The safety barometer: How safe is my plant today? Is instantaneously measuring safety level utopia or realizable?

During the last decade, serious accidents have continued to occur in the process industry. Apparently the scenarios of various undesired events leading to those accidents are still not sufficiently controlled. The key question is how potentially hazardous situations develop, what processes form the basis for this development, and how to control them? Safety level is not static but depends on many risk factors that change in presence and intensity over location and time. Safety level is dependent not only on technical process parameters that have immediate effects on the ‘frequency’ or probability of catastrophic consequences, but also depends on equipment integrity degradation, operational and management quality, attitudes, and cultural processes which may change over a prolonged time. The time and human interaction aspects make dynamic risk assessment complex. This paper will outline a conceptual approach using in addition to the regular process parameter signals received, also weak and slowly changing signals from various safety indicators, enabling to keep track of the risk factors. In theory this could lead to obtaining an instantaneous safety level ‘measure’ making possible forecast alarming for an imminent event to occur. Such concept could be regarded as a ‘writing’ safety barometer, or barograph. However, there are quite a number of problems to be solved which in the paper will be discussed.     

Operator competence and capacity - Lessons from the Montara blowout

The blowout of the Montara H1 well in the Timor Sea off the northwest coast of Australia in August 2009 was the first such incident in Australian offshore waters for 25 years. This article seeks to draw lessons for management of complex hazardous activities from these events by analysing critical decisions regarding well control barriers. Concepts such as trial and error learning, sensemaking and the need for multiple barriers are used to demonstrate why the organisation was blind to the developing problems and hence why lack of technical competence alone is not sufficient to explain the events that occurred. Three organisational improvements are proposed - providing active supervision, improved technical integrity assurance and better use of risk assessment. The article concludes with an appeal for changes in regulatory policy regarding safety to include organisational issues in addition to the traditional technical focus.     

3-Parameters SPW technique: A new method for evaluation of target safety integrity level

Introduced by IEC-61508 standard, safety integrity levels (SIL) have been used for assessing the reliability of safety instrumented functions (SIF) for protection of the system under control in abnormal conditions. Different qualitative, semi-qualitative and quantitative methods have been proposed by the standard for establishing target safety integrity levels amongst which “Risk Graph” has gained wide attention due to its simplicity and easy-to-apply characteristics. However, this method is subject to many deficiencies that have forced industry men and experts to modify it to fit their demands. In this paper, a new modification to risk graph parameters has been proposed that adds more flexibility to them and reduces their subjective uncertainties but keeps the method as simple as before. Three parameters, namely severity (S), hazard avoidance probability (P), and demand rate (W) are used instead of former four parameters. Hence, the method is named SPW. The outcome results of this method can be directly converted to probability of failure on demand (PFD) or risk reduction factor (RRF). The proposed method has been tested on an example case that has been studied before with conventional risk graph and LOPA techniques. The results show that new method agrees well with LOPA and reduces costs imposed by conservative approximations assumed during application of conventional risk graph.     

Implementing a safety culture in a major multi-national

This paper reports on the implementation of an advanced safety culture in a major oil and gas multi-national. The original proposal came from the company after it had become clear that expectations had been raised after the successful implementation of Health, Safety and Environment (HSE) Management Systems subsequent to the Piper Alpha disaster. The proposal made by the company, to develop a workforce intrinsically motivated for HSE, was operationalised as the development of an advanced safety culture after a review of the literature on motivation. The model used was the HSE Culture Ladder that had become the industry standard accepted by the OGP (International Association of Oil and Gas Producers). This model was intended to show that there were considerable opportunities for improvement even after HSE-MS had been implemented and that the more advanced cultures were ones people felt were desirable and achievable for themselves. Once top management had provided the initial support for the development of a more advanced safety culture, a number of supporting tools were developed, under the Hearts and Minds brand, and a strategy for implementation was developed that relied more on bottom-up ‘pull’ rather than top-down ‘push’ – the standard implementation model for new initiatives. The tools were designed to provide a clear direction, a road map to an advanced culture defined in terms provided by people within the industry, to support lasting changes in attitudes and beliefs, to promote an increased feeling of control when solving HSE-specific problems – all components of a more advanced culture. The tactics employed, using a pull rather than a push approach, had to allow for local variation within the general limits set by the strategy that eventually became a mixed top-down and bottom-up approach. Next there is a discussion of the current status and the lessons to be learnt from the implementation so far: moving away from command and control is hard for large organizations; such programs have to be driven by different performance indicators; managers have to learn to disperse their control; it is essential to communicate both successes and failures. Finally there is a discussion about the respective roles of academia and the industry in such endeavours, the requirement to concentrate on more than a single cultural characteristic such as reporting, and the difficulties of evaluating such programs in a worldwide environment that is continuously changing.     

