Redistribution and pollution taxes with non-linear Engel curves

This paper analyses optimal corrective taxation and optimal income redistribution. The Pigouvian pollution tax is higher if pollution damages disproportionally hurt the poor due to equity weighting of pollution damages. Moreover, under general utility functions, optimal pollution taxes should be set below the Pigouvian tax if the poor spend a disproportionate fraction of their income on polluting goods. However, if Engel curves are linear, optimal pollution taxes should follow the first-best rule for the Pigouvian corrective tax even if the government wants to redistribute income and the poor spend a disproportional part of their income on polluting goods. The often-used quasi-linear, CES and Stone-Geary utility functions all have linear Engel curves. If Engel curves are linear, and if pollution taxes are not optimised, Pareto-improving green tax reforms exist that move the pollution tax closer to the Pigouvian tax. Simulations demonstrate that optimal corrective taxes should be Pigouvian if the demand for polluting goods is derived from a LES demand system, but deviate from the Pigouvian taxes if demand for polluting goods demand is derived from a PIGLOG demand system.     

The efficiency value of effluent tax revenues

The concept of the efficiency value of effluent tax revenues is developed. It is defined as the reduction in excess burden resulting from the substitution of these revenues for current or future resource distorting tax revenues, such as those raised from federal corporate and personal income taxes. The annual efficiency value of revenues raised by national effluent taxes on two major air pollutants is estimated to range from $0.63 to $3.05 billion, if substituted for federal personal income tax revenue, and from $1 to $4.87 billion, if substituted for corporate income tax revenue, expressed in 1982 dollars. Thus previous estimates of the efficiency gain from substitution of an effluent tax scheme for current pollution regulation policy have been too low, because the efficiency value of the tax revenues has been excluded.     

Tax evasion and optimal environmental taxes

This paper introduces a new argument to the debate about the role of environmental taxes in modern tax systems. Some environmental taxes, particularly taxes on gasoline or electricity, are more difficult to evade than taxes on labor or income. When the tax base is shifted in a revenue-neutral manner toward these environmental taxes, the result is a net reduction in the amount of tax evasion. Using a carbon tax as a motivating example, the “tax evasion effect” is shown to sharply reduce the welfare cost of controlling emissions. A simple computable general equilibrium model suggests that the impact of considering tax evasion can be large: costs are lowered by 28% in the United States, by 89% in China, and by 97% in India. In countries with high levels of pre-existing tax evasion, a carbon tax will pay for itself through improvements in the efficiency of the tax system.     

Is Chinese trade policy motivated by environmental concerns?

This paper analyses whether China's export VAT rebates and export taxes are driven by environmental concerns. Since China struggles to enforce environmental regulation, trade policy can be used as a second-best environmental policy. In a general equilibrium model it is possible to show that the second-best export tax increases in a product's pollution intensity. The empirical analysis investigates whether the export tax equivalent of partial VAT rebates and export taxes are higher for products which are more pollution intensive along several dimensions. The results indicate that the VAT rebate rates are set in a way that discourages exports of water pollution intensive, SO₂ intensive and energy intensive products from 2007 on. Moreover, the conservation of natural resources such as minerals, metals, wood products and precious stones seems to be a key determinant of China's export VAT rebate rates. There is little evidence that export taxes are motivated by environmental concerns.     

A note on optimal taxation of environmental spillovers

This note addresses the question of what policy the government should adopt when industrial pollution can be reduced partially by the imposition of effluent taxes and partially by a publicly operated waste treatment plant.In the case of increasing returns to public abatement, an effluent tax set at marginal user cost will not generate enough revenue to finance the facility. The key issue is that of finding additional revenue the most efficiently. Here, this question is dealt with in the framework of commodity taxation, with consideration given to the possibility that both effluent and commodity taxes derived on efficiency grounds might be quite regressive.     

Effects of Carbon Taxes in an Economy with Prior Tax Distortions: An Intertemporal General Equilibrium Analysis

This paper analyzes the costs of carbon taxes in a model that recognizes interactions between this tax and pre-existing taxes. First we examine the extent to which costs of a U.S. carbon tax are reduced when its revenues finance cuts in income taxes. Such use of revenues significantly reduces, but does not eliminate, the overall policy costs. The positive overall costs reflect the carbon tax′s focus on intermediate inputs and its relatively narrow base in comparison with income taxes. We also examine the sensitivity of the carbon tax′s costs to the level of pre-existing taxes. For any given use of revenues, welfare costs rise significantly with pre-existing tax rates, indicating that models disregarding pre-existing taxes may substantially understate the costs of new environmental tax initiatives.     

