Modelling the Optimal Strategies of Fertiliser Application Using the Game-Theoretic Approach

This paper is a case study which describes the application of game-theoretic approach in resource management with specific emphasis on developing optimal strategies of phosphorus applications for soil fertilisation. The approach adopted allows resource managers to consider not only competitive strategies, which were treated as the Nash equilibrium game solutions, but also strategies which imply cooperation between farmers. These strategies were modelled as the cooperative Pareto optima of the game. The objective function of the game has been developed in order to reflect both economic advantages of phosphorus applications and the environmental losses associated with these applications expressed as dollar values. The paper presents algorithms for finding competitive and cooperative solutions of the game for the particular case when no time scheduling is included in the game parametrisation. The results obtained in the paper showed that the cooperative solutions lead to much lesser environmental impacts than that in the case of non-cooperative strategies.     

Capacity utilization and investment in environmental quality

This paper characterizes the optimal use of productive capacity and optimal investment in environmental quality when the latter has a positive impact on the production process. For the case of a single country, we find conditions under which capital should or should not be fully utilized, and investment in environmental quality should be positive or zero. We then extend the model to the case of two countries playing a non-cooperative dynamic game. The Nash equilibrium turns out to be a dominant-strategy equilibrium. Since this equilibrium is not Pareto efficient, we show how one country may bribe the other country to achieve a better outcome, for example, by refraining from full utilization of capacity. Under certain conditions, the optimal solution requires that a constant fraction of one country's income be used to bribe the other country to scale down its production.     

Global Emission Ceiling Versus International Cap and Trade: What is the Most Efficient System to Solve the Climate Change Issue?

We model the climate change issue as a pollution control game with the purpose of comparing two possible departures from the business as usual (BAU) where countries noncooperatively choose their emission levels. In the first scenario, players have to agree on a global emission cap (GEC) that is enforced by a uniform taxation scheme. They still behave strategically when choosing emission levels but are now subject to the coupled constraint imposed by the cap. The second scenario consists of the implementation of an international cap and trade (ICT) system. In this case, players decide on their emission quotas, and emission trading is allowed. A three heterogenous player quadratic game serves as a basis for the analysis. When the cap is binding, among all the coupled constraints Nash equilibria, we select a particular normalized equilibrium by solving a variational inequality. Comparing the normalized equilibrium with the Nash equilibria of the BAU and the ICT, we first show that if the cap is appropriately chosen, then the GEC system improves all players’ payoffs, relative to the BAU. The GEC system may thus be unanimously approved whereas the ICT is not, because moving from the BAU to the ICT is costly for one player. Second, for some values of the cap, all players get a higher payoff under the GEC than under the ICT. Therefore, the GEC outperforms the ICT both in terms of feasibility and efficiency.     

A Complementarity Approach for an Environmental–Economic Game with Coupling Emission Constraints

We consider an environmental–economic game where players face not only Cournot competition but also coupling environmental and individual capacity constraints. Under the complementarity problem framework, we study the existence of the (normalized) Nash equilibrium, computability of the equilibria, and the closed form expressions of the optimal weights. We also report numerical results of two examples as well as the insights gained from them.     

灰霾天气城市空气污染程度判据指标体系建立的探讨

灰霾天气加重空气污染程度,是空气污染呈现区域性、复合型污染的重要天气污染现象,对视觉空气质量以及人体健康造成很大影响与危害.针对灰霾天气下城市空气污染加重程度判据系统建立,对灰霾天气下空气污染程度评估方法及建立污染程度与能见度量化相关关系进行了初步探讨.     

Rational forest productivity decline

A whole forest optimisation model was employed to examine economic behaviour as it relates to long term, forest productivity decline in the boreal forests of Ontario, Canada. Our productivity investment model(PIM) incorporated a choice between productivity decline as representedby a drop in forest Site Class, and a fee to 'maintain' site productivity. Sensitivity analysis was used to determine the point at which these fees exceeded the value of the differential in timber volume between upper and lower site classes. By varying discount rate, 'productivity investment frontiers' were constructed, which highlight the effects of the magnitude in productivity decline, maintenance fees, and harvest flow constraints upon the occurrence and schedule of productivity declines. In presenting this simple approach to exploring the effects of economic choice upon forest productivity decline, the phenomena of 'natural capital divestment' within forestry is described.     

