An experimental analysis of compliance in dynamic emissions markets

Two important design elements for emission trading programs are whether and to what extent firms are able to bank emissions permits, and how these programs are to be enforced. In this paper we present results from laboratory emissions markets designed to investigate enforcement and compliance when these markets allow permit banking. Banking is motivated by a decrease in the aggregate permit supply in the middle of multi-period trading sessions. Consistent with theoretical insights, our experiments suggest that high permit violation penalties have little deterrence value in dynamic emissions markets, and that the main challenge of enforcing these programs is to motivate truthful self-reports of emissions.     

An experimental analysis of compliance in dynamic emissions markets

Two important design elements for emission trading programs are whether and to what extent firms are able to bank emissions permits, and how these programs are to be enforced. In this paper we present results from laboratory emissions markets designed to investigate enforcement and compliance when these markets allow permit banking. Banking is motivated by a decrease in the aggregate permit supply in the middle of multi-period trading sessions. Consistent with theoretical insights, our experiments suggest that high permit violation penalties have little deterrence value in dynamic emissions markets, and that the main challenge of enforcing these programs is to motivate truthful self-reports of emissions.     

Enforcement and price controls in emissions trading

This paper examines how enforcement affects the structure and performance of emissions trading programs with price controls under uncertainty about firms' abatement costs. The analysis highlights how an enforcement strategy can cause abatement-cost risk to be transmitted to enforcement costs via the price of permits. When this occurs, accommodating the effect of abatement-cost risk with an optimal policy results in higher expected emissions and lower expected permit price than their second-best optimal values. However, it is possible to design an enforcement strategy that shields enforcement costs from abatement-cost risk by tying sanctions directly to permit prices. This enforcement strategy stabilizes enforcement effort, the optimal permit supply and price controls are independent of enforcement costs, and the policy produces the second-best optimal outcome.     

Tying enforcement to prices in emissions markets: An experimental evaluation

We present results from laboratory emissions permit markets designed to investigate the transmission of abatement cost risk to firms' compliance behavior and regulatory enforcement strategies. With a fixed expected marginal penalty, abatement cost shocks produced significant violations and emissions volatility as predicted. Tying the monitoring probability to average permit prices effectively eliminated noncompliance, but transmitted abatement cost risk to monitoring effort. Tying the penalty to average prices reduced violations, but did not eliminate them. Some individuals in these treatments sold permits at low prices, presumably in an attempt to weaken enforcement. While tying sanctions directly to prevailing permit prices has theoretical and practical advantages over tying monitoring to prices, our results suggest that tying sanctions to prices may not be as effective as predicted without additional modifications.     

Multiple receptor ambient monitoring and firm compliance with environmental taxes under budget and target driven regulatory missions

We analyze the potential for an environmental monitoring agency under different regulatory missions to use multiple measures of ambient pollution levels to induce firm compliance via endogenously determined probabilistic firm-level inspections of polluting activities. Departing from previous analyses, we consider a framework where the regulator has multiple, rather than a single, measures of ambient pollution in a setting where many firms are subject to a self-reported emissions tax that is not perfectly enforceable. Under a budget-driven mission, we show that a regulator can fruitfully utilize the added information from multiple ambient monitoring receptors to induce improved environmental compliance through the creation of strategic interactions among firms. Additionally, our results provide new evidence on the relative efficiency of budget- vs. target-driven environmental enforcement missions.     

Stochastic pollution, costly sanctions, and optimality of emission permit banking

This paper identifies a new economic motive for pollution regulations that allow polluting firms to bank and borrow emission permits over time. When aggregate pollution is stochastic, an intertemporal permit trading regime can provide firms with efficient incentives for pollution abatement without the need for costly government enforcement actions that would otherwise be required.     

