Correction to: Pesticide resurrection

Environmental Chemistry Letters -     

Spectrum of selection: new approaches to detecting the scale-dependent response to habitat

Detecting habitat selection depends on the spatial scale of analysis, but multi-scale studies have been limited by the use of a few, spatially variable, hierarchical levels. We developed spatially explicit approaches to quantify selection along a continuum of scales using spatial (coarse-graining) and geostatistical (variogram) pattern analyses at multiple levels of habitat use (seasonal range, travel routes, feeding areas, and microsites). We illustrate these continuum-based approaches by applying them to winter habitat selection by woodland caribou (Rangifer tarandus caribou) using two key habitat components, Cladina lichens and snow depth. We quantified selection as the reduction in variance in used relative to available sites, thus avoiding reliance on correlations between organism and habitat, for which interpretation can be impeded by cross-scale correlations. By consistently selecting favorable habitat features, caribou experienced reduced variance in these features. The degree to which selection was accounted for by the travel route, feeding area, or microsite levels varied across the scale continuum. Caribou selected for Cladina within a 13-km scale domain and selected shallower snow at all scales. Caribou responded most strongly at the dominant scales of patchiness, implicating habitat heterogeneity as an underlying cause of multi-scale habitat selection. These novel approaches enable a spatial understanding of resource selection behavior.     

Correction to: Effect of biosolid hydrochar on toxicity to earthworms and brine shrimp

Environmental Geochemistry and Health - Unfortunately, in the original publication of the article, Prof. Yong Sik Ok’s affiliation was incorrectly published. The author’s affiliation is...     

Putting free-riding to work: A Partnership Solution to the common-property problem

The common-property problem results in excessive mining, hunting, and extraction of oil and water. The same phenomenon is also responsible for excessive investment in R&D and excessive outlays in rent-seeking contests. We propose a “Partnership Solution” to eliminate or at least mitigate these excesses. Each of N players joins a partnership in the first stage and chooses his effort in the second stage. Under the rules of a partnership, each member must pay his own cost of effort but receives an equal share of the partnership's revenue. The incentive to free-ride created by such partnerships turns out to be beneficial since it naturally offsets the excessive effort inherent in such problems. In our two-stage game, this institutional arrangement can, under specified circumstances, induce the social optimum in a subgame-perfect equilibrium: no one has a unilateral incentive (1) to switch to another partnership (or create a new partnership) in the first stage or (2) to deviate from socially optimal actions in the second stage. The game may have other subgame-perfect equilibria, but the one associated with the “Partnership Solution” is strictly preferred by every player. We also propose a modification of the first stage which generates a unique subgame-perfect equilibrium. Antitrust authorities should recognize that partnerships can have a less benign use. By organizing as competing partnerships, an industry can reduce the “excessive” output of Cournot oligopoly to the monopoly level. Since no partner has any incentive to overproduce in the current period, there is no need to deter cheating with threats of future punishments.