Exploring Nontraditional Participation as an Approach to Make Water Quality Trading Markets More Effective

Water quality trading (WQT) has the potential to be a low‐cost means for achieving water quality goals. WQT allows regulated wastewater treatment plants (WWTPs) facing discharge limits the flexibility to either reduce their own discharge or purchase pollution control from other WWTPs or nonpoint sources (NPSs) such as agricultural producers. Under this limited scope, programs with NPSs have been largely unsuccessful at meeting water quality goals. The decision to participate in trading depends on many factors including the pollution control costs, uncertainty in pollution control, and discharge limits. Current research that focuses on making WQT work tends to identify how to increase participation by traditional traders such as WWTPs and agricultural producers. As an alternative, but complementary approach, we consider whether augmenting WQT markets with nontraditional participants would help increase the number of trades. Determining the economic incentives for these potential participants requires the development of novel benefit functions requiring not only economic considerations but also accounting for ecological and engineering processes. Existing literature on nontraditional participants in environmental markets tends to center on air quality and only increasing citizen participation as buyers. Here, we consider the issues for broadening participation (both buyers and sellers) in WQT and outline a multidisciplinary approach to begin evaluating feasibility.     

THE STRUCTURE AND PRACTICE OF WATER QUALITY TRADING MARKETS1

ABSTRACT: The use of transferable discharge permits in water pollution, what we will call water quality trading (WQT), is rapidly growing in the U.S. This paper reviews the current status of WQT nationally and discusses the structures of the markets that have been formed. Four main structures are observed in such markets: exchanges, bilateral negotiations, clearinghouses, and sole source offsets. The goals of a WQT program are environmental quality and cost effectiveness. In designing a WQT market, policy makers are constrained by legal restrictions and the physical characteristics of the pollution problem. The choices that must be made include how trading will be authorized, monitored and enforced. How these questions are answered will help determine both the extent to which these goals are achieved, and the market structures that can arise. After discussing the characteristics of different market structures, we evaluate how this framework applies in the case of California's Grassland Drainage Area Tradable Loads Program.     

An Ex Post Evaluation of Ohio’s Great Miami Water Quality Trading Program1

Newburn, David A. and Richard T. Woodward, 2011. An Ex Post Evaluation of Ohio’s Great Miami Water Quality Trading Program. Journal of the American Water Resources Association (JAWRA) 48(1): 156‐169. DOI: 10.1111/j.1752‐1688.2011.00601.x Abstract: Market‐based approaches to address water quality problems have resulted in only limited success, especially in trading programs involving both point and nonpoint sources. We analyze one of the largest point‐nonpoint trading programs – the Great Miami Trading Program in Ohio, administered by the Miami Conservancy District (MCD). Our evaluation focuses on the economic and institutional aspects of the program, including cost effectiveness, efficiency of bidding, transaction costs, trading ratios, and innovation. We use a unique dataset consisting of all bids from agricultural nonpoint sources and interviews of soil and water conservation district (SWCD) agents in the watershed. We find that the MCD’s reliance on county‐level SWCD offices to recruit and advise farmers has been essential to achieve relatively high rates of farmer participation. Additionally, the MCD is able to partly free ride on the administrative costs that SWCD offices receive to assist federal conservation programs, which is helpful to lower costs for a fledgling trading program. However, the involvement of SWCD offices reduced the potential cost savings from the reverse auction structure because some agents were able to learn about the threshold price over the six rounds of bidding and help farmers bid strategically. Overall, the program structure serves as an effective model for future trading programs in other regions that seek to involve agricultural nonpoint sources.     

Multiple pollutant discharge permit markets,a challenge for wastewater treatment plants

This study focuses on the challenge of using a multiple pollutant transferable discharge permit market for operating wastewater treatment plants. It uses an analytical case of Sefidrud River in Iran with two checkpoints. It shows that the operating limitations for simultaneous biochemical oxidation demand (BOD) and total nitrogen (TN) removal may convert the economically optimal waste load allocation (WLA) to a framework with lack of incentives. Therefore, water quality trading (WQT) may lose its economical advantages. In this case, a third parameter, such as dissolved oxygen is recommended as an index for assigning market interactions. In spite of economical and practical success, this approach made WLA become a more complicated and uncertain policy. It was totally concluded that using single parameter WQT is only recommended for areas with small agricultural activities or lakes. Otherwise, the integrated discharged permit and reclaimed water market is proposed instead for simultaneous BOD and TN management.     

