebates and export taxes are higher for products which are more pollution intensive along several dimensions. The results indicate that the VAT rebate rates are set in a way that discourages exports of water pollution intensive, SO₂ intensive and energy intensive products from 2007 on. Moreover, the conservation of natural resources such as minerals, metals, wood products and precious stones seems to be a key determinant of China's export VAT rebate rates. There is little evidence that export taxes are motivated by environmental concerns.     

Remanufacturing

This paper presents a theoretical model of remanufacturing where a duopoly of original manufacturers produces a component of a final good. The specific component that needs to be replaced during the lifetime of the final good creates a secondary market where independent remanufacturers enter the competition. An environmental regulation imposing a minimum level of remanufacturability is also introduced. The main results establish that, while collusion of the firms on the level of remanufacturability increases both profit and consumer surplus, a social planner could use collusion as a substitute for an environmental regulation. However, if an environmental regulation is to be implemented, collusion should be repressed since competition supports the public intervention better. Under certain circumstances, the environmental regulation can increase both profit and consumer surplus. Part of this result supports the Porter Hypothesis, which stipulates that industries respecting environmental regulations can see their profits increase.     

Optimal exploitation of a fishery employing a non-linear harvesting function

A harvesting function is developed to described the rate of removal of fish from a fish population. The function incorporates the effects of both the handling or processing time of the catch and the competition, between boats in the fleet, for the fish.We will assume that the growth rate of the fish population can be modelled with a concave, dome shaped growth curve. With this assumption, it has been shown that if the rate of harvesting the fish is linearly related to both effort (which can be thought of as some measure of the number of boats in the fleet) and the population size, then the population will tend towards a single equilibrium level which is globally stable. This paper shows that the saturation effects due to the handling time may generate two equilibrium levels (one stable, one unstable) rather than a single globally stable equilibrium. The results of competition between boats are economically undesirable because of the decrease in efficiency. However, this competition may be beneficial to the exploited fish population.Using the harvesting model derived earlier, the steady state or long term optimal harvesting policies as well as the transition paths to these states are developed. The only constraint is on the maximum allowable effort which is effectively an upper limitation on the fleet size or number of man-hours of fishing.     

Remanufacturing

This paper presents a theoretical model of remanufacturing where a duopoly of original manufacturers produces a component of a final good. The specific component that needs to be replaced during the lifetime of the final good creates a secondary market where independent remanufacturers enter the competition. An environmental regulation imposing a minimum level of remanufacturability is also introduced. The main results establish that, while collusion of the firms on the level of remanufacturability increases both profit and consumer surplus, a social planner could use collusion as a substitute for an environmental regulation. However, if an environmental regulation is to be implemented, collusion should be repressed since competition supports the public intervention better. Under certain circumstances, the environmental regulation can increase both profit and consumer surplus. Part of this result supports the Porter Hypothesis, which stipulates that industries respecting environmental regulations can see their profits increase.     

A mechanistic model of a mutualism and its ecological and evolutionary dynamics

This paper develops a mechanistic model of the population dynamics and coevolution of mutualisms such as plants and mycorrhizae where one resource is traded for another resource. The mechanism is based on limiting resources and is derived from von Liebig's law of the minimum [von Liebig, 1862, Die Chemie in irher Anwendung auf Agricultur und Physiologie. 7e ed. F. Vieweg und Sohn, Braunschwieg] and Tilman's R* [Tilman, D., 1980, Resources: a graphical-mechanistic approach to competition and predation, Am. Nat. 116, 362–393]. The model makes several predictions: (1) resource limitations cause mutualisms to have stable population dynamics, despite previous predictions to the contrary, (2) game-theory based models of evolution show that potential coevolving mutualists face a Prisoner's-dilemma-like paradox, rigorously confirming the intuition of many people and (3) a mechanism which enforces fair-trade will eliminate the dilemma and a mutualism will evolve, despite having no gene flow between the species.     

