Hydroxyurea explosion: a thermoanalytical and calorimetric study

An accident occurred during a production process of hydroxyurea. Several thermoanalytical techniques were used in order to understand the reason for the accident, even utilising a simulation program. Thermogravimetric analysis and Fourier transform infra-red spectroscopy were performed to identify the decomposition products according to European Directive 96/82/EC, the so-called Seveso II.     

Ageing management and monitoring of critical equipment at Seveso sites: An ontological approach

A safe “ageing” of Seveso establishments is a challenge for both operators and regulators. To this scope, Seveso III Directive required to integrate the equipment integrity issue into the safety management system for the major accident prevention; at the same time, the Italian Authority adopted a short-cut method for a quick ageing evaluation, which awards the application of the best techniques to control integrity and prevent deterioration-related failures. In this paper, the use of the ontology has been proposed to support decision-making about the implementation of technical solutions to control equipment ageing and comply the requirements of the Seveso legislation. To contrast deterioration mechanisms, the rapid development of data intensive smart sensors should be exploited and, in this frame, the automated on-line direct monitoring of equipment conditions, based on innovative low-cost sensors, is a novelty and promising solution. The developed ontology-based system points towards the adoption, when possible, of on-line monitoring. This solution provides much more data than traditional measurements and it is essential for the operators to understand how to merge concurrent information and data and to adequately control equipment deterioration. The ontology-based approach appears a viable solution even for this purpose. To demonstrate its potentiality, a real use-case has been used, where the model has been tested in finding the best technical solutions to improve the ageing management of an atmospheric distillation unit of a refinery in order to comply with safety requirements. A further use-case is given to show how the model can be used to react, after real-time damage signals, to restore safety conditions by means of an adequate decision-making.     

Developing an external domino accident prevention framework: Hazwim

Empirical research on major accident safety in the second largest chemical cluster worldwide, the Antwerp port area, supports the design of a meta-technical framework for optimizing external domino prevention. First, the majority of Seveso top tier companies have expressed a willingness to cooperate more intensively to protect themselves against potential off-site major accidents. Second, Hazop, What–If analysis and the Risk Matrix, interesting building blocks for such a framework, are frequently used risk analysis techniques at Seveso lower tier and Seveso top tier companies. The developed framework, called Hazwim, integrates these three complementary techniques into an effective standardized risk analysis framework for the prevention of external xdomino accidents in an industrial area. The main strengths of Hazwim are its completeness and its cost-effectiveness. The combination of techniques on the one hand and qualitative and quantitative data on the other, offers a comprehensive up-to-date list of cross-company domino hazards and recommended actions in the area under consideration. The Hazwim framework offers support to prevention managers and safety policy makers concerning external domino prevention.     

Prevention through design: The effect of European Directives on construction workplace accidents

Workplace accidents still occur with distressing frequency, particularly in construction. Industrialized countries have become increasingly aware of this situation and have adopted policies to attempt to deal with this issue. Such policies have led to the development of new laws and regulations with a view to improving workplace conditions.This paper first analyzes policies regarding accident prevention in the European Union, as initially stipulated in the European Framework Directive 89/391/EEC, and more specifically in Directive 92/57/EEC, on the implementation of minimum safety and health requirements at temporary or mobile construction sites, concentrating on prevention through design. Whilst designers previously had some responsibilities for reducing risk under common law provisions in many countries, this directive was the first explicit legislation to enforce particular duties upon them. The adaptation of the provisions in this directive to the national legislation of EU member countries is also studied.The second section of the paper analyzes the incidence rate of workplace accidents in the construction sector in each country from the year when these regulations came into force until the present time. Based on the evolution of these accident rates, the paper postulates the extent to which European policies have contributed to accident prevention in construction. It is now more than a decade since this legislation has been in force which provides a suitable period for a reflective analysis on it is impact.     

