Species Extinction and the Vice of Thoughtlessness: The Importance of Spiritual Exercises for Learning Virtue

In this paper, I present a sample spiritual exercise—a contemporary form of the written practice that ancient philosophers used to shape their characters. The exercise, which develops the ancient practice of the examination of conscience, is on the sixth mass extinction and seeks to understand why the extinction appears as a moral wrong. It concludes by finding a vice in the moral character of the author and the author’s society. From a methodological standpoint, the purpose of spiritual exercises is to create a habit of thoughtfulness in the writer, and by way of teaching, to suggest one to the reader. Such a habit is important, at least, because virtue is a habit. In other words, there can be no learning of virtue itself without habituation into it. Accordingly, I frame the sample spiritual exercise with a deliberately controversial objection to contemporary academic virtue ethics and with a justification for why the spiritual exercise is important for taking virtue ethically. And I end the paper with some further remarks explaining the form of the exercise and its relevance to doing philosophy. In this way, the paper makes and illustrates a methodological point about virtue ethics based on a meta-ethical assumption about virtue as a habit, and it does this by focusing on a pressing environmental problem in the twenty-first century.     

Building a Sustainable Future for Animal Agriculture: An Environmental Virtue Ethic of Care Approach within the Philosophy of Technology

Agricultural technologies are non-neutral and ethical challenges are posed by these technologies themselves. The technologies we use or endorse are embedded with values and norms and reflect the shape of our moral character. They can literally make us better or worse consumers and/or people. Looking back, when the world’s developed nations welcomed and steadily embraced industrialization as the dominant paradigm for agriculture a half century or so ago, they inadvertently championed a philosophy of technology that promotes an insular human-centricism, despite its laudable intent to ensure food security and advance human flourishing. The dominant philosophy of technology has also seeded particular ethical consequences that plague the well-being of human beings, the planet, and farmed animals. After revisiting some fundamental questions regarding the complex ways in which technology as agent shapes our lives and choices and relegates food and farmed constituents into technological artifacts or commodities, I argue that we should accord an environmental virtue ethic of care—understood as caretaking—a central place in developing a more conscientious philosophy of technology that aims at sustainability, fairness, and humaneness in animal agriculture. While technology shapes society, it also is socially shaped and an environmental virtue ethic of care (EVEC) as an alternative design philosophy has the tools to help us take a much overdue inventory of ourselves and our relationships with the nonhuman world. It can help us to expose the ways in which technology hinders critical reflection of its capacity to alter communities and values, to come to terms with why we may be, in general, disengaged from critical ethical analysis of contemporary agriculture and to consider the moral shape and trajectory and the sustainability of our food production systems going into the future. I end by outlining particular virtues associated with the ethic of care discussed here and consider some likely implications for consumers and industry technocrats as they relate to farming animals.     

Environmentalism and Public Virtue

Much of the literature addressing environmental virtue tends to focus on what might be called “personal virtue”—individual actions, characteristics, or dispositions that benefit the individual actor. There has, in contrast, been relatively little interest in either “virtue politics”—collective actions, characteristics, or dispositions—or in what might be called “public virtues,” actions, characteristics, or dispositions that benefit the community rather than the individual. This focus, however, is problematic, especially in a society that valorizes individuality. This paper examines public virtue and its role in environmental virtue ethics. First, I outline different types of virtue in order to frame the discussion of public virtues and, in particular, a subclass of virtues I will refer to as political virtue. Second, I focus on practical problems and address the inadequacy of personal virtue for effecting social change and, therefore, for addressing most environmental crises. Finally, I argue that public and political virtues are necessary, if under emphasized, conditions for the flourishing of the individual, and that they are important complements to more traditional environmental virtues.     

