Knowledge brokerage designs and practices in four european climate services: A role model for biodiversity policies?

Environmental policies are broadly claimed to rely on sound scientific evidence because of the complexity, the uncertainty and the diverging political stakes that characterize issues like biodiversity decline or climate change. Classical advisory formats like assessments or standing advisory bodies have proliferated widely – especially at the global and national levels – yet exert only a limited influence on political decision-making, particularly in sub-national and local implementation contexts. Against this background, scholars have called for ‘bottom-up’ approaches to Science-policy interfaces that move from ‘problem to policy’. In the area of climate change, numerous ‘climate services’ have evolved at national, sub-national and even local levels, with the promise of being more decision-oriented. Four climate services in three European countries (the United Kingdom, Germany and Switzerland) are investigated regarding whether and how they institutionalize and enact knowledge brokerage in a credible, salient and legitimate way. Focusing on the institutional and strategic design principles of this advisory setting in climate policy, insights are generated for the biodiversity policy field, where comparable settings are still broadly lacking.     

Noisy and definitely not normal: responding to wicked issues in the environment,energy and health

Attempts by researchers and policy-makers to address the ‘wicked’ issues which pervade environmental policy usually revolve around attempting – or recommending – both more participatory and transparent, and more systematic and evidence-based, policy-making. Post-normal science (PNS), with its ‘extended peer community’, has emerged as one approach, whilst others focus on procedural reforms of the policy process, particularly on enhancing democratic decision-making. This paper applies a novel analytical framework to a primarily documentary analysis of three cases we argue are wicked—Canadian regulatory review of health products and food, European union (EU) environmental thematic strategies, and United Kingdom (UK) energy and climate change policy. It explores how various responses to wicked issues are implemented, through the ‘lenses’ of PNS and, more generally, ‘democratic and effective decision-making’. It finds such responses are often limited by practical and fundamental barriers relating to handling of uncertainty, issue framing, participation, power, politics, and attitude to evidence. We draw conclusions about future research on PNS, particularly the need to more clearly relate theory to different strands of literature on the evidence–policy-making relationship, and to continue empirical testing.     

Institutionalising social learning: Towards systemic and adaptive governance

This paper critically examines how public policy makers limit policy and other institutional design choices by a failure to appreciate (i) how situations may be characterised or framed; (ii) how practices that generate neologisms (invented terms or concepts) or reify (make into a thing) abstract concepts can displace understandings, and (iii) the epistemological bases of governance mechanism choices. An inquiry into the coining of the neologisms ‘wicked’ and ‘tame’ problems is reported and the implications for research and policy practice explored. As practices, neologising, reifying, categorising and typologising have unintended consequences – they remove us from the primary experiences and underlying emotions that provided the motivation for formulating these concepts in the first place. The failure to institutionalise the understandings and experiences that sit behind the invention of the terms ‘wicked’ and ‘tame’ problems (or similar framing choices such as ‘problematique’, ‘messes’, ‘lowland real-life swamps’, ‘resource dilemmas’ or ‘complex adaptive systems’) present systemic constraints to institutionalising social learning as an alternative yet complementary governance mechanism within an overall systemic and adaptive governance framework. Ultimately situations usefully framed as ‘wicked’,’ such as water managing and climate change are problems of relationship – of human beings with the biosphere. Re-framings, such as institutions as social technologies and other research and praxis traditions concerned with the breakdown of relationships may offer ways forward in the purposeful designing and crafting of more effective institutions.     

Trade-offs and performances of a range of alternative global climate architectures for post-2012

Quantitative assessments help to highlight the main features of climate policies by better identifying their strengths and weaknesses. In this study, we develop a grading system for assessing thirteen proposals for post-2012 climate policy. We believe that these proposals contain appropriate policy instruments which will be considered for discussions about how to design the post-2012 climate agreement. Our grades are based on four criteria: environmental effectiveness, cost effectiveness, distributional considerations and institutional feasibility. We analyze the grades with two complementary methods: principal component and cluster analysis. Our results entail three policy implications. Firstly, the higher the number of policy instruments a proposal comprises, the more difficult might be its implementation. Secondly, proposals which include a meaningful effort by the U.S. tend to fail in environmental effectiveness and institutional feasibility. Thirdly, we identify that the “first best” and the “second best” approaches belong to a stable policy group, and both may be considered as suitable candidates for post-2012 climate policy.     

