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1.
To determine whether fish welfare matters morally, we need to know what characteristics or capacities beings need to have in order to be morally considerable, and whether fish have such characteristics. In this paper I discuss a group of theories, Kantian practical reasoning theories, in which agency (or practical rationality) is traditionally thought to be a necessary condition for moral considerability. An individual must have quite sophisticated capacities to be a (moral) agent in such theories: she must be able to act on rational principles. It seems unlikely that nonhuman animals such as fish have such capacities. I argue, however, that on the basis of certain Kantian arguments, moral agents have reason to accept duties to nonrational animals if they are agents in a much less demanding sense: if they are motivated to pursue the objects of their desires. If fish have this capacity, their welfare matters morally. 相似文献
2.
Dunja Jaber 《Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics》2000,13(1-2):29-42
In their report for the Swiss government on the notion of the dignity of creatures, Philipp Balzer, Klaus-Peter Rippe, and
Peter Schaber analyze the relationship between human dignity and the dignity of creatures, taking them as two categorically
different concepts. Human dignity is defined as the “moral right not to be humiliated,” whereas the dignity of creatures is
taken to be “the inherent value of non-human living beings.” To my mind there is no need to draw a categorical distinction
between the two concepts. Both notions could be brought together under an all-encompassing concept of the inherent value of
living beings, humans and non-humans alike, a concept one could name “the dignity of living beings.” Indeed, this very notion
underlies the position taken in the report, although this is not made explicit by the authors themselves.
As the aim of the paper is only to clarify the concepts used, I do not go beyond this “internal” critique of their position,
i.e., I don’t assess how the claims articulated via these concepts — the claim that humans and/or creatures have an inherent
value consisting in a supposed intrinsic good — are to be justified, although I myself would be rather skeptical that this
might be successfully done. 相似文献
3.
Robert Heeger 《Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics》2000,13(1-2):43-51
The Swiss expert report suggests that the inherent dignity of a living being be identified with its inherent value. But the
phrase “inherent value of a living being” seems to connote two concepts of inherent value. One has a morally obligating character
but is counterintuitive because of its egalitarianism. The other is one of non-moral value. It is more compatible with considered
intuitions but insufficient for substantiating the expert report’s claim that human beings have moral duties towards animals
and plants. The paper discusses these concepts. Consideration is then given to the problem of how discursive support can be
generated for the expert report’s claim that human beings have the moral duty to abstain from impairing those functions and
abilities of a non-human being that members of its species as a rule can practice. 相似文献
4.
Animal production, especially pork production, is facing growing international criticism. The greatest concerns relate to
the environment, the animals’ living conditions, and the occupational diseases. But human and animal conditions are rarely
considered together. Yet the living conditions at work and the emotional bond that inevitably forms bring the farm workers
and the animals to live very close, which leads to shared suffering. Suffering does spread from animals to human beings and
can cause workers physical, mental, and also moral suffering, which is all the more harmful due to the fact that it is concealed.
The conceptual tools used to conceal suffering (“animal welfare,” stress, pain) suggest that the industrial system can be
improved, whereas for farmers it is by definition incompatible with animal husbandry. 相似文献
5.
Oscar Horta 《Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics》2010,23(3):243-266
In spite of the considerable literature nowadays existing on the issue of the moral exclusion of nonhuman animals, there is
still work to be done concerning the characterization of the conceptual framework with which this question can be appraised.
This paper intends to tackle this task. It starts by defining speciesism as the unjustified disadvantageous consideration
or treatment of those who are not classified as belonging to a certain species. It then clarifies some common misunderstandings
concerning what this means. Next, it rejects the idea that there are different kinds of speciesism. Such an idea may result
from confusion because there are (1) different ways in which speciesism can be defended; and (2) different speciesist positions,
that is, different positions that assume speciesism among their premises. Depending on whether or not these views assume other
criteria for moral consideration apart from speciesism, they can be combined or simple speciesist positions. But speciesism
remains in all cases the same idea. Finally, the paper examines the concept of anthropocentrism, the disadvantageous treatment
or consideration of those who are not members of the human species. This notion must be conceptually distinguished from speciesism
and from misothery (aversion to nonhuman animals). Anthropocentrism is shown to be refuted because it either commits a petitio principia fallacy or it falls prey to two arguments: the argument from species overlap (widely but misleadingly known as “argument
from marginal cases”) and the argument from relevance. This rebuttal identifies anthropocentrism as a speciesist view. 相似文献
6.
