Discrimination and bias in the vegan ideal

The vegan ideal is entailed by arguments for ethical veganism based on traditional moral theory (rights and/or utilitarianism) extended to animals. The most ideal lifestyle would abjure the use of animals or their products for food since animals suffer and have rights not to be killed. The ideal is discriminatory because the arguments presuppose a male physiological norm that gives a privileged position to adult, middle-class males living in industrialized countries. Women, children, the aged, and others have substantially different nutritional requirements and would bear a greater burden on vegetarian and vegan diets with respect to health and economic risks, than do these males. The poor and many persons in Third World nations live in circumstances that make the obligatory adoption of such diets, where they are not already a matter of sheer necessity, even more risky.Traditional moral theorists (such as Evelyn Pluhar and Gary Varner whose essays appear in this issue) argue that those who are at risk would beexcused from a duty to attain the virtue associated with ethical vegan lifestyles. The routine excuse of nearly everyone in the world besides adult, middle-class males in industrialized countries suggests bias in the perspective from which traditional arguments for animal rights and (utilitarian) animal welfare are formulated.     

What's wrong with animalby-products?

Without looking beyond the conditions under which laying hens typically live in the contemporary U.S. egg industry, we can understand why the production and consumption of factory farmed eggs could be judged immoral. However, the question, What (if anything) is wrong with animal by-products? cannot always be adequately answered by looking at the conditions under which animals live out their productive lives. For the dairy industry looks benign in those terms, but if we look beyond the conditions under which milk cows live, we can better understand some animal rights activists' reasons for objecting to dairy products. The contemporary U.S. dairy industry requires a slaughter industry between one-seventh and one-third the size of the contemporary beef industry. Today, beef slaughter is vastly more humane than poultry slaughter, but if today's beef slaughter industry is judged emmoral, the contemporary dairy industry should be judged similarly immoral, because the two are wedded. This is the deep reason for moral suspicion of the dairy industry.     

Nutritional risks of vegan diets to women and children: Are they preventable?

The potential health risks of vegan diets specifically for women and children are discussed. Women and children are at higher risk of malnutrition from consumption of unsupplemented vegan diets than are adult males. Those who are very young, pregnant, lactating, elderly, or who suffer from poverty, disease or other environmentally induced disadvantages are at special risk. The size of these risks is difficult to quantify from existing studies. Fortunately the risk of dietary deficiency disease can be avoided and the potential health benefits of vegan diets can be realized when diets for these groups are planned in line with theRecommended Dietary Allowances so that nutrient intakes reach or exceed recommended levels, and access to preventive and curative health services is assured.     

Use and abuse revisited: Response to Pluhar and Varner

In her recent Counter-Reply to my views, Evelyn Pluhar defends her use of literature on nutrition and restates her argument for moral vegetarianism. In his Vegan Ideal article, Gary Varner claims that the nutrition literature does not show sufficient differences among women, men, and children to warrant concern about discrimination. In this response I show how Professor Pluhar continues to draw fallacious inferences: she begs the question on equality, avoids the main issue in my ethical arguments, argues from irrelevancies, misquotes her sources, equivocates on context, confuses safety with morality, appeals to fear, confuses correlation with cause, fails to evaluate scientific studies, draws hasty conclusions from insufficient data, ignores a large amount of data which would call her views into question, does not follow good scientific or moral argumentation, objectionably exceeds the limits of her expertise, and resorts to scapegoating. I also argue that Professor Varner fails to make his case because he offers virtually no evidence from scientific studies on nutrition, relies on outdated and fallacious sources, makes unsupported claims, ignores evidence that would contravene his claims, draws hasty conclusions based on weakly supported hypotheses rather than facts, employs a double standard, appeals to ignorance, does not evaluate arguments from his sources, and makes anad hominem attack on a respected nutritionist when his focus should be on evaluating the evidence and arguments from the scientific studies themselves. Neither Varner nor Pluhar have responded sufficiently to the real issue in my arguments, that of discrimination and bias in the vegan ideal.     

The use and abuse of scientific studies

In response to Evelyn Pluhar'sWho Can Be Morally Obligated to Be a Vegetarian? in this journal issue, the author has read all of Pluhar's citations for the accuracy of her claims and had these read by an independent nutritionist. Detailed analysis of Pluhar's argument shows that she attempts to make her case by consistent misappropriation of the findings and conclusions of the studies she cites. Pluhar makes sweeping generalizations from scanty data, ignores causal explanations given by scientists, equates hypothesis with fact, draws false cause conclusions from studies, and in one case claims a conclusion opposite of what the scientist published. Such poor reasoning cannot be the basis of an argument for moral vegetarianism. A broader search of the literature and attention to reviews and textbooks in nutrition shows that each of Pluhar's claims is suspect or incorrect. Pluhar has not undermined my central claims: even if animals have certain rights and well-planned vegetarian diets are safe in complex industrialized societies, these diets cannot be so regarded if the presuppositions of high levels of wealth, education, and medical care do not exist; and, women, children, the aged and some ill persons are at greater risk on restrictive vegan diets. Thus, any duty of moral vegetarianism is not categorical but provisional in nature.     