Does environmental information overcome practice compartmentalisation and change consumers' behaviours?

This paper questions the long-held paradigm of consumers' rationality as well as its corresponding policy tool, the supply of information. Theoretical considerations as well as empirical evidence from a research on residential energy consumption in Belgium show that both environmental information – namely on climate change – and customised advice to save energy at home are neither just taken in as such by consumers nor translated into corresponding practices. In consumerist societies, practice compartmentalisation and moods are indeed normalised mechanisms for not adopting ‘green’ lifestyles that would threaten social normality as defined in valued networks.     

Climate change and transdisciplinary science: Problematizing the integration imperative

In this article we critically examine the ‘integration imperative’ in transdisciplinary environmental science and build on social constructivist and political theories to suggest alternative approaches of knowledge co-production in transdisciplinary settings. Our argument builds upon a body of literature in social studies of science to cull insights about knowledge co-production, social learning, and the ecology of team science, particularly as it relates to climate change adaptation. Couched in this transdisciplinary literature, we demonstrate, is the assumption that integration necessarily can and should be a regulative ideal. We critique this assumption by examining the ‘messy’ politics of achieving consensus among radically different, and sometimes irreconcilable, ways of knowing. We argue that the integration imperative conceals the friction, antagonism, and power inherent in knowledge co-production, which in turn can exclude innovative and experimental ways of understanding and adapting to climate change. By way of conclusion, the final section explores three alternative models of knowledge co-production – triangulation, the multiple evidence-based approach, and scenario building – and illustrates their application in the context of transdisciplinary research in climate change adaptation in the arctic, focusing on alternative means of cross-boundary engagement with indigenous ways of knowing.     

Correlating negotiation hotspot issues,Paris climate agreement and the international climate policy regime

The concerns over climate change negotiation, decision texts and links to domestic policy interests of countries to keep warming within an acceptable limit have become the ‘hotspot issues’ of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). Hotspot issues are the human – political economy factors which have evolved over time from negotiation texts or phrases, principles or behaviors with tendencies to influence climate negotiations yet cannot be identified with the scientific literature. Whilst big emitters have been accused as having hegemony over the negotiations, the effects of disunity amongst the parties over domestic policy interests have been overlooked. Hence the article examines the emergence of hotspot issues and how they manifest within the international climate policy regime. The Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs) of 130 countries submitted before the Paris agreement, were analyzed using the following texts: Adaptation, Mitigation, Co-benefits, Finance, Land use, Food security, Poverty, Resilience, Green growth, Green economy, Sustainable development, Biodiversity, Ecosystem services and Conservation. Of these, ‘adaptation’ was cited 2780 times, 1956 for ‘mitigation’ and 32 for ‘ecosystem services’ in the nature conservation category. Ten phases of the climate policy regime and historical hotspot issues were identified for the period 1980–2030. ‘Adaptation’ and mitigation appeared more frequently in the INDCs and correlated with each other (r = 0.56), as the two correlated further with ‘land use’ (0.50 < r < 0.60), and similarly with sustainable development (0.40 < r < 0.70) where ‘r’ is the Pearson Rank Correlation. Therefore the success of the ‘ambitious targets’ for mitigation will depend on similar ambitious goals for adaptation, land use and sustainable development. Several differences existed in the correlation of the hotspot issues within the regional geographical blocs (Africa, Asia, Europe, North America, Oceania, South America) and split along the hotspot issues yet Europe mostly oriented towards mitigation and land use, and Oceania on resilience building. These differences provide favorable conditions for increased cooperation and true multilateralism if they are properly diagnosed.     

