Incorporating natural enemies in an economic threshold for dynamically optimal pest management

The control of pests by their natural enemies represents an important regulating ecosystem service that helps maintain the stability of crop ecosystems. These services, however, are often ignored in pest management decision making. In addition, the use of broad-spectrum insecticides can damage the populations of natural enemies, reducing the cost-effectiveness of insecticide investment if unaccounted for in treatment decisions.The existing literature on modeling of biological control of insect pests has generally focused on simulations of the population dynamics of pest and natural enemy species and the processes underlying pest control. But agriculture is a managed ecosystem where predator–prey relationships are heavily influenced by human managers. In modeling managerial choices, this study develops an intra-seasonal dynamic bioeconomic optimization model for insecticide-based pest management that explicitly takes into account both the biological control effect of natural enemies on pest density and the nontarget mortality effect of insecticides on the level of natural pest control supplied. The model captures predator–prey interactions, linking them to crop growth and yield damage functions, which in turn are evaluated in a dynamic optimization framework. We introduce a new decision rule for judicious insecticide decisions using a natural enemy-adjusted economic threshold. This threshold represents the pest population density at which insecticide control becomes optimal in spite of the opportunity cost of injury to natural enemies of the target pest. Using field data from Michigan, the model is applied to the case of soybean aphid (Aphis glycines, Matsumura), a recent invasive pest of soybean (Glycine max), whose management is of both economic and environmental importance to the North Central region of the United States. As illustrated by the numerical examples, such natural enemy-adjusted threshold is likely to lead to fewer recommendations for insecticide use than naïve models that ignore natural enemies, resulting in less insecticide use, while maintaining profitability for farmers that rely on chemical pest control methods.The bioeconomic model developed in this study can be used to conduct a wide variety of analyses such as identifying dynamically optimal spray strategies and estimating the implied economic value of natural control services. Furthermore, with the incorporation of inter-year carry-over factors, such as overwintering of pests and natural enemies, the current model can contribute to building multi-year models for studying long-term pest management.     

Derived decision rules for pollution control in a general equilibrium space economy

This paper attempts to narrow the gap between economic theory and policy inthe field of environmental pollution control by expanding the traditional general equilibrium model to include the kind of spatial detail that is important for describing pollution. This model is then used to derive theorems which provide the basis for the development of spatially differentiated, tax-based decision rules. In spite of the fact that these rules require no information on either damage costs or control costs, they maintain many of the desirable properties of the more conventional informationally intensive tax policies.     

Emission control policies under uncertainty

The paper deals with the problem of optimal environmental policy under uncertainty. Usually, when an environmental policy is considered, only the expected values of the parameters of the marginal benefit and marginal cost functions associated with the policy are known. Thus a relevant question is: In the presence of uncertainty, what is the optimal policy mean for achieving the environmental objective? The study addresses itself to the specific objective of improving air quality although the analysis is generally applicable. The policy means are emission taxes and emission quotas. It is shown that under uncertainty neither of these means is generally optimal, and that specific parameter values of the costs and benefits relations and their distributions determine the optimal policy for each situation.     

Extraction capacity and the optimal order of extraction

The least-cost-first extraction rule for deposits with different extraction costs previously has been shown to be invalid in general equilibrium. This paper demonstrates that this rule also does not hold in partial equilibrium when extraction capacity is limited. Necessary and sufficient conditions for several surprising extraction orders are presented. If extraction from a high-cost resource is constrained, it may be optimal to begin extraction from a high-cost deposit (or backstop) strictly before extracting from a lower-cost deposit. If extraction from a low-cost resource is limited, it may be optimal to exhaust a high-cost deposit strictly before the low-cost deposit is exhausted or to abandon extraction temporarily from a high-cost deposit and then to exhaust it later. The analysis demonstrates how extraction constraints affect the order of extraction and shows that certain cost reversals are caused by limited extraction capacity rather than by the general equilibrium definition of extraction costs.     

