Investment in cleaner technology and signaling distortions in a market with green consumers

I analyze the pricing and investment behavior of a firm that signals the environmental attributes of its production technology through its price to uninformed environmentally conscious consumers. I then analyze the effect of change in environmental regulation on the signaling outcome and the firm's ex ante incentive to invest in cleaner technology. When regulation is weak, a firm signals cleaner technology through higher price; in this case, the firm earns lower profit when it has cleaner technology and thus, has no incentive to invest in cleaner technology. The price charged by the clean firm declines sharply beyond a critical level of regulation. When regulation is sufficiently stringent, the firm with cleaner technology charges lower price but earns higher signaling profit, and ex ante the firm has positive incentive to invest in cleaner technology. With weak regulation, the incentive of the firm to directly disclose its environmental performance rather than signal it through price is increasing in the level of regulation; the opposite holds when regulation is sufficiently stringent.     

Investment in cleaner technology and signaling distortions in a market with green consumers

I analyze the pricing and investment behavior of a firm that signals the environmental attributes of its production technology through its price to uninformed environmentally conscious consumers. I then analyze the effect of change in environmental regulation on the signaling outcome and the firm's ex ante incentive to invest in cleaner technology. When regulation is weak, a firm signals cleaner technology through higher price; in this case, the firm earns lower profit when it has cleaner technology and thus, has no incentive to invest in cleaner technology. The price charged by the clean firm declines sharply beyond a critical level of regulation. When regulation is sufficiently stringent, the firm with cleaner technology charges lower price but earns higher signaling profit, and ex ante the firm has positive incentive to invest in cleaner technology. With weak regulation, the incentive of the firm to directly disclose its environmental performance rather than signal it through price is increasing in the level of regulation; the opposite holds when regulation is sufficiently stringent.     

Plant vintage, technology, and environmental regulation

We use data on productivity and pollution abatement costs at individual pulp and paper mills to test whether the impact of environmental regulation on productivity differs by plant vintage and technology. Plants with higher pollution abatement costs have significantly lower productivity levels. This relationship differs greatly based on a plant's technology, with productivity at integrated mills being greatly affected by abatement costs, while the impact at non-integrated mills is negligible. Plant vintage does not seem to matter, with older and newer plants showing similar impacts. Reported abatement costs appear to substantially understate the true costs of abatement. Accounting for the impact of technology differences makes some difference in the estimated overall impact of environmental regulation.     

Environmental policy and human capital inequality: A matter of life and death

This paper analyzes the economic implications of an environmental policy when we account for the life expectancy of heterogeneous agents. In a framework in which everyone suffers from pollution but health status also depends on individual human capital, we find that the economy may be stuck in a trap in which inequality rises steadily, especially when the initial pollution intensity of production is too high. We emphasize that such inequality is in the long run costly for the economy in terms of health and growth. Therefore, we study whether a tax on pollution associated with an investment in pollution abatement can be used to address this situation. We show that a stricter environmental policy may allow the economy to escape from the inequality trap while enhancing the long-term growth rate when the initial inequality in human capital is not too large.     

燃煤工业锅炉大气二氧化硫污染及应用工业固硫型煤控制

本文研究我国燃煤工业锅炉大气ＳＯ２的污染状况及发展趋势，以及应用工业固硫型煤控制燃煤工业锅炉大气ＳＯ２的污染。燃煤工业锅炉燃烧工业固硫型煤时，可明显地降低ＳＯ２和烟尘的排放量，并节约煤炭。推广和发展工业固硫型煤，是防治燃煤工业锅炉大气ＳＯ２污染的一条投资少、见效快、简便易行的实用措施，其经济效益及环境效益相当可观。     

Competitive investment in clean technology and uninformed green consumers

In a market where consumers and the regulatory authorities are not fully informed about the actual production technology or environmental performance of firms that engage in strategic competition, I study the effect of environmental consciousness of consumers on firms׳ incentive to invest in cleaner technology. Firms compete in prices and may signal their environmental performance to uninformed consumers through prices. I also analyze the effect of an expected liability on firms in this setting. Compared to full information, incomplete information generates higher strategic incentive to invest in cleaner technology particularly when consciousness and/or expected liability are not too high. Requiring mandatory disclosure of technology or environmental performance may discourage such investment. Even though consumers and the regulator are uninformed, competition has a positive effect (relative to monopoly) on the incentive to invest.     

