How to treat expert judgment? With certainty it contains uncertainty!

To be acceptably safe one must identify the risks one is exposed to and decide what risk reducing measures are required. It is uncertain whether the threat really will materialize, but determining the size and probability of the risk is also full of uncertainty. When performing an analysis and preparing for decision making under uncertainty, quite frequently failure rate data, information on consequence severity or on a probability value, yes, even on the possibility that an event can or cannot occur, is lacking. In those cases, a possible way and sometimes the only way to proceed is to revert to expert judgment. Even in case historical data is available, an expert can be asked whether and to what extent such data still hold in the current situation.Anyhow, expert elicitation comes with an uncertainty depending on the expert's reliability, which becomes very visible when two or more experts give different answers or even conflicting answers. This is not a new problem, and very bright minds have thought how to tackle this in a rational and objective way. But so far, however, the topic has not been given much attention in daily process safety and risk assessment practice. Therefore, this paper has a review and applied character and will present various approaches with detailed explanation and examples.     

What is the potential of trauma registry data to be used for road traffic injury surveillance and informing road safety policy?

Introduction

Information from hospital trauma registries is increasingly being used to support injury surveillance efforts. This research examines the potential of using trauma registry data for road traffic injury surveillance for different types of road users in terms of both the information collected and how representative trauma data are compared to two population-based road traffic injury data collections.

Methods

The three data collections were assessed against recommended variables to be collected for injury surveillance purposes and the representativeness of the distribution of road traffic-related injury data from the trauma registry was compared to hospital admission and road traffic authority data collections.

Results

Data from the trauma registry was largely not representative of the distribution of age groups or activities compared to the two population-based collections, but was representative for gender for some road user groups to at least one population-based data collection.

Conclusions

Trauma data could be used to supplement information from population-based data collections to inform road safety efforts.

Impact on Industry

Road safety policy makers should be aware of the potential and the limitations of using trauma registry data for road traffic injury surveillance.     

Understanding non-industrialized workers' approaches to safety: How do commercial fishermen “stay safe”?

BACKGROUND: Commercial fishing is carried out worldwide, often in non-industrialized forms, and is associated with high rates of fatal and non-fatal occupational injury. PROBLEM: Fishermen who work independently in non-industrialized settings do not have access to union or industry sponsored safety services and must make their own decisions about safety practices. Learning the meaning of safety for them and the safety measures they employ is important before developing interventions. METHODS: Two fieldworkers conducted in-depth ethnographic interviews with 31 commercial fishermen in North Carolina. Interviews and fieldnotes were analyzed using QSR N5. RESULTS: Fishermen primarily related staying safe to work practices and attitudes. They identified specific safety measures, appropriate gear and boat maintenance, weather decisions, and working cooperatively when ocean fishing. DISCUSSION: The ethnographic research process can produce information about a group's norms of preventive behavior and safety concerns. Knowledge of workers' concepts and practices will inform researchers' inquiries.     

The safety barometer: How safe is my plant today? Is instantaneously measuring safety level utopia or realizable?

During the last decade, serious accidents have continued to occur in the process industry. Apparently the scenarios of various undesired events leading to those accidents are still not sufficiently controlled. The key question is how potentially hazardous situations develop, what processes form the basis for this development, and how to control them? Safety level is not static but depends on many risk factors that change in presence and intensity over location and time. Safety level is dependent not only on technical process parameters that have immediate effects on the ‘frequency’ or probability of catastrophic consequences, but also depends on equipment integrity degradation, operational and management quality, attitudes, and cultural processes which may change over a prolonged time. The time and human interaction aspects make dynamic risk assessment complex. This paper will outline a conceptual approach using in addition to the regular process parameter signals received, also weak and slowly changing signals from various safety indicators, enabling to keep track of the risk factors. In theory this could lead to obtaining an instantaneous safety level ‘measure’ making possible forecast alarming for an imminent event to occur. Such concept could be regarded as a ‘writing’ safety barometer, or barograph. However, there are quite a number of problems to be solved which in the paper will be discussed.     

How certain can we really be that our boss is trustworthy,and does it matter? A metacognitive perspective on employee evaluations of supervisor trustworthiness

This research helps to integrate the metacognitive concept of evaluation certainty into the trust literature by demonstrating that certainty can amplify the effects of trustworthiness evaluations and stabilize trustworthiness evaluations over time. Across an experimental study (Study 1) and a multiwave survey of employees (Study 2), we show that trustworthiness evaluations exert a stronger influence on individuals' trust at higher levels of certainty and that trust transmits the multiplicative effects of trustworthiness evaluations and certainty on key indicators of employee risk-taking including reliance and disclosure behavior. Further, in Study 2, we show that certainty can help predict change in trustworthiness evaluations over time. Finally, in a two-wave field survey (Study 3), we examine factors that influence evaluation certainty and show that relational transparency and leader prototypicality (LP) have interactive effects on employees' certainty such that the influence of relational transparency on certainty will be more positive at higher levels of LP. Theoretical and practical implications are discussed.     

