On the search for mimetic patterns in environmental disclosure: an international perspective

In this paper, we assert and test the proposition that environmental disclosure (ED) is structured by institutionalised myths and that is why ED is decoupled from environmental performance and media pressures. Focusing on firms from Canada, France and Germany, findings show that ED mimetic isomorphism for different topics varies among countries and by industry sensitiveness to the environment. The results corroborate the institutional presumption that institutionalised myths vary among different contexts. Our findings also suggest that institutionalised ED structures may not reflect environmental performance, mimetic patterns being affected by environmental performance. However, the decoupling between ED mimetic isomorphism and environmental performance decrease when firms’ ED credibility is questioned by the media.     

On optimal audit mechanisms for environmental taxes

We consider the auditing problem of an environmental enforcement agency with fixed audit resources: How to decide which firms to audit after having observed the firms' taxable emissions reports. The goal of the agency is to implement the socially efficient emissions level. The audit mechanism is the agency's sole choice variable, while other variables such as the tax rate on emissions and the fine for non-compliance are determined by other governmental actors. The fines and budget of the agency are constrained in such a way that the common random audit mechanism fails to implement socially efficient emissions. Assuming perfect information among the firms, we derive an optimal audit mechanism capable of implementing the socially efficient emissions level. The optimal audit mechanism creates a contest exploiting the strategic interdependencies between the firms, where the probability of winning (not being audited) for each firm depends on costly efforts (their taxable emissions reports).     

Strategic environmental disclosure: Evidence from the DOE's voluntary greenhouse gas registry

Although mandatory disclosure programs have been studied extensively, strategic voluntary environmental disclosures by firms are not well understood. We study the motivations for and impacts of firms' strategic disclosure of greenhouse gas reductions to the US government. We first model firms' joint abatement and disclosure decisions, incorporating both economic and political incentives. We then use data from the Department of Energy's Voluntary Greenhouse Gas Registry to compare reported reductions to actual emissions. We find that participants in the program engage in highly selective reporting: in the aggregate, they increase emissions over time but report reductions. In contrast, non-participants decrease emissions over time. Participants tend to be large firms facing strong regulatory pressure; pressure from environmental groups reduces the likelihood of participation, suggesting such groups viewed the program as a form of greenwash. Participating in the 1605(b) program had no significant effect on a firm's changes in carbon intensity over time.     

Strategic environmental policy; eco-dumping or a green strategy?

The Porter hypothesis claims that a strong environmental policy best serves the interests of a nation's export industry. While this hypothesis seems to be based on some form of bounded rationality, this paper argues that governments may have good reasons for setting an especially strong environmental policy even though firms are fully rational. If the available abatement technology turns the environment into an “inferior input”, competitiveness is spurred by a strong environmental policy. The government should take advantage of this, and set an especially strict emission quota or an especially high emission tax. The findings in the paper also has consequences for the desirability of international cooperation with respect to national environmental policy. If a strict environmental policy spurs competitiveness, the environment is better protected without cooperation.     

Adaptive social impact management for conservation and environmental management

Concerns about the social consequences of conservation have spurred increased attention the monitoring and evaluation of the social impacts of conservation projects. This has resulted in a growing body of research that demonstrates how conservation can produce both positive and negative social, economic, cultural, health, and governance consequences for local communities. Yet, the results of social monitoring efforts are seldom applied to adaptively manage conservation projects. Greater attention is needed to incorporating the results of social impact assessments in long‐term conservation management to minimize negative social consequences and maximize social benefits. We bring together insights from social impact assessment, adaptive management, social learning, knowledge coproduction, cross‐scale governance, and environmental planning to propose a definition and framework for adaptive social impact management (ASIM). We define ASIM as the cyclical process of monitoring and adaptively managing social impacts over the life‐span of an initiative through the 4 stages of profiling, learning, planning, and implementing. We outline 14 steps associated with the 4 stages of the ASIM cycle and provide guidance and potential methods for social‐indicator development, predictive assessments of social impacts, monitoring and evaluation, communication of results, and identification and prioritization of management responses. Successful ASIM will be aided by engaging with best practices – including local engagement and collaboration in the process, transparent communication of results to stakeholders, collective deliberation on and choice of interventions, documentation of shared learning at the site level, and the scaling up of insights to inform higher‐level conservation policies‐to increase accountability, trust, and perceived legitimacy among stakeholders. The ASIM process is broadly applicable to conservation, environmental management, and development initiatives at various scales and in different contexts.     

Focus and social contagion of environmental organization advocacy on Twitter

Agriculture, overexploitation, and urbanization remain the major threats to biodiversity in the Anthropocene. The attention these threats garner among leading environmental nongovernmental organizations (eNGOs) and the wider public is critical in fostering the political will necessary to reverse biodiversity declines worldwide. I analyzed the advocacy of leading eNGOs on Twitter by scraping account timelines, screening content for advocacy relating to biodiversity threats and, for prevalent threats, further screening content for positive and negative emotional language with a sentiment lexicon. Twitter advocacy was dominated by the major threats of climate change and overexploitation and the minor threat of plastic pollution. The major threats of agriculture, urbanization, invasions, and pollution were rarely addressed. Content relating to overexploitation and plastic pollution was more socially contagious than other content. Increasing emotional negativity further increased social contagion, whereas increasing emotional positivity did not. Scientists, policy makers, and eNGOs should consider how narrowly focused advocacy on platforms like Twitter will contribute to effective global biodiversity conservation.     

