清洁生产

联合国环境署工业与环境中心清洁生产网络简讯,致力于促进清洁生产这个使环境保护与发展相和谐的预防性环境管理战略——对产品、生产工艺和服务的运用社论清洁生产宣言——１９９７—９８年政策举措Ｊ．ＡｌｏｉｓｉｄｅＬａｒｄｅｒｅｌ,联合国环境署工业与环境中心主...     

清洁生产政策及其未来走向

2002年6月31日,《清洁生产促进法》在全国人大常委会上获得通过,这是我国清洁生产工作中的一个重要里程碑.本文回顾了近年来我国清洁生产领域相关政策的制订和实施情况,分析了《清洁生产促进法》提出的清洁生产促进手段和制度,讨论了如何根据《清洁生产促进法》的要求,建设适合中国国情的清洁生产政策体系,以及在建设这一体系时所应注意的问题.     

清洁生产政策及其未来走向

2002年6月31日,<清洁生产促进法>在全国人大常委会上获得通过,这是我国清洁生产工作中的一个重要里程碑.本文回顾了近年来我国清洁生产领域相关政策的制订和实施情况,分析了<清洁生产促进法>提出的清洁生产促进手段和制度,讨论了如何根据<清洁生产促进法>的要求,建设适合中国国情的清洁生产政策体系,以及在建设这一体系时所应注意的问题.     

清洁生产缺乏动力原因分析

从国家和企业两个层面上深入分析了我国缺乏清洁生产动力的原因,共性问题是对清洁生产认识不足,国家缺乏对清洁生产技术及激励政策支持,企业自身管理也存在问题,这些都严重制约了我国清洁生产发展。     

AHP-Fuzzy综合评价法在燃料乙醇行业清洁生产评价中的应用

清洁生产是从根本上解决环境保护和经济发展的最好模式。依据生命周期理论并结合燃料乙醇行业特点,本文构建了燃料乙醇行业清洁生产评价指标体系。选用AHP-Fuzzy综合评价法对其清洁生产水平进行评价,在严格的理论基础上加强了评价的科学性和有效性。通过实例研究与分析表明,该指标体系和评价方法可操作性较强,准确性较高,能够比较客观全面地评价企业清洁生产水平,了解企业自身的清洁生产潜力,同时能够找出清洁生产环节中存在的问题,对增强企业市场竞争力和推动企业清洁生产意义重大。     

中国清洁生产的十年

自1990年代以来,为支持可持续发展,中国开始将清洁生产作为一项环境预防与转变生产发展模式的战略措施推行实施.本文依照两个阶段对中国十年清洁生产的实践与进展进行了概括总结.它反映了中国从早期侧重企业层次以宣传培训、示范项目推进清洁生产转入通过政府建立政策机制推进清洁生产的探索前进过程.伴随着2002年中国《清洁生产促进法》的颁布,标志着中国进入依法推进清洁生产的新阶段.中国清洁生产的实践表明,经过政府对其政策的调整变革,将清洁生产纳入管理决策过程中,营造有利于调动企业实施清洁生产的推进机制,是促进中国清洁生产向纵深发展的关键.     

中国清洁生产的十年

自1990年代以来,为支持可持续发展,中国开始将清洁生产作为一项环境预防与转变生产发展模式的战略措施推行实施.本文依照两个阶段对中国十年清洁生产的实践与进展进行了概括总结.它反映了中国从早期侧重企业层次以宣传培训、示范项目推进清洁生产转入通过政府建立政策机制推进清洁生产的探索前进过程.伴随着2002年中国<清洁生产促进法>的颁布,标志着中国进入依法推进清洁生产的新阶段.中国清洁生产的实践表明,经过政府对其政策的调整变革,将清洁生产纳入管理决策过程中,营造有利于调动企业实施清洁生产的推进机制,是促进中国清洁生产向纵深发展的关键.     

在中国推广清洁生产：综述与展望

本文回顾了中国的清洁生产实践,总结了中央,地方政府的清洁生产政策和活动清洁生产的国际合作活动分析了推广清洁生产已取得的进展,并且讨论了各种挑战,为在中国更为广泛实现清洁生产,提出了１０条建议。     

清洁生产

清洁生产ＣｌｅａｎｅｒＰｒｏｄｕｃｔｉｏｎ联合国环境署工业与环境中心清洁生产网络简讯,致力于促进清洁生产这个使环境保护与发展相和谐的预防性环境管理战略——对产品、生产工艺和服务的运用环境水准基点标定与清洁生产在１９９６年在牛津举行的１９９６年第四次高...     

