Exploring the social and organisational aspects of human factors integration: A framework and case study

In this paper we first outline a framework which aims to capture some of the social and organisational aspects of human factors integration (HFI) which have been outlined by previous research. The framework was partly used to design a set of interview questions that were used with a case study of a human factors team working with the UK defence industry. The findings from the case study revealed a number of barriers which accord with previous research in the domain of HFI (e.g., attitudes and perceptions towards HF), as well as providing insights into the improvement strategies used by the HF team in order to improve HFI. These included attempts to build relationships and establish a working rapport with other groups in the company, as well as other activities aimed at addressing the organisational culture within the company as a whole (e.g., attempts to raise the profile of HF within the company). We use the framework for social and organisational aspects of HFI to discuss our findings alongside other research on group behaviour and boundary management within large organisations. The conclusions of the paper point to the utility of the framework as a means of planning HFI improvement strategies which can help to overcome some of the social and organisational barriers to HFI.     

Identifying an appropriate driving behaviour scale for the occupational driving context: The DBQ vs. the ODBQ

Self reported driving behaviour in the occupational driving context has typically been measured through scales adapted from the general driving population (i.e., the Manchester Driver Behaviour Questionnaire, (DBQ), Reason et al., 1990). However, research suggests that occupational driving is influenced by unique factors operating within the workplace environment, and thus, a behavioural scale should reflect those behaviours prevalent and unique within the driving context. To overcome this limitation, Newnam et al. (2011) developed the Occupational Driver Behaviour Questionnaire ((ODBQ), Newnam et al., 2011) which utilises a relevant theoretical model to assess the impact of the broader workplace context on driving behaviour. Although the theoretical argument has been established, research is yet to examine whether the ODBQ or the DBQ is a more sensitive measure of the workplace context. As such, this paper identifies selected organisational factors (i.e., safety climate and role overload) as predictors of the DBQ and the ODBQ and compares the relative predictive value in both models. In undertaking this task, 248 occupational drivers were recruited from a community-oriented nursing population. As predicted, hierarchical regression analyses revealed that the organisational factors accounted for a significantly greater proportion of variance in the ODBQ than the DBQ. These findings offer a number of practical and theoretical applications for occupational driving practice and future research.     

The nature of safety culture: a review of theory and research

This paper reviews the literature on safety culture and safety climate. The main emphasis is on applied research customary in the social psychological or organisational psychological traditions. Although safety culture and climate are generally acknowledged to be important concepts, not much consensus has been reached on the cause, the content and the consequences of safety culture and climate in the past 20 years. Moreover, there is an overall lack of models specifying either the relationship of both concepts with safety and risk management or with safety performance. In this paper, safety culture and climate will be differentiated according to a general framework based on work by Schein (1992 Schein) on organisational culture. This framework distinguishes three levels at which organisational culture can be studied — basis assumptions, espoused values and artefacts. At the level of espoused values we find attitudes, which are equated with safety climate. The basic assumptions, however, form the core of the culture. It is argued that these basic assumptions do not have to be specifically about safety, although it is considered a good sign if they are. It is concluded that safety climate might be considered an alternative safety performance indicator and that research should focus on its scientific validity. More important, however, is the assessment of an organisation's basic assumptions, since these are assumed to be explanatory to its attitudes.     

A safety culture maturity model for petrochemical companies in Brazil

A framework to measure safety culture maturity in the Brazilian oil and gas companies was formulated based on the model of Hudson (2001). Following a review of the safety culture literature, a questionnaire was designed to measure five aspects of organisational safety indicative of five levels of cultural maturity. The questionnaire was completed by the safety managers of 23 petrochemical companies based in Camacari, Bahia, Brazil and they were interviewed one month later. The reliability of the questionnaire was tested by asking the same questions in an interview and comparing the results (alternate forms reliability). The correlation coefficients between the questionnaire and interview scores on each dimension ranged from r = 0.7 to 0.9, demonstrating good reliability of the measures used. The research findings demonstrated that the 23 companies studied showed characteristics of different levels of safety culture maturity. Most scores were at the level of proactive. The model of Hudson (2001) and the revised framework and questionnaire were found to be practical to use, making it possible to identify levels of safety culture maturity in the context of the Brazilian petrochemical industry.     