People or systems? To blame is human. The fix is to engineer

Person-centered safety theories that place the burden of causality on human traits and actions have been largely dismissed in favor of systems-centered theories. Students and practitioners are now taught that accidents are caused by multiple factors and occur due to the complex interactions of numerous work system elements, human and non-human. Nevertheless, person-centered approaches to safety management still prevail. This paper explores the notion that attributing causality and blame to people persists because it is both a fundamental psychological tendency as well as an industry norm that remains strong in aviation, health care, and other industries. Consequences of that possibility are discussed and a case is made for continuing to invest in whole-system design and engineering solutions.     

Dust explosions: How should the influence of humidity be taken into account?

In this work, the influence of humidity on dust explosions of metallic (aluminium) and organic materials (icing sugar, polyethylene and magnesium stearate) has been studied. The impact of pre-humidification of powders on their ignition sensitivity, their volume resistivity and charge decay time has been assessed. The influence of humidity on explosion severity has also been studied by two methods: on the one hand, the dust sample was stored in a controlled workstation at constant relative humidity; on the other hand, the dry dust was dispersed in a humidity controlled atmosphere in the vessel.As expected, the effect of humidity strongly depends on the chemical nature of the particles. Experiments on powders volume resistivity and charge decay time have shown typical trends but have especially pointed out the inadequacy of some standards. Inhibition phenomena have been verified for polyethylene and magnesium stearate, whereas both inhibition and promotion have been observed for icing sugar and could be explained by an evolution of sucrose structure. Dry aluminium dust explosions in humid atmosphere show that water vapour inerts the explosion. However, when aluminium is stored at controlled humidity, the maximum rise of pressure rate increases with the water content, which is probably due to hydrogen generation.     

Availability organisational analysis: Is it a hazard for safety?

This main issue of this article analyses the possible way to use for availability improvement, the organisational analysis methodology initially developed for accident safety investigations. As the last decade examples in the industrial world prove that some organisational weaknesses could either impact safety or availability, we have for purpose to make some important clarifications, with the help of the organisational paradigm, and grounded on our knowledge of safety accidents or local inquiries in hazardous technical complex systems.We will first give our definition of an availability event, by comparison with a safety event and recall what is for us an organisational analysis. Then we will consider the safety organisational paradigm pathogenic factors in wondering if these factors could also be seen as pathogenic factors for availability; or if specific availability pathogenic factors can be inferred from these safety pathogenic factors.In the end we will try to assess the common points and the differences between an availability oriented organisational analysis and a safety oriented one, with a particular attention to possible negative follows-up on safety issues and to the methodology issue.     

Translation of falls prevention knowledge into action in hospitals: what should be translated and how should it be done?

Introduction

Falls prevention evidence has changed and evolved over time with positive and negative studies revealing that a “one-size fits all” approach is not the solution. Care must be taken to critically appraise the evidence and the potential applicability of that evidence to the specific hospital setting.

Method

A narrative account of the evolution of research evidence in this field is first presented. How this evidence should be applied in clinical practice is challenging, with a lack of translational evidence for the hospital setting we draw on broader theory of translating knowledge to action.

Conclusions

The journey should begin with formation of a management and engagement committee. A review of existing practices and the difference between existing practice and evidence-based practice should be undertaken to identify the “evidence-practice gap.” Engagement with staff is recommended to inform a plan for practice change. Plans for resourcing, targeting, and evaluating these strategies should also be undertaken.

Impact on Industry

This paper will assist hospitals to identify and implement evidence based falls prevention strategies leading to an improvement in patient safety.     

How does coaching interviewees affect the validity of a structured interview?

Coaching interviewees to perform in employment interviews can influence the interview scores. We describe different types of coaching, emphasizing interventions designed to focus interviewees on core, interview‐relevant content and to help them convey the content accurately (as opposed to interventions designed to teach interviewees to manipulate their scores using peripheral means). We then study the effects of the former type of intervention in relation to the criterion‐related validity of a structured employment interview. In a combined sample of 146 public safety job incumbents, a predictive validation study was conducted using scores from a situational panel interview. Predictive validity and reliability was observed to be higher in a sample of coached interviewees compared to a sample of uncoached interviewees. Implications for future research and practice in organizational behavior are discussed. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

A drop in the bucket: when is a pay raise a pay raise?