Few moral arguments have been made against vegetarian diets. One exception is the “Logic of the Larder:” We do animals a favor
by purchasing their meat, eggs, and milk, for if we did not purchase these products, fewer animals would exist. This argument
fails because many farm animals have lives that are probably not worth living, while others prevent a significant number of
wild animals from existing. Even if this were not so, the purchase of animal products uses resources that could otherwise
be used to bring a much greater number of animals into existence. 相似文献
7.
Clemens Driessen 《Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics》2012,25(2):163-179
A plethora of ethical issues in livestock agriculture has emerged to public attention in recent decades, of which environmental
and animal welfare concerns are but two, albeit prominent, themes. For livestock agriculture to be considered sustainable,
somehow these interconnected themes need to be addressed. Ethical debate on these issues has been extensive, but mostly started
from and focused on single issues. The views of farmers in these debates have been largely absent, or merely figured as interests,
instead of being considered morally worthwhile themselves. In this paper the relevance for ethical debates of the ways farmers
discuss and engage with moral concerns is explored. The variety of norms that figure in contemporary farming practices is
sketched in its multifarious complexity, illustrated by ethnographic fieldwork, and systematized in terms of “orders of worth.”
Reviewing the practical arguments and commitments of farmers within this framework reveals that farming practices are subject
to mixed motives, in which an amalgam of types of concerns play a role. Recognition of the peculiarly entangled nature of
the ethics of farming practices could counter the tendency in policy making, technological innovation, and ethical thought
to compartmentalize our moral landscape. Understanding farming practice as the integration of a mosaic of concerns in the
light of a variety of moral experiences would foster public appreciation of positions of farmers in debates on improving the
sustainability and societal acceptability of livestock agriculture. 相似文献
8.
Anne Algers Berner Lindström Edmond A. Pajor 《Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics》2011,24(4):367-379
Farm animal welfare is a knowledge domain that can be regarded as a model for new ways of organizing learning and making higher
education more responsive to the needs of society. Global concern for animal welfare has resulted in a great demand for knowledge.
As a complement to traditional education in farm animal welfare, higher education can be more demand driven and look at a
broad range of methods to make knowledge available. The result of an inventory on “farm animal welfare,” “e-learning,” “learning
resources,” and “open educational resources” in three different search engines is presented. A huge amount of information
on animal welfare is available on the Internet but many of the providers lock in the knowledge in a traditional course context.
Only a few universities develop and disseminate open learning resources within the subject. Higher education institutions
are encouraged to develop open educational resources in animal welfare for the benefit of teachers, students, society, and,
indirectly, animal welfare. 相似文献
9.
Jennifer Welchman 《Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics》2007,20(4):353-363
Norton argues on pragmatic “Deweyan” grounds that we should cease to ask scientists for value neutral definitions of “sustainability,”
developed independently of moral and social values, to guide our environmental policy making debates. “Sustainability,” like
human “health,” is a normative concept from the start—one that cannot be meaningfully developed by scientists or economists
without input by all the stake holders affected. While I endorse Norton’s approach, I question his apparent presumption that
concern for sustainability for the future is at odds with and ought to trump concern for enhancement in the present of public opportunities to access the goods nature represents. I argue that the two are not separable in practice.
I argue for Passmore’s position that unless we take care to enhance equitable access to the good and services nature represents
in the present, we cannot succeed in promoting sustainability for future generations. 相似文献
10.