Perspectives on safety culture

Overviewing selected elements from the literature, this paper locates the notion of safety culture within its parent concept of organisational culture. A distinction is drawn between functionalist and interpretive perspectives on organisational culture. The terms ‘culture’ and ‘climate’ are clarified as they are typically applied to organisations and to safety. A contrast is drawn between strategic top down and data-driven bottom up approaches to human factors as an illustrative aspect of safety. A safety case study is used to illustrate two measurement approaches. Key issues for future study include valid measurement of safety culture and developing methods to adequately represent mechanisms through which safety culture might influence, and be influenced by, other safety factors.     

A comparative analysis of safety management and safety performance in twelve construction projects

IntroductionSafety management in construction is complicated due to the complex “nature” of the construction industry. The aim of this research was to identify safety management factors (e.g., risk management and site management), contextual factors (e.g., organisational complexity) and combinations of such factors connected to safety performance. Method: Twelve construction projects were selected to compare their safety management and safety performance. An analytical framework was developed based on previous research, regulations, and standards where each management factor was defined. We employed qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) to produce case knowledge, compare the cases, and identify connections between the factors and safety performance. The material collected and analyzed included, for example, construction planning documents, reports from OHS-inspections, safety indicators, and interviews with project leaders and OHS experts. Results and conclusions: The research showed that: (a) the average score on 12 safety management factors was higher among projects with high safety performance compared to projects with low safety performance; (b) high safety performance can be achieved with both high and low construction complexity and organizational complexity, but these factors complicate coordination of actors and operations; (c) it is possible to achieve high safety performance despite relatively poor performance on many safety management factors; (d) eight safety management factors were found to be “necessary” for high safety performance, namely roles and responsibilities, project management, OHS management and integration, safety climate, learning, site management, staff management, and operative risk management. Site management, operative risk management, and staff management were the three factors most strongly connected to safety performance. Practical implications: Construction stakeholders should understand that the ability to achieve high safety performance in construction projects is connected to key safety management factors, contextual factors, and combinations of such factors.     

Reason模型在空中交通管制中的应用

指出了Reason模型及人的因素分析与分类系统的不足,提出对Reason模型进行修正的思路;结合中国民航业的实际情况,构建了空中交通管制不安全事件的分析框架;对防御系统失效、不安全行为、不安全行为的条件、管理失效4个层次的缺陷进行了论述,并给予详细的实证分析.研究有助于调查分析民航空管行业不安全事件中的原因以及为空管安全管理中的危险识别提供依据.     

航空维修差错分析及其管理

航空维修差错是诱发或直接导致飞行事故最重要的原因之一 ,对维修差错进行分类和分析有助于航空安全。笔者在分析航空维修环境变化的基础上 ,基于Reason模型构建了维修差错分类与诱因分析的框架 ,并结合机务维修的实际情况 ,对框架所包括的不安全行为、不安全行为的先兆、不安全的管理及组织因素进行了初步编码。文章还简要论述了维修差错的管理技术 ,指出借助框架编制详细的差错分类与分析编码系统是发展的方向。     

Availability organisational analysis: Is it a hazard for safety?

This main issue of this article analyses the possible way to use for availability improvement, the organisational analysis methodology initially developed for accident safety investigations. As the last decade examples in the industrial world prove that some organisational weaknesses could either impact safety or availability, we have for purpose to make some important clarifications, with the help of the organisational paradigm, and grounded on our knowledge of safety accidents or local inquiries in hazardous technical complex systems.We will first give our definition of an availability event, by comparison with a safety event and recall what is for us an organisational analysis. Then we will consider the safety organisational paradigm pathogenic factors in wondering if these factors could also be seen as pathogenic factors for availability; or if specific availability pathogenic factors can be inferred from these safety pathogenic factors.In the end we will try to assess the common points and the differences between an availability oriented organisational analysis and a safety oriented one, with a particular attention to possible negative follows-up on safety issues and to the methodology issue.     