A laboratory study of auctions for reducing non-point source pollution

Non-point source pollution, such as nutrient runoff to waterways from agricultural production, is an environmental problem that typically involves asymmetric information. Land use changes to reduce pollution incur opportunity costs that are privately known to landholders, but these changes provide environmental benefits that may be more accurately estimated by regulators. This paper reports a testbed laboratory experiment in which landholder/sellers in sealed-offer auctions compete to obtain part of a fixed budget allocated by the regulator to subsidize abatement. In one treatment the regulator reveals to landholders the environmental benefits estimated for their projects, and in another treatment the regulator conceals the potential projects’ “environmental quality.” The results show that sellers’ offers misrepresent their costs more for high-quality projects when quality is revealed, so total abatement is lower and seller profits are higher when landholders know their projects’ environmental benefits. This suggests that concealing this information may improve regulatory efficiency.     

Intra-industry trade in intermediate products, pollution and internationally increasing returns

This paper examines the relationship between intra-industry trade in intermediate products, pollution and increasing returns. We develop a two-country model in which production occurs in two stages, final and intermediate good production. Intermediate goods are produced under monopolistic competition and final good production exhibits increasing returns with respect to the number of varieties of intermediates. Pollution occurs in the production of the final good when polluting intermediates are used. We analyze the effects of international trade in intermediate products on pollution, output and welfare under an endogenous tax scenario and with two types of pollution functions. The results show that, because of increasing returns, international trade either leads to lower total pollution in each country or lower pollution per unit of output in at least one country. In addition, intra-industry trade causes countries to import the environmental quality of their trading partners.     

Intra-industry trade in intermediate products,pollution and internationally increasing returns

This paper examines the relationship between intra-industry trade in intermediate products, pollution and increasing returns. We develop a two-country model in which production occurs in two stages, final and intermediate good production. Intermediate goods are produced under monopolistic competition and final good production exhibits increasing returns with respect to the number of varieties of intermediates. Pollution occurs in the production of the final good when polluting intermediates are used. We analyze the effects of international trade in intermediate products on pollution, output and welfare under an endogenous tax scenario and with two types of pollution functions. The results show that, because of increasing returns, international trade either leads to lower total pollution in each country or lower pollution per unit of output in at least one country. In addition, intra-industry trade causes countries to import the environmental quality of their trading partners.     

Economic growth and environmental pollution under the max-min principle

This paper first analyzes the interactions between capital accumulation and environmental pollution under the program of sustained constant utility, which depends on per capita consumption and pollution, over all generations. Then the optimal program of economic growth is discussed. The implications of the constant-utility criterion (or the max-min principle) are compared with those of the utilitarian criterion which has been widely adopted in environmental pollution literature. Subsequently, the analysis incorporates pollution-abatement investment and exhaustible resources. We conclude that the max-min principle works fairly satisfactorily in this world.     

Environmentally Sensitive Productivity Analysis of the Canadian Pulp and Paper Industry, 1959-1994: An Input Distance Function Approach

This study employs a parametric input distance function that incorporates both desirable and undesirable outputs to provide a more complete representation of the production technology from which environmentally sensitive productivity and efficiency measures can be generated. This framework also generates pollution abatement cost estimates that are useful for policy making. An input-based Malmquist index of productivity growth that appropriately credits the producer not only for increases in marketable or desirable outputs but also for the production of improved environmental quality through pollution abatement activities is derived from the input distance function. The method was applied to time series data from the Canadian pulp and paper industry. Our shadow price estimates indicate that the marginal cost to producers of pollution control has been rising. The main conclusion of this study is that productivity improvement, from the social viewpoint, has been stronger than conventional measures would suggest.     

环境基础设施运营现状及市场化对策

本文对建立环境基础设施社会化投入机制和运营机制提出五条对策建议：即加强规划管理、建立社会化投入机制、推行环保设施运营市场化,发展股份制污染防治企业,加强法制建设并制定配套政策。     

Growth, environment and innovation—a model with production vintages and environmentally oriented research

I develop an innovative environmental new growth model driven by researchers striving for monopoly profits. Skilled labour is allocated between production vintages and two forms of research, ordinary and environmentally oriented. The intermediate sector includes fixed costs and decreasing returns, limiting the number of vintages used. I solve for planner's, laissez-faire, and regulator's solutions, and examine welfare implications and the various distortions in the model (monopoly power, knowledge spillovers, business stealing, environmental externalities). A regulator may wish: (i) to encourage environmentally oriented research; (ii) to concentrate production labour on recent (cleaner) vintages; (iii) to switch labour from production to research. An environmental sales tax may under some circumstances achieve all three—such taxes not only give incentives to reduce pollution, but also shift profits from old vintages to new, thus raising incentives to come up with newer (cleaner) vintages. An environmental tax may even lead to an increase in the rate of production growth.     

