Transaction costs and sequential bargaining in transferable discharge permit markets

Market-type mechanisms have been introduced and are being explored for various environmental programs. Several existing programs, however, have not attained the cost savings that were initially projected. Modeling that acknowledges the role of transactions costs and the discrete, bilateral, and sequential manner in which trades are executed should provide a more realistic basis for calculating potential cost savings. This paper presents empirical evidence on potential cost savings by examining a market for the abatement of sediment from farmland. Empirical results based on a market simulation model find no statistically significant change in mean abatement costs under several transaction cost levels when contracts are randomly executed. An alternative method of contract execution, gain-ranked, yields similar results. At the highest transaction cost level studied, trading reduces the total cost of compliance relative to a uniform standard that reflects current regulations.     

A Transactions Cost Approach to the Theoretical Foundations of Water Markets1

Abstract: Water marketing is often cited as a means of alleviating the stresses attached to allocation of water use. Frequently, marketing is suggested in a context that implies substitution of competitive markets for the allocation based on the prior appropriation doctrine. This study examines water marketing from the perspective of a transactions cost approach to the private and broad social agreements (contracts) that support water allocation. It examines the major behavioral challenges faced by any contract, and the alternative approaches to those challenges, with respect to water allocation. It also examines the impact of market design on the existence of externalities, costs imposed by transactions on society and individuals not party to the transaction. It finds that the most robust water market designs will be found in systems with sufficient property rights protection to support investment, sufficient hydrologic information to provide accurate analysis of third party effects, conjunctive management of surface and groundwater, and a governance structure capable of administering the rules while not determining outcomes.     

INCENTIVE-BASED NONPOINT SOURCE POLLUTION ABATEMENT IN A REAUTHORIZED CLEAN WATER ACT1

ABSTRACT: This paper summarizes key provisions of the Clinton Administration's proposals for change in the Clean Water Act. Two of the important themes for change are tougher controls for non-point source pollution and the use of market-based instruments. A detailed analysis of market-based abatement suggests limited potential for reducing costs. The keys to nonpoint source pollution control are clearer definition of property rights combined with changes in government programs that encourage polluting activities.     

REGULATING NONPOINT SOURCE POLLUTION IN SURFACE WATERS: A PROPOSAL1

ABSTRACT: Nonpoint sources (NPS) are an important and continuing source of toxic and conventional pollutants to surface waters. The Clean Water Act amendments of 1987 call for the regulation of these sources through the use of Best Management Practices (BMP). However, BMP implementation has generally occurred on a voluntary basis. This paper proposes a regulatory mechanism to control nonpoint source pollution. The regulatory mechanism involves the development of consortia, made up of all parties potentially responsible for NPS pollution, the development of wasteload allocations that coordinate the pollutant contributions from both point and nonpoint sources in a stream segment, and the issuance of permits to consortia to regulate the impacts of NPS pollution and ensure achievement of state or federal Water Quality Criteria and Standards.     

滨海新区大港农业非点源污染状况研究简

立足天津市滨海新区大港农业背景情况,采用适宜的方法,分别从种植业、畜禽养殖和水产养殖业三方面分析非点源污染物排放量。结果表明：2010年大港地区农业非点源主要污染物COD排放量为377.67 t,氨氮排放量为72.33 t,畜禽养殖排放的污染已占农业非点源污染的一半以上。在此基础上,分别从优化畜禽养殖的养殖模式、种植业科学施用化学品、水产养殖合理投放饲料等方面提出了大港地区农业非点源污染控制的对策。     

天津市农村非点源污染控制对策

本文介绍了2004年天津市农村非点源污染状况,对其主要污染来源和环境影响进行了分析。在此基础上,提出非点源污染控制目标和对策措施,并以天津市的重要饮用水源地——于桥水库为例,介绍了水库周边村落的畜禽养殖污染控制措施。     

