The market and shadow value of informal fish catch: a framework and application to Panama

Fisheries catches are known to be widely underreported, and much of their value flows in informal markets. Goods and services that are not directly sold in a market also have a corresponding economic value, here termed ‘shadow value’, which can apply to discarded fish—or those that are consumed but not sold (e.g., subsistence catches). Here, we estimate the monetary value of fisheries catches in Panama that are landed but not reported, or that are discarded at sea; this includes catches from artisanal and industrial fleets, as well as recreational and subsistence fisheries. Based on available data, we estimate that the market and shadow value of unreported catches in Panama in 2010 was around US$92 million, equal to approximately 43% of the total reported landed value. In the case of discarded fish, the shadow value represents the potential but entirely unrealized economic benefit of landing such fish; in the case of unreported landings, unreported market value represents only the first link in the potentially sophisticated informal seafood economy. One must be careful in considering these results for policy. It is possible that, rather than seeking to capture these ‘lost’ benefits, fish that are discarded or unreported should not have been caught at all, for example, if they are juveniles or of threatened species; conversely, unreported subsistence catches are crucial for food security throughout the world. These results help contextualize the scale of unreported fisheries in economic terms, and can inform subsequent policies and strategies to ensure social, ecological, and economic sustainability.     

Animal Rights: Autonomy and Redundancy

Even if animal liberation were to be adopted, would rights for animals be redundant – or even deleterious? Such an objection, most prominently voiced by L. W. Sumner and Paul W. Taylor, is misguided, risks an anthropocentric and anthropomorphic conception of autonomy and freedom, overly agent-centered rights conceptions, and an overlooking of the likely harmful consequences of positing rights for humans but not for nonhuman animals. The objection in question also stems from an overly pessimistic construal of autonomy-infringements thought to result from extending rights to animals, and also, of confusions that supposedly may ensue from ascribing animal rights. Whether or not a case for animal liberation and/or animal rights can cogently be made, the redundancy-or-worse objection to animal rights need pose no barrier.     

A rights foundation for ecological democracy

ABSTRACT

What would it mean to conceptualize some environmental relationships as bundles of rights, rather than as a good as generally defined by liberalism? Environmental rights are a category of human rights necessarily central to both democracy and global environmental protection and governance (ecological democracy). The world of democratic politics and governance since mid-twentieth century has been transformed by a rights revolution in which recognized rights have come to constitute a ‘global normative order.’ There are several policy spaces in which persuasive environmental rights discourses have been emerging from existing or foreseeable congruences of elite and popular environmental norms, including (1) rights involving access to information and decision-making processes; (2) rights ensuring access to food and water; and (3) rights providing environmental security to all. We analyze these three rights discourses and assess their current and necessary future trajectories. We identify next steps in achieving better understanding and more meaningful establishment of environmental rights and their integration into our thinking about human rights, with attention to how they can be reconciled with the social and cultural diversity of democratic environmental governance in coming turbulent times.     

The Five Freedoms of Animal Welfare are Rights

In this paper I defend a theory of welfare rights for nonhuman animals. I do this by demonstrating that a well-established framework for protecting the interests of farm animals, the ‘Five Freedoms of Animal Welfare’, is already functioning just as a set of rights. To support this claim I adopt a common approach to detecting evidence for deontological reasoning and look at the structural features of rights. I first consider Hohfeld’s system of legal rights and consider whether the Five Freedoms may be understood as liberties or claim rights, before making a more successful comparison with side constraints and an interest theory of rights as understood by Nozick and Raz. I also respond to a likely objection that it is not possible to have some welfare rights without a right to freedom from exploitation. The argument therefore contributes to breaking down the stubborn division between ‘animal welfare’ and ‘animal rights’.     

Biofuels: Efficiency,Ethics, and Limits to Human Appropriation of Ecosystem Services

