Are automatic systems the future of motorcycle safety? A novel methodology to prioritize potential safety solutions based on their projected effectiveness

Objective: Motorcycle riders are involved in significantly more crashes per kilometer driven than passenger car drivers. Nonetheless, the development and implementation of motorcycle safety systems lags far behind that of passenger cars. This research addresses the identification of the most effective motorcycle safety solutions in the context of different countries.

Methods: A knowledge-based system of motorcycle safety (KBMS) was developed to assess the potential for various safety solutions to mitigate or avoid motorcycle crashes. First, a set of 26 common crash scenarios was identified from the analysis of multiple crash databases. Second, the relative effectiveness of 10 safety solutions was assessed for the 26 crash scenarios by a panel of experts. Third, relevant information about crashes was used to weigh the importance of each crash scenario in the region studied. The KBMS method was applied with an Italian database, with a total of more than 1 million motorcycle crashes in the period 2000–2012.

Results: When applied to the Italian context, the KBMS suggested that automatic systems designed to compensate for riders' or drivers' errors of commission or omission are the potentially most effective safety solution. The KBMS method showed an effective way to compare the potential of various safety solutions, through a scored list with the expected effectiveness of each safety solution for the region to which the crash data belong. A comparison of our results with a previous study that attempted a systematic prioritization of safety systems for motorcycles (PISa project) showed an encouraging agreement.

Conclusions: Current results revealed that automatic systems have the greatest potential to improve motorcycle safety. Accumulating and encoding expertise in crash analysis from a range of disciplines into a scalable and reusable analytical tool, as proposed with the use of KBMS, has the potential to guide research and development of effective safety systems. As the expert assessment of the crash scenarios is decoupled from the regional crash database, the expert assessment may be reutilized, thereby allowing rapid reanalysis when new crash data become available. In addition, the KBMS methodology has potential application to injury forecasting, driver/rider training strategies, and redesign of existing road infrastructure.     

Challenges in performing technical safety reviews of modifications – A case study

The aim of the present study, is to identify strengths and weaknesses of the technical safety review process at a Swedish Nuclear Power Plant (NPP). In this context, the function of safety reviews are understood as expert judgements on proposals for design modifications¹ and redesign of technical systems (i.e. commercial nuclear reactors), supported by formalised safety review processes. The chosen methodology is using two complementary methods: interviews of personnel performing safety reviews, and analysis of safety review reports from 2005 to 2009.The study shows that personal integrity is a trademark of the review staff and there are sufficient support systems to ensure high quality. The partition between primary and independent review is positive, having different focus and staff with different skills and perspectives making the reviews, which implies supplementary roles. The process contributes to “getting the right things done the right way”. The study also shows that though efficient communication, feedback, processes for continuous improvement, and “learning organizations” are well known success factors in academia, it is not that simple to implement and accomplish in real life.It is argued that future applications of safety review processes should focus more on communicating and clarifying the process and its adherent requirements, and improve the feedback system within the process.     

What is most important for safety climate: The company belonging or the local working environment? – A study from the Norwegian offshore industry

Obtaining knowledge about factors affecting health, safety and environment (HSE) is of major interest to the petroleum industry, but there is currently a severe shortage of relevant studies. The aim of this study was to examine the relative influence of offshore installation (local working environment) and company belonging on employees’ opinions concerning occupational health and safety. We analyzed data from a safety climate survey answered by 4479 Norwegian offshore petroleum employees in 2005 on the dimensions “Safety prioritisation”, “Safety management and involvement”, “Safety versus production”, “Individual motivation”, “System comprehension” and “Competence” using one way analysis of variance (ANOVA), effect size and mixed model. The companies differed significantly for “Safety prioritisation”, “Safety versus production”, “Individual motivation”, “System comprehension” and “Competence”. The local offshore installation explained more of the safety climate than the company they were employed in or worked for did.     

Safety climate: Leading or lagging indicator of safety outcomes?

