Species Extinction and the Vice of Thoughtlessness: The Importance of Spiritual Exercises for Learning Virtue

In this paper, I present a sample spiritual exercise—a contemporary form of the written practice that ancient philosophers used to shape their characters. The exercise, which develops the ancient practice of the examination of conscience, is on the sixth mass extinction and seeks to understand why the extinction appears as a moral wrong. It concludes by finding a vice in the moral character of the author and the author’s society. From a methodological standpoint, the purpose of spiritual exercises is to create a habit of thoughtfulness in the writer, and by way of teaching, to suggest one to the reader. Such a habit is important, at least, because virtue is a habit. In other words, there can be no learning of virtue itself without habituation into it. Accordingly, I frame the sample spiritual exercise with a deliberately controversial objection to contemporary academic virtue ethics and with a justification for why the spiritual exercise is important for taking virtue ethically. And I end the paper with some further remarks explaining the form of the exercise and its relevance to doing philosophy. In this way, the paper makes and illustrates a methodological point about virtue ethics based on a meta-ethical assumption about virtue as a habit, and it does this by focusing on a pressing environmental problem in the twenty-first century.     

What's the Moral of the GM Food Story?

This paper is an attempt to examine issues and problemsraised by agricultural biotechnology by drawing on the richnessof contemporary ideas in ethical theory and thereby contribute tothe project of establishing new approaches to these problems. Thefundamental argument is that many of the negative aspects ofagricultural biotechnology are generated at the level of theunderlying conceptual frameworks that shape the technology'sinternal modes of organization, rather than the unintendedeffects of the application of an inherently benevolent set oftechniques. If ``food ethics' is to address the adverse impacts ofagricultural biotechnology, it must ultimately challenge theseconceptual frames, which, I argue, emerge from Enlightenment,liberal, political, and economic theory.The translation of traditional bioethics (focusing on principlessuch as autonomy and rights, justice, and well being) into foodethics does not produce the critical tools that are ableadequately to challenge the harmful legacy of Enlightenmentthinking. What is needed are reorientations of ethics that arecapable of formulating concepts and approaches that to someextent break with the presuppositions that underpin biotechnologyat its foundation. This paper suggests that narrative andfeminist critiques of medical bioethics are a good place to startin this project.     

The Magic Bullet Criticism of Agricultural Biotechnology

One common method of criticizing genetically modified organisms (GMOs) is to label them as “magic bullets.” However, this criticism, like many in the debate over GMOs, is not very clear. What exactly is the “magic bullet criticism”? What are its origins? What flaw is it pointing out in GM crops and agricultural biotechnology? What is the scope of the criticism? Does it apply to all GMOs, or just some? Does it point to a fatal flaw, or something that can be fixed? The goal of this paper is to answer these questions and clarify the magic bullet criticism of agricultural biotechnology. It is hoped that the results of this exercise will be helpful in advancing deliberation over the role GMOs and agricultural biotechnology should play in 21st century agriculture.     

Seeds of promise: Developing a sustainable agricultural biotechnology industry in sub–Saharan Africa

In a continent ravaged by poverty, disease and malnutrition, agricultural practices have changed little over millennia. Of all the new technologies recently arisen, molecular biotechnology is one of the few that could signi ficantly improve the livelihoods of the large numbers of people in sub–Saharan Africa. Its impact could exceed that in the developed world, where a multi–billion dollar a year agricultural biotechnology industry has emerged, secured on the back of a highly skilled research and educational sector, extensive biosafety measures, and a strong corporate sector. For much of sub–Saharan Africa, the absence of these foundations constitutes a substantial hurdle to the development of a sustainable biotechnology industry. A critical element is the development of an indigenous and innovative agricultural biotechnology community — one that is responsive to African crops, farming practices and economic imperatives, yet sensitive to local concerns and biosafety issues surrounding use of the controversial GM technology.     

