什么是次生灾害和衍生灾害？

次生灾害，是指由原生灾害诱导出来的灾害。次生灾害多发生在气象灾害与地质灾害领域，具有隐蔽性和突发性的特点，危害性大。 衍生灾害是指由于人们缺乏对原生灾害的了解，或受某些社会因素和心理影响等，造成的盲目避灾损失，以及人心浮动等一系列社会问题引起的灾害。     

地震诱发井工煤矿次生灾害系统研究

为研究地震灾害诱发的井工煤矿次生灾害中承灾体与次生灾害的关联性，首先基于系统科学、区域灾害系统理论，构建地震诱发井工煤矿次生灾害系统，定义系统结构、特征、功能及子系统间关系；其次在地震灾害、孕灾环境、井工煤矿承灾体等3个子系统中确定次生灾害的调查对象；然后基于语义网络对系统内的承灾体、关联关系进行知识表示，得出承灾体、次生灾害的知识表示方法。研究结果表明：地震灾害、原生灾害、次生灾害三者间具有链式关系，均会与环境共同作用于井工煤矿的承灾体。     

城市灾害避难系列讲座避难疏散场所规划

城市必须规划建设避难疏散场所,否则,在严重灾害发生时,或者产生严重的次生灾害时,会给灾后城市管理与抗灾救灾工作带来很大的困难. 规划指标要求 一些严重灾害后,市民的避难行动极为混乱,和灾前没有规划建设避难疏散场所不无关系.     

化工储罐区空袭次生灾害危险性评价研究

根据化工储罐区及其遭空袭次生灾害的特点,以空袭次生灾害的影响范围作为危险性评价的标准,对化工储罐区的空袭次生灾害进行危险性评价。指出储罐遭空袭后的3种毁伤方式;给出储罐遭空袭发生的次生灾害及其扩散的形式与后果;阐述了化工储罐区空袭次生灾害的成灾机理;分别提出热辐射伤害、冲击波伤害和有毒有害物质扩散的危险性评价方法。以池火灾为例,建立了池火灾的危险性评价模型;论述了池火灾危险性评价的具体流程,并进行了案例分析,根据计算结果提出了相应的减灾对策。笔者认为,化工储罐区遭空袭后的次生灾害的危险性评价具有现实意义,对于化工园区、石化厂、危化品仓库等突发安全事故产生次生灾害的危险性评价同样具有重要的参考价值。     

地震次生灾害影响条件下人员疏散问题的研究

人员疏散问题是地震应急救援研究的一个重要课题.在最短时间以最有效的方式将危险区域人员转移到疏散地域,既要求有合理的场地分配,又应考虑次生灾害等突发状况影响下对疏散路线的优选.从有组织避震疏散数学模型出发,编制了地震次生灾害影响下疏散路线的优选算法,最后介绍了该算法的实际应用情况.     

商业综合体灾害链风险评估研究

为了对商业综合体灾害链进行风险研究,基于链式风险评估模型的建模方法,构建商业综合体灾害链风险评估模型,并应用复杂网络结构对商业综合体灾害链的演化过程进行表征,综合灾害事件的致灾率、灾害损失程度、灾害链的脆弱度3个指标得到每条灾害链的风险度量值,最后以泸州摩尔玛商场爆炸事件为实例进行评估,辨识出每条灾害链的风险值。研究结果表明:该模型与实际情况具有较高的吻合性,为商业综合体次生或衍生灾害的防控提供了可靠的理论依据。     

灾害风险研究及其应用

本文将灾害分为自然灾害和人为(技术)灾害两类。指出灾害是一种随机事件,风险管理是一种适当的灾害管理手段。本文给出了风险的数学定义和社会风险水平(风险本底)的国际国内统计数据,综述了风险研究中若干问题的研究进展。     

避难疏散场所规划

城市必须规划建设避难疏散场所,否则,在严重灾害发生时,或者产生严重的次生灾害时,会给灾后城市管理与抗灾救灾工作带来很大的困难。规划指标要求一些严重灾害后,市民的避难行动极为混乱,     