Heterogeneous firms and the environment: a cap-and-trade program

Currently, cap-and-trade programs are a cornerstone of many countries' climate change policies and proposals. This paper investigates the economic and environmental effects of different climate change policy designs in a general equilibrium setting with heterogeneous firms and monopolistic competition. The analysis predicts that the cap on emissions perfectly defines the environmental quality but has no effect on firms' profits, or decisions to enter or exit the market. In contrast, increasing the share of free allocations of emission allowances, as opposed to auctions, has no effect on environmental quality but reallocates resources among firms toward the most productive ones which has an impact on firms' entry and exit decisions, the mass of firms, and the composition of the market. Firm heterogeneity magnifies these economic effects of changes in the initial allocation of allowances. The paper provides a decomposition of the change in aggregate emissions which takes account of the changes at sector level, across the firms within a sector, and at the firm level.     

Test of a behavior-based individual-based model: response of shorebird mortality to habitat loss.

In behavior-based individual-based models (IBMs), demographic functions are emergent properties of the model and are not built into the model structure itself, as is the case with the more widely used demography-based IBMs. Our behavior-based IBM represents the physiology and behavioral decision making of individual animals and, from that, predicts how many survive the winter nonbreeding season, an important component of fitness. This paper provides the first test of such a model by predicting the change in winter mortality of a charadriid shorebird following removal of intertidal feeding habitat, the main effect of which was to increase bird density. After adjusting one calibration parameter to the level required to replicate the observed mortality rate before habitat loss, the model predicted that mortality would increase by 3.65%, which compares well with the observed increase of 3.17%. The implication that mortality was density-dependent was confirmed by predicting mortality over a range of bird densities. Further simulations showed that the density dependence was due to an increase in both interference and depletion competition as bird density increased. Other simulations suggested that an additional area of mudflat, equivalent to only 10% of the area that had been lost, would be needed by way of mitigation to return mortality to its original level. Being situated at a high shore level with the flow of water in and out impeded by inlet pipes, the mitigating mudflat would be accessible to birds when all mudflats in the estuary were covered at high tide, thus providing the birds with extra feeding time and not just a small replacement mudflat. Apart from providing the first, and confidence-raising, test of a behavior-based IBM, the results suggest (1) that the chosen calibration procedure was effective; (2) that where no new fieldwork is required, and despite being parameter rich, a behavior-based IBM can be parameterized quickly (few weeks), and thus cheaply, because so many of the parameter values can be obtained from the literature and are embedded in the model; and (3) that behavior-based IBMs can be used to explore system behavior (e.g., the role of depletion competition and interference competition in density-dependent mortality).     

绿色食品生产补偿的理论机理与政策设计

制约我国绿色食品发展的重要因素之一是其生态环境成本难以通过市场来兑现。为解决这一问题,文章以生态补偿为突破口,首先从理论上明确绿色食品生产具有正外部性,政府对其生产企业或农户进行补偿具有合理性和必要性,然后进一步探讨其制度构建与政策设计。（1）构建一个包括政府、生产者、消费者三方的博弈模型,着重分析绿色食品供需过程中、政府影响下生产者和消费者的利益动机和博弈行为。模型结果显示,存在能够满足绿色食品供需平衡的1个纯战略纳什均衡解和1个混合战略纳什均衡解,这两个纳什均衡解的实现条件均要求政府对绿色食品生产者提供补偿和对消费者实施优惠政策。（2）利用C-D生产函数建构的利润函数和恢复费用法探讨绿色食品生产补偿标准范围,结果表明最低补偿标准应满足生产者生产绿色食品和生产普通食品利润相等,而最高补偿标准则应对绿色食品生产中创造的环境效益进行支付。（3）文章最后从“建立经济政策支持体系,构筑科技进步支撑体系,完善品牌质量保障体系,培育产业化生产体系”等4方面提出了现阶段我国绿色食品生产补偿的政策建议。     

Metric-topological interaction model of collective behavior

Many simulations of collective behavior have been presented in recent years. Recently, a pioneering study by [Ballerini et al., 2008a] and [Ballerini et al., 2008b] suggested that the interactions of birds in a flock should be modeled using the topological distance rather than the metric distance. The concept of topological distance is deemed important for explaining collective behavior. However, few studies have discussed the distinctions between the metric and topological distances. In this paper, we clarify the difference between models based on the topological and metric distances and propose a new hybrid model of these models. The agent of our model switches between these two interactions by tuning the threshold parameters. We show that this hybrid flocking model has the medium property between the metric and the topological distance. In other words, the agents of our hybrid model can dramatically make and divide flock by tuning their neighborhoods. This result suggests that making and dividing flock would be deeply connected with animal's cognition.     