Main differences on European regulations in the frame of the Seveso Directive

Since the first Seveso Directive was issued 25 years ago, each Member State of the European Union developed own regulations to enforce its application. The lack of a common approach generated differences between Member States, or even between regions within a Member State, which in practical terms caused that establishments falling under the field of application of the Seveso Directive face a different level of requirements. This situation causes significantly different impact on social, technical and financial aspects.Factors like industrial background, accidental history, actual land use, social attitude towards risk, economical and political structures play an important role in how the decisions about hazardous activities are perceived and handled.Answering the question: “Is there a right methodology for the assessment of the risk of major accidents?” may be sterile or impossible. Many tools are appropriate and the main concern is to use them properly. Technically, the causes and consequences of, e.g., a fire in a port in Spain on the Mediterranean Sea or in the port of Basel (Switzerland) in the Rhine River could be assessed using the same methods and criteria, but this is not usually the case.This paper shows, with practical examples, the differences existing while applying different regulations in the field of prevention of major accidents and the potential effects that these differences may generate regarding the definition and management of emergency plans outside establishments.If the existing unequal situation is not faced, the comparative disagreements between Member States will prevail. Therefore, the application of the Seveso Directive will generate a different impact on the society, operators and regulators, and may become a factor which may cause a risk transfer between Member States. Efforts should be addressed to harmonize criteria in this subject.     

Learning lessons from tunnel accidents – Recommendations in support of the implementation of Article 15 on Reporting of the EU Directive 2004/54/EC

Tunnels in the trans-European road network (TEN) facilitate the transport of persons and goods on European roads. Following a series of major tunnel accidents European Union Directive 2004/54/EC was adopted to support the achievement of uniform and high tunnel safety levels. With future accident prevention and mitigation in mind and in support of the effective implementation of Article 15 on Reporting of the Directive we outline a procedure for learning lessons and discuss every step in the process with specific regard for its implications on Article 15. This includes accident investigation, reporting, data collection and analysis, learning lessons and their implementation. The realization that validated information on tunnel accidents is not easily available or accessible, or suffers from a lack of detail or accuracy fed into the development of a data-collection template. By its very nature the template development also guided the formulation of key recommendations for accident investigation and reporting as the main information source. In addition, key recommendations on data analysis, learning lessons and implementation were also made to assist the actors responsible for reporting or sharing information under the EU Directive.     

Risk assessment in support to land-use planning in Europe: Towards more consistent decisions?

Recognising the importance of establishing appropriate separation distances between hazardous installations and vulnerable residential areas for mitigating the effects of industrial accidents, the European legislation for the control of major accident hazards - the so-called Seveso II Directive - calls for procedures ensuring that technical advice is taken systematically into account for land-use planning (LUP) purposes. Due to historical, administrative, cultural and other reasons, these European Union’s Member States which have consolidated procedures for addressing this issue, have employed different approaches, methods and criteria, with a potential for great divergence in the resulting land-use planning decisions. In order to address this situation and to increase consistency and ‘defendability’ of land-use planning decisions in the EU, a European Working Group has been established and is operating under the coordination of the European Commission’s Joint Research Centre (JRC). This Group, consisting of experts from the EU Member States, the industry and the academia, is trying to understand the different approaches and their implications to LUP decision-making, to develop guidelines in support to these decisions and to examine data sources and tools for consistent application of risk assessment in support to LUP. This paper presents the activities of the Group, reviews the situation with respect to LUP in Europe and discusses whether a direction towards more consistent LUP decisions is being followed in Europe.     

The use of current risk analysis tools evaluated towards preventing external domino accidents

Risk analysis is an essential tool for company safety policy. Risk analysis consists of identifying and evaluating all possible risks. The efficiency of risk analysis tools depends on the rigueur of identifying and evaluating all possible risks. The diversity in risk analysis procedures is such that there are many appropriate techniques for any circumstance and the choice has become more a matter of taste. In this paper, we examine the risk analysis tools used by 24 chemical plants in Belgium, mainly located in the port of Antwerp, the second largest chemical cluster in the world after Houston, TX, USA. The aim of this paper is to identify the current practice in the chemical industry subject to European Seveso legislation and to examine how the present methods can be integrated to improve safety policy, especially towards preventing major accidents. Moreover, conclusions on the prevention of catastrophic external domino accidents involving several companies are formulated. This paper also gives impulse to investigating cross-company management implementations concerning external domino accident prevention.     