She Came, She Saw, She Sowed: Re-negotiating Gender-Responsive Priorities for Effective Development of Agricultural Biotechnology in Sub-Saharan Africa

In this paper, we argue for the importance of incorporating a gendered perspective for the effective development of sustainable agricultural biotechnology systems in sub-Saharan Africa. Priority setting for agricultural policy and project development requires attention to gender issues specific to the demands of agricultural biotechnology. This is essential for successfully addressing food security and poverty reduction in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). There has been a great deal of debate and literature on the implications of gender in agricultural development and policy. However, the implications of gender in agricultural biotechnology and have received relatively less attention, especially in SSA. Based on interviews with key stakeholders in agricultural biotechnology across SSA, review of pertinent literature and field observations, we have found that incorporating a gendered perspective is critical for the sustainable development of agricultural biotechnology and requires attention in five areas: the inclusion of women, particularly women farmers, in decision-making around biotech/genetically modified (GM) crop and trait selection; equal representation of women as men in education for agricultural science and in agricultural biotechnology research and development professions; greater involvement of women in extension services and farmers’ associations for successful delivery of information about biotech crops equality between men and women in access to resources for biotech/GM crop cultivation; and increased control for women farmers over biotech/GM crop management and income generation. We explain the consequences of failing to include such gender-responsive considerations into priority setting for agricultural biotechnology development and policy in SSA and provide recommendations for how policy makers and project partners of development initiatives can avoid such oversights.     

Agricultural Biotechnology and the Future Benefits Argument

In the face of criticisms about the current generationof agricultural biotechnology products, some proponents ofagricultural biotechnology offer a ``future benefitsargument'(FBA), which is a utilitarian ethical argument thatattempts to justify continued R&D. This paper analyzes severallogical implications of the FBA. Among these are that acceptanceof the FBA implies (1) acceptance of a precautionary approach torisk, (2) the need for a more proportional and equitabledistribution of the benefits of agricultural biotechnology, andmost important, (3) the need to reorient and restructurebiotechnology R&D institutions (and the agriculturalbiotechnology community's values and attitudes) so that futurebenefits are indeed achieved through agricultural biotechnology.     

Crop Biotechnology for the Environment?

In public debates, agricultural biotechnology is almost invariably discussed as a potential threat to the environment and to human health. Without downplaying the risks associated with this technology we emphasize that if properly regulated, it can be a forceful tool to solve environmental problems and promote human health. Agricultural biotechnology can reduce environmental problems in at least three ways: it can diminish the need for environmentally damaging agricultural practices such as pesticides, fertilizers, tillage, and irrigation. It can reduce the land area needed for agriculture, thus reducing the CO₂ effect of agriculture and improving biodiversity. It can produce energy in a CO₂-neutral way (especially if new technologies involving the cultivation of microalgae become successful). Furthermore, agricultural biotechnology can have positive effects on human health by decreasing occupational and dietary exposure to pesticides, improving the nutritional value of food, and producing pharmaceuticals more efficiently. We argue that those who wish to give high priority to environmental goals cannot afford any longer to be mere onlookers while others decide the future directions of agricultural biotechnology.     

An Agrarian Imaginary in Urban Life: Cultivating Virtues and Vices Through a Conflicted History

This paper explores the influence and use of agrarian thought on collective understandings of food practices as sources of ethical and communal value in urban contexts. A primary proponent of agrarian thought that this paper engages is Paul Thompson and his exceptional book, The Agrarian Vision. Thompson aims to use agrarian ideals of agriculture and communal life to rethink current issues of sustainability and environmental ethics. However, Thompson perceives the current cultural mood as hostile to agrarian virtue. There are two related claims of this paper. The first argues that contrary to Thompson’s perception of hostility, agrarian thought is popularly and commercially mobilized among urban populations. To establish this claim I extend Charles Taylor’s notion of a social imaginary and suggest that urban agriculture can be theorized as an agrarian imaginary. Entwined with the first claim is the second, that proponents selectively use agrarian history to overemphasis a narrative of virtue while ignoring or marginalizing historical practices of agrarian violence, exclusion and dispossession. I do not discount or deny the significance of agrarian virtue. By situating agrarian thought within a clearer virtue ethics framework and acknowledging potential manifestation of agrarian vice, I suggest that the idea of agrarian virtue is strengthened.     