清洁生产

联合国环境署工业与环境中心清洁生产网络简讯,致力于促进清洁生产这个使环境保护与发展相和谐的预防性环境管理战略对产品、生产工艺和服务的运用     

我国开发区环境问题及对策

本文概要地价绍了我国开发区建设中存在的主要环境问题，并提出了加强宣传提高全民环境意识，强化政府的环境管理职能，统一规划，积极推行清洁生产等环境保护对策。     

“十五”规划期上海城市生态环境建设的战略重点与对策

评价了上海市的生态环境现状和制约因素,从人口结构优化,城乡融合规划,清洁生产与ISO1400认证,绿地生态建设,环境,环境教育与组织建设等方面研究了“十五”规划期间上海城市生态环境建设的战略重点与对策。     

Investment in cleaner technology and signaling distortions in a market with green consumers

I analyze the pricing and investment behavior of a firm that signals the environmental attributes of its production technology through its price to uninformed environmentally conscious consumers. I then analyze the effect of change in environmental regulation on the signaling outcome and the firm's ex ante incentive to invest in cleaner technology. When regulation is weak, a firm signals cleaner technology through higher price; in this case, the firm earns lower profit when it has cleaner technology and thus, has no incentive to invest in cleaner technology. The price charged by the clean firm declines sharply beyond a critical level of regulation. When regulation is sufficiently stringent, the firm with cleaner technology charges lower price but earns higher signaling profit, and ex ante the firm has positive incentive to invest in cleaner technology. With weak regulation, the incentive of the firm to directly disclose its environmental performance rather than signal it through price is increasing in the level of regulation; the opposite holds when regulation is sufficiently stringent.     

Investment in cleaner technology and signaling distortions in a market with green consumers

I analyze the pricing and investment behavior of a firm that signals the environmental attributes of its production technology through its price to uninformed environmentally conscious consumers. I then analyze the effect of change in environmental regulation on the signaling outcome and the firm's ex ante incentive to invest in cleaner technology. When regulation is weak, a firm signals cleaner technology through higher price; in this case, the firm earns lower profit when it has cleaner technology and thus, has no incentive to invest in cleaner technology. The price charged by the clean firm declines sharply beyond a critical level of regulation. When regulation is sufficiently stringent, the firm with cleaner technology charges lower price but earns higher signaling profit, and ex ante the firm has positive incentive to invest in cleaner technology. With weak regulation, the incentive of the firm to directly disclose its environmental performance rather than signal it through price is increasing in the level of regulation; the opposite holds when regulation is sufficiently stringent.     

Growth, environment and innovation—a model with production vintages and environmentally oriented research

I develop an innovative environmental new growth model driven by researchers striving for monopoly profits. Skilled labour is allocated between production vintages and two forms of research, ordinary and environmentally oriented. The intermediate sector includes fixed costs and decreasing returns, limiting the number of vintages used. I solve for planner's, laissez-faire, and regulator's solutions, and examine welfare implications and the various distortions in the model (monopoly power, knowledge spillovers, business stealing, environmental externalities). A regulator may wish: (i) to encourage environmentally oriented research; (ii) to concentrate production labour on recent (cleaner) vintages; (iii) to switch labour from production to research. An environmental sales tax may under some circumstances achieve all three—such taxes not only give incentives to reduce pollution, but also shift profits from old vintages to new, thus raising incentives to come up with newer (cleaner) vintages. An environmental tax may even lead to an increase in the rate of production growth.     

Competitive investment in clean technology and uninformed green consumers

In a market where consumers and the regulatory authorities are not fully informed about the actual production technology or environmental performance of firms that engage in strategic competition, I study the effect of environmental consciousness of consumers on firms׳ incentive to invest in cleaner technology. Firms compete in prices and may signal their environmental performance to uninformed consumers through prices. I also analyze the effect of an expected liability on firms in this setting. Compared to full information, incomplete information generates higher strategic incentive to invest in cleaner technology particularly when consciousness and/or expected liability are not too high. Requiring mandatory disclosure of technology or environmental performance may discourage such investment. Even though consumers and the regulator are uninformed, competition has a positive effect (relative to monopoly) on the incentive to invest.     

区域环评中能源及资源合理利用类比分析

在区域开发项目中合理地利用资源是反映区域内经济布局,产业结构及生产工艺先进与清洁的一个方面,其合理性分析是区域环境评价与环境规划中必不可少的一部分。本文列举了天津市近年来完成的有代表性的区域环境规划与环境评价项目中有关内容的类比分析方法。     

实施ISO14000标准与清洁生产相结合推动经济可持续发展

本文通过分析实施ＩＳＯ１４０００标准与清洁生产的关系,论述了实施ＩＳＯ１４０００标准与清洁生产相结合是推动经济可持续发展的重要手段,同时指出了当前实施ＩＳＯ１４０００标准与清洁生产中存在的问题。     

清洁生产理论基础

重点分析了清洁生产的物流基础、价值基础、经济基础,并与末端治理对比,从而论证了清洁生产是实现经济效益和环境效益的最佳模式,是实现可持续发展的必然选择。     

建设项目环境影响评价中污染物排放总量控制评价方法

本文提出了在建设项目环境影响评价中关于污染物排放总量控制评价所应包含的内容,介绍了清洁生产纳入环评中的方法,确定了在技术经济合理,污染物排放满足环境质量与排放标准前提下的排放总量,并对其合理性论证方法做了介绍,提出总量控制目标实现的对策。