The Concept of Farm Animal Welfare: Citizen Perceptions and Stakeholder Opinion in Flanders, Belgium
Filiep Vanhonacker Wim Verbeke Els Van Poucke Zuzanna Pieniak Griet Nijs Frank Tuyttens 《Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics》2012,25(1):79-101
Several attempts to conceptualize farm animal welfare have been criticized for diverging reasons, among them often the failure
to incorporate the public concern and opinion. This paper’s objective is to develop a conception of farm animal welfare that
starts from the public’s perception and integrates the opinion of different stakeholder representatives, thus following a
fork-to-farm approach. Four qualitative citizen focus group discussions were used to develop a quantitative questionnaire,
which has been completed by a representative sample of Flemish citizens (n = 459). Exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses were applied to develop a conception of farm animal welfare starting
from an extended list of aspects that relate to animal production and associate with farm animal welfare in the public’s perception.
In depth interviews with stakeholder representatives were used to match and adapt the structure of the animal welfare conception
model. The resulting conception revealed seven dimensions grouped in two different levels. Three dimensions were animal-based:
“Suffering and Stress,” “Ability to Engage in Natural Behavior,” and “Animal Health.” Four dimensions were resource-based:
“Housing and Barn climate,” “Transport and Slaughter,” “Feed and Water,” and “Human-Animal Relationship.” This conception
is distinct from earlier attempts since it is based on public perceptions; it addresses the opinion of different stakeholders,
and it distinguishes empirically between animal-based and resource-based dimensions in the conceptualization of farm animal
welfare. The relevancy of a popular definition is supported by the present demand oriented economy, in which animal welfare
is a non-trade concern, and mainly left to the market where consumers still mainly act as individuals who calculate and weigh
pros and cons. 相似文献
11.
Philipp Balzer Klaus Peter Rippe Peter Schaber 《Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics》2000,13(1-2):7-27
The 1992 incorporation of an article by referendum in the Swiss Constitution mandating that the federal government issue regulations
on the use of genetic material that take into account the dignity of nonhuman organism raises philosophical questions about
how we should understand what is meant by “the dignity of nonhuman animals,” and about what sort of moral demands arise from
recognizing this dignity with respect to their genetic engineering. The first step in determining what is meant is to clarify
the difference between dignity when applied to humans and when applied to nonhumans. Several conceptions of human dignity
should be rejected in favor of a fourth conception: the right not to be degraded. This right implies that those who have it
have the cognitive capacities that are prerequisite for self-respect. In the case of nonhuman organisms that lack this capacity,
respecting their dignity requires the recognition that their inherent value, which is tied to their abilities to pursue their
own good, be respected. This value is not absolute, as it is in the case of humans, so it does not prohibit breeding manipulations
that make organisms more useful to humans. But it does restrict morally how sentient animals can be used. In regard to genetic
engineering, this conception requires that animals be allowed the uninhibited development of species specific functions, a
position shared by Holland and Attfield, as opposed to the Original Purpose conception proposed by Fox and the Integrity of
the Genetic Make-up position proposed by Rolston. The inherent value conception of dignity, as here defended, is what is meant
in the Swiss Constitution article.
This paper is a slightly revised version of a paper that had been published in German in 1998 (“Menschenwürde vs. Würde der
Kreatur,” Freiburg i.Br.). 相似文献
12.
Evelyn Pluhar 《Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics》1988,1(1):59-68
It is commonly believed that we humans are justified in exploiting animals because we are higher beings:persons who have highly complex, autonomous lives as moral agents. However, there are many marginal humans who are not and never will be persons. Those who think it is permissible to exploit animal nonpersons but wrong to do the same to human nonpersons must show that there is a morally relevant difference between the two groups. Speciesists, who believe that membership in a species whose normal adults are persons is sufficient for a right to life, attempt to do just this. As the failure of the best arguments which can be marshalled on their behalf indicates, they are unable to justify their view. I conclude that, although there is a morally relevant difference between human nonpersons and most animal nonpersons, this difference is not an indication of superior moral status. We would do better to abandon speciesism and the assumption thatpersonhood is morally paramount for a view which implies that both human and nonhuman nonpersons are morally considerable and have a right to life. 相似文献
13.