This paper theorizes how and why safety climate can be conceived as both a leading and a lagging indicator of safety events (i.e., accidents, injuries). When safety climate is conceived as a leading indicator, a prospective design is utilized and safety climate data are correlated with accidents/injuries that occur in the future. When safety climate is conceived as a lagging indicator, retrospective designs are used in which safety climate data are correlated with prior accidents/injuries. We examine the research literature to reveal that safety climate has been investigated as both a leading and a lagging indicator, but it is usually only examined as one or the other within a given study and has been examined as a lagging indicator most frequently. Consistent with our theorizing, prospective designs yield stronger relationships than retrospective designs, suggesting that safety climate is a better leading indicator than lagging indicator; however, it is clearly both. Implications for safety climate research and study design are discussed.     

The safety barometer: How safe is my plant today? Is instantaneously measuring safety level utopia or realizable?

During the last decade, serious accidents have continued to occur in the process industry. Apparently the scenarios of various undesired events leading to those accidents are still not sufficiently controlled. The key question is how potentially hazardous situations develop, what processes form the basis for this development, and how to control them? Safety level is not static but depends on many risk factors that change in presence and intensity over location and time. Safety level is dependent not only on technical process parameters that have immediate effects on the ‘frequency’ or probability of catastrophic consequences, but also depends on equipment integrity degradation, operational and management quality, attitudes, and cultural processes which may change over a prolonged time. The time and human interaction aspects make dynamic risk assessment complex. This paper will outline a conceptual approach using in addition to the regular process parameter signals received, also weak and slowly changing signals from various safety indicators, enabling to keep track of the risk factors. In theory this could lead to obtaining an instantaneous safety level ‘measure’ making possible forecast alarming for an imminent event to occur. Such concept could be regarded as a ‘writing’ safety barometer, or barograph. However, there are quite a number of problems to be solved which in the paper will be discussed.     

Driver distraction by digital billboards? Structural equation modeling based on naturalistic driving study data: A case study of Iran

Introduction: Digital billboards (DBs) are a competing factor for attracting drivers’ attention; evidence shows that DBs may cause crashes and vehicle conflicts because they catch drivers’ attention. Because of the complexity of a system that includes road conditions, driver features, and environmental factors, it is simply not possible to identify relationships between these factors. Thus, the present study was conducted to provide a well-organized procedure to analyze the effects of DBs on drivers’ behavior and measure factors responsible for drivers’ distraction in Babol, Iran, as a case study. Method: Corresponding data were collected through a Naturalistic Driving Study (NDS) of 78 participants when facing DBs (1,326 samples). These data were analyzed by applying structural equation modeling (SEM) to concurrently recognize relationships between endogenous and exogenous variables. Human, environmental, and road factors were determined as exogenous latent variables in a model to evaluate their influences on drivers’ distraction as an endogenous variable. Results: The results showed that road, environmental, and human factors reciprocally interact with drivers’ distraction, although the estimated coefficient of human factors was more of a factor than that of the other groups. Furthermore, younger drivers, beginner drivers, and male drivers (as human factors); night and unclear weather like a rainy day (as environmental factors); and installing DBs at complicated traffic positions like near-intersections (as road factors) were determined to be the main factors that increase the possibility of drivers’ distraction. Finally, model assessment was suggested using the goodness-of-fit indices.     

The role of component arrangement in complex safety instrumented systems—A case study

The arrangement of components plays a key role in the performance of complex Safety Instrumented Systems (SIS), in which a SIS logic solver is interlocked with other logic solvers, to share a final element, for instance. The position of the components and the way they are utilized affects the reliability characteristics, such as the Probability of Failure on Demand (PFD), Spurious Trip Rate (STR), architectural sensitivity and model uncertainty. This case study uses quantitative and qualitative approaches to elaborate on various aspects of component arrangement in complex SIS. Numerous simplified models are analyzed; new classification is introduced for SIS components based on their response to demand; a set of guidelines are developed for SIS architecture design, with a focus on component arrangement; and the use of these guidelines is demonstrated in a real-life example, where an existing turbine SIS is modified to incorporate a new over-speed protection system. The simplified models and the turbine upgrade project are also used to explain the issue of unknowns and uncertainties in reliability analysis and how these issues can be addressed in SIS architecture by optimizing component arrangement.     