An Agrarian Imaginary in Urban Life: Cultivating Virtues and Vices Through a Conflicted History

This paper explores the influence and use of agrarian thought on collective understandings of food practices as sources of ethical and communal value in urban contexts. A primary proponent of agrarian thought that this paper engages is Paul Thompson and his exceptional book, The Agrarian Vision. Thompson aims to use agrarian ideals of agriculture and communal life to rethink current issues of sustainability and environmental ethics. However, Thompson perceives the current cultural mood as hostile to agrarian virtue. There are two related claims of this paper. The first argues that contrary to Thompson’s perception of hostility, agrarian thought is popularly and commercially mobilized among urban populations. To establish this claim I extend Charles Taylor’s notion of a social imaginary and suggest that urban agriculture can be theorized as an agrarian imaginary. Entwined with the first claim is the second, that proponents selectively use agrarian history to overemphasis a narrative of virtue while ignoring or marginalizing historical practices of agrarian violence, exclusion and dispossession. I do not discount or deny the significance of agrarian virtue. By situating agrarian thought within a clearer virtue ethics framework and acknowledging potential manifestation of agrarian vice, I suggest that the idea of agrarian virtue is strengthened.     

Narrating place,negotiating history: the politics of place in Land Between the Rivers

Conservation discourses in the last decade have witnessed a radical shift in the conceptualisation of nature. The imagery of a pristine nature has been replaced by a growing recognition of culture and place-based attachments as emerging frontiers of conservation. Yet, the complexities of place and culture call for a greater reflection on cultural approaches to natural resource management. In this paper, I argue that the cultural discourses in conservation policies are largely global in nature and conflict with a community's understanding of a local cultural tradition. The notion of the global closely relates to a global framing of an environmental problem that glosses over cultural specificities. On the other hand, local is defined here in materially specific terms that highlight the role of history in shaping environmental traditions. I examine these contradictory framings through a narrative of conservation, displacement, and cultural loss in a US rural community known as Land Between the Rivers.     

The Epistemic Demands of Environmental Virtue

To lead an environmentally virtuous life requires information—about morality, environmental issues, the impacts of our actions and commitments, our options for alternatives, and so on. On the other hand, we are finite beings with limited time and resources. We cannot feasibly investigate all of our options, and all environmental issues (let alone moral issues, more broadly). In this paper I attempt to provide initial steps towards addressing the epistemic demands of environmental virtue. In the first half of the paper I provide rules of thumb with respect to (1) how to prioritize our investigations into various issues, and (2) what kinds of information we should seek with respect to these issues, and the levels of epistemic justification we ought to attain. In the second half of the paper, I turn to a modified virtue ethics, appealing to the attitudes of virtuous ideal observers to provide characterizations of morally justified and morally non-culpable actions. I then apply these latter concepts in assessing agents, their actions and projects (with respect to environmental virtue), in light of their investigative efforts, and given their particular circumstances.     

The Pig’s Squeak: Towards a Renewed Aesthetic Argument for Veganism

In 1906, Henry Stephens Salt published a short collection of essays that presented several rhetorically powerful, if formally deficient arguments for the vegetarian position. By interpreting Salt as a moral sentimentalist with ties to Aristotelian virtue ethics, I propose that his aesthetic argument deserves contemporary consideration. First, I connect ethics and aesthetics with the Greek concepts of kalon and kalokagathia that depend equally on beauty and morality before presenting Salt’s assertion: slaughterhouses are disgusting, therefore they should not be promoted. I suggest three areas of development since Salt’s death that could be fruitfully plumbed to rebuild this assertion into a contemporary argument: (1) an updated analysis of factory farm conditions, (2) insights from moral psychologists on the adaptive socio-biological benefits of disgust as a source of cognitive information, and (3) hermeneutical considerations about the role of the audience that allow blameworthiness for slaughterhouse atrocities to be laid upon the meat-eater.     