Francisco Seijo Maria Marcela Godoy Dante Guglielmin Cecilia Ciampoli Samuel Ebright Omar Picco Guillermo Defoss 《Environmental management》2020,65(4):448-462
The creation of protected conservation areas may result in protracted conflicts between stakeholders. In this study we examine the drivers of anthropogenic wildfire ignitions in the National Park of “los Alerces” (NPA) in Patagonia, Argentina. The NPA was established in 1937 to protect the native “andino-patagónico” forests from wildfires as well as preserving its scenic beauty and native flora and fauna. At the time of its creation state authorities prohibited all extractive human activities in the “intangible”—fully protected—“National Park” section, while other regulated extractive and ecotourism activities were allowed to continue in the “Natural Reserve” section in an effort to accommodate the historical entitlements of the displaced populations of “pobladores” (settlers) that had been living in the NPA for over a century. Here we interviewed the main stakeholder groups—“pobladores”, forest rangers and administrators, ecolodge owners and angler club members—to identify the drivers of wildfire ignitions in the park. Wildfires have been singled out by state authorities as the main threat to the NPA though considerable scientific uncertainty exists regarding their complex ecological effects. This study argues, based on the human and biophysical system data collected, that two conflicting cultural frames exist within the NPA that provide the necessary backdrop for understanding the drivers of wildfire ignitions. In turn, these findings raise puzzling dilemmas for the main theoretical approaches that have been used to inform and design conflict management strategies in protected conservation areas. 相似文献
14.
James W. Yeates 《Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics》2010,23(3):229-241
It is commonly asserted that “death is not a welfare issue” and this has been reflected in welfare legislation and policy
in many countries. However, this creates a conflict for many who consider animal welfare to be an appropriate basis for decision-making
in animal ethics but also consider that an animal’s death is ethically significant. To reconcile these viewpoints, this paper
attempts to formulate an account of death as a welfare issue. Welfare issues are issues that refer to evaluations concerning
an animal’s interests. This includes evaluations that refer only to comparisons between the presence and absence of states,
including positive states. This means that an animal’s death may be a welfare issue insofar as it leads to the exclusion of
relevant positive states. This allows us to deny that death is necessarily not a welfare issue. 相似文献
15.
Evelyn Pluhar 《Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics》1992,5(2):189-215
Kathryn Paxton George has recently argued that vegetarianism cannot be a moral obligation for most human beings, even if Tom Regan is correct in arguing that humans and certain nonhuman animals are equally inherently valuable. She holds that Regan's liberty principle permits humans to kill and eat innocent others who have a right to life, provided that doing so prevents humans from being made worse off. George maintains that obstaining from meat and dairy products would in fact make most humans worse off. I argue that Regan's liberty principle either contradicts his equal rights view or does not permit the slaughter of another for food. I show that a different view recognizing the moral rights of nonhumans but according them less value than normal adult humans, the unequal rights view, would permit such action if human survival or health depended upon it. However, it would also permit the slaughter of innocent humans in the same circumstances. Finally, I argue that current nutritional research does not support George's contention that most humans would suffer if they ceased eating other animals and their products. 相似文献
16.
Kimberly K. Smith 《Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics》2009,22(3):241-256
Elizabeth Anderson’s “pluralist–expressivist” value theory, an alternative to the understanding of value and rationality underlying
the “rational actor” model of human behavior, provides rich resources for addressing questions of environmental and animal
ethics. It is particularly well-suited to help us think about the ethics of commodification, as I demonstrate in this critique
of the pet trade. I argue that Anderson’s approach identifies the proper grounds for criticizing the commodification of animals,
and directs our attention to the importance of maintaining social practices and institutions that respect the social meanings of animals. Her theory alone, however, does not adequately address the role of the state in this project. Drawing on social
contract theory to fill this gap, I conclude that the state’s role in regulating the pet trade should be limited to ensuring
the welfare of animals in the stream of commerce, not prohibiting their mass marketing altogether. 相似文献
17.