Vegetarianism,morality, and science revisited

Professor Kathryn George's Use and Abuse Revisited does not contain an accurate assessment of my On Vegetarianism, Morality, and Science: A Counter Reply. I show that she has misrepresented my moral and empirical argumentation.     

Animal Care Ethics, ANZCCART, and Public Perceptions of Animal Use Ethics

The public attitude to animal use in Australia and New Zealandcan be inferred from survey results and political activity. The publicis concerned about the rights of animals as far as any uses causing painare concerned, but takes a more utilitarian view of the taking of lifewhere no suffering is involved. Many of the participants in two recentANZCCART conferences fall short in their knowledge of and attitudetoward these concerns. Animal welfare legislation and standards need tobe reformed so that painful animal use is eliminated, even if economicgrowth suffers as a result.     

Animal Rights: Autonomy and Redundancy

Even if animal liberation were to be adopted, would rights for animals be redundant – or even deleterious? Such an objection, most prominently voiced by L. W. Sumner and Paul W. Taylor, is misguided, risks an anthropocentric and anthropomorphic conception of autonomy and freedom, overly agent-centered rights conceptions, and an overlooking of the likely harmful consequences of positing rights for humans but not for nonhuman animals. The objection in question also stems from an overly pessimistic construal of autonomy-infringements thought to result from extending rights to animals, and also, of confusions that supposedly may ensue from ascribing animal rights. Whether or not a case for animal liberation and/or animal rights can cogently be made, the redundancy-or-worse objection to animal rights need pose no barrier.     

Deep Ethology, Animal Rights, and the Great Ape/Animal Project: Resisting Speciesism and Expanding the Community of Equals

In this essay I argue that the evolutionary and comparative study of nonhuman animal (hereafter animal) cognition in a wide range of taxa by cognitive ethologists can readily inform discussions about animal protection and animal rights. However, while it is clear that there is a link between animal cognitive abilities and animal pain and suffering, I agree with Jeremy Bentham who claimed long ago the real question does not deal with whether individuals can think or reason but rather with whether or not individuals can suffer. One of my major goals will be to make the case that the time has come to expand. The Great Ape Project (GAP) to The Great Ape/Animal Project (GA/AP) and to take seriously the moral status and rights of all animals by presupposing that all individuals should be admitted into the Community of Equals. I also argue that individuals count and that it is essential to avoid being speciesist cognitivists; it really doesn't matter whether ‘dogs ape’ or whether ‘apes dog’ when taking into account the worlds of different individual animals. Narrow-minded primatocentrism and speciesism must be resisted in our studies of animal cognition and animal protection and rights. Line-drawing into ‘lower’ and ‘higher’ species is a misleading speciesist practice that should be vigorously resisted because not only is line-drawing bad biology but also because it can have disastrous consequences for how animals are viewed and treated. Speciesist line-drawing also ignores within species individual differences. This revised version was published online in July 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Filling the Gaps in the Risks vs. Benefits of Mammalian Adult-Cell Cloning: Taking Bernard Rollin's Philosophy Its Next Step

A critique is made of Bernard Rollin's examination of the ethics of cloning adult mammalian cells. The primary concern is less to propound an anticloning or procloning position than to call for full exploration of the ethical complexities before a rush to judgment is made. Indeed, the ethical examination in question rushes toward an ethical position in such a way that does not appear consistent with Rollin's usual methodology. By extending this methodology – which entails full weighing of benefits and costs – it becomes apparent that there are real potential risks to this type of cloning in both animals and humans, besides the possible benefits, and that the scientific, political, philosophical, and broader academic communities should explore these risks and benefits extensively. Rollin's usual methodological call for hesitation before risks would translate into hesitation before the ethical risks of adult mammalian cell cloning instead of his paper's curiously laissez-faire stance.     

Access rights for outdoor recreation in New Zealand: some lessons for open country in England and Wales

Access opportunities for outdoor recreation in New Zealand and England and Wales are classified according to their conformity with collective, citizenship or exclusion rights and their degrees of permanence. Alternative criteria for the apportionment of access rights are considered in the context of this classification. Different criteria for rights apportionment are found to be appropriate according to different circumstances in the context of pluralist provision. Policy developments in New Zealand are compared with those in England. After 150 years of a dominance of collective rights in New Zealand current policy is shifting provision towards exclusionary rights. In England, there is a policy shift in the other direction, towards collective rights. Lessons for the development of collective rights in England are drawn from the New Zealand experience in relation to styles of governance, public preferences, public cost, insurance liability and the potential of markets.     