Biofuels have lately been indicated as a promising source of cheap and sustainable energy. In this paper we argue that some important ethical and environmental issues have also to be addressed: (1) the conflict between biofuels production and global food security, particularly in developing countries, and (2) the limits of the Human Appropriation of ecosystem services and Net Primary Productivity. We warn that large scale conversion of crops, grasslands, natural and semi-natural ecosystem, (such as the conversion of grasslands to cellulosic ethanol production, or plantation of sugar cane and palm oil), may have detrimental social and ecological consequences. Social effects may concern: (1) food security, especially in developing countries, leading to an increase of the price of staple food, (2) transnational corporations and big landowners establishing larger and larger landholdings in conflict with indigenous areas and the subsistence of small farmers. Ecological effects may concern: (1) competition with grazing wild and domesticated animals (e.g., millions of grazing livestock in USA prairies), (2) an excessive appropriation of Net Primary Production from ecosystems, (3) threatening biodiversity preservation and soil fertility. We claim that is it well known how ecological and social issues are strictly interwoven and that large scale biofuels production, by putting high pressure on both fronts, may trigger dangerous feedbacks, also considering the critical fact that 9 billion people are expected to inhabit the planet by 2050. There is a need to conduct serious and deep analysis on the environmental and social impact of large scale biofuels production before important energy policies are launched at global level. Biofuels will not represent an energetic panacea and their role in the overall energy consumption will remain marginal in our present highly energivorous society, while their effect on food security and environment preservation may have detrimental results. We should also have the courage to face two key issues: (1) we cannot keep increasing resources consumption at present pace, and have to change our life style accordingly, and (2) we have to deal with population growth; we cannot expect to have 9–10 billions people inhabiting the earth by 2050, without this representing a major impact on its support system.     

Ethical Veganism,Virtue, and Greatness of the Soul

Many moral philosophers have criticized intensive animal farming because it can be harmful to the environment, it causes pain and misery to a large number of animals, and furthermore eating meat and animal-based products can be unhealthful. The issue of industrially farmed animals has become one of the most pressing ethical questions of our time. On the one hand, utilitarians have argued that we should become vegetarians or vegans because the practices of raising animals for food are immoral since they minimize the overall happiness. Deontologists, on the other hand, have argued that the practices of raising animals for food are immoral because animals have certain rights and we have duties toward them. Some virtue ethicists remain unconvinced of deontic and consequentialist arguments against the exploitation of animals and suggest that a virtue-based approach is better equipped to show what is immoral about raising and using animals for food, and what is virtuous about ethical veganism.     

Incorporating the Philosophy of Technology into Animal Welfare Assessment

Changes in attitudes towards how animals are housed in agriculture are currently under question in the public eye—particularly for laying hens. Many arguments from the rights and utilitarian viewpoints have been made for changing environmental conditions and managerial practices for animals in an effort to respect the interests of the animal and better their welfare. Yet, these arguments have been based upon belief systems that were developed from information that can be collected by human perception only. Technological advancements can facilitate animal welfare assessment by providing humans with new information about what the animal perceives. Yet, little has been discussed surrounding the thought process behind which technologies are conceived, how they are developed, and why they are implemented. Here, using the laying hen as a model, we turn to the philosophy of technology to address what role technological advancements may have in our capacity to understand animals, how technology can affect their welfare, and what role technology may play in furthering animal welfare assessment.     

Improving food security in Swaziland: The transition from subsistence to communally managed cash cropping

The Komati Downstream Development Project (KDDP), based upon the Maguga Dam has enabled 6,000 hectares of semi‐arid lowveld, in a region with low and highly variable rainfall to be converted from subsistence to irrigated commercial farming, mainly of sugar cane. This has transformed the Swazi sugar industry from one dominated by a small number of large‐scale commercial estates to one where more than 1,500 previously impoverished small‐scale Swazi farmers have been able to enter the industry by joining farmers’ associations and creating communally managed farms. Recent changes to the EU's Sugar Protocol have undermined the financial viability of the KDDP farms and undermined food security, especially for the poorest, due to the cut in sugar prices. However, some farmers’ associations have opted to keep some of their land as irrigated home gardens, rather than convert all their land to sugar cane. This model has improved food security at a time of low sugar prices and points to a more sustainable way of using water from large scale dams than the conventional model. It is argued that the EU should target support to members of the KDDP who have taken out large‐scale loans to pay for the in‐field infrastructure and encourage all farmers’ associations to adopt the food garden model. This would enable them to continue to benefit from the irrigation through improved production of subsistence crops, whilst they diversify their commercial production into novel markets.     