Light rail use is more likely on “walkable” blocks: Further support for using micro-level environmental audit measures

The primary purpose of the study was to address the claim that people are more likely to walk to a transit stop if they live on a “walkable” block. An additional purpose was to evaluate the Irvine Minnesota Inventory (IMI) as an environmental audit tool. The IMI was used to measure walkability features of 19 blocks in a revitalizing neighborhood. We hypothesized that residents who walked to a light rail TRAX stop (n = 22) would live on blocks with higher walkability ratings compared to residents who did not walk to TRAX (nonriders, n = 15), or who walked only after a closer TRAX stop was built (new users, n = 11). A MANCOVA indicated the IMI scales differentiated the blocks; the strongest differences were obtained in subscales that measured the block's diversity, safety from crime and density (marginally significant). Participants' perceptions of their complete walk to the transit stop were consistent with the home block IMI scores, with the continuing riders having more positive views than the other two groups. The results show the ability of the IMI to distinguish among blocks in walkability, and support further use of this audit tool in environmental analyses and active living research. We end with a discussion of conceptual and methodological issues in the use of audit tools and provide recommendations for using these measures for local, immediate interests, as well as for building a broader science of environmental measurement.     

Agrarian Ideals and Practices: Comments on Paul B. Thompson’s The Agrarian Vision

In The Agrarian Vision, Thompson argues that a better appreciation of agrarian ideals could lead to a more virtuous, more sustainable way of life. While I agree with Thompson in many respects, there are some aspects of the book that I question and others that I would like to hear Thompson explicate in greater detail. In this paper, I question Thompson’s claim that agrarian farmers and farming communities serve as ideal models of virtuous habits and good character. I challenge Thompson’s use of virtue theory, particularly the notion that farming virtues can be acquired without participating in farming practices. In the end, I make the point that Thompson seems to vacillate between being realistic and being idealistic, which may seriously complicate our notions of responsibility and obligation in practice.     

Norton and Passmore on Valuing Nature

Norton argues on pragmatic “Deweyan” grounds that we should cease to ask scientists for value neutral definitions of “sustainability,” developed independently of moral and social values, to guide our environmental policy making debates. “Sustainability,” like human “health,” is a normative concept from the start—one that cannot be meaningfully developed by scientists or economists without input by all the stake holders affected. While I endorse Norton’s approach, I question his apparent presumption that concern for sustainability for the future is at odds with and ought to trump concern for enhancement in the present of public opportunities to access the goods nature represents. I argue that the two are not separable in practice. I argue for Passmore’s position that unless we take care to enhance equitable access to the good and services nature represents in the present, we cannot succeed in promoting sustainability for future generations.     

Forgivingness, Pessimism, and Environmental Citizenship

Our attitudes toward human culpability for environmental problems have moral and emotional import, influencing our basic capacities for believing cooperative action and environmental repair are even possible. In this paper, I suggest that having the virtue of forgivingness as a response to environmental harm is generally good for moral character, preserving us from morally risky varieties of pessimism and despair. I define forgivingness as a forward-looking disposition based on Robin Dillon’s conception of preservative forgiveness, a preparation to be deeply and abidingly accepting yet expecting human error. As with other virtues, however, preservative forgiveness is available to some of us more than others; in the second half of this paper, I consider the deep challenge posed by rational pessimism, especially on the part of those who have been given many reasons not to hope for the very moral improvements for which they strive. I conclude that for those of us with the power roles and personal resources especially conducive to environmental activism, preservative forgiveness inclines us to remain engaged in environmental activism with fellow flawed human beings, recognizing our own mutual depredations while committing us to cooperatively respond.     

Traditional Indian beliefs: a key toward sustainable living

India is known for the moral ethos of its people. Indian beliefs have been associated with compassion and respect for nature and its creations since ages. The religious beliefs of Jain, Vedic and Buddhist traditions in India established the principles of ecological harmony centuries ago. Indian religious and philosophical traditions embody the earliest concept of environmental ethics. Some of the important traditional environmental beliefs prevalent in India in which nature has been valued are discussed here. In Rajasthan, a desert state of India, the Khejri tree is valued for its moisture-retaining properties, and it is not axed even if it comes between the constructions. The live example of this is cited in Salasar Balaji temple in Sikar district. A Bishnoi cult of India inhabiting the Jodhpur region is known for wildlife protection specially the famous Black Buck that is an endangered species. Some areas popularly known as sacred groves or orans that are dedicated to a local deity worshipped by the inhabitants of that area are especially reserved for biodiversity conservation, and anthropogenic activities are completely prohibited. These and many more similar examples show that traditional beliefs of Indian societies have got a deeper understanding of the ecological system and have been completely integrated with nature to evolve sustainable lifestyle.     