Time-Consistent Equilibria in Common Access Resource Games with Asymmetric Players Under Partial Cooperation

Given a differential game, if agents have different time preference rates, cooperative (Pareto optimum) solutions obtained by applying Pontryagin’s maximum principle become time inconsistent. We derive a set of dynamic programming equations in continuous time whose solutions are time-consistent equilibria for problems in which agents differ in their utility functions and also in their time preference rates. The solution assumes cooperation between agents at every time. Since coalitions at different times have different time preferences, equilibrium policies are calculated by looking for Markov (subgame perfect) equilibria in a (noncooperative) sequential game. The results are applied to the study of a cake-eating problem describing the management of a common property exhaustible natural resource. The extension of the results to a simple common property renewable natural resource model in infinite horizon is also discussed.     

The Strategic Impact of Adaptation in a Transboundary Pollution Dynamic Game

This work studies the strategic impact of a region’s investment in adaptation measures on the equilibrium outcomes of a transboundary pollution dynamic game played in finite horizon. We incorporate adaptation as a region-specific capital stock that decreases local damages and study the feedback (subgame perfect) equilibrium of the non-cooperative game between two regions. In order to discern the impact of adaptation, we compare the equilibrium solutions of three scenarios, which differ in the regions’ ability to invest in adaptation measures. The results show that investing in adaptation gives regions an incentive to increase their emissions, which causes an inverse strategic response in the other region. The anticipation of a rise in pollution makes the other region respond by cutting its emissions and investing more in adaptation. The equilibrium trajectories of the stocks of pollution and adaptation capital follow the highest path over time when both regions adapt. When there is an asymmetry between regions in their adaptation capabilities, the region that does not (or cannot) adapt becomes worse off due to lower emissions and higher damages, while the adapting region finishes the game better off than the no-adaptation case.     

我国环境应急资源储备体系构建初探

针对中国目前环境应急资源储备体系不成熟的现状,从制度建设、人力保障、物资及装备配置、信息平台构建等方面,提出了储备体系的构建方案,为中国建立科学的环境应急资源储备体系、提高环境应急处置能力提供重要指导。同时,就中国环境应急救援体系现存问题,提出了制定环境应急法、信息共享、救援队伍整合等具体的完善建议。     

Reconsidering the Dynamic Interaction of Renewable Resources and Population Growth: A Focus on Long-Run Sustainability

Within the framework of a general equilibrium model we study the long-run dynamics of resources and population if the growth rate of resources and population and the share of labor devoted to production are adversely affected by resource scarcity. Our results show that sustainability, i.e. a positive value of resources and population in the long run, essentially depends on the level of per capita resources at which these feedback mechanisms become active. A detailed bifurcation analysis evidences the richness of possible long-run dynamics.     

Effect of imperfect detectability on adaptive and conventional sampling: simulated sampling of freshwater mussels in the upper Mississippi River

Adaptive sampling designs are recommended where, as is typical with freshwater mussels, the outcome of interest is rare and clustered. However, the performance of adaptive designs has not been investigated when outcomes are not only rare and clustered but also imperfectly detected. We address this combination of challenges using data simulated to mimic properties of freshwater mussels from a reach of the upper Mississippi River. Simulations were conducted under a range of sample sizes and detection probabilities. Under perfect detection, efficiency of the adaptive sampling design increased relative to the conventional design as sample size increased and as density decreased. Also, the probability of sampling occupied habitat was four times higher for adaptive than conventional sampling of the lowest density population examined. However, imperfect detection resulted in substantial biases in sample means and variances under both adaptive sampling and conventional designs. The efficiency of adaptive sampling declined with decreasing detectability. Also, the probability of encountering an occupied unit during adaptive sampling, relative to conventional sampling declined with decreasing detectability. Thus, the potential gains in the application of adaptive sampling to rare and clustered populations relative to conventional sampling are reduced when detection is imperfect. The results highlight the need to increase or estimate detection to improve performance of conventional and adaptive sampling designs.     