How to consolidate Trevor’s experience and knowledge? Impossibilities,reflections on possibilities,and call to action

Looking back, significant progress in process safety and the knowledge to achieve a safe level has been made. Professor Kletz with his wise and concise maxims has shown us in many respects the way to go, yet more direction is needed for transfer of this knowledge to new generations. After a brief problem analysis, a sketch is given of various developments in the field of process safety, such as our knowledge on hazardous properties, hazard and risk analysis tools, human aspects, trends and developments in industry, and future perspectives. Subsequently, an analysis is made of the knowledge infrastructure required to maintain and to improve a knowledge base. In particular, scenario identification and modeling is mentioned. To that end the ‘lessons learned’ in the past should be better used. This has proven not to be easy. A way to go is indicated that in the longer term may reap success. However, in the present climate, funds for research are scarce and that for safety research are scant. Research is not only to develop new knowledge but is also of crucial importance to maintain quality academic education and the formation of ‘teacher of teachers’. A recent initiative is reported to bring this problem to the attention of policy makers worldwide.     

Building Safety indicators: Part 2 – Application,practices and results

Petroleum exploration and production in the Barents Sea is a controversial topic. The Goliat field outside the northern coast of Norway will be the first offshore oil development in this region, with planned production start in 2013–2014. Avoiding major accidents at Goliat is critical; not only to reduce the risks to human lives and the environment, but also to gain political acceptance. Providing early warnings of major accidents for Goliat is one of the main objectives of the research project ‘Building Safety’. The objective of this paper is to describe the development of early warnings in the form of indicators. In addition, the paper includes an overview of current status of early warnings of accidents in other major hazard industries; the nuclear power industry, the chemical process industry, and aviation. Experiences from these industries, including lessons learned from recent major accidents, have been used as important input to the development of early warning indicators.     

Identifying elements of poor construction safety management in China

Construction is one of the most hazardous industries due to its unique nature. Measured by international standards, construction site safety records in China are poor. This paper aims to examine the status of safety management in the Chinese construction industry, explore the risk-prone activities on construction sites, and identify factors affecting construction site safety. The findings reveal that the behavior of contractors on safety management are of grave concern, including the lack of provision of personal protection equipment, regular safety meetings, and safety training. The main factors affecting safety performance include ‘poor safety awareness of top management’, ‘lack of training’, ‘poor safety awareness of project managers’, ‘reluctance to input resources to safety’ and ‘reckless operations’. The study also proposes that the government should play a more critical role in stricter legal enforcement and organizing safety training programs.     

Learning from the Bhopal disaster to improve process safety management in Singapore

The Singapore process industry is mainly made up of chemical and energy companies such as Mitsui Chemicals, Clariant, Exxon Mobil, Shell, Sumitomo, Petrochemical Corporation of Singapore and Infineum. Majority of these companies are located on Jurong Island, southwest of Singapore. Jurong Island houses nearly 100 leading petroleum, petrochemicals and specialty chemicals companies and the total investment is about S$42 billion in total. With a land surface area of only 716 km² and a high concentration of process plants, the Singapore government places strong emphasis on safety and risk management. In this paper, four process industry veterans from the government, academic and private sectors were interviewed. Through the interviews, the authors sought to understand the veterans’ perspectives on lessons that the Singapore process industry should learn from the Bhopal disaster. The veterans expanded their thoughts beyond the Bhopal disaster and provided many insights and suggestions critical to process safety management in Singapore and other countries. A systemic model of process safety management was derived from the interviews and key elements of operational process safety management were identified. In addition, a research agenda was identified based on the inputs from the veterans.     