Public Technological Aid to Support Compliance to Environmental Standards

Public aid to encourage the adoption of superior emissions-control technologies is combined with monitoring to achieve a predetermined level of compliance to firm-specific abatement standards. Technological aid serves as an indirect enforcement tool in the sense that its provision reduces the direct enforcement effort necessary to reach the compliance goal. Furthermore, when direct enforcement effort and technological aid are combined to minimize the costs of reaching the compliance goal, more aid should be provided when direct enforcement effort is expensive. As a consequence, regulated firms adopt better control technologies, which, in turn, may serve to promote further innovative activity.     

美国水环境标准及其实施体系述评

从立法和技术角度系统分析了美国水环境标准及其实施的体系。美国水环境标准体系由环境水质标准和废水排放标准构成,制定这两种标准时不是力求完美,而是着重其实用性,考虑其在职能上互为补充;同时在实施中水环境标准也不是孤立起作用,而是依赖法律制度如许可证制度、市场手段如排放权交易等,构成一个完整的水环境标准及其实施体系。这对我国环境标准的制定和实施颇有借鉴作用     

On optimal audit mechanisms for environmental taxes

We consider the auditing problem of an environmental enforcement agency with fixed audit resources: How to decide which firms to audit after having observed the firms' taxable emissions reports. The goal of the agency is to implement the socially efficient emissions level. The audit mechanism is the agency's sole choice variable, while other variables such as the tax rate on emissions and the fine for non-compliance are determined by other governmental actors. The fines and budget of the agency are constrained in such a way that the common random audit mechanism fails to implement socially efficient emissions. Assuming perfect information among the firms, we derive an optimal audit mechanism capable of implementing the socially efficient emissions level. The optimal audit mechanism creates a contest exploiting the strategic interdependencies between the firms, where the probability of winning (not being audited) for each firm depends on costly efforts (their taxable emissions reports).     

Optimal pollution permit endowments in markets with endogenous emissions

In a permit market with endogenous emissions, both firms and citizens purchase permits. Presented here are static and dynamic models of pollution permit markets with endogenous emissions. The optimal permit endowments are characterized when the regulator faces uncertainty about damages and uncertainty about the severity of the citizens’ collective action problem. Due to the possibility of learning over time, the regulator issues a larger number of permits in the first period of the dynamic model than in the static model.     

Modeling the impact of uncertainty in emissions trading markets with bankable permits

The various forms of uncertainty that firms may face in bankable emission permit trading markets will affect firms’ decision making as well as their market performance. This research explores the effect of increased uncertainty over future input costs and output prices on the temporal distribution of emission. In a dynamic programming setting, the permit price is a convex function of stochastic prices of coal and electricity. Increased uncertainty about future market conditions increases the expected permit price and causes a risk neutral firm to reduce ex ante emissions in order to smooth out marginal abatement costs over time. Finally, safety valves, both low-side and high-side, are suggested to reduce the impact of uncertainty in bankable emission trading markets.     

The optimal pricing of pollution when enforcement is costly

We consider the pricing of a uniformly mixed pollutant with a model of optimal, possibly firm-specific, emissions taxes and their enforcement under incomplete information about firms’ abatement costs, enforcement costs, and pollution damage. We argue that optimality requires an enforcement strategy that induces full compliance by every firm, except possibly when a regulator can base the probabilities of detecting individual violations on observable correlates of violators’ actual emissions. Moreover, optimality requires discriminatory taxes, except when a regulator is unable to use observable firm-level characteristics to gain some information about the variation in firms’ abatement costs or monitoring costs.     

A Model of Intertemporal Emission Trading, Banking, and Borrowing

This paper provides a general treatment of emission trading, banking, and borrowing in an intertemporal, continuous-time model. Using optimal-control theory, the decentralized behavior of firms is shown to lead to the least-cost solution attainable under joint-cost minimization. Explicit solutions for the time paths of emissions and permit prices are derived when firms are allowed to both bank and borrow and when firms are only allowed to bank emission permits. The policy implications of emission banking and borrowing are discussed.     