地震次生灾害影响条件下人员疏散问题的研究

人员疏散问题是地震应急救援研究的一个重要课题。在最短时间以最有效的方式将危险区域人员转移到疏散地域,既要求有合理的场地分配,又应考虑次生灾害等突发状况影响下对疏散路线的优选。从有组织避震疏散数学模型出发,编制了地震次生灾害影响下疏散路线的优选算法,最后介绍了该算法的实际应用情况。     

2004年我国事故与灾害状况综述

2004年我国共发生各类事故803 571起,死亡136 755人.文中给出了这些安全生产事故及自然灾害中火灾(城乡火灾、森林火灾、草原火灾)、气象灾害(沙尘天气、干旱、暴雨洪涝、夏季高温等)、农业自然灾害(干旱、洪涝、风雹、低温冻害)、海洋灾害(风暴潮、赤潮、海浪、海冰、溢油)、地质灾害(地震、泥石流)以及药物不良反应的分类总结和具体评述.     

Computerized hazards analysis : The backbone of a hazards analysis effort/basis for a corporate hazards information exchange

Computerized hazards analysis has many obvious advantages. Criticality codes can be assigned, modified, sorted, grouped, and regrouped. Critical event assignments can be automatically tracked. Graphics capability can show the distribution of various types of hazards dramatically, and the risks involved with each. But, computerized hazards analyses can provide benefits orders of magnitudes beyond those mentioned above. Consider the following: as hazards analyses are performed, i.e., as hazard severity, critical events, and risks are defined for each component and each operator action in your facility, you are relying on the memories of many people for much of your input. The following text includes real life examples of such a situation.     

Risk assessment of antagonistic hazards

This paper considers the risk to major hazard plant from terrorists deliberately causing catastrophic industrial accidents. The United States of America Department of Justice [Assessment of the increased risk of terrorist or other criminal activity associated with posting off-site consequence analysis information on the internet, 2000] reports that “breaching a containment vessel of an industrial facility with an explosive or otherwise causing a chemical release may appear relatively simple to…a terrorist”. They concluded that the risk of such action is “real and credible”.

Analysis of terrorism is often hampered by its being described as ‘irrational’; one corollary would be that it is unpredictable. However, terrorism may usefully be treated as a rational behaviour and in doing so it becomes possible to assess the risks it causes.

We analyse the vulnerability of major hazard plant to terrorist attack and identify nine factors (access, security, visibility, opacity, secondary hazard, robustness, law enforcement response, victim profile, and political value) that might be used as a starting point for more formal risk assessment and management.     

Compression system check-valve failure hazards

Processes that utilize multistage compression systems (olefins plant compression systems, gas processing, integrated refrigeration systems, etc.) have the potential for overpressure due to single or multiple check-valve failure. Catastrophic equipment failure resulting from overpressure can potentially occur due to compression system discharge, interstage, and/or suction check-valve failure, coincident with compressor shutdown. Depending on system design and application, overpressure values approaching or exceeding 300% of equipment design are possible, while for some equipment, even limited overpressure can result in catastrophic vessel failure due to brittle fracture. Additional hazards associated with compression system fail-to-check scenarios include risks associated with excessive flare loading and compressor rotor reverse rotation. In the case of an ethylene refrigeration compressor at a typical ethylene plant, rotor reverse rotation can potentially exceed overspeed limits.This paper provides risk assessment results based on analyses performed on the three primary compression systems in six ethylene plants. The methodologies used for risk identification screening, detailed risk assessment and evaluation of system dynamics are all presented. Alternative methods for mitigating risks are also discussed, along with check-valve reliability data. An overview of applicable overpressure protection requirements defined in the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code is provided. This paper will be of interest to anyone who designs or operates multistage compression systems in the chemical, petrochemical or refining industries.     