A new tool to map the major worldviews in the Netherlands and USA,and explore how they relate to climate change

For addressing climate change, public support for changes in policy is needed, as well changes in individual lifestyles. Both of these appear to be intimately related with people’s worldviews. Understanding these worldviews is therefore essential. In order to research and ‘map’ them, we translated the theoretical ‘Integrative Worldview Framework’ (IWF) into an empirical, quantitative approach. We constructed a worldview-scale aiming to distinguish between four major worldviews – labeled traditional, modern, postmodern, and integrative – and explored their interface with opinions and behaviors with respect to climate change. The survey was conducted with representative samples of citizens in the Netherlands and the USA (n = 527 and n = 556). The hypothesized worldviews were found in the data with a reasonable degree of reliability, especially in the Dutch sample. We also found consistent relationships between these worldview-clusters and a range of opinions, political priorities, and behaviors. In both countries postmoderns and integratives displayed significantly more concern about climate change as well as more sustainable behaviors, compared with moderns and traditionals. The implications of these findings for environmental policy and social science are noteworthy.     

Contexualising the tool development process through a knowledge brokering approach: The case of climate change adaptation and agriculture

This article applies a ‘knowledge brokering’ approach to contextualise the development of an integrated computer modelling tool into the real world policy context of adaptation of agriculture to climate change at the EU level. In particular, the article tests a number of knowledge brokering strategies described and theorised in the literature, but seldom empirically tested. The article finds that while the policy context can be used to identify a theoretically informed knowledge brokering strategy, in practice a strategy's ‘success’ is more informed by practical considerations, such as whether the tool development process is knowledge or demand driven. In addition, in practice the knowledge brokering process is found to be dynamic and messy, which is not always apparent in the literature. The article goes on to question the perception that there is always a need (or a desire) to bridge the gap between researchers and policy makers in the tool development process. Rather than a problem of design and communication, the science policy interface may be characterised more by a high level of competition between researchers and research organisations to have their tool legitimised by its use in the policy making process.     

Pursuing an integrated development and climate policy framework in Africa: options for mainstreaming

Climate change presents a major threat to the prospects for sustained economic development in Africa. In spite of this, climate change concerns do not feature prominently in the implementation of national and regional development programmes. The present paper identifies the likely trade-offs and synergies that may emerge from an integrated ‘development-climate’ approach to policy making. Also, the paper presents the case for the formulation and evaluation of an integrated policy approach based on four principle criteria, including; long-term environmental effectiveness, equity considerations, cost-effectiveness and the institutional compatibility of the policy combinations. What is more? The paper suggests specific options for mainstreaming climate change adaptation and mitigation in various sectoral development agenda such as; agricultural intensification, poverty eradication, rural development, urban renewal, energy security of supply and trade. Given the wide divergence of socio-economic systems and the peculiar challenges faced by individual countries in the continent, further research is required on robust country-specific strategies for pursuing an integrated development-climate policy framework.     

Evidence,politics and power in public policy for the environment

Despite a recent emphasis on ‘evidence based policy’ accompanied by an abundance of ‘green’ policy instruments, experience from the European Union and OECD countries shows that decisions which truly aim to balance environmental considerations with social and economic ones remain thin on the ground. Moreover, many policies seem to fall short of, or directly contradict what the available ‘evidence’ suggests is required. This is a synthesis paper bringing together literature from the fields of political science, geography, sociology and science and technology studies to outline some of the obscurities relating to the use of scientific evidence in environmental decision-making. In this paper, we suggest that an exploration of three key inter-related issues is necessary to develop a richer understanding of why evidence and policy interact as they do. These are the nature of evidence itself; the normative, moral or ethical ‘politics’ of policy-making; and the operation of power in the policy process. Our primary goal is to bring various literatures together to better conceptualise the evidence–policy relationship. In so doing, we outline specific challenges for knowledge producers who set research priorities, and design and direct research projects. We also highlight significant implications for policy decision-making processes.     

Including adaptation costs and climate change damages in evaluating post-2012 burden-sharing regimes

Many studies have been published to evaluate the consequences of different post-2012 emission allocation regimes on regional mitigation costs. This paper goes one step further and evaluates not only mitigation costs, but also adaptation costs and climate change damages. Three post-2012 emission allocation regimes (Contraction & Convergence, Multistage and Common but differentiated convergence) and two climate targets (2°C and 3°C above the pre-industrial level) are considered. This explorative analysis shows that including these other cost categories could lead to different perspectives on the outcomes of allocation regimes. Up to 2050, the poorest regions have negative mitigation costs under all allocation regimes considered, as they benefit from emission trading. However, these regions also suffer from the most severe climate impacts. As such, the financial flows due to emission trading from developed to developing countries created under these allocation regimes could also be interpreted as compensation of climate change damages and adaptation costs. In the longer run, the sum of climate change damages, adaptation costs and mitigation costs are the highest in the poorest regions of Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia, for both climate targets and practically all emission allocation regimes.     