What does safety commitment mean to leaders? A multi-method investigation

Introduction: Perceived management safety commitment as an aspect of safety climate or culture is a key influence on safety outcomes in organizations. What is unclear is how perceptions of management commitment are created by leaders. Method: To address this gap in the literature, we position safety commitment as a leadership construct viewed from the perspectives of the leaders who experience and demonstrate it. In this paper, an established multidimensional commitment framework is applied to leaders' safety commitment (consisting of affective, normative, and calculative commitment). Via an exploratory sequential mixed methods design combining interviews (n = 40) and surveys (n = 89), we investigate the applicability of this theoretical conceptualization to safety commitment. Results: The results indicate the multiple dimensions captured leaders' safety commitment well, safety commitment can be demonstrated via a range of behaviors, and the dimensions' association with behavioral demonstrations aligned with those of other types of commitment reported in the literature. Only affective safety commitment was consistently associated with demonstrations of safety commitment. The link between high levels of affective and normative safety commitment and demonstrations was more pronounced when participants perceived their company's safety climate more positively. Conclusions: Adopting a focus on leaders' experience of safety commitment offers opportunities for new research into the way in which safety commitment perceptions are shaped by leaders. Practical application: The findings can support leaders' reflection about their personal mindset around safety and support them in fostering strong safety climates and cultures. It further encourages organizations in creating work environments that in particular foster affective and normative safety commitments in leaders.     

Where to focus? Insights from safety personnel and external safety consultants on lessons learned about safety climate interventions – A qualitative approach

Introduction: Safety climate is important for promoting workplace safety and health. However, there is a dearth of empirical research on the effective ways of planning, designing, and implementing safety climate interventions, especially regarding what is going to be changed and improved. To address this gap, the present study sought to extract a comprehensive pool of compiled suggestions for safety climate intervention based on qualitative interviews with professionals in occupational safety and health management from potentially hazardous industries. Method: A series of systematic semi-structured interviews, guided by a comprehensive sociotechnical systems framework, were conducted with company safety personnel (n = 26) and external safety consultants (n = 15) of 21 companies from various industries. The taxonomy of five work system components of the sociotechnical systems approach served as overarching themes, representing different areas of improvement in an organization for occupational safety and health promotion, with an aim of enhancing safety climate. Results: Of the 36 codes identified, seven codes were based on the theme of external environment work system, four were based on the theme of internal environment work system, five were based on the theme of organizational and managerial structure work system, 14 codes were based on the theme of personnel subsystem, and six were based on the theme of technical subsystem. Conclusions: Safety climate intervention strategies might be most commonly based upon the principles of human resource management (i.e., codes based on the personnel subsystem theme and organizational and managerial structure work system theme). Meanwhile, numerous attributes of external/internal environment work system and technical subsystem can be jointly improved to bolster safety climate in a holistic way. Practical Applications: More systematic and organized management of safety climate would be available when various interrelated codes pertinent to a given context are carefully considered for a safety climate intervention.     

Which comes first,organizational culture or performance? A longitudinal study of causal priority with automobile dealerships

Prior research supports a link between organizational culture and performance but generally falls short of establishing causality or determining the direction of a culture–performance (C‐P) relationship. Using data collected from 95 franchise automobile dealerships over 6 years, we studied longitudinal culture–performance relationships to determine whether culture or performance has causal priority, or alternatively, whether a reciprocal relationship exists. Results from cross‐lagged panel analyses indicate that culture “comes first,” consistently predicting subsequent ratings of customer satisfaction and vehicle sales. Furthermore, the positive effect of culture on vehicle sales is fully mediated by customer satisfaction ratings. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Does the potential safety risk affect whether particular construction hazards are recognized or not?