The Technological Fix Criticisms and the Agricultural Biotechnology Debate

A common tactic in public debates over science and technology is to dismissively label innovations as mere technological fixes. This tactic can be readily observed in the long debate over agricultural biotechnology. While these criticisms are often superficial rhetorical tactics, they point to deeper philosophical disagreements about the role of technology in society. Examining the technological fix criticism can clarify these underlying philosophical disagreements and the debate over biotechnology. The first part of this essay discusses the origins of the notion of a technological fix and distinguishes two types of technological fix criticisms, philosophical and practical. These distinctions are then applied to clarify and evaluate arguments for and against agricultural biotechnology. This analysis should clarify the debates over agricultural biotechnology and bring to light fundamental philosophical differences over the role of technology in agriculture.     

The Five Freedoms of Animal Welfare are Rights

In this paper I defend a theory of welfare rights for nonhuman animals. I do this by demonstrating that a well-established framework for protecting the interests of farm animals, the ‘Five Freedoms of Animal Welfare’, is already functioning just as a set of rights. To support this claim I adopt a common approach to detecting evidence for deontological reasoning and look at the structural features of rights. I first consider Hohfeld’s system of legal rights and consider whether the Five Freedoms may be understood as liberties or claim rights, before making a more successful comparison with side constraints and an interest theory of rights as understood by Nozick and Raz. I also respond to a likely objection that it is not possible to have some welfare rights without a right to freedom from exploitation. The argument therefore contributes to breaking down the stubborn division between ‘animal welfare’ and ‘animal rights’.     

Environmentally Virtuous Agriculture: How and When External Goods and Humility Ethically Constrain (or Favour) Technology Use

This paper concerns virtue-based ethical principles that bear upon agricultural uses of technologies, such as GM crops and CRISPR crops. It does three things. First, it argues for a new type of virtue ethics approach to such cases. Typical virtue ethics principles are vague and unspecific. These are sometimes useful, but we show how to supplement them with more specific virtue ethics principles that are useful to people working in specific applied domains, where morally relevant domain-specific conditions recur. We do this while still fulfilling the need for principles and associated practical reasoning to flexibly respect variation between cases. Second, with our more detailed approach we criticize and improve upon a commonly discussed principle about ecosystemic external goods that are crucial for human flourishing. We show this principle is far more conservative than appreciated, as it would prohibit many technology uses that are uncontroversially acceptable. We then replace this principle with two more specific ones. One identifies specific conditions in which ecosystem considerations are against a technology use, the other identifies favorable conditions. Third, we uncover a humility-based principle that operates within an influential “hubris argument” against uses of several biotechnologies in agriculture. These arguments lack a substantive theory of the nature of humility. We clarify such a theory, and then use it to replace the uncovered humility-based principle with our own more specific one that shifts focus from past moral failings, to current epistemic limits when deciding whether to support new technologies.     

Harm to Others: The Social Cost of Antibiotics in Agriculture

It has become increasingly clear that the use of antibiotics in conventionally raised livestock contributes to the emergence of antibiotic-resistant bacteria. In this paper, I argue that the harm principle of classical liberalism should guide agricultural policy in general, and the regulation of antibiotics in livestock in particular. After developing an interpretation of the harm principle, and framing the choice to produce and consume animals treated with antibiotics as a classic prisoner’s dilemma, I consider some policy responses to the problem, including a ban on the non-therapeutic use of antibiotics.     

