Managing Protected Woodlands: Fuelwood Collection and Law Enforcement in Lake Malawi National Park

Abstract: We examined the decisions women make in their collection of fuelwood within a protected area in Malawi. We used law enforcement data and behavioral observations of fuelwood harvesting practices to examine the risk of detection and penalties posed by law enforcement activities. Our results indicate that, at their current levels, law enforcement patrols have little effect on wood collection practices. The low risk of detection and light penalties appear to favor illegal wood collection, which is practiced by the majority of women. Alternative strategies should be pursued to enhance the conservation of the woodland and its management as a fuelwood resource for local communities.     

Breaking the Vicious Circle of Illegal Logging in Indonesia

The government of Indonesia, which presides over 10% of the world's tropical forests, has set ambitious targets to cut its high deforestation rates through an REDD+ scheme (Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation). This will require strong law enforcement to succeed. Yet, strategies that have accomplished this are rare and, along with past failures, tend not to be documented. We evaluated a multistakeholder approach that seeks to tackle illegal logging in the carbon‐rich province of Aceh, Sumatra. From 2008 to 2009, Fauna & Flora International established and supported a community‐based informant network for the 738,000 ha Ulu Masen ecosystem. The network reported 190 forest offenses to local law enforcement agencies, which responded with 86 field operations that confiscated illicit vehicles, equipment, and timber, and arrested 138 illegal logging suspects. From 45 cases subsequently monitored, 64.4% proceeded to court, from which 90.0% of defendants received a prison sentence or a verbal warning for a first offense. Spatial analyses of illegal logging and timber storage incidents predicted that illegal activities would be more effectively deterred by law enforcement operations that targeted the storage sites. Although numerous clusters of incidents were identified, they were still widespread reflecting the ubiquity of illegal activities. The multistakeholder results were promising, but illegal logging still persisted at apparently similar levels at the project's end, indicating that efforts need to be further strengthened. Nevertheless, several actions contributed to the law enforcement achievements: strong political will; strong stakeholder support; and funding that could be promptly accessed. These factors are highlighted as prerequisites for achieving Indonesia's ambitious REDD+ goals. Rompiendo el Círculo Vicioso de la Tala Ilegal en Indonesia     

Policy options for toxics disposal: Laissez-faire,subsidization, and enforcement

This paper evaluates three second-best policies for dealing with the problem of illegal hazardous-waste disposal. The first is a laissez-faire policy; the second is a policy under which legal disposal of hazardous waste is subsidized; the third is a policy that discourages illegal disposal by increasing the expected penalty associated with illegal disposal. Using a simple computational model, I compute the optimum subsidy and the optimum enforcement budget, and determine the conditions under which each policy option is superior to others.     

Spatiotemporal trends of illegal activities from ranger‐collected data in a Ugandan national park

Within protected areas, biodiversity loss is often a consequence of illegal resource use. Understanding the patterns and extent of illegal activities is therefore essential for effective law enforcement and prevention of biodiversity declines. We used extensive data, commonly collected by ranger patrols in many protected areas, and Bayesian hierarchical models to identify drivers, trends, and distribution of multiple illegal activities within the Queen Elizabeth Conservation Area (QECA), Uganda. Encroachment (e.g., by pastoralists with cattle) and poaching of noncommercial animals (e.g., snaring bushmeat) were the most prevalent illegal activities within the QECA. Illegal activities occurred in different areas of the QECA. Poaching of noncommercial animals was most widely distributed within the national park. Overall, ecological covariates, although significant, were not useful predictors for occurrence of illegal activities. Instead, the location of illegal activities in previous years was more important. There were significant increases in encroachment and noncommercial plant harvesting (nontimber products) during the study period (1999–2012). We also found significant spatiotemporal variation in the occurrence of all activities. Our results show the need to explicitly model ranger patrol effort to reduce biases from existing uncorrected or capture per unit effort analyses. Prioritization of ranger patrol strategies is needed to target illegal activities; these strategies are determined by protected area managers, and therefore changes at a site‐level can be implemented quickly. These strategies should also be informed by the location of past occurrences of illegal activity: the most useful predictor of future events. However, because spatial and temporal changes in illegal activities occurred, regular patrols throughout the protected area, even in areas of low occurrence, are also required.     

