Decentralized regulation of a common property renewable resource industry with irreversible investment

The effectiveness of output controls for rationalizing a common property renewable resource has been called into question by the theoretical work of J. R. Gould [Economica, Nov., 383–402 (1972)]. A proper examination of this question requires an intertemporal analysis, one that takes into account that asymmetries between persistent factors of production (“immaleable capital”) and factors that are instantaneously consumed (“labor” or ldharvest effort”). We present here a nonlinear intertemporal model of a renewable resource industry, under conditions of irreversible capital investment, and undertake to analyze its dynamics, both at open access and under centralized optimal management. We then examine the theoretical possibility of decentralized regulation by Pigouvian taxes, and reconsider the proposition of Gould.     

Optimal investment policies with exhaustible resources: An information-based model

An information-based model of the “optimal control” type is developed using concepts from information theory to explore the dynamics of fossil resource exhaustion and the phenomenon of substitution by other forms of capital and technological knowledge. All exhaustible resources stocks and forms of capital (and knowledge) are taken to be equivalent to forms of information in the physical sense. It is shown that, with optimal policies, the planning period, or cycle, has several distinct phases, with different optimal investment patterns. The model has two important qualitative implications: (1) economic growth rates are inherently discontinuous and (2) the model predicts an evolutionary structural change, viz., the creation of a new sector in response to the progressive exhaustion (or obsolescence) of previously essential resources or capital stocks. A multiperiod extension is suggested, leading to a tentative explanation for the Kondratieff long-wave phenomenon.     

The role of technological change

We develop an optimal growth model that includes several important new features. First, technological change is endogenously related to the growth of “knowledge.” Investment may be directed either towards physical capital or knowledge (or both). Knowledge becomes an effective substitute for scarce resources by increasing the technical efficiency of resource utilization both for consumption and in capital. Nevertheless, a finite quantity resource must be embodied in capital and a finite flow is required for depreciation. Thus, there is an upper limit to technical efficiency and economic growth is thus ultimately limited by the availability of renewable resources. For a simple aggregate production function it is shown that technical efficiency never approaches unity on an optimal path.     

Stochastic Pollution, Permits, and Merger Incentives

Pollution permit regulations introduce nonlinearities into the objective function of a polluting firm. We develop a microeconomic model to show the effects these nonlinearities might have upon firm decisions when emissions are stochastic. Under perfect competition the fraction of planned pollution covered by permits is shown to be separable from planned production. We also demonstrate that permit management incentives may motivate a merger of otherwise independent firms. Incentives to petition for “bubble” coverage are also considered. The model is studied under risk neutrality and risk aversion. Imperfectly competitive situations in the output and permit markets are also analyzed.     

Selecting parameters for calibration via sensitivity analysis: An individual-based model of mosquitofish population dynamics

A stochastic individual-based model (IBM) of mosquitofish population dynamics in experimental ponds was constructed in order to increase, virtually, the number of replicates of control populations in an ecotoxicology trial, and thus to increase the statistical power of the experiments. In this context, great importance had to be paid to model calibration as this conditions the use of the model as a reference for statistical comparisons. Accordingly, model calibration required that both mean behaviour and variability behaviour of the model were in accordance with real data. Currently, identifying parameter values from observed data is still an open issue for IBMs, especially when the parameter space is large. Our model included 41 parameters: 30 driving the model expectancy and 11 driving the model variability. Under these conditions, the use of “Latin hypercube” sampling would most probably have “missed” some important combinations of parameter values. Therefore, complete factorial design was preferred. Unfortunately, due to the constraints of the computational capacity, cost-acceptable “complete designs” were limited to no more than nine parameters, the calibration question becoming a parameter selection question. In this study, successive “complete designs” were conducted with different sets of parameters and different parameter values, in order to progressively narrow the parameter space. For each “complete design”, the selection of a maximum of nine parameters and their respective n values was carefully guided by sensitivity analysis. Sensitivity analysis was decisive in selecting parameters that were both influential and likely to have strong interactions. According to this strategy, the model of mosquitofish population dynamics was calibrated on real data from two different years of experiments, and validated on real data from another independent year. This model includes two categories of agents; fish and their living environment. Fish agents have four main processes: growth, survival, puberty and reproduction. The outputs of the model are the length frequency distribution of the population and the 16 scalar variables describing the fish populations. In this study, the length frequency distribution was parameterized by 10 scalars in order to be able to perform calibration. The recently suggested notion of “probabilistic distribution of the distributions” was also applied to our case study, and was shown to be very promising for comparing length frequency distributions (as such).     