Economic and Ecological Rules for Water Quality Trading1

Horan, Richard D. and James S. Shortle, 2011. Economic and Ecological Rules for Water Quality Trading. Journal of the American Water Resources Association (JAWRA) 47(1):59‐69. DOI: 10.1111/j.1752‐1688.2010.00463.x Abstract: Emissions trading in textbook form uses markets to achieve pollution targets cost‐efficiently. This result is accomplished in markets that regulators can implement without knowing pollution abatement costs. The theoretical promise of emissions trading, along with real‐world success stories from air emissions trading, has led to initiatives to use trading for water pollution control. Yet, trading, particularly when it involves nonpoint sources of pollution, requires significant departures from the textbook concept. This paper explores how features of water quality problems affect the design of markets for water pollution control relative to textbook emissions markets. Three fundamental design tasks that regulators must address for pollution trading to achieve an environmental goal at low cost are examined: (1) defining the point and nonpoint commodities to be traded, (2) defining rules governing commodity exchange, and (3) setting caps on the commodity supplies so as to achieve an environmental target. We show that the way in which these tasks are optimally addressed for water quality markets differs significantly from the textbook model and its real‐world analogs. We also show that the fundamental appeal of emissions trading is lost in the case of realistic water quality markets, as market designs that reduce the costs of achieving water quality goals may no longer be implementable without the regulatory authority having information on abatement costs.     

Multiple Interactive Pollutants in Water Quality Trading

Efficient environmental management calls for the consideration of multiple pollutants, for which two main types of transferable discharge permit (TDP) program have been described: separate permits that manage each pollutant individually in separate markets, with each permit based on the quantity of the pollutant or its environmental effects, and weighted-sum permits that aggregate several pollutants as a single commodity to be traded in a single market. In this paper, we perform a mathematical analysis of TDP programs for multiple pollutants that jointly affect the environment (i.e., interactive pollutants) and demonstrate the practicality of this approach for cost-efficient maintenance of river water quality. For interactive pollutants, the relative weighting factors are functions of the water quality impacts, marginal damage function, and marginal treatment costs at optimality. We derive the optimal set of weighting factors required by this approach for important scenarios for multiple interactive pollutants and propose using an analytical elasticity of substitution function to estimate damage functions for these scenarios. We evaluate the applicability of this approach using a hypothetical example that considers two interactive pollutants. We compare the weighted-sum permit approach for interactive pollutants with individual permit systems and TDP programs for multiple additive pollutants. We conclude by discussing practical considerations and implementation issues that result from the application of weighted-sum permit programs.     

A Mixed Bag: Assessmentof Market Performance and Firm Trading Behaviour in the NOx Reclaim Programme

Tradable permit markets have become an increasingly popular tool to address environmental policy problems. This paper describes and evaluates the performance of the Regional Clean Air Incentives Market (RECLAIM) that started operating in Southern California at the beginning of 1994. In analysing overall market performance as well as industry and firm specific information,we find strong evidence for uncertainty influencing market participation during the first two years. Furthermore we find evidence for flexibility-induced abatement cost savings as well as a potential business cycle effect on trading behaviour.Our findings emphasizethe importanceof institutional features of trading programmes.     

Transaction costs and the clean development mechanism

The emissions trading provisions of the Kyoto Protocol and its clean development mechanism (CDM) are designed to permit greenhouse gas (GHG) emission reductions at the lowest cost globally. However, to ensure climate integrity, these reductions must pass through vigilant approval, monitoring and evaluation procedures that create additional transaction costs unrelated to the physical process of eliminating GHGs. Moreover, the CDM's additionality criterion creates constraints that magnify the influence of these transaction costs on project viability. If these costs are extreme, they could undermine the success of the CDM, and possibly of the Kyoto Protocol itself. This article describes the trading provisions of the treaty, creates a working definition of transaction costs, and discusses their effects. It then analyzes the process of creating a CDM project to identify the sources of transaction costs, illustrated by an example of a fuel substitution project in Ghana. The conditions for project profitability are analyzed and compared with recent GHG emission credit prices in Europe. The specific Ghanaian results are not generalizable to all CDM projects, but the model does suggest a template that can be used to analyze the effects of project and transaction costs in other contexts.     

Uncertainty in exhaustible natural resource economics: The irreversible sunk costs of Hotelling

According to Pindyck (2007) there are three important aspects of uncertainly in environmental economics: (1) the benefits and costs of environmental policy tend to be highly non-linear, (2) environmental policy tends to involve important irreversibilities, where investment in pollution abatement can impose an irreversible, sunk cost on society, and where certain pollutants can stay in the environment forever and build up to cause even more future harm in which case investment in abatement can cause an irreversible, sunk benefit to society, and (3) environmental policy involves long time horizons and yet the discount rate society should use is uncertain for determining the net present value of costs and benefits of pollution abatement. These same uncertainties also affect non-renewable, exhaustible, natural resource economics and in particular the use of the Hotelling rule: (1) the costs, benefits and transversality conditions of using the Hotelling rule can be highly non-linear, (2) the Hotelling rule involves important sunk cost irreversibilities, which will be explained here, and (3) the Hotelling rule can involve long time horizons with uncertain discount rates. All three of these problem make it extremely difficult for a market to use in any way the Hotelling rule, yet by the sheer number of articles in non-renewable natural resource economics, one would believe that it is the basis of all resource markets. In this article, we concentrate on the sunk cost irreversibilities of using the Hotelling rule. The idea of the Hotelling rule is to optimally store a non-renewable resource, but the optimization is highly dependent on the actual reserves that are available to extract. However, reserves of underground exhaustible resources are often unobservable at the beginning stages of extraction which makes using the Hotelling Rule difficult.     

