The states of public opinion on the environment

State-level public opinion on the environment within the US is examined, using data from the General Social Survey (GSS) from 2000 to 2010. A Multilevel Regression and Post-Stratification (MRP) approach is taken to estimate three different survey items on environmental issues at the US state level. This allows for a comparable understanding of state-level public opinion on environmental issues, which is then connected to economic, environmental, and political conditions, and representation in policy making. The findings indicate the MRP technique is a sophisticated way to make accurate estimations of state-level public opinion, and those estimates provide further insight into the shaping of public opinion and public policy.     

Cross-national variation in determinants of climate change concern

ABSTRACT

Our understanding of the determinants of public concern about climate change relies heavily on survey research in the United States. But can those findings be generalized to the rest of the world? Analysis of the Pew Research Center’s 2015 Global Attitudes Survey shows fairly similar patterns in the English-speaking Western democracies and, to a lesser extent, western Europe, but party identification and political ideology matter much less in most of the globe, and demographic factors have very different impacts. Female, younger, and less religious people tend to worry more about climate change in English-speaking Western democracies. In most of the world, however, concern is only weakly correlated with gender, rises with age and religiosity, and is more strongly correlated with education. A new measure of commitment to democratic values proved to be the most consistent predictor of concern globally.     

Political ideology and views about climate change in the European Union

There is a strong political divide on climate change in the US general public, with Liberals and Democrats expressing greater belief in and concern about climate change than Conservatives and Republicans. Recent studies find a similar though less pronounced divide in other countries. Its leadership in international climate policy making warrants extending this line of research to the European Union (EU). The extent of a left–right ideological divide on climate change views is examined via Eurobarometer survey data on the publics of 25 EU countries before the 2008 global financial crisis, the 2009 ‘climategate’ controversy and COP-15 in Copenhagen, and an increase in organized climate change denial campaigns. Citizens on the left consistently reported stronger belief in climate change and support for action to mitigate it than did citizens on the right in 14 Western European countries. There was no such ideological divide in 11 former Communist countries, likely due to the low political salience of climate change and the differing meaning of left–right identification in these countries.     

How to tell the truth about climate change

Scientific knowledge, it is argued, is insufficient to overcome climate skepticism. Spiritual truth is proposed as a way to do so. First, the cases of Eric Holthaus and Paul Kingsnorth are examined. Though they knew about climate change, they were only able to tell the truth and act on it after a personal collapse that transformed them. Telling the truth in this way carried a political force that their previous advocacy did not. These figures help animate and adapt Foucault’s notion of spiritual truth for climate change. Finally, this theory of spiritual truth is compared to Naomi Klein’s argument that climate science determines political truth and Bruno Latour’s argument that politics should decide the truth of climate science. Spiritual truth accommodates the insights these perspectives provide while adding transformation as a key element for telling the truth about climate change.     

Climate voting in the US Congress: the power of public concern

In the United States, few constituents know and understand climate policy, prioritize it as a political topic, or let their voting decisions depend on it. In these conditions, representatives would not be expected to pay heed to constituents’ climate concern in their voting decisions. Still, even after controlling for the presence of interest groups, campaign finance, and legislators’ party affiliation and ideology, there is a consistent link between public opinion and votes on cap-and-trade legislation in the House (and to a lesser degree in the Senate). The same is true when public opinion is simulated based on pre-vote district characteristics. Explanations for these findings are discussed.     

The News You Choose: news media preferences amplify views on climate change

How do choices among information sources reinforce political differences on topics such as climate change? Environmental sociologists have observed large-scale and long-term impacts from news media and think-tank reports, while experimental science-communication studies detect more immediate effects from variations in supplied information. Applying generalized structural equation modeling to recent survey data, previous work is extended to show that political ideology, education and their interaction predict news media information choices in much the same way they predict opinions about climate change itself. Consequently, media information sources serve as intervening variables that can reinforce and, through their own independent effects, amplify existing beliefs about climate change. Results provide empirical support for selective exposure and biased assimilation as mechanisms widening political divisions on climate change in the United States. The findings fit with the reinforcing spirals framework suggesting partisan media strengthens climate change beliefs which then influences subsequent use of media.     