Human and organisational factors in the operational phase of safety instrumented systems: A new approach

The international standards IEC 61508 and IEC 61511, which provide a general framework for the design and implementation of safety instrumented systems, require quantification of the achieved risk reduction, expressed as a safety integrity level (SIL). Human and organisational factors affect the performance of safety instrumented systems during operation and may threaten the achieved SIL, but this is usually not explicitly accounted for. This article presents a new approach to address human and organisational factors in the operational phase of safety instrumented systems. This approach gives a prediction of the operational SIL and can also be used to improve safety. It shows which human and organisational factors are most in need of improvement and it provides guidance for preventive or corrective action. Finally, the approach can be used as part of a SIL monitoring strategy in order to maintain the achieved SIL at the required level during the operational phase.     

An investigation of occupational subgroups with respect to patient safety culture

There are varying views about the consistency of safety culture across a given organisation or industrial sector: some view it as homogeneous, whereas others have suggested the presence of sub-cultures that vary according to the work group or worksite. This paper reports on a study in which job characteristics and safety climate ratings from a sample of British community pharmacists (N = 860) were subjected to a cluster analysis, with the aim of identifying whether discrete groups can be identified on the basis of these ratings. A four-cluster solution was obtained from the analysis. Examination of quantitative and qualitative data from each cluster led to them being identified as: (i) the disenfranchising pharmacy; (ii) the perilous pharmacy; (iii) the safety-focused pharmacy; (iv) the challenging pharmacy. On the basis of the data obtained, safety culture appears to have both characteristics generic to all community pharmacies and characteristics specific to each cluster, with a number of social and organisational factors influencing the culture in any one setting. Implications for the modelling and assessment of safety culture are discussed.     

The use of questionnaires in safety culture research – an evaluation

Questionnaires have not been particularly successful in exposing the core of an organisational safety culture. This is clear both from the factors found and the relations between these and safety indicators. The factors primarily seem to denote an overall evaluation of management, which does not say much about cultural basic assumptions. In addition, methodology requires that levels of theory and measurement are properly recognised and distinguished. That is, measurements made at one level cannot be employed at other levels just like that unless certain conditions are met.Safety management has been described through nine separate processes that together encompass the safety management system (SMS) of an organisation. Policies developed at the organisational level shape the organisational context and working conditions of the group and individual levels and therefore also attitudes within the organisation. The questionnaires seem to expose only those attitudes that are shared throughout the whole of the organisation. The workforce could very well recognise the safety policies of higher management as concern for their well-being and the overall value attached to safety. Pictured this way, safety climate (attitudes) and safety culture are not separate entities but rather different approaches towards the same goal of determining the importance of safety within an organisation.     

Recognition primed decision making and the organisational response to accidents: Überlingen and the challenges of safety improvement in European air traffic management

The pioneering work of Rasmussen, Reason and their colleagues has greatly improved our understanding of the longer term causes of adverse events in safety-critical systems. Far less attention has been paid to the organisational decision making that characterises the response to accidents and incidents. Therefore, this paper examines the interventions by national and international agencies after one of the most serious accidents in European Air Traffic Management. Insights from Naturalistic Decision Making (NDM) and Recognition Primed Decision Making (RPDM) are used to explain the complex ways in which technical, organisational and political constraints shape and support the decisions and actions taken by different agencies. These constraints affect national and international safety organisations in the aftermath of major accidents. In particular, this paper uses NDM and RPDM to assess the interventions made by Swiss Federal agencies and by the Air Navigation Service provider (ANSP) following the Überlingen mid-air collision in July 1st 2002. Later sections show that there are strong similarities between the technical, organisational and political constraints that informed their decisions and the factors that directed the work of the European Organisation for the Safety of Air Navigation (EUROCONTROL). Some of EUROCONTROL’s safety responsibilities (i.e. the safety regulation elements) will in the future pass to the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), an Agency of the European Commission. This transfer of responsibilities has the potential to increase the powers available to ensure the implementation of recommendations following future accidents. At the same time there is a danger that key aspects of existing safety and regulatory activities may be overlooked. It is critical, therefore, that the same level of audit and monitoring be conducted on the European agencies during the transition period as is proposed for service providers and national regulatory agencies. It is important to ensure that these changes do not inadvertently lead to the loss of insights from previous adverse events.     