Measuring and Monitoring Illegal Use of Natural Resources

Abstract: Illegal use of natural resources is a threat to biodiversity globally, but research on illegal activities has methodological challenges. We examined 100 studies that empirically identify targeted resources, techniques used to procure resources illegally, locations of illegal activities, characteristics of typical violators, incentives driving illegal use of resources, magnitude of the problem of illegal use (e.g., quantities used), or frequency of illegal activity. We based our evaluation of the methods used in these studies on their ability to provide these empirical data, relative labor demands, training and technology requirements, and levels of uncontrollable bias. We evaluated eight different methods: law‐enforcement records, indirect observation, self‐reporting, direct observation, direct questioning, randomized response technique (a survey method designed to improve accuracy of responses to sensitive questions), forensics, and modeling. Different situations favored different methods, each with distinct advantages and limitations. Six context‐specific factors—location of resource use (in situ vs. ex situ), budget, technology and training capacity, ease of detection of illegal activity, scope of illegal activity (limited vs. widespread), and researchers’ willingness to accept bias in results—help narrow the choice of methods. Several methodological concerns applied to any study of illegal resource use: regular monitoring can detect trends; modeling can incorporate sampling error and data uncertainties; researchers must manage levels of bias that vary between methods; triangulation of results from multiple methods can improve accuracy. No method is a panacea, but a combination of techniques can help address the lack of data on illegal activity. Researchers empirically compared results from different methods in only four studies, and no one has compared more than two methods simultaneously. Conservation would benefit from more research focused on: methods comparisons that include cost effectiveness, time efficiency, and statistical rigor; unique applications of the eight techniques currently in use; and testing of new methods.     

Detecting deterrence from patrol data

The threat posed to protected areas by the illegal killing of wildlife is countered principally by ranger patrols that aim to detect and deter potential offenders. Deterring poaching is a fundamental conservation objective, but its achievement is difficult to identify, especially when the prime source of information comes in the form of the patrols’ own records, which inevitably contain biases. The most common metric of deterrence is a plot of illegal activities detected per unit of patrol effort (CPUE) against patrol effort (CPUE-E). We devised a simple, mechanistic model of law breaking and law enforcement in which we simulated deterrence alongside exogenous changes in the frequency of offences under different temporal patterns of enforcement effort. The CPUE-E plots were not reliable indicators of deterrence. However, plots of change in CPUE over change in effort (ΔCPUE-ΔE) reliably identified deterrence, regardless of the temporal distribution of effort or any exogenous change in illegal activity levels as long as the time lag between patrol effort and subsequent behavioral change among offenders was approximately known. The ΔCPUE-ΔE plots offered a robust, simple metric for monitoring patrol effectiveness; were no more conceptually complicated than the basic CPUE-E plots; and required no specialist knowledge or software to produce. Our findings demonstrate the need to account for temporal autocorrelation in patrol data and to consider appropriate (and poaching-activity-specific) intervals for aggregation. They also reveal important gaps in understanding of deterrence in this context, especially the mechanisms by which it occurs. In practical applications, we recommend the use of ΔCPUE-ΔE plots in preference to other basic metrics and advise that deterrence should be suspected only if there is a clear negative slope. Distinct types of illegal activity should not be grouped together for analysis, especially if the signs of their occurrence have different persistence times in the environment.     

Optimal fishery management in the presence of illegal activity

A simple fishery model is developed with legal and illegal markets for fish, the latter market being combated by enforcement efforts put forth by a social regulator. In response to enforcement, violators undertake avoidance activities to escape detection. The possible impacts of illegal activity on optimal fishery management are then explored, and some policy implications are suggested. Concurrently, optimal regulation is calculated when: (a) only legal surplus is maximized versus (b) when both legal and illegal surplus is maximized. The rationale for these two regimes and their divergence in optimal management policies is outlined.     

Policies for the Enforcement of Wildlife Laws: The Balance between Detection and Penalties in Luangwa Valley, Zambia

Models have shown that levels of law enforcement in Luangwa Valley, Zambia, during the 1980s were not adequate to prevent illegal exploitation of black rhinos and African elephants. Theory suggests that the deterrent effect of an increase in detection rate will be larger than that of a similar increase in penalty. The most effective penalty, in economic terms, would be a variable fine related to the number of illegal trophies harvested, but this may be hard to legislate effectively. Wildlife managers conserving rhinos and elephants should focus on improving detection rates rather than on requesting severe penalties with no improvements in detection.     