Introduction: Evidence from the global construction industry suggests that an unacceptable number of safety hazards remain unrecognized in construction workplaces. Unfortunately, there isn’t a sufficient understanding of why particular safety hazards remain unrecognized. Such an understanding is important to address the issue of poor hazard recognition and develop remedial interventions. A recent exploratory effort provided anecdotal evidence that workers often fail to recognize safety hazards that are expected to impose relatively lower levels of safety risk. In other words, the research demonstrated that the underlying risk imposed by a safety hazard can affect whether a hazard will be recognized or not. Method: The presented research focused on empirically testing this preliminary finding. More specifically, the study tested the proposition that Construction workers are more likely to recognize safety hazards that impose higher levels of safety risk than those that impose relatively lower levels of safety risk. The research goals were accomplished through a number of steps. First, a set of 16 construction case images depicting a variety of construction operations that included a number of known safety hazards was presented to a panel of four construction safety experts. The experts were tasked with examining each of the known safety hazards and providing a rating of the relative safety risk that the individual hazards impose. Having obtained an estimate of the underlying safety risk, a hazard recognition activity was administered to 287 workers recruited from 57 construction workplaces in the United States. The hazard recognition activity involved the examination of a random sample of two construction case images that were previously examined by the expert panel and reporting relevant safety hazards. Results: The results of the study provided support for the proposition that workers are more likely to recognize hazards that impose relatively higher levels of safety risk. Practical Applications: The findings of the study can be leveraged to improve existing hazard recognition methods and develop more robust interventions to address the issue of poor hazard recognition levels.     

How do drivers avoid collisions? A driving simulator-based study

Introduction: Drivers' collision avoidance performance in an impending collision situation plays a decisive role for safety outcomes. This study explored drivers' collision avoidance performances in three typical collision scenarios that were right-angle collision, head-on collision, and collision with pedestrian. Method: A high-fidelity driving simulator was used to design the scenarios and conduct the experiment. 45 participants took part in the simulator experiment. Drivers' longitudinal/lateral collision avoidance performances and collision result were recorded. Results: Experimental results showed that brake only was the most common response among the three collision scenarios, followed by brake combining swerve in head-on and pedestrian collision scenarios. In right-angle collision scenario with TTC (time to collision) largest among three scenarios, no driver swerved, and meanwhile drivers who showed slow brake reaction tended to compensate the collision risk by taking a larger maximum deceleration rate within a shorter time. Swerve-toward-conflict was a prevalent phenomenon in head-on and pedestrian collision scenarios and significantly associated with collision risk. Drivers that swerved toward the conflict object had a shorter swerve reaction time than drivers that swerved away from conflict. Conclusions: Long brake reaction time and wrong swerve direction were the main factors leading to a high collision likelihood. The swerve-toward-conflict maneuver caused a delay in brake action and degraded subsequent braking performances. The prevalent phenomenon indicated that drivers tended to use an intuitive (heuristic) way to make decisions in critical traffic situations. Practical applications: The study generated a better understanding of collision development and shed lights on the design of future advanced collision avoidance systems for semi-automated vehicles. Manufactures should also engage more efforts in developing active steering assistance systems to assist drivers in collision avoidance.     

The role of standardization in safety management – A case study of a major oil & gas company

This article discusses the strengths and weaknesses of various kinds of standardization, when applied to the field of safety management. Recently, there are signs that organizations operating in high risk environments take further steps towards standardization. On the positive side, standardization has the potential to enhance the predictability of normal operations as well as facilitating the transfer of lessons learnt across organizational contexts. On the negative side, standardization is by definition a strategy for dealing with known hazards and accident scenarios. We discuss how too strong an emphasis on standardization can involve unintended negative consequences for organizations’ crisis-handling capabilities.     

Work-contingent self-esteem: A boon or bane for worker well-being?