Although merit pay continues to receive much theoretical and practical attention, little systematic effort is devoted to determining how large a pay raise must be before employees see it as a pay raise. This study uses psychophysical reasoning and techniques in a sample of 192 student ‘employees’ to establish the size of pay raise thresholds in a relatively controlled setting. Results indicate that, below about the 7 per cent level, increases in pay amounts are unlikely to evoke positive perceptual and attitudinal reactions among employees. Theoretical, methodological, and practical implications of these results are highlighted. © 1997 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Ticketing aggressive cars and trucks (TACT): How does it work on city streets?

Objective: The purpose of this study was to determine the feasibility of modifying the Ticking Aggressive Cars and Trucks (TACT) program, originally designed to work on state highways, within a metropolitan area to reduce unsafe interactions and their related crashes between drivers of large trucks and passenger vehicles.

Methods: Using crash data, the driving behaviors most commonly associated with large truck and passenger vehicle crashes were identified. A public awareness campaign using media messaging and increased law enforcement was created targeting these associated behaviors. The frequency of these behaviors both before and after the public awareness campaign was determined through observation of traffic at 3 specific locations within the city. Each location had a sufficient volume of large truck and passenger traffic to observe frequent interactions. Pre- and postintervention data were compared using negative binomial regression with generalized estimating equations to evaluate whether the campaign was associated with a reduction in the identified driving behaviors.

Results: A comparison between crash data from before, during, and after the campaign and crashes during the same time periods in previous years did not show a significant difference (P =.081). The number of large trucks observed in traffic remained the same during pre- and postintervention periods (P =.625). The rates of negative interactions per 100 large trucks decreased for both large trucks and passenger vehicles after the intervention, with calculated rate ratios of 0.58 (95% confidence interval [CI], 0.48, 0.70) and 0.31 (95% CI, 0.20, 0.47). The greatest reduction was seen in passenger vehicles following too close, with a rate ratio of 0.21 (95% CI, 0.15, 0.30).

Conclusions: Although designed for reducing crashes on highways, the TACT program can be an effective approach for improving driver behaviors on city streets.     

Macroergonomics and Total Quality Management: How to Improve Quality of Working Life?

Abstract

In this paper, we present a macroergonomic model of work design that is applied and tested to examine Total Quality Management (TQM) in the public sector. According to the model, TQM can influence different aspects of work design and quality of working life (QWL), Questionnaire data collected in 2 public sector organizations in the USA show that TQM can have both positive and negative impact on work design and QWL. The main positive impact of TQM was found on job content, job control and participation, and social relationships. The main negative impact of TQM was on workload, uncertainty, and clarity of job duties. The impact of TQM on QWL was mixed. Our results show that the impact of TQM on work design and QWL varied very much across the 6 participating departments, as well as within the departments. Further research is warranted to assess the human impact of TQM, in particular research on the linkage between various aspects of TQM, on one hand, and work design and QWL, on the other hand.     

The Bhopal gas tragedy: could it have happened in a developed country?

The Bhopal gas tragedy occurred in December 1984 wherein approximately 41 tonnes of deadly MIC was released in the dead of night. It caused the death of over 3000 people and continued life-long misery for over 300,000 with certain genetic defects passed on to the next generation. It happened in a plant operated by a multinational, Union Carbide Corporation, in a developing country, India. The tragedy has changed the chemical process industry (CPI) forever. The results have been new legislation with better enforcement, enhancement in process safety, development of inherently safer plants, harsher court judgements, pro-active media and NGOs, rights-conscious public, and a CPI management willing to invest in safety related equipment and training. These have already resulted in savings of several hundred lives and over a billion dollars in accident damages [Kletz, T. (1998a). Process plants: a handbook of inherently safer designs. London: Taylor & Francis. Sutton, I. Chemical Engineering, 106(5), (1999). 114]. However, thousands did not have to die for the world to realise the disaster potential of CPI. The question that still remains is whether such an accident could have happened in a developed country. The answer is ‘yes’, as a number of major accidents in the developed countries since 1984, such as the Piper Alpha oil platform fire (1988, 167 killed), the Zeebrugge ferry disaster (1987, 167 killed), Phillips petroleum fire and explosion (1989, 23 killed), the Challenger disaster (1986, 7 killed), Esso Australia Longford explosion (1998, 2 killed) have demonstrated. One or more of the following are the primary reasons for such disasters: The indifferent attitude of the management towards safety, the lax enforcement of the existing regulations by the regulatory bodies as well as unusual delays in the judicial systems. Such conditions can happen regardless of the level of development in a country. Hence, the Bhopal gas tragedy could have happened in a developed country too, albeit with a lower probability. This paper is concerned with the possibility and not with the probability value. It also points out that further significant advances in process safety will occur with fundamental research into the causes of accidents and with a move towards inherently safer design.     