Hunting, law enforcement, and African primate conservation

Abstract: Primates are regularly hunted for bushmeat in tropical forests, and systematic ecological monitoring can help determine the effect hunting has on these and other hunted species. Monitoring can also be used to inform law enforcement and managers of where hunting is concentrated. We evaluated the effects of law enforcement informed by monitoring data on density and spatial distribution of 8 monkey species in Taï National Park, Côte d’Ivoire. We conducted intensive surveys of monkeys and looked for signs of human activity throughout the park. We also gathered information on the activities of law‐enforcement personnel related to hunting and evaluated the relative effects of hunting, forest cover and proximity to rivers, and conservation effort on primate distribution and density. The effects of hunting on monkeys varied among species. Red colobus monkeys (Procolobus badius) were most affected and Campbell's monkeys (Cercopithecus campbelli) were least affected by hunting. Density of monkeys irrespective of species was up to 100 times higher near a research station and tourism site in the southwestern section of the park, where there is little hunting, than in the southeastern part of the park. The results of our monitoring guided law‐enforcement patrols toward zones with the most hunting activity. Such systematic coordination of ecological monitoring and law enforcement may be applicable at other sites.     

The Clean Air Act Watch List and federal oversight of state enforcement efforts

For major federal environmental statutes in the United States, primary monitoring and enforcement responsibilities rest with most states. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is charged with overseeing state efforts and has at its disposal formal tools to discipline lax states, tools which are rarely used. In this paper, we explore the extent to which the EPA's now-defunct Clean Air Act Watch List served as an informal tool for influencing the enforcement activities of state regulators. We estimate event studies designed around the primary listing criteria for the Watch List. Our empirical results are consistent with the average state regulator acting to reduce the chances of their facilities appearing on the Watch List. We also examine heterogeneity in the response to the Watch List between two states with high numbers of regulated facilities, Texas and California. We find a larger change in enforcement activity under the Watch List among state and local regulators in Texas compared to California.     

Effects of law enforcement and community outreach on mammal diversity in a biodiversity hotspot

Management activities such as law enforcement and community outreach are thought to affect conservation outcomes in protected areas, but their importance relative to intrinsic environmental characteristics of the parks and extrinsic human pressures surrounding the parks have not been explored. Furthermore, it is not clear which is more related to conservation outcomes—the management itself or local people's perceptions of the management. We measured objective (reports by park staff) and subjective (reports by local people) levels of community outreach and law enforcement based on responses to 374 questionnaires. We estimated mammal abundance and diversity of 6 protected areas based on data from 115 camera traps in Xishuangbanna, southwest China, a biodiversity hotspot with high hunting and land-conversion pressures. We then examined correlations among them and found that local people's perception of law enforcement was positively related to the local abundance of 2 large, hunted species, wild boar (Sus scrofa) (β = 15.22) and muntjac (Muntiacus vaginalis) (β = 14.82), but not related to the abundance of smaller mammals or to objective levels of enforcement. The subjective frequency of outreach by park staff to local communities (β = 3.42) and park size (β = 3.28) were significantly and positively related to mammal species richness, whereas elevation, human population density, and subjective frequency of law enforcement were not. We could not conclude that community outreach and law enforcement were directly causing increased mammal abundance and diversity. Nevertheless, the patterns we detected are some of the first empirical evidence consistent with the idea that biodiversity in protected areas may be more positively and strongly related to local perceptions of the intensity of park management than to either intrinsic (e.g., elevation, park size) or extrinsic (e.g., human population density) environmental factors.     

Optimal environmental policy for waste disposal and recycling when firms are not compliant

We investigate a model that considers disposal and recycling activities after the consumption of products. In the field, the deposit–refund (D–R) policy has been considered as an ideal policy for internalizing disposal costs, which can result in the realization of the first-best policy. However, the possibility of firms' illegal disposal has been neglected. We introduce a monitoring cost to prevent firms from disposing of collected residuals illegally and induce the second-best D–R policy. We find that the relation between the monitoring problem for firms and the price of the recycling market brings about a variation in the optimal level of the refunds (which is typically smaller than the first-best level). Further, we investigate an alternative policy that requires producers to take-back residuals and show how this policy works equivalently to the second-best D–R policy by applying the theory of the tradable rights market.     