THE COSTS OF CONFLICTING ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY: A CASE STUDY IN MILWAUKEE1

ABSTRACT: The history of the Milwaukee water pollution abatement program is examined as a case study to investigate the costs of conflicting environmental policy. The recent U.S. Supreme Court decision concerning the Milwaukee case is described as a milestone in U.S. water pollution abatement policy which will help preclude the type of environmental policy conflict which has been found to be so costly to Milwaukee. The implications to U.S. water pollution abatement policy of the 13-year history of conflict in Milwaukee are presented.     

Economic and Ecological Rules for Water Quality Trading1

Horan, Richard D. and James S. Shortle, 2011. Economic and Ecological Rules for Water Quality Trading. Journal of the American Water Resources Association (JAWRA) 47(1):59‐69. DOI: 10.1111/j.1752‐1688.2010.00463.x Abstract: Emissions trading in textbook form uses markets to achieve pollution targets cost‐efficiently. This result is accomplished in markets that regulators can implement without knowing pollution abatement costs. The theoretical promise of emissions trading, along with real‐world success stories from air emissions trading, has led to initiatives to use trading for water pollution control. Yet, trading, particularly when it involves nonpoint sources of pollution, requires significant departures from the textbook concept. This paper explores how features of water quality problems affect the design of markets for water pollution control relative to textbook emissions markets. Three fundamental design tasks that regulators must address for pollution trading to achieve an environmental goal at low cost are examined: (1) defining the point and nonpoint commodities to be traded, (2) defining rules governing commodity exchange, and (3) setting caps on the commodity supplies so as to achieve an environmental target. We show that the way in which these tasks are optimally addressed for water quality markets differs significantly from the textbook model and its real‐world analogs. We also show that the fundamental appeal of emissions trading is lost in the case of realistic water quality markets, as market designs that reduce the costs of achieving water quality goals may no longer be implementable without the regulatory authority having information on abatement costs.     

碳排放交易体系的政策灵活性:国际经验及启示

在《联合国气候变化框架公约》和《京都议定书》的背景下,越来越多的国家开始关注全球气候变暖的问题。考虑到碳排放交易体系比碳税更具有政治可行性,不少国家或地区开始实施碳排放交易体系,以最低的减排成本来达到温室气体减排目标。然而,采用碳排放交易体系,其排放总量是固定的,而减排成本是不确定的,可能会出现由于政策或外部冲击而产生的配额价格异常波动的现象。因此,为确保碳排放交易体系的成本有效性,政策灵活性十分重要。在理想情况下,碳排放市场具有完全的时间灵活性(包括长期的履约期、自由的配额储存与预借)和空间灵活性(即建立全球碳市场),这将对增强市场流动性、降低减排成本、缓解价格波动起到重要的作用。然而,由于政策设计需要考虑更多因素,实际上理想状态很难达到。本文将对国外碳排放交易体系的政策灵活性设计进行较为系统的分析和比较,尤其关注履约期的长短、配额的跨期使用、配额的抵消、区域碳市场连接等方面的具体政策设计,这对我国在7个省市进行碳排放交易试点以及今后建立全国性的碳排放交易体系有较强的借鉴意义。     

Policy Integration as a Success Factor for Emissions Trading

Emissions trading will not be able to become the single instrument of a national climate policy because of costs for monitoring of greenhouse gases and transfers of allowances. Thus, it is important to assess optimal ways of integrating emissions trading into national climate policy mixes, thus leading to a more efficient policy, especially by allowing the use of transboundary transactions. The implemented trading systems of the UK and Denmark, the agreed EU one, and the planned ones of Norway are used as case studies. In the UK, the introduction of an energy tax on industry was the catalyst that led to the development of emissions trading, voluntary agreements, and two subsidy programs. However, in Denmark trading was limited in scope and not integrated with the successful emission tax. The EU and Norwegian trading schemes both have a large scope and integrate international transfers; the former is integrated with other instruments to avoid free riding. Policy integration will thus enhance the efficiency improvements that emissions trading can introduce.     

