Climate adaptation in fragmented governance settings: the consequences of reform in public administration

The impact of dominant trends in public administration, such as decentralisation and privatisation on complex collective challenges is insufficiently understood. This is relevant in settings where climate change impacts become manifest at local level, and where financing power resides at national level but decisions are made more locally in a fragmented institutional setting. This study assists in overcoming this gap by analysing how the institutional context (i.e. a decentralised, privatised, fragmented setting) influences the capacity to address climate change challenges in a vulnerable area (the South Devon coast in the UK). There has been little action to address expected climate change impacts in this vulnerable stretch of coast. A lack of clarity around responsibility for addressing climate impacts and a lack of a deliberative structure between various actors involved, within a context of austerity, hamper climate change adaptation. The findings question whether decentralised decision making is sufficient for addressing climate adaptation challenges.     

Trust,political orientation,and environmental behavior

A growing body of large-N cross-national studies has identified key predictors of environmental behavior. Adopting a social dilemma perspective, where individuals must choose collective over self-interest to act pro-environmentally, integrated national datasets for 30 countries are used to examine the effects of generalized trust, trust in government, leftism, and post-materialism on three types of environmental behavior (intended action, informal action, and formal action). At the individual level, all predictors but institutional trust have significant positive effects on each type of behavior. Institutional trust is associated with greater willingness to make economic sacrifice for the environment and with less frequent informal environmental behavior, but it is unrelated to formal behavior. However, at the country level, the effect of trust is limited to intended behavior and depends on the type of trust. Individuals in countries with higher generalized trust averages are less willing to sacrifice for the environment, and those in countries with higher averages of institutional trust are more willing to do so.     

The environmental state at sea

Seas and oceans are confronted with a plethora of environmental problems, caused by land-based activities (agriculture, industries, and ports) and by maritime activities (such as shipping, fishing, oil and gas drilling, tourism, and navigational dredging). Environmental problems at sea challenge the efficacy of state sovereignty. Who is responsible, accountable, and regulates environmental and spatial problems at the level of regional seas, and what is the role of states in these processes of governance? In the regional seas and on the high seas, the environmental state is challenged by two developments: states become players at different levels, and states are confronted with the activities of big market players where they have no or little jurisdiction. The different forms of the environmental state in Europe’s regional seas and in the Arctic Ocean are examined.     

The Tea Party versus Agenda 21: local groups and sustainability policies in U.S. cities

As local governments have moved toward adopting sustainability policies, there have been some cases where local Tea Parties have emerged as aggressive and strident opponents of such changes. Looking broadly at the Tea Party movement across the United States and systematically measuring its influence in urban America, we assess each Tea Party chapter’s capacity – its ability to convert resources into meaningful political advocacy. Data is derived from surveys of political elites in 50 cities as well as from determining the level of sustainability programming in each of these same cities. Evidence demonstrates that the Tea Party has not had a significant impact on city policymaking in the area of sustainability. Rather, the typical Tea Party chapter appears to be at best a modest presence in local politics.     

The states of public opinion on the environment

State-level public opinion on the environment within the US is examined, using data from the General Social Survey (GSS) from 2000 to 2010. A Multilevel Regression and Post-Stratification (MRP) approach is taken to estimate three different survey items on environmental issues at the US state level. This allows for a comparable understanding of state-level public opinion on environmental issues, which is then connected to economic, environmental, and political conditions, and representation in policy making. The findings indicate the MRP technique is a sophisticated way to make accurate estimations of state-level public opinion, and those estimates provide further insight into the shaping of public opinion and public policy.     

Leadership and lesson-drawing in the European Union’s multilevel climate governance system

ABSTRACT

The important role that climate leaders and leadership play at different levels of the European Union (EU) multilevel governance system is exemplified. Initially, climate leader states set the pace with ambitious policy measures that were adopted largely on an ad hoc basis. Since the mid-1980s, the EU has developed a multilevel climate governance system that has facilitated leadership and lesson-drawing at all governance levels including the local level. The EU has become a global climate policy leader by example although it had been set up as a ‘leaderless Europe’. The resulting ‘leadership without leader’ paradox cannot be sufficiently explained merely by reference to top-level EU climate policies. Local-level climate innovations and lesson-drawing have increasingly been encouraged by the EU’s multilevel climate governance system which has become more polycentric. The recognition of economic co-benefits of climate policy measures has helped to further the EU’s climate leadership role.     

The greening of Christianity? A study of environmental attitudes over time

In contradistinction to the ideas of Lynn White and others who have long suggested that the Judeo-Christian tradition fosters a ‘dominion over nature’ ethos, a number of scholars have recently argued that there has been a ‘greening of Christianity’. Largely missing from this debate is strong evidence at the individual level as to whether Christians have in fact adopted deeper environmental concerns over time. This study provides such evidence through an examination of longitudinal data from Gallup’s annual surveys on the environment. The analysis reveals little evidence that Christians have expressed more environmental concern over time. In fact, across many measures, Christians tend to show less concern about the environment. This pattern holds across Catholic, Protestant and other Christian denominations and for differing levels of religiosity. These findings support a conclusion that there has not been a discernible ‘greening of Christianity’ among the American public.     