Attitude Towards Risk and Production Decision: an Empirical Analysis on French Private Forest Owners

This paper deals with the forest owner’s attitude towards risk and the harvesting decision in several ways. First, we propose to characterize and quantify the forest owner’s attitude towards risk. Second, we analyze the determinants of the forest owner’s risk attitude. Finally, we determine the impact of the forest owner’s risk attitude on the harvesting decision. The French forest owner’s risk attitude is tackled by implementing a questionnaire, including a context-free measure borrowed from experimental economics. The determinants of the forest owner’s risk attitude and harvesting decision are estimated through a recursive bivariate ordered probit model. We show that French forest owners are characterized by a relative risk aversion coefficient close to 1 with a DARA assumption. In addition, we find that the forest owner’s risk aversion is influenced positively and significantly by the level of risk exposure, the geographical location of the forest and the fact to be a forester, and negatively by the income. Finally, we obtain that the forest owner’s risk aversion has a positive and significant impact on the harvesting decision.     

Natural resource protection on buffer lands: integrating resource evaluation and economics

Environmental managers are faced with the wise management, sustainability, and stewardship of their land for natural resource values. This task requires the integration of ecological evaluation with economics. Using the Department of Energy (DOE) as a case study, we examine the why, who, what, where, when, and how questions about assessment and natural resource protection of buffer lands. We suggest that managers evaluate natural resources for a variety of reasons that revolve around land use, remediation/restoration, protection of natural environments, and natural resource damage assessment (NRDA). While DOE is the manager of its lands, and thus its natural resources, a range of natural resource trustees and public officials have co-responsibility. We distinguish four types of natural resource evaluations: (1) the resources themselves (to the ecosystem), (2) the value of specific resources to people (e.g. hunting/fishing/bird-watching/herbal medicines), (3) the value of ecological resources to services for communities (e.g. clean air/water), and (4) the value of the intact ecosystems (e.g. forests or estuaries). Resource evaluations should occur initially to provide information about the status of those resources, and continued evaluation is required to provide trends data. Additional natural resource evaluation is required before, during and immediately following changes in land use, and remediation or restoration. Afterwards, additional monitoring and evaluations are required to evaluate the effects of the land use change or the efficacy of remediation/restoration. There are a wide range of economic methods available to evaluate natural resources, but the methods chosen depend upon the nature of the resource being evaluated, the purpose of the evaluation, and the needs of the agencies, natural resource trustees, public officials, and the public. We discuss the uses, and the advantages and disadvantages of different evaluation methods for natural resources.     

Optimal Harvesting of the Norwegian Spring-Spawning Herring: Variable Versus Fixed Harvesting Strategies

In this paper we study optimal harvesting of the Norwegian spring-spawning herring stock. The biological model is described by a discrete time age-structured model. The optimal harvesting patterns are studied numerically and the results show that when using a linear cost function and constant price in the optimisation model, the optimal harvesting pattern is pulse fishing. However, optimal constant fishing effort gives only slightly lower profit. Moreover, when price is made responsive to harvest the optimal harvesting strategy is substantially smoothed. This revised version was published online in July 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

The Impact of Accidental Deviation by Natural Disaster-Prone Countries on Renegotiation-Proof Climate Change Agreements

This study provides a new framework for international environmental agreements (IEAs), which include punishment exceptions for accidental deviation, using repeated games. We consider that deviation from an agreement can occur accidentally because of phenomena such as natural disasters, even if the agreement is sustained as a weakly renegotiation-proof equilibrium. If an IEA signatory deviates accidentally, it fails to achieve its emission abatement target. In the repeated game, a cooperative relationship among signatories is sustained by a strategy that prescribes rules of cooperation and punishment for deviation. We present a new strategy, called Regional Cooperative, which integrates accidental deviations into an IEA. Our model reveals that punishing countries tend to revoke the punishment of deviators and return to cooperation if an accidental deviator increases its abatement volume. That is, the abatement efforts of the accidental deviator can lead to renegotiation. The Regional Cooperative strategy motivates the accidental deviator to try to engage in abatement and the punishing countries to restart cooperation by renegotiation. We conclude that social welfare loss by punishment is prevented through renegotiation in cases of accidental deviation.     