Optimal policy instruments for externality-producing durable goods under present bias

When consumers exhibit present bias, the standard solution to market failures caused by externalities—Pigouvian pricing—is suboptimal. I investigate policies aimed at externalities for present-biased consumers. Optimal policy includes an instrument to correct the externality and an instrument to correct the present bias. Either instrument can be an incentive-based policy (e.g. a tax on fuel economy) or a command-and-control policy (e.g. a fuel economy mandate). Under consumer heterogeneity, a command-and-control policy may dominate an incentive-based policy. Calibrated to the US automobile market, simulation results suggest that the second-best gasoline tax is 3–30% higher than marginal external damages. The optimal price policy includes a gasoline tax set about equal to marginal external damages and a fuel economy tax that increases the price of an average non-hybrid car by about $550–$2200 relative to the price of an average hybrid car.     

Spatial economic theory of pollution control

In February 1972 the Nixon Administration proposed a tax on sulfur oxide emissions, beyond the Federal standards, of electric power plants. It was hoped that such a tax would discourage power plant locations in heavily polluted areas like urban areas. Assuming that such a tax varies over space because pollution is not invariant over space, the spatial theory of the firm is presented in this paper cast doubt on the efficacy of such a polltuion tax to achieve the desired goal of the administration. In particular it is shown that the cost-minimizing spatial firm would abate its pollution in response to a tax by either changing its location or by reducing waste through process change or by using a transportable abatement good if the tax savings due to the change in marginal abatement through location change per unit change in abatement is greater than or equal to transport rate on the abatement good. If the goal of the firm is to maximize profits, the desired outcome would follow if in addition to the fulfillment of the above condition the percentage change in the delivered price of raw material (situated at one end of the linear location space) per unit distance is greater than or equal to the percentage change in net marginal revenue, i.e., marginal revenue net of transport cost per unit of output. In simple terms, the conclusions of this paper raise doubts regarding the effectiveness of a pollution tax in curtailing pollution of a firm which is operating in a space economy. This outcome is peculiar to a spatial firm. Sufficient conditions also have been obtained when land input is included in the production function of the firm.     

Uncertainty and the choice of pollution control instruments

This paper compares the relative efficiencies of pollution taxes, pollution standards, and the auctioning of pollution rights when the marginal damage function or marginal control cost are subject to uncertainty. In the first case, we find that all instruments yield the same expected social surplus. In the latter case, the choice of the optimal instrument depends, in general, on the relative elasticities of the marginal damage and marginal expected cost functions, on the way in which uncertainty enters the model, and on the distribution of the error term. Policy conclusions are derived.     

Tax versus emissions trading scheme in the long run

In this paper we compare the performance of emission taxes and tradable permits under free market entry when firms face idiosyncratic ex ante cost uncertainty. We show that under auctioned permits insufficient entry occurs, while under a linear emission tax scheme, depending on parameters, market entry can be either excessive or insufficient. Our long-run analysis thus contrasts with Spulber׳s (1985) equivalence result and also modifies Weitzman׳s result in favor of an ETS in that the superiority of a tax over an ETS is not guaranteed, even when the Weitzman condition favors a tax. We also show that an ETS is superior to a tax scheme when the entry cost is low and the magnitude of uncertainty/asymmetric information and the size of the output market are large.     

Stable taxation schemes in regional environmental management

Economists have frequently proposed the use of taxes to internalize externalities, the unit tax on a particular activity being equal to the marginal social damage it generates. This paper introduces such a taxation scheme, comprising a set of rules which, given a set of polluters, their profits, and costs, and a central authority for environmental control, generates a set of taxes to be levied on the waste emissions. Different attributes of the taxation schemes are then presented, the most important of which (stability) refers to the possibility of overall cooperation between all the polluters. The paper concludes by examining the implications of the existence of stable taxation schemes and of the imposition of constraints either on the emissions or on the percentage of load removed.     

Strategic pollution control and capital tax competition

In an analytical model of symmetric countries with mobile capital and local or transboundary pollution we investigate whether competition in emissions taxes (or emissions caps) and capital taxes leads to efficient outcomes when governments act strategically. When they have capital taxes and emissions caps at their disposal, they refrain from taxing capital and set their caps inefficiently lax [efficient] for transboundary [local] pollution. When they have the option to tax capital and emissions, capital is subsidized [untaxed] and emissions taxes are inefficiently low [efficient] for transboundary [local] pollution. In case of transboundary pollution emissions caps are Pareto-superior to emissions taxes. That holds regardless of whether the environmental policy is applied as stand-alone policy or combined with capital tax competition.     

Pollution taxes and standards: A continuum of quasi-optimal solutions

A generalized second-best problem, involving a perfectly competitive industry which produces a pollution type of externality, is examined. The pollution tax is allowed to assume an arbitrary value (possibly zero), while a pollution standard, set as a ratio of pollution to output, is determined by a first-order optimizing condition. The general condition for a set of quasi-optimal solutions includes the Pareto-optimal solution as a special case. It is also found that when the pollution tax is below the optimal level, the usual implication is that the standard should be set so that the marginal cost of pollution reduction exceeds the marginal external damage.     