Carbon capture and storage deployment rates: needs and feasibility

Carbon capture and storage (CCS) may become a key technology to limit human-induced global warming, but many uncertainties prevail, including the necessary technological development, costs, legal ramifications, and siting. As such, an important question is the scale of carbon dioxide abatement we require from CCS to meet future climate targets, and whether they appear reasonable. For a number of energy technology and efficiency improvement scenarios, we use a simple climate model to assess the necessary contribution from CCS to ‘fill the gap’ between scenarios’ carbon dioxide emissions levels and the levels needed to meet alternative climate targets. The need for CCS depends on early or delayed action to curb emissions and the characteristics of the assumed energy scenario. To meet a 2.5°C target a large contribution and fast deployment rates for CCS are required. The required deployment rates are much faster than those seen in the deployment of renewable energy technologies as well as nuclear power the last decades, and may not be feasible. This indicates that more contributions are needed from other low-carbon energy technologies and improved energy efficiency, or substitution of coal for gas in the first half of the century. In addition the limited availability of coal and gas by end of the century and resulting limited scope for CCS implies that meeting the 2.5°C target would require significant contributions from one or more of the following options: CCS linked to oil use, biomass energy based CCS (BECCS), and CCS linked to industrial processes.     

The perceived psychological distance of climate change impacts and its influence on support for adaptation policy

Factors influencing support for climate mitigation policy in the United States are well researched, however, research regarding individuals’ support for climate adaptation policy is relatively sparse. This study explores how an individual’s perception of climate change impacts may influence their support for adaptation actions. Results of a survey of the U.S. public (n = 653) indicates that individuals who believe climate change impacts are unlikely to happen or will primarily affect other people in other places are less likely to be concerned about climate change impacts and less likely to support climate adaptation. However, an individual’s support for climate change adaptation measures is not influenced by their perception of when climate change impacts will occur even when taking into account concern for climate impacts. Critical for policy-makers, a belief that climate adaptation measures will not be effective attenuates the relationship between psychological distance, concern for climate change impacts, and adaptation policy measures. Our results indicate that to effectively communicate about climate change, policy-makers should emphasize that: (i) climate change impacts are occurring, (ii) that their constituents are being affected now, or will be in the future, and (iii) communicate that adaptation measures can be effective in addressing risks associated with climate change impacts.     

Disaster reduction,loss and damage data,and the post-2015 international policy agenda

Disaster risk management, particularly management of climate-related risks, has become central to the international policy agenda. Reducing hazard-related loss and damage relies heavily on scientific inputs. Science, in turn, relies on data—in this case 1) risk-related data on hazards, exposure and vulnerability, and 2) data on associated loss and damage outcomes. The latter, data on losses and damage, are also post-2015 international policy outcome indicators at the highest level, required for countries’ monitoring of progress in reducing disaster risk, adapting to climate change, and achieving sustainable development. Although the quantity and accessibility of loss and damage data are improving, a number of issues continue to constrain their potential. These include needs for more consistent cataloguing of hazards and extreme events, more systematic and accurate documentation of per-event losses and damage, more precise cross-referencing of hazard events with associated loss and damage, and improved standardization and interoperability among databases. We identify measures for improvement in this regard, both for research purposes and for post-2015 international policy implementation.     

African voters indicate lack of support for climate change policies

Will African voters support climate change policies? By 2020, the United Nations’ Green Climate Fund intends to provide tens of billions of dollars per year to African nations to support climate adaptation and mitigation policies. It is widely assumed that African citizens will support implementation of these climate policies. We observe the opposite result. In this article – across two experimental studies – we find evidence that Sub-Saharan African politicians who commit to climate change policies may lose electoral support. Electorally important swing voters with weak party affiliations are least likely to support party statements about climate change. Interviews with standing elected officials from Malawi and South Africa corroborate our experimental findings. The combined results suggest voter preferences may hinder the successful implementation of climate change policy in Sub-Saharan African democracies.     