Discrimination and bias in the vegan ideal

The vegan ideal is entailed by arguments for ethical veganism based on traditional moral theory (rights and/or utilitarianism) extended to animals. The most ideal lifestyle would abjure the use of animals or their products for food since animals suffer and have rights not to be killed. The ideal is discriminatory because the arguments presuppose a male physiological norm that gives a privileged position to adult, middle-class males living in industrialized countries. Women, children, the aged, and others have substantially different nutritional requirements and would bear a greater burden on vegetarian and vegan diets with respect to health and economic risks, than do these males. The poor and many persons in Third World nations live in circumstances that make the obligatory adoption of such diets, where they are not already a matter of sheer necessity, even more risky.Traditional moral theorists (such as Evelyn Pluhar and Gary Varner whose essays appear in this issue) argue that those who are at risk would beexcused from a duty to attain the virtue associated with ethical vegan lifestyles. The routine excuse of nearly everyone in the world besides adult, middle-class males in industrialized countries suggests bias in the perspective from which traditional arguments for animal rights and (utilitarian) animal welfare are formulated.     

Obligations to animals are based on rights

Some feminist philosophers criticize the idea of human rights because, they allege, it encapsulates male bias; it is therefore misguided, in their view, to extend moral rights to non-human animals. I argue that the feminist criticism is misguided. Ideas are not biased in favour of men simply because they originate with men, nor are ideas themselves biased in favour of men because men have used them prejudicially. As for the position that women should abandon theories of rights and embrace an ethic that emphasizes care: women who made this choice would not so much liberate themselves from the patriarchy as they would conform to its representation of women as emotional, subjective and irrational. There is, then, no good reason to withhold ascribing rights to non-human animals, based on the criticisms of rights made by some feminists.Some of the material in the discussion of the feminist critique of rights originally appeared in my The Case for Animal Rights: A Decade's Passing inA Quarter Century of Value Inquiry: Presidential Addresses of the American Society of Value Inquiry, edited by Richard T. Hull, pp. 451–455. Amsterdam and Atlanta, GA: Rodopi, 1994. These passages are reprinted with the permission of the editor and publisher, whose thoughtful co-operation is gratefully acknowledged.     

Institutional reform in the Andean irrigation sector: Enabling policies for strengthening local rights and water management

For centuries, local and indigenous water rights and rules in the Andean region have been largely neglected and discriminated against. The process of undermining local communities’ water access and control rights continues up to today and not only is it headed by powerful local, national and international water‐use actors encroaching local rights — it is also a direct consequence of vertical State law and intervention practices, and the latest privatization policies. Recognition of and security for the diverse and dynamic local rights and management frameworks is crucial for improving rural livelihoods and even national food security in Andean countries. At the request of the Government of Ecuador — in which at that time the indigenous movement had its political participation — a research mission was organized to formulate a proposal for institutional reform, aiming at the strengthening of the national irrigation sector. In this article, some basic mission results are outlined and analyzed within the scope of four concepts (institutional viability, political democracy, equity, and water rights security), and practical elements for institutional reform are suggested, not only for the Ecuadorian irrigation sector but also other settings. The complementary roles of central Government, local governments and water user organizations in water resources management are emphasized as is the need to strengthen enabling legal and policy frameworks. The importance of translating constitutional recognition of local and indigenous rights and common property systems into practical procedures and institutional structures is also stressed.     

Consuming for the Sake of Others: Whose Interests Count on a Market for Animal-Friendly Products?

Many Europeans are concerned about the living conditions of farm animals because they view animals as beings that possess interests of their own. Against this background the introduction of an animal welfare label is being intensively discussed in Europe. In choosing a market-based instrument to take these concerns into account, normative judgments are made about the formation of preferences, the value system that is implicitly assumed, and the distribution of property rights. From the perspective of classical institutional economics it can be shown that the introduction of a label as an institutional change does not redefine institutions in a way that allows them to consider the interests of animals for their own sake. Rather, the label only redefines the property rights that humans have over animals. The market segregation into privileged and normal animals conflicts with the idea of equality between sentient animals. Within the group of humans only the interests of those who act on markets count. The commodification of their moral concerns assumes that people always decide based on their own interests, which can be traded off. The lexicographical ordering of preferences, which occurs when humans view animals as entities with rights, is not compatible with the normative assumptions of markets. Furthermore, interpreting animal suffering as market failure that can be corrected by labeling impedes a reasoned dialog within the society about the values and beliefs that serve as a basis for preference formation. Thus, an animal welfare label cannot replace a fundamental societal debate about legal standards on animal well-being.     

On the moral acceptability of killing animals

According to a rights view it is acceptable to kill animals if they are innocent threats or shields or are in a lifeboat situation. However, according to advocates of such a view, our practices of killing animals for food or scientific research may be morally unacceptable. In this paper we argue that, even if we grant the basic assumptions of a rights view, a good deal of killing of animals for food and scientific research continues to be morally acceptable.     