Entitlements, missing markets, and environmental uncertainty: Reply

At one level Dore and Ward seem intent on immunizing received doctrine. They say that I did not prove that rights violated Nozick's principles of justice, and that I did not prove that missing markets were the problem. More telling, they allege I did not prove that my story was better than the particular story favored by Dore and Ward. That is, they argue that : “ … there is an alternative approach, based on the theory of public economics, which is indeed operational.”³ They then use the bulk of their comment to explain and defend this alternative model. They hope to convince the reader that the model of “public economics” survives intact in the face of my alternative model. To the extent that their model allows one to define the problem away, it is not difficult to see why they find it so compelling.More seriously, Dore and Ward fail to make a coherent argument about the concept of rights and duties and the logic of a particular rights structure that happens to prevail. They seem concerned that my article was tampering with some sacred social construct—the status quo rights structure—and that my article threatened the received wisdom of both “public economics” and Paretian-Walrasian bliss. Indeed, theirs seems to be a genuine fear that if economists release their grip on the certitude of received orthodoxy the floodgates will be open to all manner of bumbling regulators seeking to shift rights and wealth positions across generations. My article is apparently threatening because it seems to suggest that the received wisdom may, at times, be misleading.     

Evolutionary diversity and spatiotemporal dynamics of a spatial game

In this paper, the evolution of cooperation is studied by a spatially structured evolutionary game model in which the players are located on a two-dimensional square lattice. Each player can choose one of the following strategies: “always defect” (ALLD), “tit-for-tat” (TFT), and “always cooperate” (ALLC). Players merely interact with four immediate neighbors at first and adjust strategies according to their rewards. First, the evolutionary dynamics of the three strategies in non-spatial population is investigated, and the results indicate that cooperation is not favored in most settings without spatial structure. Next, an analytical method, which is based on comparing the local payoff structures, is introduced for the spatial game model. Using the conditions derived from the method as criteria, the parameter plane for two major parameters of the spatial game model is divided and nine representative regions are identified. In each parameter region, a distinct spatiotemporal dynamics is characterized. The spatiotemporal dynamics not only verify that the spatial structure promote the evolution of cooperation but also reveal how cooperation is favored. Our results show that spatial structure is the keystone of the evolution of intraspecific diversity.     

Pollution control in a simplified general-equilibrium model with production externalities

Pollution externalities of the producer-producer type are considered in a positive two-sector model with stationary capital and labor. By assumption, output from the polluting sector can be diverted to pollution abatement. Environmental authorities attempt to control the level of pollution to some minimum “acceptable” standard by requiring polluters to depollute through the mechanism of a uniform tax on production. Following discussion of short-run considerations, the stability of the tax-adjustment scheme is examined and the dynamic nature of growth paths in the economy is explored.     

Ancillary benefits of reduced air pollution in the US from moderate greenhouse gas mitigation policies in the electricity sector

Actions to slow atmospheric accumulation of greenhouse gases also would reduce conventional air pollutants yielding “ancillary” benefits that tend to accrue locally and in the near-term. Using a detailed electricity model linked to an integrated assessment framework to value changes in human health, we find a tax of $25 per metric ton of carbon emissions would yield NO_x-related health benefits of about $8 per metric ton of carbon reduced in the year 2010 (1997 dollars). Additional savings of $4–$7 accrue from reduced investment in NO_x and SO₂ abatement in order to comply with emission caps. Total ancillary benefits of a $25 carbon tax are $12–$14, which appear to justify the costs of a $25 tax, although marginal benefits are less than marginal costs. At a tax of $75, greater total benefits are achieved but the value per ton of carbon reductions remains roughly constant at about $12.     