The environment as a factor of production

This paper uses firm-level data about electric utilities to develop an empirical model of how electric utilities use and bank SO₂ pollution permits under the Acid Rain Program. The empirical model considers emissions, fuels, and labor as variable inputs with quasi-fixed stocks of permits and capital. Consequently, substitution possibilities between the environment and other production factors can be measured and tested. The results reveal substantial substitution between emissions, permit stocks, capital, fuel, and labor. The empirical findings also indicate that firms bank permits primarily as a hedge against uncertainty and for other firm-specific reasons. Overall, the results suggest that cap-and-trade approaches can reduce the cost of meeting environmental goals by providing a mechanism for addressing regulatory and market risks and by signaling an appropriate price for factor use, especially irreversible capital investments.     

The environment as a factor of production

This paper uses firm-level data about electric utilities to develop an empirical model of how electric utilities use and bank SO₂ pollution permits under the Acid Rain Program. The empirical model considers emissions, fuels, and labor as variable inputs with quasi-fixed stocks of permits and capital. Consequently, substitution possibilities between the environment and other production factors can be measured and tested. The results reveal substantial substitution between emissions, permit stocks, capital, fuel, and labor. The empirical findings also indicate that firms bank permits primarily as a hedge against uncertainty and for other firm-specific reasons. Overall, the results suggest that cap-and-trade approaches can reduce the cost of meeting environmental goals by providing a mechanism for addressing regulatory and market risks and by signaling an appropriate price for factor use, especially irreversible capital investments.     

Stochastic Pollution, Permits, and Merger Incentives

Pollution permit regulations introduce nonlinearities into the objective function of a polluting firm. We develop a microeconomic model to show the effects these nonlinearities might have upon firm decisions when emissions are stochastic. Under perfect competition the fraction of planned pollution covered by permits is shown to be separable from planned production. We also demonstrate that permit management incentives may motivate a merger of otherwise independent firms. Incentives to petition for “bubble” coverage are also considered. The model is studied under risk neutrality and risk aversion. Imperfectly competitive situations in the output and permit markets are also analyzed.     

Environmental policy à la carte: Letting firms choose their regulation

Under uncertainty, the optimal choice between price and quantity instruments depends on the technology of the regulated firms, which is often private information. We consider an environmental policy that delegates the prices-versus-quantities decision to the firms by offering them the choice between an emissions tax and permit trading. Such an approach is currently used in Swiss climate policy. We provide a detailed characterization of the optimal policy and show that this approach reduces expected social costs compared to a pure tax or permit-trading regime. We demonstrate that an optimal allocation of firms to instruments can be achieved despite substantial informational constraints, and that all firms gain from the introduction of the instrument choice compared to optimally designed single-instrument policies. Furthermore, we discuss the conditions under which this approach is likely to be preferable to a hybrid regulation.     

Emission reduction and profit-neutral permit allocations

The present paper addresses two policy objectives: to implement a market for pollution permits and to make regulation acceptable for businesses. Profit-neutral permit allocations are defined as the number of permits that the regulator should give for free so that post-regulation profits (i.e. a firm's profits in the products market plus the value of the allowances granted for free) are equal to pre-regulation profits. The proposed model is developed by assuming that firms use polluting technologies and compete “à la Cournot”. The paper demonstrates that a low number of free allowances is sufficient to meet these two goals. Moreover, the regulator can fully offset losses, even when the reduction in emissions is high, provided that the sectors concerned are not monopolies, both for isoelastic and linear demand functions.     

On marketable air-pollution permits: The case for a system of pollution offsets

After examining the properties of several alternative forms of marketable permit systems for the control of air pollution, this paper proposes a system of pollution offsets as the most promising approach. Under the pollution-offset scheme, sources of emissions are free to trade emissions permits subject to the constraint of no violations of the predetermined air-quality standard at any receptor point. The paper shows that the pollution-offset system has the capacity to achieve the predetermined standards of air quality at the minimum aggregate abatement cost, while making comparatively modest demands both on the sources and on the administering agency.