Pär Segerdahl 《Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics》2007,20(2):167-193
Although the notion of natural behavior occurs in many policy-making and legal documents on animal welfare, no consensus has
been reached concerning its definition. This paper argues that one reason why the notion resists unanimously accepted definition
is that natural behavior is not properly a biological concept, although it aspires to be one, but rather a philosophical tendency
to perceive animal behavior in accordance with certain dichotomies between nature and culture, animal and human, original
orders and invented artifacts. The paper scrutinizes the philosophy of natural behavior as it developed in the organic movement
in response to a perceived contrast between industrialized and traditional agriculture. There are two reasons for focusing
on the organic movement: (i) the emphasis on “the natural” is most accentuated there and has a long history, (ii) everyday
life on organic farms presupposes human/animal interplay, which conflicts with the philosophical tendency to separate nature
from culture. This mismatch between theory and practice helps us see why, and how, the philosophy of natural behavior needs
to be reconsidered. The paper proposes that we understand farms as local human/animal cultures, and asks what we can mean
my natural behavior in such contexts. Since domestic animals adapt to agricultural environments via interaction with caretakers,
such interplay is analyzed as “hub” in these animals’ natural behavior. 相似文献
18.
The vegan ideal is entailed by arguments for ethical veganism based on traditional moral theory (rights and/or utilitarianism) extended to animals. The most ideal lifestyle would abjure the use of animals or their products for food since animals suffer and have rights not to be killed. The ideal is discriminatory because the arguments presuppose a male physiological norm that gives a privileged position to adult, middle-class males living in industrialized countries. Women, children, the aged, and others have substantially different nutritional requirements and would bear a greater burden on vegetarian and vegan diets with respect to health and economic risks, than do these males. The poor and many persons in Third World nations live in circumstances that make the obligatory adoption of such diets, where they are not already a matter of sheer necessity, even more risky.Traditional moral theorists (such as Evelyn Pluhar and Gary Varner whose essays appear in this issue) argue that those who are at risk would beexcused from a duty to attain the virtue associated with ethical vegan lifestyles. The routine excuse of nearly everyone in the world besides adult, middle-class males in industrialized countries suggests bias in the perspective from which traditional arguments for animal rights and (utilitarian) animal welfare are formulated. 相似文献
19.
Ellen-Marie Forsberg 《Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics》2011,24(4):351-366
Over the last years, Norway has revised its animal welfare legislation. As of January 1, 2010, the Animal Protection Act of
1974 was replaced by a new Animal Welfare Act. This paper describes the developments in the normative structures from the
old to the new act, as well as the main traits of the corresponding implementation and governance system. In the Animal Protection
Act, the basic animal ethics principles were to avoid suffering, treat animals well, and consider their natural needs and
instincts. In addition, a principle for balancing our duties towards animals with the needs and interests of humans was expressed
by the formulation “unnecessary suffering.” These principles (only with slightly different formulations) are retained in the new act. The novelty of the
new act is shown by its explicit intention to promote respect for animals and its recognition of animals’ intrinsic value.
Whereas intrinsic value is only given a symbolic function, the notion of respect is intended to have practical consequences.
One interpretation of respect for animals is taking the animal’s integrity—and not only welfare—into account. Another is to
see the introduction of respect as a call to animal keepers to provide animals with welfare exceeding the minimum requirements.
In several respects, the legal system now seems to leave more responsibility to the individual animal keeper—and to citizens
in general. I argue that if the authorities really do want to promote respect for animals, they must at the same time initiate
activities to achieve this. In my perspective the challenge is to provide adequate measures to achieve in practice the intended
respect for animals expressed in the new act. 相似文献
20.
Michael C. Morris 《Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics》2006,19(5):495-514
Changes in attitudes toward animal welfare, with a greater emphasis on the importance of allowing animals to express normal patterns of behavior has led to an examination of the practice of keeping hens in battery cages. There is widespread scientific consensus that the conditions of confinement and the barren nature of battery cages severely restrict hens’ behavioral repertoire, and are thus detrimental to their welfare. The New Zealand Animal Welfare Act 1999, stipulates that animals must have “the opportunity to display normal patterns of behaviour.” In spite of this provision, the New Zealand government has not acted in phasing out battery cages, arguing instead that there is insufficient evidence that welfare will be improved by a phase-out. There is evidence of strong industry pressure on the government, and the use of tactics common in policy considerations where changes are resisted by powerful interests. It is important that policy processes are better managed so that welfare changes are based on both public preferences and scientific knowledge, and ways of doing this are discussed. 相似文献