The derivation of discount rates with an augmented measure of income

Most developed economies invest in public goods such as national defense, education, infrastructure, and the environment. Discount rates used to evaluate such projects should reflect the rate of return on the current mix of investment opportunities. Rates derived from the productivity of private capital neglect returns beyond the market boundary. The present paper derives discount rates using an augmented measure of national income inclusive of non-market goods. In an empirical application focusing on air pollution and climate damages in the United States economy, the paper reports that the difference between augmented and market discount rates averages 0.3 percentage points from 1999 to 2014.     

The resource curse revisited and revised: A tale of paradoxes and red herrings

We critically evaluate the empirical basis for the so-called resource curse and find that, despite the topic's popularity in economics and political science research, this apparent paradox may be a red herring. The most commonly used measure of “resource abundance” can be more usefully interpreted as a proxy for “resource dependence”—endogenous to underlying structural factors. In multiple estimations that combine resource abundance and dependence, institutional, and constitutional variables, we find that (i) resource abundance, constitutions, and institutions determine resource dependence, (ii) resource dependence does not affect growth, and (iii) resource abundance positively affects growth and institutional quality.     

Pollution Permits and Sustainable Growth in a Schumpeterian Model

In Chapter 4 of their book (“Endogenous Growth Theory,” MIT Press, Cambridge, MA (1998)), Aghion and Howitt introduce environmental pollution in an aggregate Schumpeterian model and characterize the optimal path. In this paper, we study the equilibria in a decentralized economy compatible with their model. First, we study the trade-off between environmental quality and growth and identify the channels of transmission of environmental policy into growth performance. Then, we compute the levels of the tools which are used to implement the optimum.     

Strategic environmental policy; eco-dumping or a green strategy?

The Porter hypothesis claims that a strong environmental policy best serves the interests of a nation's export industry. While this hypothesis seems to be based on some form of bounded rationality, this paper argues that governments may have good reasons for setting an especially strong environmental policy even though firms are fully rational. If the available abatement technology turns the environment into an “inferior input”, competitiveness is spurred by a strong environmental policy. The government should take advantage of this, and set an especially strict emission quota or an especially high emission tax. The findings in the paper also has consequences for the desirability of international cooperation with respect to national environmental policy. If a strict environmental policy spurs competitiveness, the environment is better protected without cooperation.     

Incentive compatibility tests of choice experiment value elicitation questions

This paper uses laboratory experiments with induced values to address fundamental issues related to the incentive compatibility of choice experiment value elicitation questions. In particular, we compare two- versus three-option choice sets and the effect of using alternative provision rules, including one where the outcome is influenced by both participant and “regulator” votes. We find the overall proportion of choices that are inconsistent with induced preferences is rather low. However, there are more deviations from induced preferences for two-option choice sets, and for alternatives to a simple plurality vote implementation rule. A multinomial probit analysis of choices in tandem with a mixed logit welfare analysis suggests there is a statistically significant but modest degree of bias towards selecting the status quo option.     

Putting free-riding to work: A Partnership Solution to the common-property problem

The common-property problem results in excessive mining, hunting, and extraction of oil and water. The same phenomenon is also responsible for excessive investment in R&D and excessive outlays in rent-seeking contests. We propose a “Partnership Solution” to eliminate or at least mitigate these excesses. Each of N players joins a partnership in the first stage and chooses his effort in the second stage. Under the rules of a partnership, each member must pay his own cost of effort but receives an equal share of the partnership's revenue. The incentive to free-ride created by such partnerships turns out to be beneficial since it naturally offsets the excessive effort inherent in such problems. In our two-stage game, this institutional arrangement can, under specified circumstances, induce the social optimum in a subgame-perfect equilibrium: no one has a unilateral incentive (1) to switch to another partnership (or create a new partnership) in the first stage or (2) to deviate from socially optimal actions in the second stage. The game may have other subgame-perfect equilibria, but the one associated with the “Partnership Solution” is strictly preferred by every player. We also propose a modification of the first stage which generates a unique subgame-perfect equilibrium. Antitrust authorities should recognize that partnerships can have a less benign use. By organizing as competing partnerships, an industry can reduce the “excessive” output of Cournot oligopoly to the monopoly level. Since no partner has any incentive to overproduce in the current period, there is no need to deter cheating with threats of future punishments.     