Defining response capacity to enhance climate change policy

Climate change adaptation and mitigation decisions made by governments are usually taken in different policy domains. At the individual level however, adaptation and mitigation activities are undertaken together as part of the management of risk and resources. We propose that a useful starting point to develop a national climate policy is to understand what societal response might mean in practice. First we frame the set of responses at the national policy level as a trade off between investment in the development and diffusion of new technology, and investment in encouraging and enabling society to change its behaviour and or adopt the new technology. We argue that these are the pertinent trade-offs, rather than those usually posited between climate change mitigation and adaptation. The preference for a policy response that focuses more on technological innovation rather than one that focuses on changing social behaviour will be influenced by the capacity of different societies to change their greenhouse gas emissions; by perceived vulnerability to climate impacts; and by capacity to modify social behaviour and physical environment. Starting with this complete vision of response options should enable policy makers to re-evaluate the risk environment and the set of response options available to them. From here, policy makers should consider who is responsible for making climate response decisions and when actions should be taken. Institutional arrangements dictate social and political acceptability of different policies, they structure worldviews, and they determine the provision of resources for investment in technological innovation and social change. The importance of focussing on the timing of the response is emphasised to maximise the potential for adjustments through social learning and institutional change at different policy scales. We argue that the ability to respond to climate change is both enabled and constrained by social and technological conditions. The ability of society to respond to climate change and the need for technological change for both decarbonisation and for dealing with surprise in general, are central to concepts of sustainable development.     

Policy coherence in climate governance in Caribbean Small Island Developing States

Climate governance in Small Island developing States (SIDS) is a pressing priority to preserve livelihoods, biodiversity and ecosystems for the next generations. Understanding the dynamics of climate change policy integration is becoming more crucial as we try to measure the success of environmental governance efforts and chart new goals for sustainable development. At the international level, climate change policy has evolved from single issue to integrated approaches towards achieving sustainable development. New actors, new mechanisms and institutions of governance with greater fragmentation in governance across sectors and levels (Biermann and Pattberg, 2008) make integration of policy in the area of climate change governance even more of a challenge today. What is the Caribbean reality regarding policy coherence in climate change governance? Are the same climate change policy coherence frameworks useful or indeed applicable for environmental governance in developing states more generally and for SIDS in particular? What are the best triggers to achieve successful climate change policy integration in environmental governance—especially as the complex interconnectivity of new actors, institutions and mechanisms make the process of integration even more challenging? What facilitates and what hampers climate policy integration in the regional Caribbean context? This article reviews the debates around policy coherence for climate change governance, creates a framework to test or measure policy coherence and examines how relevant this has been to regional climate change governance processes in Commonwealth Caribbean States. The study found that though at the regional level, there is substantial recognition of the importance of and mechanics involved in climate policy coherence, this has not translated to policy coherence at the regional and national levels. There is a large degree of fragmentation in the application of climate policy in each Caribbean Island with no mechanism to breach the gap. Silos in public environmental governance architectures, unwillingness to share data, insufficient political will; unsustainable project-based funding and lack of accountability among actors are the main challenges to climate policy coherence. The findings fill a gap in the literature on the elements of climate policy coherence from a SIDS perspective.     

Review of drivers and barriers for nuclear power in the UK

There has been resurgence in interest in new nuclear power stations over the last couple of years. The UK Government has taken steps to encourage the private sector to build new stations in the UK, a change in its previous neutral stance toward nuclear power. This paper examines the change in government policy asking what drivers have led to this decision and what barriers were preventing new nuclear power in the past and what barriers are still faced by both government and industry. Three main drivers are discussed: security of energy supply; diminishing energy generation capacity; and climate change. The paper also examines other key factors that play a part in facilitating a shift in government policy, namely economics, public perception and waste management policy. Barriers are identified through examination of public perception, and policy. The changes to the planning system are also discussed. The paper concludes by comparing drivers and barriers for other technologies and contrasting the UK experience with that of other countries.