Unintended consequences of management strategies for improving labor productivity in construction industry

Introduction: Labor productivity and safety are important topics in the construction industry. Even so, the literature provides little information for project managers trying to determine how management strategies designed to improve labor productivity impact safety. Method: This research addresses the gap by measuring the impact of two groups of management strategies that involve human resource related management strategies and construction related management strategies related to safety performance in construction projects. Data were collected from 111 general construction projects through the survey. Results: The results show that the relationship between the implemented management strategies and safety performance is nuanced with ‘Communication’ harming safety performance while implementation of ‘Labor Management,’ ‘Supervision and Leadership,’ ‘Planning’ and ‘Management of Construction’ strategies improve the level of safety performance. This study took a further step by measuring the impact of the interactions between the two groups of management strategies on safety performance. The results show that the interactions of construction and human related management strategies are not always in the favor of safety. Practical Applications: This paper adds to the literature on the relationship between productivity and safety in the construction industry. The research findings can assist project managers to improve labor productivity without harming the safety of laborers unintentionally.     

Working safely with foreign contractors and personnel

Foreign companies and personnel are increasingly being employed for risky activities in process industry (Agro, Gas and Chemicals) in the north of the Netherlands. Against the backdrop of these developments, the need arose within the ‘VGM Noord-Nederland’ cooperation (health, safety and the environment in the Northern Netherlands) to further investigate experienced and detected problems, possible explanations, solutions and directions for preventing unsafe situations when working with foreign contractors and personnel. Because of little scientific information available on the topic, in autumn of 2004 an exploratory study was conducted into ‘working with foreign contractors and personnel’ in the process industry in the northern Netherlands under the auspices of VGM Noord-Nederland. In the course of the study, ten qualitative interviews were held with safety experts working at multinational companies in the agro, gas and chemical industry in the Northern Netherlands. The objective of the study was to gain sharper insight into the common problems and best practices experienced by these companies when working with foreign contractors and personnel in order to focus future joint activities towards these problematic areas. The study resulted in the identification of five problematic areas: communication, level of education, cultural differences, specific employment situations and cooperation between principal and contractor. All of these factors can be located within the ‘latent failure types’ or ‘basic risk factors’ described by the well known Tripod Model (i.e. Groeneweg, J., Lancioni, G.E., Metaal, N., 2002. Motivating for Safety, Leading by Example: moving from Compliance to Competence, Profshore Management Motivation Module, Stavanger) of accident causation. The results of the interviews are described for each problem area individually and are linked to state of the art scientific theory and models. Directions for ‘best practice’ examples are given and an indication for follow-up action is made.     

Cultural influences on risks and risk management: six case studies

Ever since the accident at the Three Mile Island nuclear power plant on 28 March 1979, the term ‘safety culture’ has been a hot topic for both researchers and organisations. Both the content and causes of a poor safety culture have been the focus of numerous research projects, but also its consequences on an organisation's safety performance and the way organisations should be ‘designed’ to facilitate a ‘good’ safety culture. Since others in this issue focus on the content and causes of safety culture, this article focuses on its consequences from two different but inter-related angles. In the first place, the cultural influences on incident causation are considered. In the second place, the cultural influences on risk management, or specifically incident reporting and analysis, are considered. Both angles are supported by empirical incident data collected in the Dutch steel industry and the medical domain. To collect this data, a risk management approach called PRISMA was used. Further, cultural differences between the domains investigated are highlighted and discussed.     

Lessons learned from a supercritical pressure BLEVE in Nihon Dempa Kogyo Crystal Inc.

On December 7, 2009, a 50-foot-tall high-pressure vessel ruptured in the Nihon Dempa Kogyo Crystal, Inc. facility in Belvidere, Illinois. Several projectiles rapidly traveled outward from the facility, killing a truck driver 650 feet away and injuring an employee in another building 435 feet away. This paper summarizes the lessons learned from this incident both on causal and consequential aspects. Stress corrosion cracking was identified as the failure mechanism by the U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board. After analyzing the operating conditions and the aftermath, this incident has been identified as a Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapor Explosion (BLEVE) under a supercritical pressure. A consequence analysis of the incident is performed where overpressure and fragment distance are calculated, together with safety distance estimation. Additionally, other safety-related problems, such as safety culture, management inside the corporation, and communication between this facility and the government are discussed.     