The hazards and risks of hydrogen

An analysis was completed of the hazards and risks of hydrogen, compared to the traditional fuel sources of gasoline and natural gas (methane). The study was based entirely on the physical properties of these fuels, and not on any process used to store and extract the energy. The study was motivated by the increased interest in hydrogen as a fuel source for automobiles.The results show that, for flammability hazards, hydrogen has an increased flammability range, a lower ignition energy and a higher deflagration index. For both gasoline and natural gas (methane) the heat of combustion is higher (on a mole basis). Thus, hydrogen has a somewhat higher flammability hazard.The risk is based on probability and consequence. The probability of a fire or explosion is based on the flammability range, the auto-ignition temperature and the minimum ignition energy. In this case, hydrogen has a larger flammability zone and a lower minimum ignition energy—thus the probability of a fire or explosion is higher. The consequence of a fire or explosion is based on the heat of combustion, the maximum pressure during combustion, and the deflagration index. Hydrogen has an increased consequence due to the large value of the deflagration index while gasoline and natural gas (methane) have a higher heat of combustion. Thus, based on physical properties alone, hydrogen poses an increase risk, primarily due to the increased probability of ignition.This study was unable to assess the effects of the increased buoyancy of hydrogen—which might change the probability depending on the actual physical situation.A complete hazard and risk analysis must be completed once the actual equipment for hydrogen storage and energy extraction is specified. This paper discusses the required procedure.     

透视我国非煤矿山事故隐患

据国土资源部统计:到2000年底,全国共有各类矿山153,063个。据此估算,非煤矿山约占一半,其从业人员达数百万之多。这数百万人的生死存亡,与矿山的安全状况息息相关。众所周知,矿山是基础产业。由于矿山的自然特点,其伤亡率远远高于其他产业。但是只要加强安全工作,伤亡事故是完全可以大大减少直至销声匿迹的。如美国2001年全国煤矿死亡人数仅为42人,非煤矿山死亡人数仅为30人。     

Prediction of thermal hazards from fireballs

Various models of fireball diameter have been evaluated by statistical techniques. The model of Gayle for fireball diameter estimation showed good agreement between the predicted and experimental data. The models relating to fireball duration, transmissivity and view factor have been selected based on their relative merits. A user interactive computer program has been developed to predict thermal hazards from fireballs in chemical process industries.     

Strategies for controlling hazards at work

This paper presents an heuristic framework for analyzing hazards (potential for loss or harm) and strategies that may be developed to control their realization. Two basic forms of intervention for hazard control (anticipation and reaction) are identified. Three broad anticipative strategies are discussed: (1) elimination of the source of the hazard, (2) containment of the risk of its realization, and (3) mitigation of likely consequences. The communication and judgmental processes involved in decisions about strategies are shown to be embedded in the organizational “political” context, in which a variety of interests backed by varying sources of power and influence are represented. The development, implementation, and monitoring of any strategies that are decided upon are then discussed, including the fact that such actions and events may not produce the intended results. Comments are also made on the need for data provided by monitoring to be evaluated and appropriate adaptations made. Finally, a brief section of the paper discusses reactive strategies.     

Reactive chemical hazards of diazonium salts

Many diazonium salts are thermally unstable and sensitive to friction and shock. Most diazonium salts are known for their violent decomposition hazard in the solid state. There are many industrial and laboratory incidents caused by this group of chemicals. For safety purposes, the hazards related to the preparation and the handling of diazonium salts are discussed. Twelve cardinal rules are provided:1. Use only a stoichiometric amount of sodium nitrite when generating diazonium salts, avoiding excess sodium nitrite.2. Check for the excess of nitrous acid by starch–potassium iodide papers and neutralize it.3. Minimize the presence of nitrous acid by combining amine and acid first, then subsequently adding the sodium nitrite.4. Keep the temperature below 5 °C.5. Always vent the gases generated.6. Determine the thermal stability of diazonium compounds in your system.7. Understand the explosive properties of diazonium salts. If unknown, always assume they are explosive.8. Never allow the undesired precipitation of diazonium salts out of solution.9. Analyze the residual diazo compounds in the final product, especially for new process conditions.10. Quench the remaining diazonium salts before any further treatments.11. Isolate no more than 0.75 mmol of explosive diazonium salts at one time; also consider the addition of an inert material to stabilize the diazonium salts.12. Use a plastic spatula when handling the solid. The dried powder should not be “scratched” with a metal spatula or ground finely.An example of a testing strategy and data interpretation is provided for a process which has multiple steps and two diazonium compounds. Differential Scanning Calorimetry (DSC) and Heat of Mixing calorimetry (HOM) successfully serve as efficient tests to screen thermal stability and gas generation, identifying the candidates for advanced tests.