Taking Ethics into Account in Farm Animal Breeding: What can the Breeding Companies Achieve?

Animal welfare and the ethical issues it raises have been discussed intensively for a couple of decades. The emphasis has been on the direct effects of housing and husbandry, but more attention is now being given to problems originating in selective breeding. European attempts to adjust animal welfare legislation to deal with these problems have been largely unsuccessful, but the fact that selective breeding can introduce welfare problems continues to place an ethical responsibility on the animal breeding industry. Since breeding decisions are made centrally and, increasingly, internationally, strategic change is only likely to occur if it is embedded in an international agreement of some kind. The aim of this paper is to describe the key ethical issues facing animal breeding and assess the suggestion that the breeding industry itself can deal with ethical issues by means of an ethical code. Results from recent projects involving commercial breeding enterprises are presented.     

Human Diets and Animal Welfare: the Illogic of the Larder

Few moral arguments have been made against vegetarian diets. One exception is the “Logic of the Larder:” We do animals a favor by purchasing their meat, eggs, and milk, for if we did not purchase these products, fewer animals would exist. This argument fails because many farm animals have lives that are probably not worth living, while others prevent a significant number of wild animals from existing. Even if this were not so, the purchase of animal products uses resources that could otherwise be used to bring a much greater number of animals into existence.     

What is old is new again: the reintroduction of indigenous fishing technologies in British Columbia

In 2008, the Cowichan Tribes of British Columbia re-established a traditional fishing weir on the Cowichan River. After being banned by the Canadian Government for nearly 70 years, the reintroduction of the Cowichan weir has served to revitalise Cowichan cultural traditions, and after a century of hostility, is creating an opportunity for more collaborative approaches for salmon conservation. This paper demonstrates that the reintroduction of indigenous conservation practices into western systems of fisheries management can be complementary rather than conflicting to conservation objectives. However, while collaborative salmon conservation has been a positive outcome, the reintroduction of the Cowichan weir is also symbolic of the conflict that remains between the Cowichan and the Government of Canada over competing territorial claims, the legitimacy of an imposed western legal tradition, and the ultimate control of the Cowichan River fishery.     

我国自然资源市场体系的建立与发展

文章以“东阳卖水—义鸟买水”这起全国首例水权交易的案例说明，必须清晰地界定自然资源的产权，同时减少有关自然资源交易过程中的费用，以尽快建立自然资源市场体系，发挥市场在配置自然资源方面的基础性作用。     

Long-term trends in the Real real prices of primary commodities: Inflation bias and the Prebisch-Singer hypothesis

Following the Boskin et al., (1996) report, it became widely recognized that price indexes in the U.S. and elsewhere overstate inflation. Svedberg and Tilton (2006) highlighted that this inflation bias may have important implications for estimated long-term trends in nonrenewable resource prices. ST construct an inflation-bias corrected CPI (and PPI) for the U.S. and use their corrected deflator(s) to define a so-called ‘real real’ price of copper. Their ‘real real’ price of copper is then used to re-estimate long-term trends in real copper prices. This paper proposes a quick method for obtaining inflation-bias-corrected estimates of long-run trends in real primary commodity prices directly from estimates in the published literature. Our approach obviates the need re-do existing empirical studies using a corrected or ‘real real’ price of nonrenewable resources. The two approaches are mathematically equivalent.     

Greenhouse effect and coastal wetland policy: How Americans could abandon an area the size of Massachusetts at minimum cost

Climatologists generally expect an anthropogenic global warming that could raise sea level 30–150 cm in the next century and more thereafter. One of the impacts would be the loss of coastal wetlands. Although the inundation of adjacent dryland would enable new wetlands to form, much of this land is or will soon be developed. If developed areas are protected, wetlands will be squeezed between an advancing sea and the land being protected, which has already happened in China and the Netherlands, where people have built dikes for centuries. Unlike those countries, the United States has enough land to accommodate the landward migration of wetlands; but governments lack the funds to purchase all the coastal lowlands that might be inundated and the legal authority to prohibit their development. We propose a third approach: allowing property owners to use coastal lowlands today as they choose, but setting up a legal mechanism to ensure that the land is abandoned if and when sea level rises enough to inundate it. Although compensation may be required, this approach would cost less than 1% as much as purchasing the land, and would be (1) economically efficient by enabling real estate markets to incorporate expectations of future sea level rise; (2) constitutional by compensating property owners; and (3) politically feasible by pleasing people who care about the long-term fate of the coastal environment without disturbing people who either are unconcerned about the distant future or do not believe sea level will rise. This article demonstrates that it would be irrational to delay policy formulation until sea level rise projections are more precise. The cost will be small if we act now but great if we wait, and sea level is already rising along most coasts. The US government should develop a strategy in the next three years. The opinions expressed in this paper do not necessarily reflect the views of EPA and no official endorsement should be inferred.     