Hume’s Knave and Nonanthropocentric Virtues

This essay offers a critical assessment of environmental virtue ethics (EVE). Finding an environmental ethical analogy with Hume’s critique of the sensible knave, I argue that EVE is limited in much the same way as morality is on the Humean view. Advocates of nonanthropocentrism will find it difficult to engage those whose virtues comport them to anthropocentrism. Nonetheless, EVE is able to ground confidence in nonanthropocentric virtues by explicating specific key virtues, thereby holding open the possibility of bridging the motivational gap between anthropocentrism and nonanthropocentrism.     

Crayfish Use of Trash Versus Natural Cover in Incised, Sand-Bed Streams

Historic land use changes and subsequent river channelization created deeply incised, unstable stream channels largely devoid of natural cover throughout the Yazoo River basin, Mississippi, USA. Large trash (e.g., televisions, toilets, car parts) dumped in streams provided shelter for some aquatic fauna. To determine whether trash served as a surrogate for natural cover, I examined crayfish use of both cover types. I sampled crayfishes by kick-seining 2 × 1-m plots in three cover classes: trash, natural cover, and no cover. I captured 415 crayfishes from 136 of the 294 plots. Most crayfishes were in natural cover (253), followed by trash (154), and no-cover (8) plots. Trash use varied by crayfish genus and size. Frequencies of all size classes of Procambarus and of the smallest Cambarus were higher in natural cover than trash. Many of the smallest individuals were found in live root mats. As Cambarus and Orconectes grew, they shifted more toward trash, and the largest Orconectes size class was significantly more abundant than expected in trash. Trash served as “artificial reefs,” providing cover for crayfishes and other fauna, but functioned differently than the remaining natural cover. The results confirmed that stream substrate did not provide adequate instream cover for crayfishes in the study area and suggested that high-quality natural cover for large crayfishes was in short supply, at least for some species. Land management that provides for abundant, ongoing input and retention of complex cover, such as trees and live roots, to stream channels should be beneficial for crayfish assemblages.     

Sustainable Development and Institutional Design: The Example of the Mersey Basin Campaign

The Mersey Basin Campaign was established in 1985 in the North West of England to address continuing problems of water quality and associated landward dereliction of the River Mersey and its tributaries. The Campaign's premise that water quality should be improved both for its own sake and as a stimulus to regeneration has proved to be well founded and has subsequently been extended to embrace community action to help nurture watercourse improvement and care. The Campaign can now be seen as a model for engaging co-ordinated environmental action through a partnership approach. This paper explores the nature of the Mersey Basin Campaign as an example of the new structures which are being developed in order to help deliver the new environmentalpolicy agenda. It is argued that the Campaign stands as a model for what will become an increasing need to develop focused environmental planning and management at the sub-regional and regional scales.     

Measuring love and care for nature

This study aimed to develop a psychometrically sound measure of the construct of love and deep caring for nature as an expression of people’s personal and explicitly emotional relationship with nature. Expert opinion and pre-pilot surveys were employed for refinement of the item pool, and a sample of 307 university students was used in a major pilot study aiming to further purify scale items. A field trial was conducted using a sample of 261 tourists at leisure with nature. The final 15-item Love and Care for Nature (LCN) scale is differentiated from established measures of similar constructs, and demonstrates high internal consistency and sound validity. This research extends the psychological frameworks of environmental altruism, and has also taken the philosophical concept of biophilia, as love for nature, into the operational realm by making it perceptible and measurable.     