Regulation with direct benefits of information disclosure and imperfect monitoring

We model the optimal design of programs requiring heterogeneous firms to disclose harmful emissions when disclosure yields both direct and indirect benefits. The indirect benefit arises from the internalization of social costs and resulting reduction in emissions. The direct benefit results from the disclosure of previously private information which is valuable to potentially harmed parties. Previous theoretical and empirical analyses of such programs restrict attention to the former benefit while the stated motivation for such programs highlights the latter benefit. When disclosure yields both direct and indirect benefits, policymakers face a tradeoff between inducing truthful self-reporting and deterring emissions. Internalizing the social costs of emissions, such as through an emissions tax, will deter emissions, but may also reduce incentives for firms to truthfully report their emissions.     

Implementing second-best environmental policy under adverse selection

A key obstacle to practical application of mechanism design theory to regulation is the difficulty of obtaining consistent beliefs regarding information that theoretical models assume to be commonly held. This article presents a solution to this problem by developing an easily implemented empirical methodology with which the government can use available data to develop beliefs regarding the technology and distribution of types in a regulated sector characterized by hidden information. Results are used to calibrate a second-best land conservation mechanism and evaluate its cost relative to simpler alternatives.     

Interdisciplinarity and participatory approaches to environmental health

This paper reviews a workshop discussion postulated on the notion that social, economic and behavioural factors are responsible for the creation of environmental hazards and benefits that, in turn, can affect human health, with concomitant effects on future social well-being. The workshop case study centred on environmental health investigations, public engagement and partnership work undertaken following the death of two neighbouring children in Cheshire. Discussion included questions of causality and generalisability. It revealed how the attribution of responsibility for environmental damage to health is fraught with difficulties. It may often militate against an informed and open debate among interested parties, with concomitant implications for reducing the danger from environmental hazards. To improve communication, vocabulary needs to be free from jargon and acronyms, and differences in conceptual approach between different disciplines need to be better understood. The definition of the ‘community’ is itself far from clear-cut, yet questions of how to involve this community in intervention processes are important ones. The workshop identified a clear need for better, more considered forms of communication with communities and the public if fears are to be allayed, but recognised the additional costs that this would incur.     

Organizational adoption of sustainable manufacturing practices in India: integrating institutional theory and corporate environmental responsibility

Organizations are increasingly engaging in socially and environmentally sustainable initiatives. This paper focuses on the institutional isomorphism mechanisms to analyse the organizational adoption of sustainable manufacturing practices like eco-design, source reduction, and environmental management practices. This paper empirically examines the role of institutional influence in the organizational adoption of sustainable manufacturing practices among firms in India. The results of this study confirm the significance of the three institutional isomorphism mechanisms in influencing sustainable responses, but not all mechanisms influence the organizational response equally. In particular, the results show a strong influence of self-regulatory normative isomorphism on the implementation.     

Altruism and environmental risks to health of parents and their children

This paper tests an equilibrium condition from a model that incorporates: (1) altruism of parents toward their young children, and (2) household production of latent health risks. The model demonstrates that an altruistic parent's marginal rate of substitution between an environmental health risk to herself and to her child is equal to the ratio of marginal risk reduction costs. Econometric estimates support this prediction based on data from a stated preference survey involving 488 parents of children aged 3–12 years. This outcome implies that parents reallocate family resources to at least partly offset the effectiveness of public programs that aim to reduce their children's environmental risks.     

From data and theory to environmental models and indices formation

A prerequisite for environmental indices is that they represent environmental pressure, and the state of, and impact on environmental conditions. In other words, they should capture as much as possible of the cause-effect chains they represent and relate pressure and effect to criteria of environmental quality. The approach proposed in the article attempts to link the pressure–state–impact–response framework of indicators to the integrated environmental model, based on the method of response function (MRF). The MRF allows to construct purposeful, credible models from data and prior knowledge or information. The data are usually time series observations of system inputs and outputs, and sometimes of internal states. The output of such models is presented with highly aggregated environmental indices, reflecting the main pressure–state–impact–response cause-effect chains. The proposed approach is illustrated with the example of soil erosion indices.     

Prevention and cleanup of dynamic harm under environmental liability

This paper explores incentives for accident prevention and cleanup when firms are subject to environmental liability. In our two-period setup, the level of environmental harm in the second period depends on first-period harm when cleanup was incomplete. Under strict liability, in the first period, firms with a positive probability of going out of business before the second period have inadequate prevention and cleanup incentives. The fundamental disconnect between private incentives and social optimality cannot be remedied by using a multiple of harm as the level of compensation. Under negligence with a causation requirement, incentive problems remain; however, under negligence without such a requirement, first-best incentives may emerge, and using a multiple of harm as the level of compensation can ensure the efficient solution.     

