Negative Off‐Site Impacts of Ecological Restoration: Understanding and Addressing the Conflict

Abstract: Ecological restoration is a key component of biological conservation. Nevertheless, unlike protection of existing areas, restoration changes existing land use and can therefore be more controversial. Some restoration projects negatively affect surrounding landowners, creating social constraints to restoration success. Just as negative off‐site impacts (i.e., negative externalities) flow from industrial areas to natural areas, restoration projects can generate negative externalities for commercial land uses, such as agriculture. Negative externalities from industry have led to government regulation to prevent human health and environmental impacts. Negative externalities from restoration projects have elicited similar legal constraint on at least one large‐scale conservation project, riparian restoration in the Sacramento River Conservation Area. The negative externalities of restoration that are perceived to be the direct result of specific goals, such as endangered species management, are likely to be more contentious than externalities arising from unintended phenomena such as weed invasion. Restoration planners should give equal consideration to off‐site characteristics as to on‐site characteristics when choosing sites for restoration and designing projects. Efforts to control externalities can lead to off‐site ecological benefits.     

Time delay,complexity and support for taxation

People often experience the benefits of taxation over time. We design an intertemporal market experiment with negative externalities to examine how delaying the benefits of taxation affects support for taxes. We find that when negative externalities occur immediately, people learn to adopt Pigouvian taxes, which are aimed at reducing negative externalities and restoring market efficiency. By contrast, when negative externalities are delayed, people are less receptive to taxation. This effect persists over time. Our data reveal that the strong negative delay effect can be explained in large part by narrow bracketing and the increased perceived complexity of the environment, rather than by time discounting per-se. We argue and demonstrate that increasing the transparency of intertemporal tradeoffs can effectively promote support for taxation.     

Does the presence of wind turbines have negative externalities for people in their surroundings? Evidence from well-being data

Throughout the world, governments foster the deployment of wind power to mitigate negative externalities of conventional electricity generation, notably CO₂ emissions. Wind turbines, however, are not free of externalities themselves, particularly interference with landscape aesthetics. We quantify these negative externalities using the life satisfaction approach. To this end, we combine household data from the German Socio-Economic Panel Study (SOEP) with a novel panel dataset on over 20,000 installations. Based on geographical coordinates and construction dates, we establish causality in a difference-in-differences design. Matching techniques drawing on exogenous weather data and geographical locations of residence ensure common trend behaviour. We show that the construction of wind turbines close to households exerts significant negative external effects on residential well-being, although they seem both spatially and temporally limited, being restricted to about 4000 m around households and decaying after five years at the latest. Robustness checks, including view shed analyses based on digital terrain models and placebo regressions, confirm our results.     

Dispersal, pair formation and social structure in gibbons (Hylobates lar)

We report observations on reproduction, natal dispersal, pair formation, and group structure based on longitudinal observations of several white-handed gibbon (Hylobates lar) groups spanning 18 years. Our observations are at odds with the traditional view that gibbons live in nuclear family groups consisting of a pair of adults and their offspring, and that parents exclude young from the family territory when they reach adult size. In the relatively dense Khao Yai study population, dispersing young usually obtain mates by replacing adults in existing territories, which creates non-nuclear families. Six subadults, five males and one female, matured and dispersed at an average age of 10 years, or about 2 years after reaching adult size. Average natal dispersal distance was 710 m, or between one and two territories away. At least two dispersing males replaced adults in neighboring groups. In one case, forcible displacement of the resident male resulted in a group which included a young juvenile presumably fathered by the previous male, two younger juveniles (probably brothers) from the new male's original group, and (later) offspring of the new pair. Social relations within this heterogeneous group remained harmonious: the adults groomed all the young and play occurred between all preadult members. In only two out of a total of seven cases of dispersal seen did two subadults pair and disperse into new territorial space. Nonreproducing subadults which delay dispersal may be tolerated by the adults provided that they contribute benefits to the adults or their offspring. Possible benefits include behaviors such as grooming, social play with juveniles, and support of the adult male in defending the territory. Delayed dispersal is probably advantageous in a saturated environment where there is no room for floaters, but subadults may also gain indirect fitness benefits by aiding siblings and other relatives. Received: 24 January 1997 / Accepted after revision: 12 January 1998     