Substituting pollution taxation for general taxation: Some implications for efficiency in pollutions taxation

Earlier papers have recognized that nonenvironmental benefits will be realized if pollution taxes are substituted for other taxes which impose efficiency losses on society. The purpose of this paper is to investigate the importance of these nonenvironmental benefits for the design of an efficient pollution tax. It is found that the efficient tax may be higher or lower than that conventionally defined as optimal, and that the net benefit from unrestrained pollution can have important implications for the size of the tax.     

Public Preferences for Compensatory Mitigation of Salt Marsh Losses: a Contingent Choice of Alternatives

Abstract:  Human activities continue to eliminate or degrade wetlands that provide rich habitat for many species. Compensatory mitigation, including creation of new wetlands, restoration of previously degraded wetlands, or preservation of existing wetlands, is one policy option that seeks to maintain no net loss of wetland habitat. Public support of wetland mitigation is essential because the public incurs the cost for many mitigation projects in the form of higher taxes. Therefore, public preferences should be considered when decisions are made about wetland mitigation options. We used a contingent-choice survey in Rhode Island to identify factors affecting public support for different types of compensatory wetland mitigation. Results were based on 640 survey responses. The amount of wetland lost during the original development project had no significant effect on the preferred mitigation alternative. Preferences for preservation, restoration, and no-action alternatives varied according to respondents' gender, education, and income. Certain general considerations applied, however, regardless of mitigation type. Respondents were willing to incur increases in taxes and fees for most mitigation projects. The larger the mitigation project and the lower the cost, the more likely it was to gain public support. The presence of endangered species contributed to public support, but less significantly than public access. Public access can be critical to public support, particularly if the size of the wetland is small or the cost is high. If the cost of providing public access, such as a boardwalk or viewing tower, is relatively small, the gain in public support for mitigation expenditures may well allow a substantial expansion of the area involved in mitigation projects and thus a greater increase in the amount of habitat conservation.     

Rational host country use of a severance tax

This paper addresses the basic question: How should a host country use a constant severance tax to control a foreign-owned mining firm? The basic rule is derived, and comparative static analysis is performed to show the effects of price, cost, and interest changes on the optimal tax policy.     

Firm behavior under imperfectly enforceable pollution standards and taxes

Assuming expected profit maximization, the behavior of the firm under imperfectly enforceable pollution standards is examined. Among other results, it is found that cost subsidies can reduce the size of violation and amount of wastes, and that the shape of the expected penalty function determines the direction of the firm response to tighter standards. Under imperfectly enforceable pollution taxes, it is found, among other results, that the firm's actual level of wastes is independent of proportional changes in the expected penalty for pollution tax evasion, and that the marginal cost of actual waste reduction equals the unit tax on reported wastes. Some normative aspects of the results are discussed.     

Dynamic adjustment to land taxation policy: Neutrality and welfare implications

In this paper we use a dynamic three sector model to examine the neutrality and welfare effects of land income taxes. We find that (1) taxes that are neutral in long run equilibrium need not be neutral in the short run; (2) short run neutrality depends upon the tax treatment of development costs and losses; and (3) many of the neutrality results hold under both static and rational expectations assumptions. We also find that, even without externality assumptions, nonneutrality in the short run does not necessarily entail a welfare cost and may be welfare-enhancing when agents have less-than-perfect foresight.     

A note on the effect of tax brackets on non-renewable resource extraction

Tax brackets are a common feature of non-renewable resource taxes. Although the introduction of brackets would seem to be an innocuous way of approximating a non-linear tax system, the dynamic effects are surprising. This paper shows that the presence of tax brackets in both a severance tax system and a profits tax system can induce the extractive firm to depart from the well-known monotonically declining extraction profile and to choose instead a profile which has constant extraction rates over some interval of time.     

Cost-effective environmental policy: implications of induced technological change

Cost-effective environmental policy generally requires that all emission sources are faced with the same tax. In this paper I discuss how the existence of induced technological change may alter this result, if at least some of the effect is external to the firm. Focusing on Learning by doing (LBD) effects in abatement activities, it is shown that emission sources with external learning effects should be faced with a higher tax than emission sources with only autonomous technological change. By using simple numerical simulations, it is further investigated to what degree a cost-effective climate policy differs from a free quota market, under various assumptions about learning effects, diffusion of technology and environmental targets. The results indicate that optimal taxes may be significantly higher in the industrial world than in the developing world. Moreover, the industrial world's share of global abatement may be much higher in a cost-effective solution than in a free quota market. The global cost savings of a fully flexible implementation of the Kyoto Protocol are further questioned, as potential spillover effects of technological growth in the industrial world are not internalised in the market.