Regulations of major accident hazards control in Serbia and their implementation

The paper presents a brief summary of contents and implementation of the current Serbian regulations on the prevention and control of major accidents involving dangerous materials. Further, it discusses issues connected with implementation of the regulation, including inspection, review, and approval of safety reports. This regulation comprises legal requirements and methodological guidelines for risk analysis and preparation of emergency plans. Although the roots of the Serbian regulation are basically in the Seveso I Directive, this study revealed significant differences compared with current regulations and practice in Europe.     

Influence of new generic frequencies on the QRA calculations for land use planning purposes in Walloon region (Belgium)

In Europe, the article 12 of the “Seveso” Directive focuses on land use planning (LUP) around major hazard plants and imposes to keep a sufficient distance between a major hazard plant and populated areas. In Belgium, the LUP is treated at the regional level. The regional authority defines the policy and manages the LUP according to the quantified risk. The quantified external risk, around each Seveso company in the Walloon Region, is assessed by a unique technical expert, the Faculté Polytechnique de Mons, by means of a full probabilistic approach (QRA). This QRA methodology uses accident generic frequencies published by the Flemish Region (Aminal, 2004). In 2009-2010, the quantification of the external risk of the 90 walloon Seveso plants will be completed, based on this set of generic frequencies. However, the Flemish Region recently published a new set of generic frequencies (LNE, 2009), which, in some cases, are quite different of the previous ones for some equipment. This paper discusses the influence of the new frequency data on the quantified risk. An overview of the changes induced by the new set of data will be presented, as well as their impact on the already defined "consultation zones" in which decisions are made concerning the compatibility of the land use and the intensity of risk.     

Reference criteria for the identification of accident scenarios in the framework of land use planning

Land use planning (LUP) around industrial sites at risk of major accidents requires the application of sound approaches in the selection of credible accident scenarios. In fact, the ‘technical’ phase of LUP is based on the identification and assessment of relevant accident scenarios. An improper choice of scenarios may critically affect both the ‘technical’ phase of risk assessment and the following ‘policy’ phase concerning decision making on land-use restrictions and/or licensing. The present study introduces a procedure aimed at the systematic identification of reference accident scenarios to be used in the gathering of technical data on potential major accidents, which is a necessary step for LUP around Seveso sites. Possible accident scenarios are generated by an improved version of the MIMAH methodology (Methodology for the Identification of Major Accident Hazards). The accident scenarios are then assessed for LUP relevance considering severity, frequency and time scale criteria. The influence of prevention and mitigation barriers is also taken into account. Two applications are used to demonstrate the proposed procedure. In both case-studies, the proposed methodology proved successful in producing consistent sets of reference scenarios.     

A Bayesian network-based approach for the assessment and management of ageing in major hazard establishments

Currently, there is an increasing attention towards ageing of industrial equipment, as the phenomenon has been recognised as a cause of severe accidents, recorded in the last years in many process establishments. Recent studies described ageing through a number of key-factors affecting the phenomenon by accelerating or slowing it down. The Italian Competent Authority for the prevention of chemical accidents (Seveso III Directive) adopted a short-cut method, accounting for the assessment of these factors, to evaluate the adequateness of ageing management during inspections at Seveso sites. In this paper, a Bayesian Network was developed, by using the data gathered during the first application of the short-cut method, with the aim to verify the robustness of the approach for ageing assessment and the validity of the a priori assumptions used in assessing the key-factors. The structure of the Bayesian network was established by using experts’ knowledge, whereas the Counting Learning algorithm was adopted to execute the parameter learning by means of the software Netica. The results showed that this network could effectively explore the complex logical and uncertain relationships amongst factors affecting equipment ageing. Results of the present study were exploited to improve the short-cut method.     

