Human Dignity and the Dignity of Creatures

In their report for the Swiss government onthe notion of the dignity of creatures, PhilippBalzer, Klaus-Peter Rippe, and Peter Schaber analyzethe relationship between human dignity and the dignityof creatures, taking them as two categoricallydifferent concepts. Human dignity is defined as the``moral right not to be humiliated,' whereas thedignity of creatures is taken to be ``the inherentvalue of nonhuman living beings.' To my mind there isno need to draw a categorical distinction between thetwo concepts. Both notions could be brought togetherunder an all-encompassing concept of the inherentvalue of living beings, humans and non-humans alike,a concept one could name ``the dignity of livingbeings.' Indeed, this very notion underlies theposition taken in the report, although this is notmade explicit by the authors themselves.As the aim of the paper is only to clarify theconcepts used, I do not go beyond this ``internal'critique of their position, i.e., I don't assess howthe claims articulated via these concepts – theclaim that humans and/or creatures have an inherentvalue consisting in a supposed intrinsic good – areto be justified, although I myself would be ratherskeptical that this might be successfully done.     

The good life of creatures with dignity some comments on the swiss expert opinion

The notion of Dignity of Creatures has been voted into the Swiss Federal Constitution by a plebiscite. Philipp Balzer, Klaus-Peter Rippe, and Peter Schaber have given an expert opinion for the Swiss government to clarify the notion of Dignity of Creatures. According to them, by voting this notion into the Swiss constitution, the Swiss have chosen for a limited biocentric approach towards biotechnology. In such an approach genetic engineering of non-human beings is only allowed insofar that their own good is not impaired. It is, however, not clear when the good of a non-human being is impaired. I defend the position that — even if we confine ourselves to animals — their good goes beyond their well being.     

Human dignity and the dignity of creatures

In their report for the Swiss government on the notion of the dignity of creatures, Philipp Balzer, Klaus-Peter Rippe, and Peter Schaber analyze the relationship between human dignity and the dignity of creatures, taking them as two categorically different concepts. Human dignity is defined as the “moral right not to be humiliated,” whereas the dignity of creatures is taken to be “the inherent value of non-human living beings.” To my mind there is no need to draw a categorical distinction between the two concepts. Both notions could be brought together under an all-encompassing concept of the inherent value of living beings, humans and non-humans alike, a concept one could name “the dignity of living beings.” Indeed, this very notion underlies the position taken in the report, although this is not made explicit by the authors themselves. As the aim of the paper is only to clarify the concepts used, I do not go beyond this “internal” critique of their position, i.e., I don’t assess how the claims articulated via these concepts — the claim that humans and/or creatures have an inherent value consisting in a supposed intrinsic good — are to be justified, although I myself would be rather skeptical that this might be successfully done.     

Two Concepts of Dignity for Humans and Non-Human Organisms in the Context of Genetic Engineering

The 1992 incorporation of an article by referendum in the SwissConstitution mandating that the federal government issue regulations onthe use of genetic material that take into account the dignity ofnonhuman organism raises philosophical questions about how we shouldunderstand what is meant by ``the dignity of nonhuman animals,' andabout what sort of moral demands arise from recognizing this dignitywith respect to their genetic engineering. The first step in determiningwhat is meant is to clarify the difference between dignity when appliedto humans and when applied to nonhumans. Several conceptions of humandignity should be rejected in favor of a fourth conception: the rightnot to be degraded. This right implies that those who have it have thecognitive capacities that are prerequisite for self-respect. In the caseof nonhuman organisms that lack this capacity, respecting their dignityrequires the recognition that their inherent value, which is tied totheir abilities to pursue their own good, be respected. This value isnot absolute, as it is in the case of humans, so it does not prohibitbreeding manipulations that make organisms more useful to humans. But itdoes restrict morally how sentient animals can be used. In regard togenetic engineering, this conception requires that animals be allowedthe uninhibited development of species specific functions, a positionshared by Holland and Attfield, as opposed to the Original Purposeconception proposed by Fox and the Integrity of the Genetic Make-upposition proposed by Rolston. The inherent value conception of dignity,as here defended, is what is meant in the Swiss Constitution article.     

Two concepts of dignity for humans and non-human organisms in the context of genetic engineering

The 1992 incorporation of an article by referendum in the Swiss Constitution mandating that the federal government issue regulations on the use of genetic material that take into account the dignity of nonhuman organism raises philosophical questions about how we should understand what is meant by “the dignity of nonhuman animals,” and about what sort of moral demands arise from recognizing this dignity with respect to their genetic engineering. The first step in determining what is meant is to clarify the difference between dignity when applied to humans and when applied to nonhumans. Several conceptions of human dignity should be rejected in favor of a fourth conception: the right not to be degraded. This right implies that those who have it have the cognitive capacities that are prerequisite for self-respect. In the case of nonhuman organisms that lack this capacity, respecting their dignity requires the recognition that their inherent value, which is tied to their abilities to pursue their own good, be respected. This value is not absolute, as it is in the case of humans, so it does not prohibit breeding manipulations that make organisms more useful to humans. But it does restrict morally how sentient animals can be used. In regard to genetic engineering, this conception requires that animals be allowed the uninhibited development of species specific functions, a position shared by Holland and Attfield, as opposed to the Original Purpose conception proposed by Fox and the Integrity of the Genetic Make-up position proposed by Rolston. The inherent value conception of dignity, as here defended, is what is meant in the Swiss Constitution article. This paper is a slightly revised version of a paper that had been published in German in 1998 (“Menschenwürde vs. Würde der Kreatur,” Freiburg i.Br.).     

Genetic engineering and the dignity of creatures

The Swiss expert report suggests that the inherent dignity of a living being be identified with its inherent value. But the phrase “inherent value of a living being” seems to connote two concepts of inherent value. One has a morally obligating character but is counterintuitive because of its egalitarianism. The other is one of non-moral value. It is more compatible with considered intuitions but insufficient for substantiating the expert report’s claim that human beings have moral duties towards animals and plants. The paper discusses these concepts. Consideration is then given to the problem of how discursive support can be generated for the expert report’s claim that human beings have the moral duty to abstain from impairing those functions and abilities of a non-human being that members of its species as a rule can practice.