Where Did the Agricultural Nonpoint Source Trades Go? Lessons from Virginia Water Quality Trading Programs

Governmental agencies, nongovernmental organizations, and agricultural organizations promote water quality trading programs as an innovative policy to engage agricultural producers in conservation activities. Cost analyses suggest regulated sources can reduce compliance costs by purchasing agricultural nonpoint source credits. Yet, such “point‐nonpoint” trades are rare. This article assesses the demand for agricultural nonpoint sources in well‐developed nutrient trading programs in Virginia for industrial and municipal wastewater treatment plants, municipal stormwater programs, and land developers. Evidence suggests nutrient trading programs in Virginia will not stimulate investments in pollutant reduction practices on working agricultural lands. The lack of demand for agricultural nonpoint source credits can be attributed to a substantial degree to the design features and incentives present in multiple overlapping regulatory programs. The legal setting that dampens regulated source demand for nonpoint source credits in Virginia is broadly representative of conditions found elsewhere in the United States.     

Baseline requirements can hinder trades in water quality trading programs: Evidence from the Conestoga watershed

The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA) and the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) are promoting point/nonpoint trading as a way of reducing the costs of meeting water quality goals. Farms can create offsets by implementing management practices such as conservation tillage, nutrient management and buffer strips. To be eligible to sell offsets or credits, farmers must first comply with baseline requirements. USEPA guidance recommends that the baseline for nonpoint sources be management practices that are consistent with the water quality goal. A farmer would not be able to create offsets until the minimum practice standards are met. An alternative baseline is those practices being implemented at the time the trading program starts, or when the farmer enters the program. The selection of the baseline affects the efficiency and equity of the trading program. It has major implications for which farmers benefit from trading, the cost of nonpoint source offsets, and ultimately the number of offsets that nonpoint sources can sell to regulated point sources. We use a simple model of the average profit-maximizing dairy farmer operating in the Conestoga watershed in Pennsylvania to evaluate the implications of baseline requirements on the cost and quantity of offsets that can be produced for sale in a water quality trading market, and which farmers benefit most from trading.     

ECONOMIC INCENTIVES FOR AGRICULTURAL NONPOINT SOURCE POLLUTION CONTROL1

ABSTRACT. The limited success of command-and-control policies for reducing nonpoint source (NPS) water pollution mandated under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA) has prompted increased interest in economic incentive policies as an alternative control mechanism. A variety of measures have been proposed ranging from fairly minor modifications of existing policies to substantial revisions including watershed-wide polices that rely on economic incentives. While greater use of economic incentive policies, such as environmental bonds and point/nonpoint source trading is being advocated in the reauthorization of the CWA, the expected effects of individual proposals will be modest. The characteristics of NPS pollution, namely uncertainty and asymmetrical information, underscores that there is no single, ideal policy instrument for controlling the many types of agricultural NPS water pollution. Some of the usual incentive-based policies, such as effluent taxes, are not well suited to the task. Individual incentive policies proposed for the reauthorized CWA, such as pollution trading or deposit/refund systems, are not broadly applicable for heterogeneous pollution situations. Economic incentive policies may be appropriate in some cases, and command-and-control policies will be preferable in others and may in fact complement incentive policies.     

Point‐Nonpoint Trading – Can It Work?1

Ribaudo, Marc O. and Jessica Gottlieb, 2011. Point‐Nonpoint Trading – Can It Work? Journal of the American Water Resources Association (JAWRA) 47(1):5‐14. DOI: 10.1111/j.1752‐1688.2010.00454.x Abstract: Water quality trading between point and nonpoint sources is of great interest as an alternative to strict command and control regulations on point sources for achieving water quality goals. The expectation is that trading will reduce the costs of water quality protection, and may speed compliance. The United States Environmental Protection Agency has issued guidance to the States on developing point‐nonpoint trading programs, and United States Department of Agriculture is encouraging farmer participation. However, existing point‐nonpoint trading programs have resulted in very few trades. Supply side and demand side impediments seem to be preventing trades from occurring in most trading programs. These include uncertainty over the number of discharge allowances different management practices can produce, high transactions costs of identifying trading partners, baseline requirements that eliminate low‐cost credits, the reluctance of point sources to trade with unfamiliar agents, and the perception of some farmers that entering contracts with regulated point sources leads to greater scrutiny and potential future regulation. Many of these problems can be addressed through research and program design.     