Cost-effective environmental policy: implications of induced technological change

Cost-effective environmental policy generally requires that all emission sources are faced with the same tax. In this paper I discuss how the existence of induced technological change may alter this result, if at least some of the effect is external to the firm. Focusing on Learning by doing (LBD) effects in abatement activities, it is shown that emission sources with external learning effects should be faced with a higher tax than emission sources with only autonomous technological change. By using simple numerical simulations, it is further investigated to what degree a cost-effective climate policy differs from a free quota market, under various assumptions about learning effects, diffusion of technology and environmental targets. The results indicate that optimal taxes may be significantly higher in the industrial world than in the developing world. Moreover, the industrial world's share of global abatement may be much higher in a cost-effective solution than in a free quota market. The global cost savings of a fully flexible implementation of the Kyoto Protocol are further questioned, as potential spillover effects of technological growth in the industrial world are not internalised in the market.     

A Note on Environmental Federalism: Interpreting Some Contradictory Results

This paper reconciles some conflicting interpretations of recent literature on interjurisdictional environmental regulatory competition.[6], [7]present a model in which competition to attract investment by lowering environmental standards leads to a Pareto-optimal equilibrium. [3]; and [4]describe a model in which such competition can result in a suboptimal Nash equilibrium. While it would be possible to draw opposite policy implications from the two models regarding the appropriate degree of environmental federalism, such a conclusion would be incorrect. This paper reconciles the different results by showing that they depend in large part on monopoly profits and tax exporting, not the nature of the pollution externality or environmental federalism.     

Pollution havens and industrial agglomeration

This paper examines the pollution haven hypothesis using a spatial-economy model of two countries and two sectors. The manufacturing sector generates cross-border pollution which reduces cross-sectoral productivity of agricultural goods, and lowers local income. We derive a demand-reducing effect that discourages firms to move to the country with laxer environmental regulations, in the absence of any comparative advantage. Our analysis also demonstrates that manufacturing agglomeration forces can alleviate the pollution-haven effect: a pollution haven may not arise if environmental regulation is slightly more stringent in the larger country.     

生物制氢最新研究进展与发展趋势

氢能具有清洁、高效、可再生的特点,是一种最具发展潜力的化石燃料替代能源.与传统的热化学和电化学制氢技术相比,生物制氢具有低能耗、少污染等优势.近年来,生物制氢技术在发酵菌株筛选、产氢机制、制氢工艺等方面取得了较大进展.暗发酵和光发酵结合制氢技术是一种新技术,具有较高的氢气产量.以厌氧细菌和光合细菌为发酵菌种,以富含碳水化合物的工农业废弃物为原料,进行暗发酵和光发酵结合制氢,具有广阔发展前途前景.本文综述了国内外生物制氢技术研究进展,展望了未来发展趋势.     

Do credit constraints favor dirty production? Theory and plant-level evidence

This paper explores the effect of credit constraints on production-generated pollution emissions. I develop a theoretical model wherein polluting firms borrow externally to finance investment in various assets, subject to a credit constraint. The main insight of the model is that credit constraints distort the composition of assets towards over-investment in tangible assets, which can be pledged as collateral, thereby increasing the intensity of emissions. The predictions of the model are tested using a unique dataset consisting of plant-level measures of pollution emissions and creditworthiness. The empirical results indicate that credit constraints significantly increase pollution emissions (even after accounting for the scale effect), and the results withstand multiple robustness checks. Moreover, the effect of credit constraints is particularly acute in industries with greater reliance on external credit. Finally, I demonstrate that firm-level credit constraints distort the composition of assets and that the composition of assets influences pollution emissions.     

工业发展与环境污染关系的区域差异分析--基于江苏省的实证研究

利用格兰杰因果关系检验（Granger causality tests）方法分析了江苏省处在不同发展阶段的三大区域的工业经济增长和环境污染之间双向作用关系。研究结果表明：经济发展水平越高,工业经济增长对环境污染的影响越明显,并且持续时间长,在某种程度上环境污染已经成为受工业经济增长影响的内生变量;江苏省三大区域环境污染都不是工业经济增长的原因,环境污染的加重并不能带来工业经济的增长,因此,在实践中靠牺牲环境来换取经济增长的理念是不可取的,＂先污染后治理＂的发展思路是不可行的。     

Controlling the monopolistic polluter: Nihilism or eclecticism?

This paper is concerned with the consequences of pollution control when the polluter is a monopolist who can choose between abating pollution by reducing output and by adopting a less-polluting technology. It is suggested that the risk of welfare losses resulting from control policy is lower when technology is flexible than when it is rigid. Nevertheless some risk does remain, so the paper concludes with a discussion of the possible use of selective control instruments to keep the risk to a minimum.