Small enterprises and major hazards: How to develop an appropriate safety management system

Many small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) are obliged to adopt a Safety Managements System (SMS) by the Directive 2012/18/EU for the control of Major Accident Hazards (Seveso III). The difficulties of implementing an SMS within a small sized work organization are well known by practitioners, including inspectors and auditors and have been discussed in many recent papers. In the present paper is discussed a new method, based on the bowtie model, to build an easy and effective SMS. The very core of this method is a “safety net model”, which is able to connect in a network all the tangible and intangible elements of safety, including equipment, operating instructions, procedures and safety documents. This safety model has been used as the core of a smart application, the strength of which is the workers' contribution. The application allows the users to build step by step an SMS. It starts from a first version based just on regulations and standard codes (version 0), then it integrates internal knowledge through the bowtie paradigm (version 1). Near misses' discussion is used to transfer actual workers' experience into the system, to get intermediate improvement of the SMS (version 1.x). At the end audit may be used to a major release of the SMS (version 2). The full cycle has been tested at two small Seveso establishments: a galvanic plant and small glue manufacturer.     

提高重大工业事故预防控制能力研究

从系统宏观安全及事故预防的微观要素两方面,深入剖析我国在事故预防法规标准、重大危险源监控、隐患治理、安全设备设施、安全科研、人员素质等方面存在的问题,提出"五个转变"的理念,并从健全事故预防法规标准、严格安全设备及人员准入、构建多级事故风险预警机制、创新安全管理模式、加强重大事故预防控制新技术研究和应用、推进重大危险源监管实用技术开发与推广等方面提出相应的措施方法,突出强调了风险预控和依靠安全科技,建议加强对重大危险源和重大事故隐患预防控制工作的系统思考和统筹规划。     

A framework addressing a safe ageing management in complex industrial sites: The Italian experience in «Seveso» establishments

In Europe, the Directive 2012/18/EU (Seveso III) strengthens the obligation to adopt a program assuring the integrity of critical equipment at major hazard establishments, by taking into account actual deterioration mechanisms (internal and external corrosion, erosion, thermal and mechanical fatigue, etc.). The program must cover all phases of the lifecycle and ensure a safe ageing of equipment, particularly when these are reaching the final stage of life. The effectiveness of the integrity program must be carefully assessed during the audits planned by the establishment's operator as well as by inspectors on behalf of the Competent Authorities. The adoption of a Risk Based Inspection scheme provides a valuable help to face this matter. The operator is, anyway, required a considerable effort to face at least three issues related to: (i) the understanding of concurring physical and chemical phenomena; (ii) the management of information associated with each individual component and its history, (iii) the appropriate measurement, including acquisition and management of data. There is a considerable difficulty in understanding these issues during Seveso inspections and external audits, because time and resources are often limited. For this reason, models and methods supporting the definition of the ageing status and trend in industrial sites are needed. This paper analyses the main factors affecting ageing. A framework for “ageing” assessment in complex industrial sites, including “Seveso” establishments, is proposed; then, its validation, by means of data collected during a testing phase carried out in Italy, is also given.     

Prevention and mitigation of injuries and damages arising from the activity of subliminal enterprises: A case study in Slovakia

The paper focuses on risk sources under no legislative pressure in the field of prevention of major accidents. Despite this, they can represent significant sources of risk of accidents.The aim of the paper is to present the results of the risk assessment associated with the operation of enterprises not regulated by the SEVESO III Directive (the so-called subliminal enterprises), to provide information on possible operational problems and to verify the applicability of recognized risk analysis methods for these specific sources of risk. Last but not least, its purpose is to point out that subliminal enterprises, due to their location close to residential areas or areas with a high concentration of population, pose a serious risk to the population.The paper summarizes the results of the quantitative risk assessment of a specific enterprise not included in the Seveso Directive – a filling station. Filling stations are frequently located in built-up areas with a dense coefficient of habitability. Due to their number, location (e.g. close to residential areas), frequency of occurrence of persons in the area and handling of dangerous substances during normal operation, they can have negative or even tragic consequences to the life and health of the population.Due to the non-existent risk assessment methodology for enterprises with subliminal quantities of dangerous substances and the lack of a systematic search for risk sources, a risk assessment procedure for these companies is designed.     

The impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the safety management in Italian Seveso industries

The paper discusses the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the Italian chemical and process industries, where Directive 2012/18/EU Seveso III, for the control of Major Accident Hazard (MAH), is enforced. The Safety Management System (SMS) for the control of MAH, which has been mandatory for 20 years in Italian Seveso Establishments, has been highly stressed by the external pressure, related in some way to the COVID-19 pandemic. Fairly, most companies, in particular in oil and gas sectors, have demonstrated an adequate capability to reconcile operation continuity and health requirements. This experience is providing the establishment operators and the regulators with valuable suggestions for the improvements of the SMS-MAH. Within this framework, an innovative organisational resilience model is proposed, aiming at the development of a higher capability to face future new crisis. The current SMS-MAH already includes some basic pillars to enhance resilience, which were valuable during the pandemic crisis, but a full and rationale development is still needed. Starting from the first pandemic phase experience, this paper presents a novel tool to assess the degree of “resilience” of a SMS-MAH. It is based on a questionnaire, featuring 25 questions grouped into eight items, according to the typical SMS-MAH structure. A two level AHP model has been developed in order to define the weights to be assigned to each point. The AHP panel included industrial practitioners, regulators, authorities and researchers. The results are based on the COVID-19 experience and consequently the developed model is tailored to face health emergencies, but the approach may be easily transferred to other external crises.     

The digital representation of safety systems at “Seveso” plants and its potential for improving risk management

At Seveso plants, duty holders must have a complex system for assessing and managing risks. The pillars of this system are the safety report and the safety management system, with a number of underlying documents. The strength of the system is the high standardization of these documents. Regulations, standard codes and guidelines define content, structure and formats. The weakness is the high complexity. Managers and workers perceive documents as difficult to understand and far from actual operations. Major threats for the credibility of documents (and therefore for the safety systems) come from the continuous organizational and technical changes, which in a short time can make most documents obsolete; as well as by near misses, which continuously show the holes in safety systems. A big effort is required to follow up the plant changes and the near misses. In order to help safety managers, a new software has been developed. At Seveso plants, it has been possible build an integrated digital representation, because all documents are perfectly structured. This representation may be used both for updating the relevant documents after a change and to improve documents after a near miss or an accident. In this way, safety documents are always up to date and trustworthy and the huge knowledge, which is usually hidden inside safety documents, is clearly revealed and revived. The approach is basically “knowledge based” and the intention is to provide safety managers with an easy and simple tool. IRISonLine is a software that has been developed by ISPESL to provide safety managers of “Seveso” establishments with a tool for improving the management of change and of near misses.     

Major accident management in the process industry: An expert tool called CESMA for intelligent allocation of prevention investments

A tool (called CESMA) was developed to carry out cost–benefit analyses and cost-effectiveness analyses of prevention investments for avoiding major accidents. A wide variety of parameters necessary to calculate both the costs of the considered preventive measures and the benefits related with the avoidance of accidents were identified in the research. The benefits are determined by estimating the difference in (hypothetical) major accident costs without and with the implementation of a preventive measure. As many relevant costs and benefits as possible were included into the tool, based on literature and expert opinion, in order to be able to deliver an all-embracing cost–benefit analysis and cost-effectiveness analysis to assist in the investment decision process. Because major accidents are related to extremely low frequencies, the tool takes the uncertainty of the unwanted occurrence of a major accident into account through the usage of a so-called ‘disproportion factor’. Compared with existing software, the CESMA tool is innovative by striving for an as-accurate-as-possible picture of costs and benefits of major accident prevention, and taking the uncertainties accompanying disastrous events into consideration. Furthermore, an illustrative example of CESMA is presented in the paper.