Work-contingent self-esteem (WCSE; the degree to which workers' self-esteem is based on workplace performance) has positive consequences for performance, yet less is known about its consequences for well-being. In this paper, we contribute to the literature on WCSE by examining the mechanisms through which it impacts well-being at work and outside of work. We challenge contingent self-esteem (CSE) theory (Crocker & Park, 2004), which argues that CSE negatively impacts well-being by fostering internally controlled (introjected) motivation and diminishing autonomous motivation, by suggesting that WCSE fosters autonomous and internally controlled motivation and thus has both beneficial and harmful effects on well-being. We also expand CSE theory by suggesting that WCSE can negatively impact well-being outcomes by causing work–nonwork conflict. Results from a time-separated design in a sample of full-time employees supported our arguments, revealing that WCSE impacted well-being at work through both autonomous and internally controlled work motivations. WCSE also had negative effects on well-being at and outside of work through work–nonwork conflict. The beneficial effects of WCSE outweighed its harmful effects on job satisfaction and neutralized its harmful effects for all other outcomes. We discuss theoretical implications for CSE theory, self-determination theory, and work–nonwork issues and note important practical implications.     

A consideration for using workers’ heuristics to improve safety rules based on relationships between creative mental sets and rule-violating actions

This paper reports on the relationships between creative mental sets and rule-violating actions using questionnaires answered by 218 nursing workers. An exploratory factor analysis was conducted. The results revealed five factors of creative mental sets: curiosity, minutiae, inquiry, sensitivity, and courage. In addition, rule-violating actions were found to consist of three factors: violation of regulations, violation of local rules, and self-style. The results of multiple regression analyses showed a negative relation between curiosity and regular rule violation. Negative correlations were observed among minutiae, inquiry, and local rule violation. Furthermore, the mean score of local rule violation of a person who thinks that it is important for the work environment to offer high and excellent care is significantly higher than that of those who think that other environmental considerations are more important. The result elucidated the necessity of using workers’ heuristics in the process of improving safety rules as well as improving their acceptability to workers. This point is important and applicable not only in the field of patient safety management systems, but also in other fields.     

Making work environment auditable – A ‘critical case’ study of certified occupational health and safety management systems in Denmark

This paper discusses the impact of certification on occupational health and safety management (OHSM) systems. Most research in the field has focused on how well such systems comply with voluntary standards such as OHSAS 18001 or with national and international legislation. However, this paper shows that even in cases of compliance, the certified systems have problems dealing with a range of contemporary complex work environment issues. Furthermore, certification also transforms the kinds of topics addressed and the procedures and activities applied in the system. Using the (in many ways successful) development of certified OHSM system in a manufacturing company in Denmark as a critical case, we demonstrate how certified OHSM systems unintentionally yet actively create an environment of ‘measurable and auditable facts’ shaped not only in response to legal and market demands for a safe work environment, but also as a consequence of the external demands for a visible and accountable work environment standard. We show how certified OHSM systems function like a hinge between internal operations and an external audience in a globalized market, thus giving priority to work environment issues that may later become demonstrable guarantees for a safe and healthy work environment. Thus the certified management system does not necessarily tackle the most urgent work environment issues and may exclude important aspects of the work environment such as psychosocial factors.     

Give them what they want or give them what they need? Ideology in the study of leadership

In recent years, a number of new, values‐based, or ideological models focusing on leader behavior have been proposed. These models include authentic, servant, character‐based, ethical, spiritual, and aesthetic leadership. In the present effort, we argue that these models, despite some differences in key dimensions, are tied together by a focus on moral behavior. The available evidence indicates that these models have only modest predictive power with respect to organizational performance criteria. More centrally, we argue that tests of these models are characterized by significant methodological problems with respect to both measurement and control. Moreover, these models suffer from some serious substantive concerns, including the explicit confounding of leadership and morality, discounting of system impacts, inappropriate assumptions about follower needs, and inappropriate scientific inferences. These models also fail to provide viable new approaches for leader development. We conclude that caution must be exercised when these models are employed as a basis for understanding leadership. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.