Asymmetric larval competition in the parasitoid wasp <Emphasis Type="Italic">Nasonia vitripennis</Emphasis>: a role in sex allocation?

Sex allocation theory offers excellent opportunities for testing how animals adjust their behaviour in response to environmental conditions. A major focus has been on instances of local mate competition (LMC), where female-biased broods are produced to maximise mating opportunities for sons. However, the predictions of LMC theory can be altered if there is both local competition for resources during development and an asymmetry between the competitive abilities of the sexes, as has been seen in animals ranging from wasps to birds. In this paper, we test the extent to which asymmetric larval competition alters the predictions of LMC theory in the parasitoid wasp Nasonia vitripennis. We found that the body size of both sexes was negatively correlated with the number of offspring developing within the host. Further, we found that when faced with high levels of competition, the body size of females, but not males, was influenced by the sex ratio of the competing offspring; females were smaller when a higher proportion of the brood was female. This asymmetric competition should favour less biased sex ratios than are predicted by standard LMC theory. We then develop a theoretical model that can be parameterised with our data, allowing us to determine the quantitative consequences of the observed level of asymmetric larval competition for sex allocation. We found that although asymmetric competition selects for less biased sex ratios, this effect is negligible compared to LMC. Furthermore, a similar conclusion is reached when we re-analyse existing data from another parasitoid species where asymmetric larval competition has been observed; Bracon hebetor. Consequently, we suspect that asymmetric larval competition will have its greatest influence on sex ratio evolution in species that have smaller clutches and where local mate competition is not an issue, such as birds and mammals.     

Cap-and-trade properties under different hybrid scheme designs

This paper examines the key design mechanisms of existing and proposed cap-and-trade markets. First, it is shown that the hybrid systems under investigation (price floor using a minimum price guarantee, price collar, allowance reserve, options offered by the regulator, and offset relaxation) can be decomposed into a combination of an ordinary cap-and-trade scheme with European- or American-style call and put options. Then, we quantify and discuss the advantages and disadvantages of the proposed hybrid schemes by investigating whether pre-set objectives (enforcement of permit price bounds and reduction of the compliance costs for relevant companies) can be accomplished while maintaining the original environmental targets. Plain vanilla options are proposed as an alternative that reconciles the otherwise conflicting policy objectives.     

The response of the woodpigeon (Columba palumbus) to relaxation of intraspecific competition: A hybrid modelling approach

The recent rapid growth of the woodpigeon population in the British Isles is a cause for concern for environmental managers. It is unclear what has driven their increase in abundance. Using a mathematical model, we explored two possible mechanisms, reduced intraspecific competition for food and increased reproductive success. We developed an age-structured hybrid model consisting of a system of ordinary differential equations that describes density-dependent mortality and a discrete component, which represents the birth-pulse. We investigated equilibrium population dynamics using our model. The two hypotheses predict contrasting population age profiles at equilibrium. We adapted the model to examine the impacts of control measures. We showed that an annual shooting season that follows the period of density-dependent mortality is the most effective control strategy because it simultaneously removes adult and juvenile woodpigeons. The model is a first step towards understanding the processes that influence the dynamics of woodpigeon populations.     

Environmental Legislation and Enforcement: A Voting Model under Asymmetric Information

This paper examines the effects of asymmetric voter information on the environmental policies of democratic governments. The model builds on the electoral signaling model of Rogoff to illustrate the possibility that democratic governments may systematically overlegislate-and yet underenforce-environmental standards in a rational expectations equilibrium. The model also offers insights into the welfare implications of "right to know" legislation, proposals to depoliticize environmental policy, and private voluntary institutions.     

Derived decision rules for pollution control in a general equilibrium space economy

This paper attempts to narrow the gap between economic theory and policy inthe field of environmental pollution control by expanding the traditional general equilibrium model to include the kind of spatial detail that is important for describing pollution. This model is then used to derive theorems which provide the basis for the development of spatially differentiated, tax-based decision rules. In spite of the fact that these rules require no information on either damage costs or control costs, they maintain many of the desirable properties of the more conventional informationally intensive tax policies.