Beyond “Second Animals”: Making Sense of Plant Ethics

Concern for what we do to plants is pivotal for the field of environmental ethics but has scarcely been voiced. This paper examines how plant ethics first emerged from the development of plant science and yet also hit theoretical barriers in that domain. It elaborates on a case study prompted by a legal article on “the dignity of creatures” in the Swiss Constitution. Interestingly, the issue of plant dignity was interpreted as a personification or rather an “animalization of plants.” This sense of irony makes sense when one realizes that on scientific grounds the plant is a “second animal,” i.e., it differs from the animal in degree of life or some ethically-relevant criterion but not in nature. From the point of view of ethics however, plants should be defended for what they are by nature and not by comparison to external references: the ethical standing of plants cannot be indexed to animals. It is thus reckoned that to circumvent this odd fetishism, the plant ethics can only be adequately addressed by changing the theory of plant science. Common sense tells us this: plants and animals belong to radically different fields of perception and experience, a difference that is commonly captured by the notion of kingdom. In this paper we remind the ethical conversation that plants are actually incommensurable with animals because they are unsplit beings (having neither inside nor outside), i.e., they live as “non-topos” in an undivided, unlimited, non-centered state of being. It is concluded that the unique ontology of plants can only be addressed through a major change from object-thinking to process-thinking and a move from ego-centric to “peri-ego” ethics.     

Vegetarianism, Sentimental or Ethical?

In this paper, I provide some evidence for the view that a common charge against those who adopt vegetarianism is that they would be sentimental. I argue that this charge is pressed frequently by those who adopt moral absolutism, a position that I reject, before exploring the question if vegetarianism might make sense. I discuss three concerns that might motivate those who adopt vegetarian diets, including a concern with the human health and environmental costs of some alternative diets, a concern about inflicting pain on animals, and a concern with the killing of animals. While I argue that vegetarianism does not make sense in some situations, I hope that this paper shows that there are many good reasons why the adoption of vegetarian, and—even more so—vegan diets might be appropriate in some situations. In carving out this position, I focus primarily on the question whether a morally relevant distinction between the killing of plants and the killing of animals should be made. I engage primarily with the views of two of the most prominent authors on this issue, arguing that neither Peter Singer nor Tom Regan provide a satisfactory account on the ethics of killing nonhuman organisms. Two views are challenged in particular, the view that relatively simple animals such as molluscs, as well as plants, lack awareness, and the view that animals without a preference to continue living stand to lose little or nothing by being killed. I provide some evidence to support the claim that many share my view that it is more problematic to kill animals than to kill plants, before analyzing why some suppress the negative feelings they associate with killing animals. By exploring these issues I hope to shed some light on the issue of whether the feelings of those who adopt vegetarianism are sentimental or make sense, and to stimulate reflection amongst those with an interest in food ethics.     

A Critique of FAWC’s Five Freedoms as a Framework for the Analysis of Animal Welfare

The Brambell Report of 1965 recommended that animals should have the freedom to stand up, lie down, turn around, groom themselves and stretch their limbs. The Farm Animal Welfare Council (FAWC) developed these into the Five Freedoms, which are a framework for the analysis of animal welfare. The Five Freedoms are well known in farming, policy making and academic circles. They form the basis of much animal welfare legislation, codes of recommendations and farm animal welfare accreditation schemes, and are the foundation of the Welfare Quality^® assessment scheme. The Five Freedoms are also extensively employed for the education of veterinary and animal welfare science students. Hence they have proven to be of great practical utility. In this paper, the Five Freedoms framework is examined in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions for the analysis of animal welfare. Overall, the Five Freedoms are judged to be individually necessary and jointly sufficient as a framework for the analysis of animal welfare. FAWC has recently criticized the Five Freedoms for concentrating on negative aspects of welfare. However, it is shown here how the satisfaction of the Five Freedoms should lead to good welfare, from the animal’s point of view. The Five Freedoms are formulated as ideals of animal welfare. This has significant advantages that have likely contributed to their impact. However, the ideality of the Five Freedoms means that the framework is without power to determine what a satisfactory level of animal welfare is, in an ethical sense.     