Bourdieu,environmental NGOs,and Australian climate politics

Environmental nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in Australia have struggled to generate and sustain public concern about climate change. If debates about climate policy can be viewed as sites of contestation between competing actors, Australia’s environmental NGOs have found it difficult to compete against countervailing forces that have sought to shape public attitudes to climate action and the contours of policy responses. While to a significant degree this reflects the power of those forces and the sentiments of the government of the day, there is also a case to be made that some of Australia’s most prominent environmental NGOs have appeared wedded to strategies inconsistent with building or sustaining public support for action or guiding policy responses. How have Australia’s largest environmental NGOs engaged climate politics, and why has this engagement taken that form? Pierre Bourdieu’s political sociology provides unique insight for coming to terms with the multifaceted nature of the constraints, opportunities, and drivers of political action, from the context of climate politics to the forces behind Australian NGOs’ engagement with that politics, and the limits of that engagement. Bourdieu’s work also suggests possible avenues for more effective forms of political communication on climate change in the Australian context.     

Avoiding cultural trauma: climate change and social inertia

ABSTRACT

The failure of societies to respond in a concerted, meaningful way to climate change is a core concern of the social science climate literature. Existing explanations of social inertia display little coherence. Here, a theoretical approach is suggested that integrates disparate perspectives on social inertia regarding climate change. Climate change constitutes a potential cultural trauma. The threat of cultural trauma is met with resistance and attempts to restore and maintain the status quo. Thus, efforts to avoid large-scale social changes associated with climate change constitute an effort to avoid cultural trauma, and result in social inertia regarding climate change at individual, institutional, and societal levels. Existing approaches to social inertia are reviewed. An intellectual framework utilizing the work of Pierre Bourdieu is proposed to integrate these different levels of social interaction. Social processes that maintain social order and thus avoid cultural trauma create social inertia regarding climate change.     

Hurricanes and hegemony: A qualitative analysis of micro-level climate change denial discourses

The climate change countermovement and its program of climate change denial have been well documented and studied. However, individual rationales for rejecting climate science remain under-studied. Twitter data related to Hurricane Sandy in 2012 are used to understand why individuals reject the orthodox climate consensus, using a summative content analysis of climate change denial discourses. Three major discourses are discovered: rejecting climate science because climate science is a conspiracy favoring growth of government; opposing renewable energy and energy taxation; and expressing fear of governmental abuse of power. Importantly, each discourse expressed certainty that climate science itself was a wholesale fraud; the denial discourses themselves focused far more on climate politics than on science.     

Does size matter? Comparing the party politics of climate change in Australia and Norway

ABSTRACT

The implications of state size for the party politics of climate change are examined, and in particular its effect in facilitating or impeding cross-party consensus on the issue. This issue is explored through an in-depth, qualitative comparison of Australia and Norway, which are shown to be comparable in important respects yet differ in terms of their size and climate politics. Original primary data is presented from 44 interviews with policymakers and policy-shapers in both countries, which shows that, to the limited extent that state size moderates the parties’ behaviour, it is the countries’ geographical – not economic – size that matters. Institutional factors are found to play a more significant role, however, and the corporatist features of state-business cooperation, strong ENGOs and compensatory welfare arrangements are highlighted as particularly important.     

The oil and gas sector: from climate laggard to climate leader?

ABSTRACT

The oil and gas industry has traditionally been reticent to engage with the issues surrounding climate change, typically being cast as a laggard. Yet, over recent years, the sector has begun taking on a more active role in climate governance, doing so in a variety of capacities – as initiators, catalysts and participants in industry-led or multi-stakeholder efforts. The Oil and Gas Climate Initiative is reviewed, as a case study to illustrate emerging climate leadership within the global oil and gas industry. In 2015, its members committed to a two-degree pathway. The paucity of research on the nascent role of oil and gas firms in climate governance is addressed.     