On the use of criteria based on the SMART acronym to assess quality of performance indicators for safety management in process industries

Management of safety, and barriers in particular, includes using information expressing performance, i.e. use of safety performance indicators. For this information to be useful, the indicators should demonstrate adequate quality. In other words, they should satisfy some predefined set of quality criteria. Without showing adequate quality, the indicators are generally unable to provide sufficient support for barrier management, which could result in poor decisions. In this article, the use of the SMART criteria is considered to assess the quality of safety performance indicators in process industries. SMART being an acronym for ‘specificity’, ‘measurability’ or ‘manageability’, ‘achievability’, ‘relevancy’ and ‘time-based’, covering five key aspects and criteria for assessing the quality of an indicator. A discussion on whether the indicators are able to demonstrate adequate quality by satisfying these criteria has been conducted. The finding is that all of the SMART criteria should be satisfied for a safety performance indicator to demonstrate acceptable quality and to be regarded as useful to support barrier management decision-making. However, it has also been observed that including the ‘M’ criterion in the assessment of quality is not needed. When all the other criteria are satisfied there is no way the conclusions could be misleading as a result of measurability or manageability aspects. Hence, for safety performance indicator quality, only four of the criteria are assessed and suggested for such situations to shorten the acronym to ‘STAR’. A key safety indicator used in downstream process facilities, i.e. ‘dangerous fluid overfilling events’, motivated from the 2005 Texas City refinery accident, is used to illustrate the situation. The indicator is also applied to another incident, the Buncefield oil storage depot's accident in 2005, to provide a broader context for using it. The findings in this article could also be applied beyond the context studied. This means that, despite focusing on safety indicators in the process industries, the findings are considered as relevant and applicable to other types of performance indicators and to other energy industries.     

我国安全产业发展现状与趋势分析

调研了安全产业相关概念,从安全生产角度,提出了狭义的安全产业定义;结合部分领域、部分地区的安全产业市场规模以及安全产业基地建设情况,分析了我国安全产业的总体发展现状;从产业规模、产业结构、产业政策和标准、产业科技基础和成果转化应用等方面,分析了我国安全产业发展面临的主要问题;基于我国安全产业发展现状,结合相关产业发展的经验教训,提出了我国安全产业的市场化、规模化、专业化、标准化、集约化的发展趋势;针对发展存在的主要问题,结合安全产业发展趋势,提出了开展产业基础调研、制定产业发展战略、构建产业支撑体系等加快我国安全产业发展的相关建议.分析提出的问题、趋势和建议,可为加快我国安全产业的发展提供参考.     

Corrosion failure probability analysis of buried gas pipelines based on subset simulation

Corrosion is the main reason for the failure of buried gas pipelines. For effective corrosion failure probability analysis, the structural reliability theory was adopted in this study to establish two calculation models for pipeline corrosion failure: the pressure failure model and von Mises stress failure model. Then, two calculation models for the corrosion failure probability were established based on a corrosion depth growth model obtained from actual survey data of soil corrosion characteristics. In an example, Monte Carlo simulation (MCS) and subset simulation (SS) were used to analyze the corrosion failure probability of pipelines, and the results were compared. SS can compensate for the shortcomings of MCS as it has higher computational efficiency and accuracy. Therefore, SS was adopted to simulate variations in the corrosion failure probability of buried pipelines with the service time for the two failure probability calculation models, which were applied to a natural gas pipeline located in a chemical industry park in Zhuhai, China. A sensitivity analysis was carried out on the relevant parameters that affect the failure probability. The results showed that multiple loads caused by the covering soil, residual stress, temperature differential, and bending stress have a non-negligible effect on the pipeline reliability. The corrosion coefficients gradually become the most important factors that affect the failure probability with increased service time. The proposed methodology considers the actual operating conditions of pipelines to provide a reliable theoretical basis for integrity management.     

Risk assessment in the offshore industry

This paper describes the implementation and use of risk assessment in the offshore industry in relation to safety aspects — safety to people's life and health, as well as environment and property. Although risk assessments may be based on both qualitative and quantitative methods, the main focus here will be on quantitative risk assessments (QRA). The development of offshore QRA has been lead by a mutual influence and interaction between the regulatory authorities for the UK and Norwegian sectors of the North Sea as well as the oil companies operating here. The experience from this area has been the main basis during the writing of this paper.     