Environmentalism and Public Virtue

Much of the literature addressing environmental virtue tends to focus on what might be called “personal virtue”—individual actions, characteristics, or dispositions that benefit the individual actor. There has, in contrast, been relatively little interest in either “virtue politics”—collective actions, characteristics, or dispositions—or in what might be called “public virtues,” actions, characteristics, or dispositions that benefit the community rather than the individual. This focus, however, is problematic, especially in a society that valorizes individuality. This paper examines public virtue and its role in environmental virtue ethics. First, I outline different types of virtue in order to frame the discussion of public virtues and, in particular, a subclass of virtues I will refer to as political virtue. Second, I focus on practical problems and address the inadequacy of personal virtue for effecting social change and, therefore, for addressing most environmental crises. Finally, I argue that public and political virtues are necessary, if under emphasized, conditions for the flourishing of the individual, and that they are important complements to more traditional environmental virtues.     

The transatlantic rift in genetically modified food policy

The regulatory structures underlying United States and European Union policies regarding genetically modified (GM) food and crops are fundamentally different. The US regulates GM foods and crops as end products, applying roughly the same regulatory framework that it does to non GM foods or crops. The EU, on the other hand, regulates products of agricultural biotechnology as the result of a specific production process. Accordingly, it has developed a network of rules that regulate GM foods and crops specifically. As a result, US regulation of GM foods and crops is relatively permissive, whereas EU regulation is relatively restrictive. Why are genetically modified food policies in the United States and the European Union so strikingly different? In the light of the recent World Trade Organization dispute on agricultural biotechnology, it may seem that economic interests are the driving force behind policies. While they are certainly part of the picture, the issue is far more complex. This paper argues that three different elements help explain differences between US and EU GM food policies. First, an investigation of US and European policies of the 1970s and 1980s on recombinant DNA research and of events leading up to early GM food and crop regulation allows a deeper understanding of current policy. Second, scrutinizing underlying values and norms can uncover the beliefs that condition current GM food and crop policy. Third, an analysis of involved actors’ views and levels of success in influencing policy is essential to understanding US and EU policies.     

The Epistemic Demands of Environmental Virtue

To lead an environmentally virtuous life requires information—about morality, environmental issues, the impacts of our actions and commitments, our options for alternatives, and so on. On the other hand, we are finite beings with limited time and resources. We cannot feasibly investigate all of our options, and all environmental issues (let alone moral issues, more broadly). In this paper I attempt to provide initial steps towards addressing the epistemic demands of environmental virtue. In the first half of the paper I provide rules of thumb with respect to (1) how to prioritize our investigations into various issues, and (2) what kinds of information we should seek with respect to these issues, and the levels of epistemic justification we ought to attain. In the second half of the paper, I turn to a modified virtue ethics, appealing to the attitudes of virtuous ideal observers to provide characterizations of morally justified and morally non-culpable actions. I then apply these latter concepts in assessing agents, their actions and projects (with respect to environmental virtue), in light of their investigative efforts, and given their particular circumstances.     

Heideggerian Environmental Virtue Ethics

Environmental ethics is apparently caught in a dilemma. We believe in human species partiality as a way of making sense of many of our practices. However as part of our commitment to impartialism in ethics, we arguably should extend the principle of impartiality to other species, in a version of biocentric egalitarianism of the kind advocated by Paul Taylor. According to this view, not only do all entities that possess a good have inherent worth, but they have equal inherent worth, and in particular no species is superior to any other. In this paper, I elaborate a Heideggerian environmental virtue ethics that slips between the horns of the dilemma. Central to this ethics is the relation of “dwelling” and the many virtues of dwelling, according to which the world is seen as “holy” in a variety of ways. This ethics is importantly local in respect of time and place, but also has universalistic aspects. To understand such an ethics, it is necessary to grasp Heidegger’s notion of truth as “aleithia” or opening, which enables us to escape the metaphysical dilemmas besetting ethics in the analytic tradition, including standard virtue ethics. Elaborating this notion occupies a large part of the paper.     