From revelation to revolution: apocalypticism in green politics

Apocalyptic narratives in green politics have provoked much controversy about questions of rhetoric and framing. Critics argue that constant warnings about impending environmental collapse demoralise and demobilise the public, while advocates argue that dire predictions embody a realism necessary if the radical collective action required for a green transition is to be taken. This is not just a debate about the tactics of presentation; at a substantive ideological level, the multilayered questions raised by apocalypticism cut to the heart of significant divisions in the green movement between radical and mainstream currents concerning their orientation to structures of political and economic power. Comparisons with the contested historical tradition of apocalyptics in Christian theology shed light upon the dynamic tensions between movement insurgency and institutionalisation. Apocalypticism has played a key role in framing the green critique of capitalist modernity and is intrinsically connected to the formulation of utopic alternatives. In both theory and practice, it remains the animating spirit of radical environmentalism.     

Environmental public opinion in U.S. states, 1973–2012

Partisan polarization of public opinion is a major trend in American environmental politics. While the national pattern is widely recognized, scholars know much less about the polarization of public opinion over time at the state level. This lack of knowledge is unfortunate because geographic variation in the polarization of opinion is essential for explaining the origins of partisan polarization and evaluating its consequences for policy. To fill the gap, the multilevel regression and poststratification technique is applied to provide credible estimates of state-level environmental public opinion for both Democrats and Republicans, 1973–2012. It appears that the growing partisan gap reflects increased pro-environmental opinion among Democrats across many states, whereas Republican state-level public opinion is converging toward a much lower baseline. Cross-state variation among both parties has decreased over time, contributing to greater partisan polarization in the aggregate. Changes in the sorting of voters in and out of political parties cannot explain these patterns of polarization.     

Public opinion on climate change: Is there an economy–environment tradeoff?

Does the state of the economy condition public concern for the environment? Scholars have long argued that environmental preferences decline during economic downturns as individuals prioritize short-term economic needs over longer-term environmental concerns. Yet, this assumption has rarely been subjected to rigorous empirical scrutiny at the individual level. The presumed link between economic and environmental preferences is revisited, using the first individual-level opinion panel (n = 1043) of US climate attitudes, incorporating both self-reported and objective economic data. In contrast with prior studies that emphasize the role of economic downturns in driving environmental preference shifts, using a stronger identification strategy, there is little evidence that changes in either individual economic fortunes or local economic conditions are associated with decreased belief that climate change is happening or reduced prioritization of climate policy action. Instead, the evidence suggests that climate belief declines are associated with shifting political cues. These findings have important implications for understanding the dynamics of political conflict over environmental policy globally.     

Regulation of non-point source pollution under n-firm Bertrand competition

Environmental Economics and Policy Studies - This study demonstrates the conditions under which an increase in the ambient charge positively or negatively affects the total level of non-point...     

Optimizing contract allocation for risky conservation tenders

In the face of a shrinking budget for environmental activities, conservation agencies must design and implement agri-environmental policies that cost-effectively meet the environmental objectives. However, designing such programs is often challenging due to different uncertainties. For example, landholders may be exposed to risks when carrying out conservation projects. To minimise the negative impact of unexpected losses, landholders may require additional financial incentives as compensation for undertaking “risky” conservation projects. In such situations, the conservation agency risks over-spending public funds because of prohibitively high opportunity costs from landholders or failing to meet the environmental target. We used analytical and simulation approaches to explore optimal budget allocation in a target-constrained conservation tender. We also compared the performance of the tender with and without own-cost uncertainty. Results showed that as landholders’ own-cost uncertainty rises, the conservation agency is forced to allocate more funding to secure the same level of the environmental target. We found that the optimal funding level is sensitive to landholders’ competition uncertainty and the magnitude of expected losses.

     

Climate citizenship in the European union: environmental citizenship as an analytical concept

The concept of environmental citizenship is employed as an analytical tool to determine what kind of climate citizenship(s) the citizen-directed material in the European Commission’s climate change campaign is constructing. The research material is read, analysed and interpreted through elements attached to environmental citizenship: the realm of activity, political space, depth of activity, level of activity, citizen virtues, citizen rights and responsibilities and conception of the environment. The results suggest that climate citizenship is considered mainly as a private sphere activity performed by individuals and consists mainly in small adjustments in daily life. Climate citizens are motivated to everyday-life mitigation by personal benefit, greenhouse gas emissions and preserving natural resources.     

Do global climate summits influence public awareness and policy preferences concerning climate change?

A survey-embedded experiment implemented around the time of the 2014 annual Conference of the Parties (COP) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (N ≈ 1200) examined whether such summits are able to increase citizens’ awareness of climate problems. This study finds that exposure to positive or negative cues about the COP increases climate change awareness, particularly among participants who start out with a low level of awareness. Neither positive nor negative cues about the COP significantly affect people’s policy preferences. Our finding resonates with Bernard Cohen’s observation that the mass media may not often be successful in telling people what to think, but they are successful in telling readers what to think about.     