Health and Welfare in Danish Dairy Cattle in the Transition to Organic Production: Problems, Priorities and Perspectives

During the past few years,organic dairy farming has grown dramatically inDenmark. Consequently, an increasing number ofpeople are encountering this method ofproduction for the first time. Amongst these,many veterinarians have suddenly had to dealwith organic herds in their home district, and,meeting examples of poor animal welfare, theyhave recently started to express some concerns.Against this background, a so-called``Synthesis of Knowledge' project was initiatedto examine the health and welfare of dairycattle and the use of medication in thetransition to organic production. The aim ofthe project was to investigate associatedproblems from the point of view of the dairyherd. Based on qualitative research interviewswith vets and agricultural advisors, as well asfocus group interviews with farmers who hadrecently converted from conventional to organicfarming, an expert panel attempted to identifyproblem areas and possible solutions. Theproblems related to (a) the adjustment to newand unknown practices, (b) poor management ingeneral, and (c) inappropriate legislation fororganic farming.One problem area was the rearing of dairycalves, particularly with regard to theestablishment of post partumrelationships between cow and calf, grouphousing, and the grazing of young animals. A``natural life' was identified as beingfundamental to organic animal husbandry. Interms of animal welfare, this concept can beunderstood as a way of living in which the calfis allowed to express its natural behavior andsatisfy its natural needs. Essentially, theconditions needed for good calf welfare requirethe compatibility and interplay of elementsfrom ``nature' (the natural life; includingopportunities to satisfy natural needs) and``culture' (farmer management skills; exerciseof care). These elements should be balanced toensure animal welfare in organic herds.     

Dealing with Ambivalence: Farmers' and Consumers' Perceptions of Animal Welfare in Livestock Breeding

The results of an empirical study intoperceptions of the treatment of farm animals inthe Netherlands are presented. A qualitativeapproach, based on in-depth interviews withmeat livestock farmers and consumers was chosenin order to assess motivations behindperceptions and to gain insight into the waypeople deal with possible discrepancies betweentheir perceptions and their daily practices.Perceptions are analyzed with the help of aframe of reference, which consists ofvalues, norms, convictions, interests, andknowledge.The perceptions of the interviewed farmersare quite consistent and without exceptionpositive: according to them, nothing is wrongwith animal welfare in livestock breeding. Theperceptions of the consumers we interviewed aremore divergent, but generally negative. Bothgroups show ambivalence as a result ofdiscrepancies between perceptions and behavior.Although the consumers share the impressionthat the living conditions of livestock animalsare far from optimal, most of them still buyand eat meat from the meat industry. Thefarmers believe the welfare of their animals isgood, but, as frequent defensive utterancesshow, they feel uncomfortable with expressed orunexpressed accusations of mistreating animals.The ways the respondents deal with thisambivalence were analysed by drawing ontheories of dissonance reduction and distancing devices.Catherine and Raphaël Larrère(Larrère and Larrère, 2000) argue thatanimal rearing is a hierarchical relationshipwhose rules are to be found in the fiction of adomestic contract. We argue that the questionis not whether there should be a domesticcontract, because such a contract seems alreadyaccepted. However, since values and normsdiffer widely, not only among meat livestockfarmers and consumers, but also amongconsumers, the question remains as to whosevalues and norms should form the basis of thedomestic contract.     

Bison and elk in the American Southwest: In search of the pristine

Ecosystem managers often use the early historic condition of the fauna in an area as the model for restoration or management. West of the Pecos River in the American Southwest, present-day abundances and distributional ranges of bison and American elk exceed those reported in early historic times. I evaluate several potential causes for the historic scarcity of these animals—inadequate forage, insufficient water, nonhuman predation, disease, and hunting by late-prehistoric humans. Archaeological and ecological evidence suggest that restricted availability of water coupled with hunting by late-prehistoric peoples probably were the most important causes. Perennial water is more widely distributed now than previously, mainly because of water well and water catchment construction. Proliferation of agriculture-based human economies in the region from AD 0–1500 led to rapid population growth of aboriginal peoples, with resulting increased harvests of resources. The likelihood that late-prehistoric humans severely depleted the abundances of large mammals indicates a need to reevaluate the exclusive use of early-historic conditions as the basis for setting goals for ecosystem management. Implications of reintroducing large herbivores to ecosystems are discussed.