International environmental agreements with support

We augment the standard cartel formation game from non-cooperative coalition theory, often applied in the context of international environmental agreements, with the possibility that singletons support coalition formation without becoming coalition members themselves. We assume their support takes the form of a monetary transfer to the coalition, in order to induce larger coalitions, higher levels of public good provision and higher payoffs. We show that, under mild conditions on the costs and benefits of contributing to the public good (e.g. abatement of greenhouse gas emissions), there exist equilibria with support. Allowing for support increases payoffs to each of three types of agents: members, supporters and free-riders.     

Green clubs

This paper treats programs in which firms voluntarily agree to meet environmental standards as “green clubs”: clubs, because they provide non-rival but excludable reputation benefits to participating firms; green, because they also generate environmental public goods. The model illuminates a central tension between the congestion externality familiar from conventional club theory and the free-riding externality familiar from the theory on private provision of public goods. We compare three common program sponsors—governments, industry, and environmental groups. We find that if monitoring of the club standard is perfect, a government constrained from regulating club size may prefer to leave sponsorship to industry if public-good benefits are sufficiently low, or to environmentalists if public-good benefits are sufficiently high. If monitoring is imperfect, an important question is whether consumers can infer that a club is too large for its standard to be credible. If they can then the government may deliberately choose an imperfect monitoring mechanism as a way of regulating club size indirectly. If they cannot then this reinforces the government's preference for delegating sponsorship.     

Do meerkat (<Emphasis Type="Italic">Suricata suricatta</Emphasis>) pups exhibit strategic begging behaviour and so exploit adults that feed at relatively high rates?

Adults vary in their generosity in provisioning the young and their sensitivity to the need of the young. Do the young modulate their behaviour so as to specifically target more high-provisioning adults? This is especially likely in situations with mobile, nutritionally dependent young. We studied cooperatively breeding meerkats Suricata suricatta, in which pups beg to parents and other adults in the group. We found that the young begged differently when next to different adults and that they are consistent in how they beg when next to each adult. Pups next to adults that provision at high rates beg at higher rates and spend longer with them, and these adults are generally more sensitive to increases in begging rate. Such behaviour has adaptive benefits to offspring in terms of increased likelihood of being fed. However, offspring do not appear to be actively seeking out high-provisioning adults or increasing their begging behaviour when they encounter one. Pups did not appear to actively discriminate between adults in their association or begging behaviour. We suggest instead that the relationship between an adult's relative contribution to pup feeding and the behaviour of its accompanying pup is driven by adult behaviour, with responsive adults that feed pups at a relatively higher rate preferentially associating with fast-begging hungry pups.     

Reputation is valuable within and outside one’s own social group

To find conditions under which humans cooperate within groups of unrelated individuals has been of major interest in the behavioral sciences. The experimental paradigm for studying potential cooperation in social dilemmas is the public goods game. Here humans regularly fail to sustain a public resource cooperatively. However, the need to maintain good reputation for other social interactions, such as indirect reciprocity, has been identified as an effective mechanism to sustain cooperation in public goods situations. As a side effect of building a good reputation through cooperative actions, an individual provides direct benefits to members of his/her own social group. These benefits could be an incentive to reward a good reputation of group members. Here we show experimentally that building a good reputation through cooperative behavior in a public goods situation is rewarded in future social interactions, not only within ones own social group but also, at a similar level, in other social groups: humans regard cooperative behavior of others as an honest signal irrespective of past direct personal benefits. Reputation gained within as well as outside ones own social group can be a driving force for selfish individuals to cooperate in public goods situations, and thereby sustain any public resource.Communicated by T. Czeschlik     

Two roads to two sexes: unifying gamete competition and gamete limitation in a single model of anisogamy evolution