Safer than the average human driver (who is less safe than me)? Examining a popular safety benchmark for self-driving cars

Although the level of safety required before drivers will accept self-driving cars is not clear, the criterion of being safer than a human driver has become pervasive in the discourse on vehicle automation. This criterion actually means “safer than the average human driver,” because it is necessarily defined with respect to population-level data. At the level of individual risk assessment, a body of research has shown that most drivers perceive themselves to be safer than the average driver (the better-than-average effect). Method: Using an online sample, this study examined U.S. drivers’ ratings of their own ability to drive safely and their desired level of safety for self-driving vehicles. Results: This study replicated the better-than average effect and showed that most drivers stated a desire for self-driving cars that are safer than their own perceived ability to drive safely before they would: (1) feel reasonably safe riding in a self-driving vehicle; (2) buy a self-driving vehicle, all other things (cost, etc.) being equal; and (3) allow self-driving vehicles on public roads. Conclusions: Since most drivers believe they are better than average drivers, the benchmark of achieving automation that is safer than a human driver (on average) may not represent acceptably safe performance of self-driving cars for most drivers. Practical applications: If perceived level of safety is an important contributor to acceptance of self-driving vehicles, the popular “safer than a human driver” benchmark may not be adequate for widespread acceptance.     

How can process safety and a risk management approach guide pandemic risk management?

The coronavirus disease (COVID-19) brought the world to a halt in March 2020. Various prediction and risk management approaches are being explored worldwide for decision making. This work adopts an advanced mechanistic model and utilizes tools for process safety to propose a framework for risk management for the current pandemic. A parameter tweaking and an artificial neural network-based parameter learning model have been developed for effective forecasting of the dynamic risk. Monte Carlo simulation was used to capture the randomness of the model parameters. A comparative analysis of the proposed methodologies has been carried out by using the susceptible, exposed, infected, quarantined, recovered, deceased (SEIQRD) model. A SEIQRD model was developed for four distinct locations: Italy, Germany, Ontario, and British Columbia. The learning-based approach resulted in better outcomes among the models tested in the present study. The layer of protection analysis is a useful framework to analyze the effect of different safety measures. This framework is used in this work to study the effect of non-pharmaceutical interventions on pandemic risk. The risk profiles suggest that a stage-wise releasing scenario is the most suitable approach with negligible resurgence. The case study provides valuable insights to practitioners in both the health sector and the process industries to implement advanced strategies for risk assessment and management. Both sectors can benefit from each other by using the mathematical models and the management tools used in each, and, more importantly, the lessons learned from crises.     

How important is vehicle safety in the new vehicle purchase/lease process for fleet vehicles?

OBJECTIVE: Despite the potential benefits that fleet vehicle purchase decisions could have on road safety, the role that vehicle safety plays in fleet managers' purchase decisions is poorly understood. METHODS: In this study, fleet managers from Sweden and Spain completed a questionnaire regarding the importance of vehicle safety in the new vehicle purchase/lease process and the importance that is placed on safety options/features relative to other convenience and comfort features. RESULTS: The findings of the current study suggest that vehicle safety is generally not the primary consideration in the vehicle purchase process and is consistently outranked by factors such as price and dependability/reliability. For example, when asked to indicate the vehicle factors that are included in their company's criteria for purchasing/leasing a new vehicle, fleet managers from both Sweden and Spain were more likely to list the vehicle's price, reliability, running costs, size, and fuel consumption than the vehicle's safety (defined as the vehicle's EuroNCAP rating/other safety reports). In addition, the findings of this study suggest that the importance of vehicle safety did not differ across the two countries. For example, there was no significant difference in the proportion of fleet managers who indicated that EuroNCAP ratings were part of their official policy across the two countries. CONCLUSION: The findings highlighted the need to educate fleet managers about vehicle safety in the new vehicle purchase/lease process. In addition, vehicle safety information, such as EuroNCAP results or other crash test results need to be promoted more widely and effectively so that they play a more prominent role in their new vehicle choices.