A goal interval programming model for resource allocation in a marine environmental protection program

A multidimensional “goal programming” model is developed to aid resource allocation decisions in the U. S. Coast Guard's Marine Environmental Protection (MEP) program. It is then extended to a model of “goal interval programming” (GIP ) type where exact values for the indicated goals, as in ordinary goal programming, are replaced by ranges. Deviations outside these ranges are also accommodated by piecewise linear functions with slopes that vary with distance from the goal intervals. Uses and generalizations are discussed in the context of applications to allocating manhours and planning the activities of the Coast Guard's MEP program.     

Do microbial processes regulate the stability of a coral atoll's enclosed pelagic ecosystem?

Complex marine ecosystems contain multiple feedback cycles that can cause unexpected responses to perturbations. To better predict these responses, complicated models are increasingly being developed to enable the study of feedback cycles. However, the sparseness of ecological data often limits the direct empirical parameterization of all model parameters. Here we use a Bayesian inverse analysis approach to synthesize empirical data and ecological theory derived from published studies of a coral atoll's enclosed pelagic ecosystem (Takapoto Atoll, French Polynesia). We then use the estimates of flux magnitudes to parameterize probabilistic compartment models with two forms of heterotrophic consumption: (1) “bottom-up” donor-controlled heterotrophic consumption and (2) “top-down” mass-action heterotrophic consumption. We explore how the flux magnitudes affect the ecosystem's stability properties of resilience, reactivity, and resistance under both assumptions for heterotrophic consumption. The models suggest that the microbial uptake of dissolved organic carbon (DOC) regulates the long term rate of return to steady state following a temporary or pulse perturbation (resilience), and the cycling of carbon between abiotic pools and heterotrophic compartments regulates the short-term response (reactivity). In the bottom-up process model, the sensitivity of steady state masses following a sustained or press perturbation (resistance) is highest for the DOC pool following a sustained change to the microbial uptake rate of DOC. Further, a change in the microbial uptake of DOC propagates through the ecosystem and affects the steady state values of zooplankton. The analysis suggests that the food web is highly dependent on the recycling between the abiotic and biotic carbon pools, particularly as mediated by the microbial consumption of DOC, and this recycling determines how the ecosystem responds to perturbations.     

Pollution,welfare, and environmental policy in the theory of Comparative Advantage

Within a simple two-sector general equilibrium model it is shown how some well-known propositions of the neoclassical trade theory can be applied to countries with pollution-generating industries. Results are obtained not only under the assumption that the countries do not enforce any environmental policy but also for the case that one or each country implements an environmental price and standard system. In particular, several versions of the Theorem of Comparative Advantage with respect to environmental scarcity are derived, a theorem on welfare losses from trade, and an emission charge equalization theorem.     

Optimal harvesting of ecologically interdependent fish species

The optimal exploitation of a two-species predator-prey system is considered, using Lotka-Volterra-type equations. Due to the density-dependence of ecological efficiency, both species should be harvested simultaneously over a range of relative prices. Beyond the limits of this price range, either the prey species should be utilized indirectly by harvesting the predator, or the predator should be eliminated to maximize the prey yield. Neglecting harvesting costs, the simultaneous harvest of prey and predators requires that a unit of prey biomass increase in value by being “processed” by predators. Certain results from single-species fishery models are shown not to apply to multispecies models. These are as follows: (i) Optimal regulation of a free access fishery may call for subsidizing instead of taxing the harvest of predator species. (ii) Increasing the discount rate may, at “moderate” levels, imply that the optimal standing stock of biomass increases instead of decreasing. (iii) A rising price or a falling cost per unit fishing effort of a species may raise and not lower the optimal standing stock of that species.