Task partitioning, division of labour and nest compartmentalisation collectively isolate hazardous waste in the leafcutting ant Atta cephalotes

We studied the organisation of garbage disposal and management in the leafcutting ant Atta cephalotes. The nest of this species has an internal garbage heap to which waste from the fungus garden is taken. The transport of waste from the fungus gardens to the garbage heaps is an example of task partitioning. Ninety-four percent of the garbage loads transferred from the fungus garden to the garbage heap were transferred indirectly via a caching site just outside the garbage heap entrance. A further 3% were transferred directly from a fungus garden worker to a garbage heap worker, again just outside the heap entrance. Only 3% were taken directly to the garbage heap without task partitioning. This is the first described example of task partitioning in insect societies for work other than foraging and the first example of task partitioning occurring entirely within the nest. Furthermore, there is a strong division of labour between the fungus garden workers and the garbage heap workers, with garbage workers hardly ever leaving the heap. Division of labour is reinforced by aggressive behaviour directed towards workers contaminated with garbage. This pattern of work organisation minimises contact between garbage heap workers, who are probably contaminated with pathogens hazardous to both the ants and their symbiotic fungus, and both fungus garden workers and the fungus garden. Task partitioning, division of labour (reinforced by aggression) and nest compartmentalisation act synergistically to isolate the hazardous garbage heap from the fungus gardens.     

Sustainable design of sanitation system based on material and value flow analysis for urban slum in Indonesia

Material flow analysis (MFA) and value flow analysis (VFA) were applied to the sanitation system in an urban slum in Indonesia. Based on the results of the MFA and VFA, garbage and excreta disposal costs were evaluated to be 0.7% and 1.1%, respectively, of per capita income. Such value flows seem reasonable in light of the recognized affordability to pay (ATP) standard. However, current excreta disposal methods create negative impacts on downstream populations. Because such disadvantages do not go back to disposers, but passed to downstream, the current value flow structure does not motivate individual toilet users to install treatment facility. Based on current material and value flow structures, a resource recycling sanitation system scenario was examined. Based on VFA, an affordable initial cost for such a system was calculated; this was found to be comparable in price to a cheaper composting toilet that is currently available in the market.     

Post-frontier governance up in smoke? Free-for-all frontier imaginations encourage illegal deforestation and appropriation of public lands in the Brazilian Amazon

ABSTRACT

Post-frontier governance in the Brazilian Amazon highlights the interaction of regulatory technologies, institutions and practices to combat illegal deforestation and appropriation of public lands. While the Amazon fires received tremendous media coverage in 2019, the dismantlement of environmental laws and regulatory agencies has supported the rise in deforestation as early as 2012. We discuss the impact of post-frontier governance in Southwest-Pará by analyzing the spatial distribution of deforestation, territorial management, law enforcement, and environmental regularization from 2000 to 2018. The integration of spatial analysis with qualitative field surveys in the blacklisted municipality Novo Progresso shows that deforestation control largely fails, specifically in undesignated public lands. While land tenure security remains the biggest challenge in the region, the persistent imagination of free-for-all frontier spaces encourages the uncontrolled appropriation of and speculation with public lands. Here, the Rural Environmental Registry (CAR) has been identified as a key instrument to secure land claims.     

Changing legislative thinking in China to better protect wild animals and human health

The COVID-19 pandemic has exposed the inadequacy of China's legal protection of wildlife. Long-standing illegal wildlife trade in China and worldwide increases the risk of zoonotic infectious diseases. We sought to improve the understanding of China’ legal system for the protection of wildlife, which has at its core the wildlife protection law, by systematically evaluating the laws and regulations of China's Wildlife Protection Framework. We examined how existing legal documents (e.g., the Wildlife Protection Law 2018) are directly or indirectly related to wildlife conservation. The inherent defects of wildlife protection legislation include a narrow scope of protection, insufficient public participation, and inconsistent enforcement among responsible agencies. Solutions to improve China's Wildlife Protection Law include expanding the legal protection of wildlife, and improving monitoring of wildlife protection. Strengthening legislation will be the basis for effective regulation of the use of wild animals. We advocate the establishment of a sound wildlife protection legal system for resolving conflicts between humans and wild animals and preventing zoonotic disease, such a system will have a profound impact on the sustainable development of China's wildlife resources.     

Assessing the extent and nature of wildlife trade on the dark web

Use of the internet as a trade platform has resulted in a shift in the illegal wildlife trade. Increased scrutiny of illegal wildlife trade has led to concerns that online trade of wildlife will move onto the dark web. To provide a baseline of illegal wildlife trade on the dark web, we downloaded and archived 9852 items (individual posts) from the dark web, then searched these based on a list of 121 keywords associated with illegal online wildlife trade, including 30 keywords associated with illegally traded elephant ivory on the surface web. Results were compared with items known to be illegally traded on the dark web, specifically cannabis, cocaine, and heroin, to compare the extent of the trade. Of these 121 keywords, 4 resulted in hits, of which only one was potentially linked to illegal wildlife trade. This sole case was the sale and discussion of Echinopsis pachanoi (San Pedro cactus), which has hallucinogenic properties. This negligible level of activity related to the illegal trade of wildlife on the dark web relative to the open and increasing trade on the surface web may indicate a lack of successful enforcement against illegal wildlife trade on the surface web.     