The limits of democracy in tackling climate change

Previous research has shown that democracies exhibit stronger commitments to mitigate climate change and, generally, emit less carbon dioxide than non-democratic regimes. However, there remains much unexplained variation in how democratic regimes perform in this regard. Here it is argued that the benefits of democracy for climate change mitigation are limited in the presence of widespread corruption that reduces the capacity of democratic governments to reach climate targets and reduce CO₂ emissions. Using a sample of 144 countries over 1970–2011, the previously established relationship between the amount of countries’ CO₂ emissions and their level of democracy is revisited. It is empirically tested whether this relationship is instead moderated by the levels of corruption. The results indicate that more democracy is only associated with lower CO₂ emissions in low-corruption contexts. If corruption is high, democracies do not seem to do better than authoritarian regimes.     

The untapped potential of preferential trade agreements for climate governance

The regulatory contribution that preferential trade agreements (PTAs) make to global climate governance is assessed through an analysis of climate-related provisions found in 688 PTAs signed between 1947 and 2016. Provisions are analyzed along four dimensions: innovation, legalization, replication, and distribution. Innovative climate provisions are found in several PTAs that are in some cases more specific and enforceable than the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement. Nonetheless, these climate provisions offer limited progress because they remain weakly ‘legalized’, fail to replicate broadly in the global trade system, and were not adopted by the largest greenhouse gas emitters. Despite the inclusion of innovative climate provisions in a number of PTAs, their poor design and weak replication position them as some of the weakest environmental provisions within PTAs.     

The importance of compatible beliefs for effective climate policy integration

ABSTRACT

European climate policy faced increasing constraints during the economic and Eurozone crises (2008–2014). The European Commission subsequently refocused policymaking toward integrating climate objectives into other policy areas such as energy and the 2014–2020 European Union (EU) budget. The conditions for successful climate policy integration (CPI) are analyzed, focusing on the compatibility of key actors’ beliefs. In renewable energy policy, CPI was successful as long as the co-benefits and related policy-core beliefs of energy security, rural economic development and climate action coexisted harmoniously. Once conflict among these policy-core beliefs emerged during the biofuels controversy, CPI was weakened as actors with competing economy-focused beliefs controlled the decision-making process. The case of EU budget climate mainstreaming illustrates how actors can add climate objectives into legislation despite meaningful discussion being ‘crowded out’ by other priorities. The findings highlight the importance of low conflict between departments, compatible beliefs and policy priorities for successful CPI.     

Addressing concerns about climate policies: the possibilities and perils of responsive accommodation

Responsive accommodation is a political strategy that addresses concerns about a policy proposal by incorporating amendments that address those concerns. This approach can broaden the policy’s appeal, but is strategically risky, as it can alienate the policy’s base of support. We examine this strategy and its application in the politics of climate change. Using a novel survey experiment, relative public support is evaluated for two amendments to a carbon tax proposal – revenue neutrality assurances and a carbon tariff – designed to ease concerns about taxes and global competitiveness. Analysis shows that support for a carbon tax increases when coupled with a carbon tariff, but decreases among some of the policy’s supporters when described as revenue-neutral. These results suggest that policymakers using a responsive accommodation strategy must carefully weigh its possible risks and rewards in their particular context.     

The UN climate change negotiations and the role of the United States: assessing American leadership from Copenhagen to Paris

The role of American leadership in the UN climate negotiations that produced the 2015 Paris Agreement is examined. First, United States (US) climate goals are identified. Then, utilizing unique survey data collected at eight UN climate summits between 2008 and 2015, the extent to which the US was recognized as a leader by potential followers is investigated. Finally, the extent to which US goals are reflected in negotiation outcomes is evaluated. Recognition of the US as a leader varied over time, peaking at the UN climate meetings in Copenhagen and Paris, reflecting US leadership in shaping the outcomes of both meetings. Although the results reveal a divided leadership landscape in which the US must compete for leadership with other actors, such as the European Union and China, US leadership was crucial to the successful adoption of the Paris Agreement.