Deep Ethology, Animal Rights, and the Great Ape/Animal Project: Resisting Speciesism and Expanding the Community of Equals

In this essay I argue that the evolutionary and comparative study of nonhuman animal (hereafter animal) cognition in a wide range of taxa by cognitive ethologists can readily inform discussions about animal protection and animal rights. However, while it is clear that there is a link between animal cognitive abilities and animal pain and suffering, I agree with Jeremy Bentham who claimed long ago the real question does not deal with whether individuals can think or reason but rather with whether or not individuals can suffer. One of my major goals will be to make the case that the time has come to expand. The Great Ape Project (GAP) to The Great Ape/Animal Project (GA/AP) and to take seriously the moral status and rights of all animals by presupposing that all individuals should be admitted into the Community of Equals. I also argue that individuals count and that it is essential to avoid being speciesist cognitivists; it really doesn't matter whether ‘dogs ape’ or whether ‘apes dog’ when taking into account the worlds of different individual animals. Narrow-minded primatocentrism and speciesism must be resisted in our studies of animal cognition and animal protection and rights. Line-drawing into ‘lower’ and ‘higher’ species is a misleading speciesist practice that should be vigorously resisted because not only is line-drawing bad biology but also because it can have disastrous consequences for how animals are viewed and treated. Speciesist line-drawing also ignores within species individual differences. This revised version was published online in July 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Incorporating Indigenous Rights and Environmental Justice into Fishery Management: Comparing Policy Challenges and Potentials from Alaska and Hawaiʻi

Colonial processes including the dispossession of indigenous lands and resources and the development of Western management institutions to govern the use of culturally important fish resources have served in many ways to marginalize indigenous interests within the United States fisheries. In recent years, several US fishery institutions have begun to develop policies that can confront this colonial legacy by better accommodating indigenous perspectives and rights in fishery management practices. This paper analyzes two such policies: the 2005 community quota entity program in Alaska which permits rural communities (predominantly Alaska Native villages) to purchase and lease commercial halibut fishing privileges and the 1994 State of Hawai?i community-based subsistence fishing area (CBSFA) legislation through which Native Hawaiian communities can designate marine space near their community as CBSFAs and collaborate with the state of Hawai?i to manage those areas according to traditional Hawaiian practices. The analysis reveals a striking similarity between the trajectories of these two policies. While they both offered significant potential for incorporating indigenous rights and environmental justice into state or federal fishery management, they have so far largely failed to do so. Environmental managers can gain insights from the challenges and potentials of these two policies. In order to introduce meaningful change, environmental policies that incorporate indigenous rights and environmental justice require a commitment of financial and institutional support from natural resource agencies, a commitment from indigenous groups and communities to organize and develop capacity, and careful consideration of contextual and cultural factors in the design of the policy framework.     

Utilitarian killing,replacement, and rights

The ethical theory underlying much of our treatment of animals in agriculture and research is the moral agency view. It is assumed that only moral agents, or persons, are worthy of maximal moral significance, and that farm and laboratory animals are not moral agents. However, this view also excludes human non-persons from the moral community. Utilitarianism, which bids us maximize the amount of good (utility) in the world, is an alternative ethical theory. Although it has many merits, including impartiality and the extension of moral concern to all sentient beings, it also appears to have many morally unacceptable implications. In particular, it appears to sanction the killing of innocents when utility would be maximized, including cases in which we would deliberately kill and replace a being, as we typically do to animals on farms and in laboratories. I consider a number of ingenious recent attempts by utilitarians to defeat the killing and replaceability arguments, including the attempt to make a place for genuine moral rights within a utilitarian framework. I conclude that utilitarians cannot escape the killing and replaceability objections. Those who reject the restrictive moral agency view and find they cannot accept utilitarianism's unsavory implications must look to a different ethical theory to guide their treatment of humans and non-humans.     

Vegetarian Meat: Could Technology Save Animals and Satisfy Meat Eaters?

Between people who unabashedly support eating meat and those who adopt moral vegetarianism, lie a number of people who are uncomfortably carnivorous and vaguely wish they could be vegetarians. Opposing animal suffering in principle, they can ignore it in practice, relying on the visual disconnect between supermarket meat and slaughterhouse practices not to trigger their moral emotions. But what if we could have the best of both worlds in reality—eat meat and not harm animals? The nascent biotechnology of tissue culture, originally researched for medical applications, holds out just such a promise. Meat could be grown in vitro without killing animals. In fact, this technology may not just be an intriguing option, but might be our moral obligation to develop.