The Value of Better Information on Technology R&D Programs in Response to Climate Change

Expert elicitations are a promising method for determining how R&D investments are likely to have an impact on technological advance in climate change energy technologies. But, expert elicitations are time consuming and resource intensive. Thus, we investigate the value of the information gained in expert elicitations. More specifically, given baseline elicitations from one study, we estimate the expected value of better information (EVBI) from revisiting and improving these assessments. We find that the EVBI is very large in comparison with the cost of performing expert elicitations. We also find that EVBI is higher on technologies with larger budgets and with net values that are not too high or too low.     

高校危险化学品分类分级管理实践与探索

根据国内危险化学品分类与分级管理现状,结合北京大学实验室危险化学品管理工作实际情况,总结了危险化学品源头管控、过程管理、监督检查等方面的分级分类管理策略与方法,介绍了北京大学在实验室安全教育与培训、技防与物防建设、信息化技术运用、奖惩机制建设方面的经验,以期为提升危险化学品管理水平、消除安全隐患、提高高校实验室安全管理...     

PAHs in soils and estimated air�Csoil exchange in the Pearl River Delta, South China

In this study, 74 soil samples collected from the Pearl River Delta were analyzed for polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons (PAHs). The PAH mixture in the soils is mainly of low molecular weight compounds, with naphthalene (21.4%) and phenanthrene (21.8%) being dominant. Soil PAH levels from the Pearl River Delta are relatively low (28?C711 ng/g, averaged 192 ng/g) compared to those from urban soils in temperate regions. The mean concentration of ??PAHs generally decrease with increasing distance from the city center, with ??PAHs of paddy soils > crop soil > natural soil. PAHs in the air were measured during a year-round sampling campaign using semipermeable membrane devices, and the transfer of chemicals between the soil and air compartments were estimated. Soil?Cair fugacity quotient calculations showed a highly uncertain equilibrium position of PAHs, with net volatilization of naphthalene and fluorene, whereas net deposition of phenanthrene, fluoranthene, and pyrene, indicating a capacity for the air to supply the soil with more substances.     

黄河包头段环境中α-HCH的迁移与残留的动态模拟

以黄河包头段作为研究区域,α-HCH作为研究对象,利用稳态假设的逸度方法,建立符合包头段污染特征的微分方程组,利用MATLAB 6.5求出该方程的稳态解和随时间变化的微分解,模拟出环境各相中稳态时各种迁移过程的年迁移量,得出年迁移量大小顺序:水体>悬浮颗粒物>沉积物>大气;该段的α-HCH主要迁移来源为水体迁移和悬浮物迁移,迁移量分别为1.68t/a和1.34t/a;稳态时α-HCH在河流环境中的残留以沉积物为最多,其残留量达38.56kg,与实测结果数量级相吻合,且在沉积物中达到稳态的时间也是最长的,约为53年。     

Signal-transfer modeling for regional assessment of forest responses to environmental changes in the southeastern United States

Stochastic transfer of information in a hierarchy of simulators is offered as a conceptual approach for assessing forest responses to changing climate and air quality across 13 southeastern states of the USA. This assessment approach combines geographic information system and Monte Carlo capabilities with several scales of computer modeling for southern pine species and eastern deciduous forests. Outputs, such as forest production, evapotranspiration and carbon pools, may be compared statistically for alternative equilibrium or transient scenarios providing a statistical basis for decision making in regional assessments. This revised version was published online in July 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.