环境成本的内在化问题

环境成本是指人类经济活动引起的环境损失。主流经济学认为，外部性与产权是产生环境污染的经济根源，减少环境成本的实质是通过一定的手段将环境成本内在化。不同的治理手段具有不同的治理成本，一般而言，经济手段具有更高的经济效率和较低的成本，但管制手段也有其存在的意义。解决我国的环境成本问题需要树立生态经济协调发展模式，让企业成为污染治理的主体，建立环境补偿机制等。     

WATER MARKETS AND DECENTRALIZED WATER RESOURCES MANAGEMENT: INTERNATIONAL PROBLEMS AND OPPORTUNITIES1

ABSTRACT: Because of its importance and the perceived inability of private sector sources to meet water demands, many countries have depended on the public sector to provide water services for their populations. Yet this has resulted in many inefficient public water projects and in inadequate supplies of good quality and reliable water. Decentralization of water management, including the use of water markets, cannot solve all of these water problems, but it can improve the efficiency of water allocation. When given adequate responsibility and authority, water user associations have effectively taken over water management activities at a savings to tax payers. Moreover, water markets add the potential benefit of improving water efficiency within a sector as well as providing a mechanism for reallocating water among sectors. The key question involves developing innovative mechanisms for reducing the transaction costs of organizing water users and of making water trades. Water rights need to be established which are recorded, tradable, enforceable, and separate from land if markets are to operate effectively. Also, institutions are needed that effectively resolve conflicts over water rights, including third party impacts and water quality concerns.     

Water Quality Trading with Lumpy Investments,Credit Stacking,and Ancillary Benefits

This paper studies the economics of a water quality trading market in a predominantly agricultural watershed, and explores the effects of credit stacking in such a market when buyers and sellers of pollution credits can only reduce pollution with large, discrete investments that yield discontinuous supply and demand. The research simulates hypothetical water quality trading markets in the corn‐belt area of Illinois, where wastewater treatment plants (WWTPs) can pay farmers to reduce nutrients by installing wetlands and farmers may or may not be allowed to earn payments for multiple services from one wetland. We find that wetlands are a more cost‐effective way to mitigate nitrogen pollution than abatement by WWTPs. Stacking credits may improve social welfare while providing more ecosystem services if there is enough demand for the primary credit in the market (nitrogen) to cover most of the cost of installing the wetland but the supply of nitrogen credits is not exhausted. However, in the presence of lumpy pollution reduction activities, the effects of allowing stacked credit sales are idiosyncratic and not necessarily positive; stacked payments may or may not satisfy additionality. The results imply that credit trading for nitrogen is likely to make society better off, but the effects of allowing farmers to receive multiple payments from a single wetland depend on details of the situation.     

WATERSHEDSS: A DECISION SUPPORT SYSTEM FOR WATERSHED-SCALE NONPOINT SOURCE WATER QUALITY PROBLEMS1

ABSTRACT: A significant portion of all pollutants entering surface waters (streams, lakes, estuaries, and wetlands) derives from non-point source (NPS) pollution and, in particular, agricultural activities. The first step in restoring a water resource is to focus on the primary water quality problem in the watershed. The most appropriate NPS control measures, which include best management practices (BMPs) and landscape features, such as wetlands and riparian areas, can then be selected and positioned to minimize or mitigate the identified pollutant(s). A computer-based decision sup. port and educational software system, WATERSHEDSS (WATER, Soil, and Hydro-Environmental Decision Support System), has been developed to aid managers in defining their water quality problems and selecting appropriate NPS control measures. The three primary objectives of WATERSHEDSS are (1) to transfer water quality and land treatment information to watershed managers in order to assist them with appropriate land management/land treatment decisions; (2) to assess NPS pollution in a watershed based on user-supplied information and decisions; and (3) to evaluate, through geographical information systems-assisted modeling, the water quality effects of alternative land treatment scenarios. WATERSHEDSS is available on the World Wide Web (Web) at http://h2osparc.wq.ncsu.edu .     