Recent studies have revealed the importance of self-consistency in evolutionary models, particularly in the context of male–female interactions. This has been largely ignored in models of the ancestral divergence of the sexes, i.e., the evolution of anisogamy. Here, we model the evolution of anisogamy in a Fisher-consistent context, explicitly taking into account the number of interacting individuals in a typical reproductive group. We reveal an interaction between the number of adult individuals in the local mating group and the selection pressures responsible for the divergence of the sexes. The same underlying model can produce anisogamy in two different ways. Gamete competition can lead to anisogamy when it is relatively easy for gametes to find each other, but when this is more difficult and gamete competition is absent, gamete limitation can provide another route for anisogamy to evolve. In line with earlier models, organismal complexity favors anisogamy. We argue that the early contributions of Kalmus and Scudo, largely dismissed as group selectionist, are valid under certain conditions. Linking their work with the contributions of Parker helps to explain why precisely males keep producing more sperm than can ever lead to offspring: sperm could evolve to provision zygotes but this brings little profit for the effort required, because sperm would have to be equipped with provisioning ability before it is known which sperm will make it to the fertilization stage. This insight creates a logical link between paternal care under uncertain paternity (where again investment is selected against when some investment never brings about genetic benefits) and gamete size evolution.     

Externalities,expectations, and pigouvian taxes

This article derives Pigouvian-type corrective measures for reciprocal externalities when non-Nash behavior characterizes the participants. These reciprocal externalities may involve various kinds of environmental pollutants, such as acid rain. A comparison between corrective measures for Nash and non-Nash behavior demonstrates that positive conjectures, regarding the other agent's externality-generating activity, have an expectation-internalizing influence that usually reduces the required corrective measures. Negative conjectures (e.g., free-riding expectations), however, have an expectation-externalizing effect that increases the required corrective measures. The article analyzes both two-person and n-person externalities.     

Valuing Ecosystem Services in Terms of Ecological Risks and Returns

Abstract: The economic valuation of ecosystem services is a key policy tool in stemming losses of biological diversity. It is proposed that the loss of ecosystem function and the biological resources within ecosystems is due in part to the failure of markets to recognize the benefits humans derive from ecosystems. Placing monetary values on ecosystem services is often suggested as a necessary step in correcting such market failures. We consider the effects of valuing different types of ecosystem services within an economic framework. We argue that provisioning and regulating ecosystem services are generally produced and consumed in ways that make them amenable to economic valuation. The values associated with cultural ecosystem services lie outside the domain of economic valuation, but their worth may be expressed through noneconomic, deliberative forms of valuation. We argue that supporting ecosystem services are not of direct value and that the losses of such services can be expressed in terms of the effects of their loss on the risk to the provision of the directly valued ecosystem services they support. We propose a heuristic framework that considers the relations between ecological risks and returns in the provision of ecosystem services. The proposed ecosystem‐service valuation framework, which allows the expression of the value of all types of ecosystem services, calls for a shift from static, purely monetary valuation toward the consideration of trade‐offs between the current flow of benefits from ecosystems and the ability of those ecosystems to provide future flows.     

Subordinate males are more likely to help if unrelated to the breeding female in cooperatively breeding white-browed scrubwrens

Subordinates in communally breeding groups of birds usually help to provision nestlings, but in some species helping-at-the-nest is facultative. In species in which groups usually contain relatives, subordinates either always feed young or are more likely to do so when breeding dominants are close relatives, suggesting that benefits of helping collateral kin are important. In other species, adult group members are unrelated to each other and males may only feed young if they have gained paternity, showing that cooperation is related to the mating system. The white-browed scrubwren, Sericornis frontalis, is a communally breeding species in which most groups consist of a simple pair or a dominant pair with a subordinate male. Subordinate males either fed nestlings in a given nest at a rate comparable to the dominants, or did not feed them at all. Breeding groups usually formed through natal philopatry of males, so that about 80% of subordinates were closely related to one or both members of the dominant pair. However, because of death and dispersal, 54% of subordinates were unrelated to the resident female. Although subordinates with their mother fed nestlings in 48% of cases, they fed offspring in 75% of cases if their mother had been replaced by an unrelated female, suggesting that their decision to help is influenced by the opportunity to mate with the female. Supporting this conclusion, relatedness to the dominant male did not affect subordinate behaviour, and genetic studies showed that subordinates often gained paternity if unrelated to the female. Thus, paradoxically, provisioning nestlings is related to the opportunity for mating in a society in which there is natal philopatry and subordinates are usually related to one or both members of the dominant pair. Received: 25 January 1997 / Accepted after revision: 1 May 1997     