Adolescents’ environmental worldview and personality: An explorative study

There is a growing interest among scholars in instruments based on environmental worldview. Several studies have used instruments of this kind to compare groups of children or to assess the impact of environmental education initiatives (EEIs) on children’s environmental worldview. When using scales of this nature, it is important to control for factors that might blur the true impact of EEIs. One such factor - and which may have been neglected - is personality. This study (n = 957) examines the link between environmental worldview of Belgian adolescents (as measured by the New Environmental Paradigm scale for children - NEP) and their personality (as measured by the Hierarchical Personality Inventory for Children - HiPIC). The results show that adolescents who are willing to take responsibility for their actions and who feel in control over the outcomes of their decisions are more likely to have an ecocentric worldview. Furthermore, this study demonstrates that, for Belgian adolescents, egocentrism and ecocentrism are opposite conceptions. All correlations were, however, small and showed no deterministic pattern in the relationship between adolescents’ environmental worldview and personality, indicating that worldviews are not stable or innate characteristics within individuals, but can be influenced by interactions between the individual and its context. Personality traits explained only a very small part of the variation in adolescents’ environmental worldview (.7%), suggesting that they are unlikely to blur the impact of EEIs in worldview-based assessment. This is an important finding as it indicates that the results of studies showing differences in the environmental worldview of different groups of respondents or changes in their environmental worldview as a result of taking part in an EEI are not artefacts of non-control for personality and that they may, therefore, reflect genuine differences, changes or impacts.     

Radical Hope for Living Well in a Warmer World

Environmental changes can bear upon the environmental virtues, having effects not only on the conditions of their application but also altering the concepts themselves. I argue that impending radical changes in global climate will likely precipitate significant changes in the dominate world culture of consumerism and then consider how these changes could alter the moral landscape, particularly culturally thick conceptions of the environmental virtues. According to Jonathan Lear, as the last principal chief of the Crow Nation, Plenty Coups exhibited the virtue of “radical hope,” a novel form of courage appropriate to a culture in crisis. I explore what radical hope may look like today, arguing how it should broadly affect our environmental character and that a framework for future environmental virtues will involve a diminished place for valuing naturalness as autonomy from human interference.     

Oekopsychologie: Some general implications from a particular literature

One goal of this paper is to present a perspective on psychological research in which the relationship between person and environment is the central point of interest. The german term Oekopsychologie is introduced as a higher level framework that subsumes both, the theory-oriented ecological perspective (the Oekologische Psychologie in German), and problem-oriented and environmental psychology (the Umweltpsychologie in German) with its more applied character. It is argued that the ecological perspective should be based on 10 tenets which stem from an emphasis on the fundamental importance of the man-environment relationship. The paper is also an attempt to stimulate bridge-building activities between German-speaking and English-speaking environmental psychologists.     

Rights & Nature

Due to the significant and often careless human impact on the natural environment, there are serious problems facing the people of today and of future generations. To date, ethical, aesthetic, religious, and economic arguments for the conservation and protection of the natural environment have made relatively little headway. Another approach, one capable of garnering attention and motivating action, would be welcome. There is another approach, one that I will call a rights approach. Speaking generally, this approach is an attempt to address environmental issues via the language and theory of legal and moral rights. Ultimately, it is our duties to our fellow humans that explain why we have duties regarding the natural environment. There are three main contenders among theories that can be called rights approaches to environmental issues. The first identifies the (alleged) human right to a healthful environment as the source of our obligations to conserve and protect nature. The second approach has it that our duties to nature arise from the rights of the constituents of nature themselves, its flora and fauna. The third approach to addressing environmental problems via rights is, I argue, the best path to environmental conservation and protection. This approach—which grounds duties toward nature on the human right to health—has the benefits of being a straightforward, uncontroversial, and simple approach to issues and problems that desperately need to be resolved.