Legal ivory trade in a corrupt world and its impact on African elephant populations

Illegal hunting of African elephants (Loxodonta africana) for ivory is causing rapid declines in their populations. Since 2007, illegal ivory trade has more than doubled. African elephants are facing the most serious conservation crisis since 1989, when international trade was banned. One solution proposed is establishment of a controlled legal trade in ivory. High prices for ivory mean that the incentives to obtain large quantities are high, but the quantity of tusks available for trade are biologically constrained. Within that context, effective management of a legal ivory trade would require robust systems to be in place to ensure that ivory from illegally killed elephants cannot be laundered into a legal market. At present, that is not feasible due to corruption among government officials charged with implementing wildlife‐related legislation. With organized criminal enterprises involved along the whole commodity chain, corruption enables the laundering of illegal ivory into legal or potentially legal markets. Poachers and traffickers can rapidly pay their way out of trouble, so the financial incentives to break the law heavily outweigh those of abiding by it. Maintaining reliable permitting systems and leak‐proof chains of custody in this context is challenging, and effective management breaks down. Once illegal ivory has entered the legal trade, it is difficult or impossible for enforcement officers to know what is legal and illegal. Addressing corruption throughout a trade network that permeates countries across the globe will take decades, if it can ever be achieved. That will be too late for wild African elephants at current rates of loss. If we are to conserve remaining wild populations, we must close all markets because, under current levels of corruption, they cannot be controlled in a way that does not provide opportunities for illegal ivory being laundered into legal markets. Comercio Legal de Marfil en un Mundo Corrupto y su Imapacto sobre Poblaciones de Elefantes     

Will unit‐pricing enhance recycling?

Unit pricing is a program in solid waste management that integrates market instruments to encourage households to reduce waste generation and increase recycling. Many studies have shown that unit pricing is effective, especially when the evaluation is based on comparing outcomes before and after implementation. In this paper, we use the so-called difference-in-differences approach to evaluate unit pricing. This approach can provide a less-biased estimation, and can help to examine whether a unit pricing program generates less waste and higher recycling or results in illegal dumping in neighboring regions. Using the fee-per-bag program implemented in Taipei City, Taiwan, as a case study, we found that unit pricing does reduce the amount of garbage but its impact on recycling is not as significant as the current literature suggests. Moreover, the program causes a serious negative externality: more than 60%?of the garbage reduction in the city is due to increased dumping of waste in neighboring regions. As the impact of unit‐pricing on recycling is limited, policy-makers cannot rely solely on this program to enhance recycling in the management of municipal solid waste.     

Conservation Implications of Patterns of Horn Regeneration in Dehorned White Rhinos

The demand for rhino horn has led to drastic declines in numbers of rhinos in Asia and Africa. Although all trade in rhino products has been illegal since the mid-1970s, a lucrative illegal market flourishes and poaching continues. Horn removal from African rhinos has been conducted in Zimbabwe, Namibia, and Swaziland to deter poaching. Regeneration of horns following dehorning has created the potential for a sustainable harvest of rhino horn through dehorning programs. Establishment of a regulated legal market for rhino horn has been suggested to help fund rhino conservation programs in African countries. However, evaluation of an economic harvest of rhino horn from dehorning programs has been limited because few data on rates and form of horn regeneration exist. Because rate of horn regeneration will determine the interval at which rhino horns could be harvested profitably, we measured horn regrowth for two white rhino (Ceratotherium simum) populations studied in Zimbabwe between 1991–1995. Measurements of horn sizes were collected before and after dehorning, and mass to volume relationships were calculated. Von Bertalanffy growth curves were used to model horn size and rates of horn regrowth relative to age. Adult males had larger horn bases (p < 0.001) and faster rates of horn regrowth than adult females. Regenerated horn mass for adult males (>1.3 kg/yr) was almost twice the mass of adult females. Based on an economic model for profit maximization, intervals for dehorning range from 1.16 to 1.51 years and vary with both sex and age. We suggest managers use these values as minimum dehorning intervals to balance profits with longer-term management goals. Rates of horn regeneration are likely to be less important than law enforcement in determining the efficacy of dehorning as a deterrent to rhino poaching.