The Moral Considerability of Invasive Transgenic Animals

The term moral considerability refers to the question of whether a being or set of beings is worthy of moral consideration. Moral considerability is most readily afforded to those beings that demonstrate the clearest relationship to rational humans, though many have also argued for and against the moral considerability of species, ecosystems, and “lesser” animals. Among these arguments there are at least two positions: “environmentalist” positions that tend to emphasize the systemic relations between species, and “liberationist” positions that tend to emphasize the attributes or welfare of a particular individual organism. Already, this classic conflict provides for some challenging theoretical clashes between environmentalists and animal liberationists. The question of moral considerability is complicated, however, by recent developments in genetic engineering. Some animals, like pigs and fish, have been genetically modified by humans to grow organs that can then be transplanted into humans. If environmental arguments for the moral consideration of species are correct, then we are released from our obligations to morally consider those animals that we have genetically modified, since they are by their nature always an “invader species.” If, instead, the welfare of the animal is of penultimate importance, then there is a case for strengthening the moral considerability of GM animals over “naturally-occurring” animals, since they bear a closer relationship to humans. This would appear to be an intractable problem, a “bad marriage,” as Mark Sagoff once proposed. This paper argues that the case of invasive transgenic animals exposes weaknesses in this classic conflict, and particularly, in the framing of this conflict. To remedy this framing problem, this paper argues for a reconceptualization of the term “moral considerability,” instead urging a strong distinction between moral considerability, moral relevance, and moral significance.     

Welcoming,Wild Animals,and Obligations to Assist

Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics - Committee composition is a recurrent theme within the literature on Institutional Animal Care and Use Committees (IACUCs). The ability of IACUCs...     

Facing Animals: A Relational,Other-Oriented Approach to Moral Standing

In this essay we reflect critically on how animal ethics, and in particular thinking about moral standing, is currently configured. Starting from the work of two influential “analytic” thinkers in this field, Peter Singer and Tom Regan, we examine some basic assumptions shared by these positions and demonstrate their conceptual failings—ones that have, despite efforts to the contrary, the general effect of marginalizing and excluding others. Inspired by the so-called “continental” philosophical tradition (in particular Emmanuel Levinas, Martin Heidegger, and Jacques Derrida), we then argue that what is needed is a change in the rules of the game, a change of the question. We alter the (pre-) normative question from “What properties does the animal have?” to “What are the conditions under which an entity becomes a moral subject?” This leads us to consider the role of language, personal relations, and material-technological contexts. What is needed then in response to the moral standing problem, is not more of the same—yet another, more refined criterion and argumentation concerning moral standing, or a “final” rational argumentation that would be able to settle the animal question once and for all—but a turning or transformation in both our thinking about and our relations to animals, through language, through technology, and through the various place-ordering practices in which we participate.     

Fundamental Moral Attitudes to Animals and Their Role in Judgment: An Empirical Model to Describe Fundamental Moral Attitudes to Animals and Their Role in Judgment on the Culling of Healthy Animals During an Animal Disease Epidemic

In this paper, we present and defend the theoretical framework of an empirical model to describe people’s fundamental moral attitudes (FMAs) to animals, the stratification of FMAs in society and the role of FMAs in judgment on the culling of healthy animals in an animal disease epidemic. We used philosophical animal ethics theories to understand the moral basis of FMA convictions. Moreover, these theories provide us with a moral language for communication between animal ethics, FMAs, and public debates. We defend that FMA is a two-layered concept. The first layer consists of deeply felt convictions about animals. The second layer consists of convictions derived from the first layer to serve as arguments in a debate on animal issues. In a debate, the latter convictions are variable, depending on the animal issue in a specific context, time, and place. This variability facilitates finding common ground in an animal issue between actors with opposing convictions.     

Not All Animals are Equal Differences In Moral Foundations For The Dutch Veterinary Policy On Livestock and Animals In Nature Reservations

The Netherlands is a small country with many people and much livestock. As a result, animals in nature reservations are often living near cattle farms. Therefore, people from the agricultural practices are afraid that wild animals will infect domestic livestock with diseases like Swine Fever and Foot and Mouth Disease. To protect agriculture (considered as an important economic practice), very strict regulations have been made for minimizing this risk. In this way, the practice of animal farming has been dominating the practices of nature management completely. If, for instance, Foot and Mouth Disease strikes an agricultural area, all wild pigs and cattle living in the nearby nature reservations have to be killed, whether infected or not. This dominant position of one practice over the other has now become problematic. While the morality of the practice of nature management seems to be very different from the morality of agriculture and agriculture has become less important from an economic point of view, the public as well as those involved in nature management no longer seem to accept the dominant position of agriculture. Besides a literature study, we performed a field study with in-depth interviews with experts from both practices to analyze the dynamics of the internal moralities of both practices in the previous century, in order to clarify the contemporary situation. The conclusion was that the traditionally strong position of agriculture is not only weakening; it also appears that the internal values of agriculture are changing. The experts from both sides agreed that, in case of a disease outbreak, it is neither ethically justified nor necessary (because of the estimated low risk of disease transfer) to destroy the animals in nature reservations as a routine preventive measure. This is a major shift in morality.     