Understanding the Scope of Farmer Perceptions of Risk: Considering Farmer Opinions on the Use of Genetically Modified (GM) Crops as a Stakeholder Voice in Policy

In the beginning, policy debates between critics and advocates of genetically modified (GM) crops focused on scientifically determined risks. Ten years later, the argument between environmentalists or consumers and regulators or industry has changed into a discussion about the implementation of more democratic policymaking about GM farming. A notable omission from the political debate about food biotechnology in the United States, however, is the opinion of farmers who cultivate the GM crops. Policymakers should value practical knowledge based on experiences from farmers, not only scientific industry reports or consumer product opinions. This project uses in-depth interviews to create an original mail survey that uses the practical discourse of farmers in order to explore the relationship of farmer attitudes and GM agriculture. Although national research indicates that larger yields are the most common reason for GM adoption, qualitative information suggest that the potential of GM crops to increase revenue per acre does not truly reflect all the concerns of modern farmers. For example, farmers who use GM seeds indicate that they constantly question the social impacts of their agricultural practices. As such, GM policies should be restructured as a political rationalization of both economic modeling and political theory because this research suggests that farmers’ business decisions are utility calucations that consider economics without ignoring environmental and political contexts. Farmers’ concerns about non-economic risks suggest that they need more information about GM crops and that governmental policies should respond to their interests, as they are more democratic or pluralistic than industry or consumer arguments.     

Reconstruction of the Ethical Debate on Naturalness in Discussions About Plant-Biotechnology

This paper argues that in modern (agro)biotechnology, (un)naturalness as an argument contributed to a stalemate in public debate about innovative technologies. Naturalness in this is often placed opposite to human disruption. It also often serves as a label that shapes moral acceptance or rejection of agricultural innovative technologies. The cause of this lies in the use of nature as a closed, static reference to naturalness, while in fact “nature” is an open and dynamic concept with many different meanings. We propose an approach for a dynamic framework that permits an integrative use of naturalness in debate, by connecting three sorts of meaning that return regularly in the arguments brought forward in debate; cultural, technological, and ecological. We present these as aspects of nature that are always present in the argument of naturalness. The approach proposes a dynamic relation between these aspects, formed by gradients of naturalness, which in turn are related to ethical concerns. In this way we come to an overview that makes it possible to give individual arguments a relative place and that does justice to the temporality of the concept of nature and the underlying ethical concerns stakeholders have in respect to innovation in agriculture.     

Biophilia as an Environmental Virtue

Beginning with E. O. Wilson’s notion of biophilia, our “innate tendency to focus on life and life-like processes,” I construct an environmental virtue with the same name that meets certain criteria an environmental virtue should meet. I argue that this virtue can have its status as a virtue by its contribution to human flourishing, while having care for live nature as its target, and care about live nature as its affective content. I explore its characteristics as both an individual and a collective virtue, and finally show how cultivation of it might serve to unite various communities in the cause of preserving biodiversity.     

“The Moral Difference between Intragenic and Transgenic Modification of Plants”

Public policy on the development and use of genetically modified organisms (GMOs) has mainly been concerned with defining proper strategies of risk management. However, surveys and focus group interviews show that although lay people are concerned with risks, they also emphasize that genetic modification is ethically questionable in itself. Many people feel that this technology “tampers with nature” in an unacceptable manner. This is often identified as an objection to the crossing of species borders in producing transgenic organisms. Most scientists reject these opinions as based on insufficient knowledge about biotechnology, the concept of species, and nature in general. Some recent projects of genetic modification aim to accommodate the above mentioned concerns by altering the expression of endogenous genes rather than introducing genes from other species. There can be good scientific reasons for this approach, in addition to strategic reasons related to greater public acceptability. But are there also moral reasons for choosing intragenic rather than transgenic modification? I suggest three interrelated moral reasons for giving priority to intragenic modification. First, we should respect the opinions of lay people even when their view is contrary to scientific consensus; they express an alternative world-view, not scientific ignorance. Second, staying within species borders by strengthening endogenous traits reduces the risks and scientific uncertainty. Third, we should show respect for nature as a complex system of laws and interconnections that we cannot fully control. The main moral reason for intragenic modification, in our view, is the need to respect the “otherness” of nature.