People or systems? To blame is human. The fix is to engineer

Person-centered safety theories that place the burden of causality on human traits and actions have been largely dismissed in favor of systems-centered theories. Students and practitioners are now taught that accidents are caused by multiple factors and occur due to the complex interactions of numerous work system elements, human and non-human. Nevertheless, person-centered approaches to safety management still prevail. This paper explores the notion that attributing causality and blame to people persists because it is both a fundamental psychological tendency as well as an industry norm that remains strong in aviation, health care, and other industries. Consequences of that possibility are discussed and a case is made for continuing to invest in whole-system design and engineering solutions.     

Managers’ conceptions regarding human factors in air traffic management and in airport operations

Human factors (HF) in creating and managing safety in complex systems is a continuous topic of research and discussion. In the aviation organisation under study here, an HF expert had started work in a newly created position one and a half years prior to the study. The aim of the study was to find out if HF was seen as a safety creating factor and what the conceptions of HF were in regard to the theoretical developments in the field. These topics were studied in order to determine the most effective means of implementing HF-work within the organisation. Two manager groups (upper and middle management) were targeted as subjects of the study due to their crucial role in developing working culture. Twenty-one managers were interviewed from nine units that represented three operational environments (radar units with heavy traffic, combined civil/military units and procedural air traffic control units, including airport operations. Managers were found to have disjointed and vague conceptions of HF and a lack of shared vision or strategy regarding HF. Some managers lacked an appropriate conception of HF. The present situation can prevent the organisation from utilizing HF competence in maintaining and developing the safety of services. Conceptions were most up-to-date at units, where outside pressures for change had forced managers to take HF issues into account in their operational environments. While the long-term implementation of HF faces considerable challenges, the article gives several proposals for organisational structures that support a more effective realization of HF.     

Business strategy,work processes and human resource training: are they congruent?

This study examines the extent to which human resource (HR) training (content and context) is contingent on business strategy (i.e. classified according to Miles and Snow (1984) typology—‘Designing strategic human resource systems’, Organizational Dynamics, 13 , 36–52) as well as the characteristics of the work process. Sixty‐five Spanish organizations (i.e. 65 senior executives and 65 senior HR officers) participated in the study. Using primarily factorial and cluster analyses, support was found to the assertion that companies adopting a particular type of training strategy/policy have a high degree of internal consistency amongst the training objectives sought. In terms of work processes and training, results indicate that under work processes where the content of work provides for enrichment and for long‐term results, companies tend to adopt training strategies where emphasis is on enhancement of individual specialized skills aimed at improving direct productivity. By contrast, firms who use work processes that are characterized by repetitive and routine tasks, de‐emphasize this type of training content. Results also indicae that limited level of contingencies exist between training policies and business strategy, especially when time dimension is also accounted for. While the theory suggests that organizations that have their HR training fit (contingent) on their business strategy are more effective, the empirical results portrayed in this study shows a more complex picture. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Layer of Protection Analysis – Quantifying human performance in initiating events and independent protection layers

Layer of Protection Analysis (LOPA) is widely used within the process industries as a simplified method to address risks and determine the sufficiency of protection layers. LOPA brings a consistent approach with added objectivity and a greater degree of understanding of the scenarios and risks as compared to purely qualitative studies such as Process Hazard Analyses. LOPA can be used to address a wide range of risk issues and serves as a highly effective aid to decision making.Incorporation of human performance within LOPA is recognized as an important, though often challenging, aspect of the analysis. The human role in potential initiating events or within human independent protection layers is important throughout the process industries, and becomes even more critical for batch processing facilities and in non-routine operations. The human role is key to process safety and the control of risks, necessitating the inclusion and quantification of human actions in independent protection layers for most companies. Human activities as potential initiating events and human performance within independent protection layers are reviewed and methods for quantification outlined. An extension into Human Reliability Analysis (HRA) is provided, including methods to develop Human Error Probabilities specific to the process safety culture and operations at a given plant site.     

Characteristics of direct causes and human factors in major gas explosion accidents in Chinese coal mines: Case study spanning the years 1980–2010

Major accidents from gas explosions have a high rate of occurrence in Chinese coal mines. The frequency of major gas explosion accidents between the years 1980–2000, and the years 2001–2010 was reviewed. Case studies were also compared. The study of direct causes indicates that during the period 2001–2010 the proportion of accidents caused by deliberate violation was reduced by 31.13% compared with data from 1980 to 2000. However the proportion of accidents caused by mismanagement rose by 32.38% during this period. Direct causes of high occurrence rate accidents include deliberate violations such as illegal blasting, conducting maintenance with the power on, and mismanagement behaviors such as chaotic electromechanical management and chaotic ventilation management. The study of environmental characteristics shows that the proportion of accidents occurring in the heading faces increased by 27.18%. The study of human factors indicates that deliberate violation behaviors showed a high utility–high cost factor. Mismanagement behaviors showed strong correlation with responsibility awareness and weak correlation with technological ability.