The varying effects of left–right ideology on support for the environment: Evidence from a Swedish survey experiment

Years of research show that left-leaning individuals are more supportive of environmental policies than right-leaning individuals. The explanation for the lower level of support among right-leaning individuals is their stronger preference for economic growth and lower acceptance of intervention in markets. However, recent cross-national studies have questioned whether the effect of ideology on environmental support is universal. A Swedish survey experiment shows that the effect of ideology varies greatly depending on how individuals think about the environment. Specifically, it demonstrates that if environmental support is contrasted with economic growth, then the effect of ideology is stronger as opposed to when environmental support is not juxtaposed with economic growth. Furthermore, among people who strongly perceive the environment as a left–right issue, there is a larger divide between left and right.     

The limits of democracy in tackling climate change

Previous research has shown that democracies exhibit stronger commitments to mitigate climate change and, generally, emit less carbon dioxide than non-democratic regimes. However, there remains much unexplained variation in how democratic regimes perform in this regard. Here it is argued that the benefits of democracy for climate change mitigation are limited in the presence of widespread corruption that reduces the capacity of democratic governments to reach climate targets and reduce CO₂ emissions. Using a sample of 144 countries over 1970–2011, the previously established relationship between the amount of countries’ CO₂ emissions and their level of democracy is revisited. It is empirically tested whether this relationship is instead moderated by the levels of corruption. The results indicate that more democracy is only associated with lower CO₂ emissions in low-corruption contexts. If corruption is high, democracies do not seem to do better than authoritarian regimes.     

Elite cues,media coverage,and public concern: an integrated path analysis of public opinion on climate change, 2001–2013

To analyze the factors affecting US public concern about the threat of climate change between January 2002 and December 2013, data from 74 separate surveys are used to construct quarterly measures of public concern over global climate change. Five factors should account for changes in levels of concern: extreme weather events, public access to accurate scientific information, media coverage, elite cues, and movement/countermovement advocacy. Structural equation modeling indicates that elite cues, movement advocacy efforts, weather, and structural economic factors influence the level of public concern about climate change. While media coverage exerts an important influence, it is itself largely a function of elite cues and economic factors. Promulgation to the public of scientific information on climate change has no effect. Information-based science advocacy has had only a minor effect on public concern, while political mobilization by elites and advocacy groups is critical in influencing climate change concern.     

The rapid reproducers paradox: population control and individual procreative rights

This article argues that population policies need to be evaluated from macro and micro perspectives and to consider individual rights. Ecological arguments that are stringent conditions of liberal democracy are assessed against a moral standard. The moral standard is applied to a series of reasons for limiting procreative rights in the cause of sustainability. The focus is directly on legally enforced antinatalist measures and not on indirect policies with incentives and disincentives. The explicit assumption is that population policy violates the fairness to individuals for societal gain and that population policies are incompatible with stringent conditions of liberal democracy. The author identifies the individual-societal tradeoff as the "rapid reproducers paradox." The perfect sustainable population level is either not possible or is a repugnant alternative. 12 ecological arguments are presented, and none are found compatible with notions of a liberal democracy. Three alternative antinatalist options are the acceptance of less rigid and still coercive policies, amendments to the conception of liberal democracy, or loss of hope and choice of noncoercive solutions to sustainability, none of which is found viable. If voluntary abstinence and distributive solutions fail, then frugal demand options and technological supply options both will be necessary.     

Greening the Congressional record: environmental social movements and expertise-based access to the policy process

ABSTRACT

A new dataset of organizational testimony at U.S. Congressional hearings on environmental protection is used to examine how social movement organizations use issue expertise to gain access to the policy process. Environmental movement organizations (EMOs) are shown to testify in greater numbers at hearings that consider proposed legislation, compared to hearings that are exploratory or investigatory in nature. The increased representation at legislative hearings is unique to EMOs; other kinds of organizations do not obtain similar increases in legislative access. These findings suggest that, due to their scientific expertise and perceived legitimacy, EMOs receive privileged access to the policy process relative to other organizations affected by environmental policy and at a later stage than has been proposed by prior work examining social movement access to the policy process.     

Sleepwalking into lock-in? Avoiding wrongs to future people in the governance of solar radiation management research

ABSTRACT

Arguments are advanced for two ways in which we can avoid the reckless endangerment of future people in the governance of solar radiation management (SRM) research, which could happen through lock-in to SRM deployment from research. SRM research is at an early stage, one at which the mechanisms of lock-in could start to operate. However, lock-in fit to endanger future people could be slowed or stopped through targeted governance. Governance of SRM research that does not include provisions to detect, slow, or stop lock-in fails the test of an intergenerationally adequate precautionary principle, and research governed without these provisions cannot itself be justified as a precaution against the impacts of climate change.