Achieving Nutrient Water Quality Goals: Bringing Market‐Like Principles to Water Quality Management*1

Abstract: Market‐like trading programs for water quality management begin with enforceable limits on the amount of the pollutant allowed in a watershed. Properly designed market‐like trading programs then create incentives for dischargers to reduce nutrient control costs over time by making pollution prevention innovations. However, the structure of the Clean Water Act can be a barrier to establishing market‐like trading programs. First, we describe the general features and advantages of market‐like trading programs. Then we offer practical suggestions for bringing market‐like design concepts to nutrient trading programs within the existing legal and regulatory setting.     

Farmers' willingness to participate in best management practices in Kentucky

This paper investigates farmers' willingness to participate in Best Management Practices (BMPs) through a proposed Water quality trading (WQT) program in Kentucky. This analysis includes two parts: the first part is to investigate the factors influencing farmers' current usage of BMPs; the second part is to estimate farmers' willingness to implement BMPs given different levels of compensation given in a survey. The results show that farmers who participate in the conservation programs are more likely to use BMPs, but these farmers may not accept the offer to implement additional BMPs. Farmers' experiences about BMPs are more likely to persuade them to adopt additional BMPs than the level of compensation. The results find that using riparian buffers, fencing off animals and building up waste storage facilities are responsive to the levels of compensation offered.     

POINT‐NONPOINT SOURCE WATER QUALITY TRADING: A CASE STUDY IN THE MINNESOTA RIVER BASIN1

ABSTRACT: Contrary to the general trend of only a few actual trades occurring within point‐nonpoint source water quality trading programs in the United States, two trading projects in the Minnesota River Basin, created under the provisions of National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permits, have generated five major trades and numerous smaller ones. In this paper, these two projects are described to illustrate their origins, implementation, and results. It was found that several factors contributed to the relatively high number of trades in these projects, including the offsetting nature of the projects (hence a fixed number of credits that the point sources were required to obtain), readily available information on potential nonpoint source trading partners, and an effectively internal trading scheme used by one of the two projects. It was also found that long term structural pollution control measures, such as streambank stabilization, offered substantial cost savings over point source controls. Estimates of transaction costs showed that the total costs of the trading projects were increased by at least 35 percent after transaction costs were taken into account. Evidence also showed that in addition to pollution reduction, these two trading projects brought other benefits to the watershed, such as helping balance environmental protection and regional economic growth.     

Rhetoric and Reality of Water Quality Trading and the Potential for Market‐like Reform1

Stephenson, Kurt and Leonard Shabman, 2011. Rhetoric and Reality of Water Quality Trading and the Potential for Market‐Like Reform. Journal of the American Water Resources Association (JAWRA) 47(1):15‐28. DOI: 10.1111/j.1752‐1688.2010.00492.x Abstract: Many public interest groups, government agencies, and professional economists argue that current approaches to water quality trading are a cost‐effective, politically practical innovation for achieving water quality standards, in part by addressing one of the most difficult water quality improvement challenges – limiting the discharge from nonpoint sources. A critical analysis shows that these claims for current water quality trading programs are often unrealized. This rhetoric, without adherence to principles of market‐like reform, can undermine the support of regulated parties for meaningful water quality policy reform, contribute to missed opportunities to implement cost‐effective programs, and postpone successfully meeting the challenge of limiting nonpoint source discharges. A better understanding and application of market‐like principles can result in an improved design of trading as well as general water quality management programs.     