Environmental federalism and environmental liability

Environmental federalism considers what level of government should optimally regulate pollution. This paper addresses this question for accidental pollution, which government regulates through the ex post liability regimes of either negligence or strict liability. We find that decentralizing the choice between these regimes does not, in general, induce the socially optimal outcome. When firms can pay all damages, all regions may choose negligence and impose an overly strict standard of due care. When firms may be bankrupted by damages, all regions may choose strict liability, which induces too little care. In addition, asymmetric equilibria are possible in which some regions choose negligence, others strict liability. Combining negligence with a Pigovian tax, or strict liability with a bonding requirement can align regional authorities' incentives with those of a central government.     

Incentives to diffuse advanced abatement technology under environmental liability law

Polluting firms with advanced abatement technology at their disposal have incentives or disincentives to share this technology with other polluting firms. The ‘direction’ and extent of those incentives depends on the liability rule applicable and the way technical change impacts marginal abatement costs. We establish that incentives for diffusion are socially optimal under strict liability and socially suboptimal under negligence if technical change lowers marginal abatement costs for all levels of abatement. Negligence may, however, induce better diffusion incentives than strict liability if technical change decreases (increases) marginal abatement costs for low (high) levels of abatement.     

Competitive investment in clean technology and uninformed green consumers

In a market where consumers and the regulatory authorities are not fully informed about the actual production technology or environmental performance of firms that engage in strategic competition, I study the effect of environmental consciousness of consumers on firms׳ incentive to invest in cleaner technology. Firms compete in prices and may signal their environmental performance to uninformed consumers through prices. I also analyze the effect of an expected liability on firms in this setting. Compared to full information, incomplete information generates higher strategic incentive to invest in cleaner technology particularly when consciousness and/or expected liability are not too high. Requiring mandatory disclosure of technology or environmental performance may discourage such investment. Even though consumers and the regulator are uninformed, competition has a positive effect (relative to monopoly) on the incentive to invest.     

Emissions standards and ambient environmental quality standards with stochastic environmental services

Many important environmental policies involve some combination of emission controls and ambient environmental quality standards, for instance SO₂ emissions are capped under Title IV of the U.S. Clean Air Act Amendments while ambient SO₂ concentrations are limited under National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS). This paper examines the relative performance of emissions standards and ambient standards when the natural environment provides stochastic environmental services for assimilating pollution. For receiving media characterized by greater dispersion in the distribution of environmental services, the optimal emissions policy becomes more stringent, whereas the optimal ambient policy generally becomes more lax. In terms of economic performance, emissions policies are superior to ambient policies for relatively non-toxic pollutants, whereas ambient standards welfare dominate emissions standards for sufficiently toxic pollutants. In the case of combined policies that jointly implement emissions standards and ambient standards, we show that the optimal level of each standard relaxes relative to its counterpart in a unilateral policy, allowing for greater emissions levels and higher pollution concentrations in the environmental medium.     

The transition from dirty to clean industries: optimal fiscal policy and the environmental Kuznets curve

This paper investigates privately and socially optimal patterns of economic development in a two-sector endogenous growth model with clean and dirty goods. We consider a second-best fiscal policy framework in which distortionary taxes jointly influence economic growth and environmental quality. In this policy setting, three conditions produce an Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC): (i) dirty output is bounded; (ii) clean output grows endogenously; and (iii) growth in the dirty sector reduces growth in the clean sector. These conditions do not arise with a consumption externality, but can emerge with a production externality. Endogenous labor supply implications are also investigated. Although not necessary for producing an EKC, endogenous labor supply provides additional linkages that produce an EKC under circumstances in which it would otherwise not appear.     

Best policy response to environmental shocks: Applying a stochastic framework

The paper develops a general framework for the analysis of environmental shocks in growing economies. Endogenous capital investments allow identifying the dual role of capital as a buffer against shocks and a source of pollution. We study the effects of recurring natural disasters on optimal growth and efficient environmental policies. Emissions may cause continuous fluctuations, entail discrete and recurring jumps, or trigger so-called “tipping points” with large costs to the economy. Closed-form solutions are provided for all the model variants. We discuss possible applications in environmental economics and identify current research gaps.     

Effects of social networks on interventions to change conservation behavior

Social networks are critical to the success of behavioral interventions in conservation because network processes such as information flows and social influence can enable behavior change to spread beyond a targeted group. We investigated these mechanisms in the context of a social marketing campaign to promote a wildlife poisoning hotline in Cambodia. With questionnaire surveys we measured a social network and knowledge and constructs from the theory of planned behavior at 3 points over 6 months. The intervention initially targeted ∼11% (of 365) of the village, but after 6 months ∼40% of the population was knowledgeable about the campaign. The likelihood of being knowledgeable nearly doubled with each additional knowledgeable household member. In the short term, there was also a modest, but widespread improvement in proconservation behavioral intentions, but this did not persist after 6 months. Estimates from stochastic actor-oriented models suggested that the influences of social peers, rather than knowledge, were driving changes in intention and contributed to the failure to change behavioral intention in the long term, despite lasting changes in attitudes and perceived norms. Our results point to the importance of accounting for the interaction between networks and behavior when designing conservation interventions.