Cooperative breeding increases reproductive success in the social spider <Emphasis Type="Italic">Stegodyphus dumicola</Emphasis> (Araneae,Eresidae)

Sociality in some birds, mammals, and social insects was suggested to have evolved through the lengthening and extension of parental care behaviors to nondirect descendents. In these systems, group members care for young cooperatively and, thus, increase the reproductive success of the breeders and fitness of the young. Parental care behaviors, such as regurgitation feeding and matriphagy (consumption of the mother), occur in several subsocial and social spiders. However, it is not known whether females in a colony cooperate in caring for the young of other females and whether such cooperative care improves reproductive success. To answer this question, we created experimental colonies of the social spider Stegodyphus dumicola (Araneae, Eresidae), allowing only one female in a group to produce young, simulating reproductive skew occurring in nests in nature. In this paper, we show for the first time that females of S. dumicola cooperate in providing regurgitated food for young of other females and are even eaten by those young. Young raised by a group of females were larger and had greater survival than young raised only by their mother. Thus, fitness benefits from raising broods cooperatively may have favored the evolution of sociality in spiders.     

Toward a delineation of the circumstances in which cooperation can be sustained in environmental and resource problems

Play in standard laboratory Public Good games suggests that on average, humans are quite prone to cooperate. Yet cooperation is often absent in real world social dilemmas, including many environmental problems. We propose that this discrepancy arises because in the Public Good game, the worst freeriders can do is to not contribute to the public account, while in many real world environmental situations freeriders can even appropriate contributions made by others before the public good is produced. We introduce the Claim Game that modifies the Public Good game by allowing for appropriating the contributions of others before the public good is produced. The impact of such possible takings on public good production is dramatic. No public good is produced, not even in the initial stages of interaction. We link our findings to the relevance of common pool games for modeling environmental problems, and stress the need to experimentally test environmental institutions within harsher social dilemmas than the standard Public Good game.     

Double-dipping in environmental markets

There is an increasing tendency to use markets to induce the provision of environmental services. As such markets increase in scope, potential market participants might sell multiple environmental services. The question we consider here is whether participants in such markets should be allowed to sell credits in more than one market simultaneously. Some have argued in favor of such “double-dipping”, because it would make the provision of environmental services more profitable. In practice however, most programs do not allow double-dipping. We show that if the optimal level of pollution abatement is sought, then double-dipping maximizes societal net benefits. However, if pollution policies are set in a piecemeal fashion, then the caps for each market are unlikely to be optimal and, in this second-best setting, a policy prohibiting double-dipping can lead to greater social net benefits. We explore conditions under which a single-market policy is preferred, or equivalently, where piecemeal policies are likely to yield particularly inefficient outcomes.     

A cultural model of private provision and the environment

This paper analyses an overlapping generations model of environmental externalities and capital accumulation where private contributions to environmental quality are motivated by a desire to socialize others into environmental attitudes. In this framework, the formation of environmental preferences is the result of a cultural transmission process depending on the extent of private contributions. In the short run, we show that three equilibria may arise: a first one where all green agents contribute to the environment, a second one where nobody contributes to the environment and a third interior one. We show that the capital-accumulation process and the change in preferences that occur in this economy lead the interior equilibrium to be selected, in which some, but not all, green agents contribute to the environment. The model thus provides an economic rationale for the gap between the number of people who care about the environment and the number who adopt pro-environmental behaviours. We also show that the fraction of contributors rises with capital, so that we explain the negative relationship between this gap and country income. Last, we show that this gap is particularly detrimental for welfare, and analyse the impact of a number of public policies.     

Is boldness affected by group composition in young-of-the-year perch (Perca fluviatilis)?