THE STRUCTURE AND PRACTICE OF WATER QUALITY TRADING MARKETS1

ABSTRACT: The use of transferable discharge permits in water pollution, what we will call water quality trading (WQT), is rapidly growing in the U.S. This paper reviews the current status of WQT nationally and discusses the structures of the markets that have been formed. Four main structures are observed in such markets: exchanges, bilateral negotiations, clearinghouses, and sole source offsets. The goals of a WQT program are environmental quality and cost effectiveness. In designing a WQT market, policy makers are constrained by legal restrictions and the physical characteristics of the pollution problem. The choices that must be made include how trading will be authorized, monitored and enforced. How these questions are answered will help determine both the extent to which these goals are achieved, and the market structures that can arise. After discussing the characteristics of different market structures, we evaluate how this framework applies in the case of California's Grassland Drainage Area Tradable Loads Program.     

The case against free market environmentalism

Free market environmentalists believe that the extension of private property rights and market transactions is sufficient to address environmental difficulties. But there is no invisible hand operating in markets that ensures that environmentally sound practices will be employed just because property rights are in private hands. Also, liability laws and the court systems cannot be relied upon to force polluters to internalize the social costs of pollution. Third, market prices do not provide an objective measure of environmental matters. Finally, there is a right to a livable environment that justifies regulations protecting the public from unreasonable environmental risks.     

Consuming for the Sake of Others: Whose Interests Count on a Market for Animal-Friendly Products?

Many Europeans are concerned about the living conditions of farm animals because they view animals as beings that possess interests of their own. Against this background the introduction of an animal welfare label is being intensively discussed in Europe. In choosing a market-based instrument to take these concerns into account, normative judgments are made about the formation of preferences, the value system that is implicitly assumed, and the distribution of property rights. From the perspective of classical institutional economics it can be shown that the introduction of a label as an institutional change does not redefine institutions in a way that allows them to consider the interests of animals for their own sake. Rather, the label only redefines the property rights that humans have over animals. The market segregation into privileged and normal animals conflicts with the idea of equality between sentient animals. Within the group of humans only the interests of those who act on markets count. The commodification of their moral concerns assumes that people always decide based on their own interests, which can be traded off. The lexicographical ordering of preferences, which occurs when humans view animals as entities with rights, is not compatible with the normative assumptions of markets. Furthermore, interpreting animal suffering as market failure that can be corrected by labeling impedes a reasoned dialog within the society about the values and beliefs that serve as a basis for preference formation. Thus, an animal welfare label cannot replace a fundamental societal debate about legal standards on animal well-being.     

Transaction costs and community-based natural resource management in Nepal

Transaction costs in community-based resource management are incurred by households attempting to enforce property right rules over common resources similar to those inherent in private property rights. Despite their importance, transaction costs of community-based management of common pool resources (CPRs) are often not incorporated into the economic analysis of participatory resource management. This paper examines the transaction costs incurred by forest users in community forestry (CF) based on a survey of 309 households belonging to eight different forest user groups (FUGs) in the mid hills of Nepal. The analysis reveals that the average 'poor' household incurred Nepalese rupees (NRS) 1265 in transaction costs annually, while wealthier 'rich' households incurred an average of NRS 2312 per year. Although richer households bear higher proportions of such costs, transaction costs for CF management as a percentage of resource appropriation costs are higher for poorer households (26%) than those of middle-wealth (24%) or rich households (14%). There are also village differences in the level of transaction costs. The results show that transaction costs are a major component of resource management costs and vary according to socio-economic status of resource users and characteristics of the community.     

Policy Utopias for Nutrient Credit Trading Programs with Nonpoint Sources

A promising program to address water contamination from nutrients is water quality trading (WQT), whereby entities with high abatement costs purchase credits from entities with lower abatement costs. The concept has found some success with point source water pollution, but very few trades have occurred in over 50 programs in the United States (U.S.) that have focused on nonpoint sources (NPSs). To understand why success has been slow, we identified three environments needed for programs to succeed: physical, economic, and institutional. We estimate that only 5% of watersheds in the U.S. currently listed as nutrient impaired provide a viable physical environment for trading nitrogen; 13% are suitable for phosphorus. Economic and institutional challenges would shrink that domain even further. Therefore, we find places with the ideal physical, economic, and institutional environments necessary for feasible WQT programs are virtual policy utopias — rare places with ideal environments. Fortunately, a growing literature provides the tools necessary to identify where these policy utopias are and to expand that domain through a better understanding about how to manage WQT programs more effectively.