The regional economic impact of reducing greenhouse gas emissions: Western Australia

This study analyses the general-equilibrium impacts of an international climate change response policy on the economy of Western Australia (WA), one of the most mining-based and energy-intensive states of Australia. It finds that emissions would fall by up to 11% from the base level in WA. However, such environmental benefits emanate at some costs to the state economy; in terms of foregone gross state product, the costs are up to 3% of the base level. Indeed, the actual costs and benefits depend on the precise design of the climate change response policy as well as on the other policies within which it operates. For example, when emission quota permits are sold to industries and no tradeable carbon credits (i.e. credits for the carbon sequestrated in Kyoto forests) are granted, emissions decline by about 8% and GSP falls by about 3% of the base levels. If carbon credits are tradeable, however, the environmental benefits could be increased and the GSP cost could be reduced substantially. Also, the reduced economic activity caused by emission abatement results in a modest fall in net government revenue, despite the additional revenue from permit sales in some cases. Accordingly, government’s fiscal package surrounding the emission permits would influence the emission abatement impacts on the economy. With regard to the effects on the structure of the state economy, the oil and gas industry suffers only a slight contraction but the energy-supplying sector as a whole contracts substantially. It is therefore not surprising that the impacts on the WA economy of curbing emissions by energy and transport industries alone are quite significant when compared to those resulted from all industries’ compliance with the abatement scheme. It needs to be noted that the model projections analysed in the paper are based on simplifying assumptions and tentative scenarios, and hence should be viewed with caution and not be understood as unconditional forecasts.     

Toward quantifying the effectiveness of water trading under uncertainty

This paper presents a methodology for quantifying the effectiveness of water-trading under uncertainty, by developing an optimization model based on the interval-parameter two-stage stochastic program (TSP) technique. In the study, the effectiveness of a water-trading program is measured by the water volume that can be released through trading from a statistical point of view. The methodology can also deal with recourse water allocation problems generated by randomness in water availability and, at the same time, tackle uncertainties expressed as intervals in the trading system. The developed methodology was tested with a hypothetical water-trading program in an agricultural system in the Swift Current Creek watershed, Canada. Study results indicate that the methodology can effectively measure the effectiveness of a trading program through estimating the water volume being released through trading in a long-term view. A sensitivity analysis was also conducted to analyze the effects of different trading costs on the trading program. It shows that the trading efforts would become ineffective when the trading costs are too high. The case study also demonstrates that the trading program is more effective in a dry season when total water availability is in shortage.     

不完全竞争行业中的环境工具有效性研究:一个理论框架

各级政府贯彻落实绿色发展的理念,实现经济增长与环境保护的共赢,才能真正实现"绿水青山就是金山银山"。在经济"新常态"背景下,防治环境污染是个复杂而系统性的工程,需要进行经济追因与综合治理,其中,制定实施有效的环境政策工具尤为关键。本文把微观经济学中的双寡头产量竞争模型作为基准模型拓展用于环境经济分析,并把环境税、环境规制、排污权交易这三类主要环境工具对企业生产决策的影响纳入基准模型,旨在对比研究不完全竞争行业中环境工具的有效性问题。结果表明:主要基于市场机制的环境经济政策比行政色彩浓厚的环境规制更有效率。提高环境税率或排污权价格均能显著削减行业污染物排放量,如果环境税率恰好等于排污权价格,则环境税与排污权交易这两类环境工具的效力相等。这对进一步建立和完善我国尚处于探索或初始实施阶段的环境工具,促进石化、电力、钢铁等不完全竞争行业的主要污染物减排,具有一定参考价值和借鉴意义。     

Transaction costs and sequential bargaining in transferable discharge permit markets

Market-type mechanisms have been introduced and are being explored for various environmental programs. Several existing programs, however, have not attained the cost savings that were initially projected. Modeling that acknowledges the role of transactions costs and the discrete, bilateral, and sequential manner in which trades are executed should provide a more realistic basis for calculating potential cost savings. This paper presents empirical evidence on potential cost savings by examining a market for the abatement of sediment from farmland. Empirical results based on a market simulation model find no statistically significant change in mean abatement costs under several transaction cost levels when contracts are randomly executed. An alternative method of contract execution, gain-ranked, yields similar results. At the highest transaction cost level studied, trading reduces the total cost of compliance relative to a uniform standard that reflects current regulations.