SESAR safety decision-making: Lessons from environmental,nuclear and defense modeling

SESAR, the ‘Single European Sky Air traffic Research’ program, envisages radical changes for European Air Traffic Management (ATM). It integrates and implements new technologies and information processing. This paper examines the safety decision-making in the implementation of SESAR projects. SESAR poses new safety problems because it adopts new paradigms for ATM safety – what lessons are there from environmental, nuclear and defense modeling? These disciplines have also had to confront the limitations of modeling the rates of rare and damaging – even catastrophic – events. A major conceptual change in SESAR is that of automated separation assurance systems. Some existing responsibilities transfer from the controller – either to the pilot or to computer systems – in a progressively phased approach. The major problem for SESAR safety validation is that mixed equipage/operations within a common airspace potentially generate new and different safety issues regarding the validation of safety predictions. A potential way forward uses high-fidelity Human In The Loop Simulations (HITLS) to generate confidence in the resilience of the ATM system. The focus changes from proving safety, i.e. through traditional kinds of validation processes, to extensive resilience testing using these simulations. The aim would be to test how resilient the system is to seeded errors, penetration testing, and crash/stress testing. This would be a high cost process because of the large investments required and the need for long sequences of testing. However, these demanding processes can provide ‘justified belief’ to the decision-maker that the changed ATM system is acceptably safe.     

Utilizing Integrity Operating Windows (IOWs) for enhanced plant reliability & safety

Several industry codes, standards and recommended practices have been developed and utilized to maintain pressure equipment integrity and improve reliability. These industry standards focus heavily on inspections (time or risk based) and guidelines for operating equipment at conditions that enable a tolerable deterioration rate. RBI (risk based inspection), in effect, utilizes process conditions at a snapshot in time to recommend inspection strategies which can cover the span of the equipment's remaining life. On a day to day level, changes that occur in process conditions (excursions and upsets) are not fed back into the risk and criticality calculation. When such changes to operating conditions affect key process variables, new damage mechanisms could be introduced that affect the remaining life of an asset or accelerate existing damage mechanisms. The increase in risk resulting from these process changes goes unaccounted for until the effect of the deterioration is captured at the next inspection.Integrity Operating Windows (IOWs) are established limits for key process variables that can affect the integrity of the equipment if the process operation deviates from the established limits. The development of these IOWs requires fundamental understanding of the process and resulting damage mechanisms and is best facilitated by a team of corrosion and process engineers along with feedback from plant operators. A well-established IOW program is designed to provide real time notification of an increased risk to the integrity of an asset so that identified actions can be taken by the operators and/or plant managers proactively in a timely manner. Combining an RBI program with an IOW program can greatly increase its effectiveness and provide early recognition of equipment risks due to process changes. This paper will focus on the development of an IOW program and the benefits of combining it with a viable RBI program.     

Road transport in drift? Applying contemporary systems thinking to road safety

Despite the extent to which the proximal causes of road traffic injury are known, road trauma remains a substantial and growing component of the global health burden. Application of contemporary sociotechnical systems theory to the problem of traffic injury suggests that the lack of progress globally may be a consequence of “drift into failure”. This article considers the new systems perspective on safety, explores the utility of this approach for road safety efforts, and specifically examines the ‘drift into failure’ hypothesis. It is argued that road transport systems do currently display characteristics of complex systems in drift and that greater understanding of complexity theory-based models will support improved road safety efforts. However, the extent to which such models can support road safety practitioners appears to be limited by the lack of practical tools for translating theory to practice. The article concludes by drawing attention to similarities between complex systems theory and the contexts in which the discipline of Human Factors has been developed, and suggests that Human Factors methodologies could be usefully used to facilitate further research in this field.     

Developing a standard for psychosocial risk management: PAS 1010

The nature of work has changed dramatically due to globalisation, migration, technological advances and the emergence of the knowledge-based economy. These changes have been accompanied by the increased prevalence of new and emerging types of risk to workers’ health and safety, such as psychosocial risks. This paper reviews the key regulatory and voluntary standards on occupational health and safety of relevance to the management of psychosocial risks in the workplace that are applicable to the European Union member states. The review indicates that regulatory standards set the minimum level of protection for workers and voluntary standards may further enable organisations to go beyond their legal obligations. However, the review also highlights that the terms ‘stress’ and ‘psychosocial risks’ are not mentioned explicitly in most pieces of legislation leading to lack of clarity on the terminology used. While voluntary standards seek to address this, very few provide specific guidance on the process of psychosocial risk management to enable organisations to manage psychosocial risks successfully. On the basis of the review, the case for the development of a voluntary standard for psychosocial risk management is presented. The paper further discusses the recent development of such a standard and its implications at the European level.