Studying organisational cultures and their effects on safety

How do organisational cultures influence safety? To answer this question requires a strategy for investigating organisational culture. By far the most widely used research strategy is the perception survey. An alternative is for researchers is to immerse themselves in one or more organisations, making detailed observations about activities and drawing inferences about the nature of the organisation’s culture (the ethnographic method). A third technique makes use of the wealth of material that is assembled by inquiries into major accidents. This paper describes how this material can be used to provide insights into organisational cultures. It draws on specific examples from the author’s own work as well as the cultural analysis carried out by the Columbia Accident Investigation Board. It concludes with some additional suggestions for carrying out research on safety-relevant aspects of organisational culture.     

Between a rock and a hard place: Accident and near-miss reporting on offshore service vessels

Reporting accidents and near misses is an important aspect of safety management. This study explores reporting in contract work, exemplified by offshore service vessels, and the associations with external and internal organisational factors. The empirical foundation for the study is a questionnaire survey (N = 1108). Reporting was negatively related to high efficiency demands from external actors and low quality of feedback to the reporting community. These factors were more strongly related to reporting than internal factors within the safety climate construct. Short-term contract engagement was also negatively associated with reporting. The results could reflect the organisational complexity that characterises much contract work. The study implies that attempts to increase the level of reporting in contract work should not be limited to focusing on internal organisational factors. Framework conditions and signals from external actors regarding the actual priority accorded to safety should also be considered.     

Predicting safety culture: the roles of employer, operations manager and safety professional

Introduction: This study explores predictive factors in safety culture. Method: In 2008, a sample 939 employees was drawn from 22 departments of a telecoms firm in five regions in central Taiwan. The sample completed a questionnaire containing four scales: the employer safety leadership scale, the operations manager safety leadership scale, the safety professional safety leadership scale, and the safety culture scale. The sample was then randomly split into two subsamples. One subsample was used for measures development, one for the empirical study. Results: A stepwise regression analysis found four factors with a significant impact on safety culture (R² = 0.337): safety informing by operations managers; safety caring by employers; and safety coordination and safety regulation by safety professionals. Safety informing by operations managers (ß = 0.213) was by far the most significant predictive factor. Impact on industry: The findings of this study provide a framework for promoting a positive safety culture at the group level.     

Safety culture in an aircraft maintenance organisation: A view from the inside

This article deals with a case study about the safety culture of an aircraft maintenance organisation. The case study provides ethnographic accounts based on participant observation, interviews and document analysis. Safety culture is specifically related to the development and growth phase of the organisation and explicitly relates safety culture to production interests. The analysis focuses on the various roles and the tensions between the quality assurance and maintenance management departments, and the way aircraft maintenance technicians (AMTs) in practice deal with tensions between safety and production interests. Theoretically this article stresses the value of a process view on organisational development for the analysis of safety culture and the paradoxical relationship between safety and economic interests.     

Work-related driving safety in light vehicle fleets: A review of past research and the development of an intervention framework

This paper presents a critical review of past research in the work-related driving field in light vehicle fleets (e.g., vehicles < 4.5 tonnes) and an intervention framework that provides future direction for practitioners and researchers. Although work-related driving crashes have become the most common cause of death, injury, and absence from work in Australia and overseas, very limited research has progressed in establishing effective strategies to improve safety outcomes. In particular, the majority of past research has been data-driven, and therefore, limited attention has been given to theoretical development in establishing the behavioural mechanism underlying driving behaviour. As such, this paper argues that to move forward in the field of work-related driving safety, practitioners and researchers need to gain a better understanding of the individual and organisational factors influencing safety through adopting relevant theoretical frameworks, which in turn will inform the development of specifically targeted theory-driven interventions. This paper presents an intervention framework that is based on relevant theoretical frameworks and sound methodological design, incorporating interventions that can be directed at the appropriate level, individual and driving target group.