GMOs and Global Justice: Applying Global Justice Theory to the Case of Genetically Modified Crops and Food

Proponents of using genetically modified (GM) crops and food in the developing world often claim that it is unjust not to use GMOs (genetically modified organisms) to alleviate hunger and malnutrition in developing countries. In reply, the critics of GMOs claim that while GMOs may be useful as a technological means to increase yields and crop quality, stable and efficient institutions are required in order to provide the benefits from GMO technology. In this debate, the GMO proponents tend to rely on a simple utilitarian type of calculus that highlights the benefits of GMOs to the poor, but that overlooks the complex institutional requirements necessary for GMO production. The critics, recognizing the importance of institutional conditions, focus primarily on the negative impacts of institutional deficiencies, thereby overlooking the basically Rawlsian claim that institutions per se may generate claims to justice. This article investigates how GMOs might generate claims to global justice and what type of justice is involved. The paper argues that the debate on GMOs and global justice can be categorized into three views, i.e., the cosmopolitan, the pluralist, and the sceptic. The cosmopolitan holds that GMOs can and should be used for alleviating global hunger, whereas the sceptic rejects this course of action. I will argue here for a moderately cosmopolitan approach, relying on the pluralist view of institutions and the need to exploit the benefits of GMOs. This argument rests on the premise that global cooperation on GMO production provides the relevant basis for assessing the use of GMOs by the standard of global distributive justice.     

未自然分布于我国的陆生野生动物及其制品的价值认定问题研究

未自然分布于我国的野生动物及其制品的价值认定是破坏野生动物资源类犯罪案件中备受争议的内容,具体涉及《濒危野生动植物种国际贸易公约》附录Ⅰ、Ⅱ物种直接平移为国内一、二级保护动物管理的级别核准方式、参照同种国内保护动物核定价值时出现的交叉核定困境,以及确认涉案价值所依据的价格鉴定结果迥异的问题。这些问题既有碍于将有限的执法资源用于珍贵、濒危的野生动物种群,也不必要地加重了对被告人的刑事处罚。为此,需要通过人工核准、就低原则的普遍适用等措施,保障价值认定过程的正当性,在坚持罪责刑相适应的基础上保护生物多样性。     

The Reintroduction and Reinterpretation of the Wild

This paper is concerned with changing social representations of the ``wild,' in particular wild animals. We argue that within a contemporary Western context the old agricultural perception of wild animals as adversarial and as a threat to domestication, is being replaced by an essentially urban fascination with certain emblematic wild animals, who are seen to embody symbols of naturalness and freedom. On closer examination that carefully mediatized ``naturalness' may be but another form of domestication. After an historical overview of the human-animal, domestic-wild construction, an anthropological approach is used to interpret the social representation of wild animals held by different social actors – farmers, hunters, and tourists – within the context of an inhabited National Park, that of the Cévennes in south east France. Within the Park, the domestic and the wild, along with agriculture, hunting, conservation, re-introduced wild animals, and tourists co-habit. It is argued that changes in the representation of ``wildness' may well be an important indicator ofchanges in the social representation of nature.     

The Struggle over Functional Foods: Justice and the Social Meaning of Functional Foods

The social and scientific debate overfunctional foods has two focal points: one isthe issue of the reliability andtrustworthiness of the claims connected withfunctional foods. You don't have to be asuspicious person to be skeptical vis-à-visthe rather exorbitant claims of most functionalfoods. They promise prevention against allkinds of illnesses and enhancement ofachievements like memory and vision, withouthaving been tested adequately. The second issueis the issue of the socio-cultural dimension offunctional foods and their so calleddetrimental effect on the social and normativemeanings of food, with possibly the effect thatfood in general will be treated like amedicine, with radical individualizing effects.Finally, individuals would only be allowed toeat what their gene-profile prescribes them. Inthis paper, it is argued that food is anon-neutral public good that contributesinherently to the identity of vulnerableindividuals. It should be treated in anon-neutral, but impartial way. Therefore,politics need to intervene in food markets froma justice and ethical point of view with twoaims in mind. The first aim (as an implicationof justice considerations) should be toestablish safety conditions, and to identifyand monitor food safety standards in anobjective and impartial way. Preventive medicalclaims of foods should be allowed on the basisof appropriate and objective testing methods.The second aim (as an implication of ethicalconsiderations) should be to shape conditionsfor a cohabitation of various food styles,including that of functional foods. Moreover,the cultural and symbolic meaning of food in apluralistic society requires that the differentfood styles find some modus of living andinteracting together. As long as functionalfoods comply with safety standards and respectother food styles, they should be allowed onthe market, just like any other food product.     

The Relationship Between Workers and Animals in the Pork Industry: A Shared Suffering

Animal production, especially pork production, is facing growing international criticism. The greatest concerns relate to the environment, the animals’ living conditions, and the occupational diseases. But human and animal conditions are rarely considered together. Yet the living conditions at work and the emotional bond that inevitably forms bring the farm workers and the animals to live very close, which leads to shared suffering. Suffering does spread from animals to human beings and can cause workers physical, mental, and also moral suffering, which is all the more harmful due to the fact that it is concealed. The conceptual tools used to conceal suffering (“animal welfare,” stress, pain) suggest that the industrial system can be improved, whereas for farmers it is by definition incompatible with animal husbandry.     

罗布泊野骆驼自然保护区野双峰驼的分布与生态环境的关系

罗布泊野骆驼自然保护区位于我国西部极旱荒漠带 ,以世界级濒危物种———野双峰驼为主要保护对象 ,也保护当地特有的地貌、盐泉、丝绸之路遗迹及其他珍稀动植物物种 ,面积 7 86× 10 4km2 ,实际控制面积 15× 10 4km2 。该保护区分布有野双峰驼约4 0 0～ 4 80头 ,分布于戈壁、低山残蚀丘陵、谷地和沙漠地带 ,在不同生态环境中野骆驼的种群数量及生态习性各异。