In young-of-the-year perch (Perca fluviatilis), individuals within groups differed in the degree of boldness, estimated by habitat utilisation and feeding activity in visual contact with a potential predator. We looked at changes in individual behaviour in connection with change of group composition. During the first period, perch were randomly assigned to groups, and time spent in open habitat versus in vegetation and number of prey attacks were registered. The perch were then categorised into personality types (shy, bold, intermediate) according to their behaviour. During the second period, fish were observed when sorted into new groups, each containing only one personality type. Shy individuals showed the largest changes in behaviour, and increased both the time spent in the open and the number of prey attacks when placed into the new groups. Feeding activity in shy fish during the second period was affected by group composition during the first period. After regrouping, bold individuals decreased their time in the open, whereas intermediate individuals did not change behaviour. Time in the open habitat was, to some extent, influenced by the behaviour of the other members of the group, but number of prey attacks was not. The behaviour of fish of the different personality types we have defined in this study seemed to be based on innate traits, but also modified by the influence of other group members and by habituation to the environment.Communicated by J.Krause     

Vicarious sampling: the use of personal and public information by starlings foraging in a simple patchy environment

Group foragers may be able to assess patch quality more efficiently by paying attention to the sampling activities of conspecifics foraging in the same patch. In a previous field experiment, we showed that starlings foraging on patches of hidden food could use the successful foraging activities of others to help them assess patch quality. In order to determine whether a starling could also use another individual’s lack of foraging success to assess and depart from empty patches more quickly, we carried out two experimental studies which compared the behaviour of captive starlings sampling artificial patches both when alone and when in pairs. Solitary starlings were first trained to assess patch quality in our experimental two-patch system, and were then tested on an empty patch both alone and with two types of partner bird. One partner sampled very few holes and thus provided a low amount of public information; the other sampled numerous holes and thus provided a high amount of public information. In experiment 1, we found no evidence of vicarious sampling. Subjects sampled a similar number of empty holes when alone as when with the low and high information partners; thus they continued to rely on their own personal information to make their patch departure decisions. In experiment 2, we modified the experimental patches, increasing the ease with which a bird could watch another’s sampling activities, and increasing the difficulty of acquiring accurate personal sampling information. This time, subjects apparently did use public information, sampling fewer empty holes before departure when with the high-information partner than when with the low-information partner, and sampling fewer holes when with the low-information partner than when alone. We suggest that the degree to which personal and public information are used is likely to depend both on a forager’s ability to remember where it has already sampled and on the type of environment in which foraging takes place. Received: 31 January 1995/Accepted after revision: 11 September 1995     

International environmental agreements with consistent conjectures

We introduce consistent conjectures into Barrett (1994) canonical model of international environmental agreements. The existing literature assumes inconsistent Nash conjectures, despite the fact that policymakers recognize that abatement levels are strategic substitutes and increases in abatement generate carbon leakage. With consistent conjectures much of the conventional wisdom is reversed. The non-cooperative abatement level is below the Nash equilibrium. The difference between Nash and consistent conjectures is greatest when benefits are large and costs are small. We find that large coalitions cannot form. However, small coalitions can result in substantial increases in abatement relative to the non-cooperative outcome.     

The emergence of unshared consensus decisions in bottlenose dolphins

Unshared consensus decision-making processes, in which one or a small number of individuals make the decision for the rest of a group, are rarely documented. However, this mechanism can be beneficial for all group members when one individual has greater knowledge about the benefits of the decision than other group members. Such decisions are reached during certain activity shifts within the population of bottlenose dolphins residing in Doubtful Sound, New Zealand. Behavioral signals are performed by one individual and seem to precipitate shifts in the behavior of the entire group: males perform side flops and initiate traveling bouts while females perform upside-down lobtails and terminate traveling bouts. However, these signals are not observed at all activity shifts. We find that, while side flops were performed by males that have greater knowledge than other male group members, this was not the case for females performing upside-down lobtails. The reason for this could have been that a generally high knowledge about the optimal timing of travel terminations rendered it less important which individual female made the decision. This contribution is part of the special issue “Social Networks: new perspectives” (Guest Editors: J. Krause, D. Lusseau and R. James).