Optimal fishery policy with artificial enhancement through stocking: California's white sturgeon as an example

Although optimal fishery policy has been derived from different kinds of economic and biological models, the interaction of fishing policy with artificial stocking policy has not been explicitly considered. We here determine optimal size limits, fishing effort, and stocking rate for three cases of interest: (1) recruitment-limited population, pre-recruitment stocking; (2) adult biomass-limited population, post-recruitment stocking; and (3) adult biomass-limited and recruitment-limited population, post-recruitment stocking. Results show that lower size limits should be set at the size at which the current market value exceeds the total future value of an individual, both to the fishery and to reproduction. Imposition of upper size limits is rarely optimal. Stocking is advisable when the hatchery cost times the relative contribution of stocking to recruitment is less than the contribution to the value of the catch. Optimal policy ranges from infinite effort at a specific size limit with maximum stocking when the cost of stocking is zero, to lower values of size limit and effort as stocking costs increase, the amount of stocking decreases, and more natural reproduction is optimal. Thus, as hatchery costs decline (or value of captured fish increases), optimal stocking/fishery policy varies from an unstocked fishery to a “put and take” fishery. The results are applied to the sturgeon fishery in the San Francisco Bay Estuary as an example. They imply that a reduced lower size limit and greater fishing mortality together with stocking would be optimal, but that current levels are conservative. The stocking decision depends critically on the values of parameters that are currently poorly known, such as: hatchery costs, survival to the fishery and the mechanisms controlling the sturgeon population.     

Monopoly and external costs: An application of second-best theory to the automobile industry

A monopoly that creates external costs poses a classic second-best problem: Whereas optimal allocation would be achieved by both removal of the monopoly and correction of the externality, it cannot be presumed that either action taken alone would improve welfare. It is shown that the desirability of pursuing either policy in isolation depends on the relative size of the external cost and the monopolist's price-cost margin. The analysis is applied to the automoblie manufacturing industry. Under current estimates of pollution damage and price-cost margin, industry output is suboptimal. Whereas this finding may not be translated directly into policy recommendations, it suggests that some skepticism about internalizing pollution costs is justified unless such action is accompanied by an appropriate reduction in monopoly power.     

The economics of enforcing pollution taxation

The efficient structure of pollution tax policy is examined when it is recognized that enforcing compliance will be costly. There are two components of this cost: (1) the direct cost of enforcement and (2) the cost polluters incur avoiding enforcement. Considering only the first cost, the efficient pollution policy calls for a tax in excess of that conventionally recommended as efficient, T¹ but with little enforcement. Once avoidance cost is recognized the efficient policy can be substantially altered; requiring a tax lower than T¹, but with greater enforcement. Even when direct enforcement cost is zero, it is shown that there is no unique advantage to T¹ in the absence of avoidance cost.     

Open- and closed-loop equilibrium control of trophic chains

If a nearly natural population system is deviated from its equilibrium, an important task of conservation ecology may be to control it back into equilibrium. In the paper a trophic chain is considered, and control systems are obtained by changing certain model parameters into control variables. For the equilibrium control two approaches are proposed. First, for a fixed time interval, local controllability into equilibrium is proved, and applying tools of optimal control, it is also shown how an appropriate open-loop control can be determined that actually controls the system into the equilibrium in given time. Another considered problem is to control the system to a new desired equilibrium. The problem is solved by the construction of a closed-loop control which asymptotically steers the trophic chain into this new equilibrium. In this way, actually, a controlled regime shift is realized.     

Environmental Cleanliness as a Public Good: Welfare and Policy Implications of Nonconvex Preferences

This paper explores the implications of a form of nonconvexity in individual preferences over the public good “cleanliness.” The implications of this nonconvexity on equilibrium outcomes, welfare analysis, the process of development, and optimal government policy are examined. The nonconvexity can imply a role for government in providing a commitment to a clean environment even if the government has a cost disadvantage in cleaning compared with individuals. By providing a credible commitment to a clean environment the government can induce private individuals to undertake optimal levels of cleaning on their own.     

Nash Implementation of a Proportional Solution to International Pollution Control Problems

For a very general class of pollution control models involving strictly quasi-concave utility functions over consumption and environmental quality and strictly convex emission abatement cost functions, a proportional cost sharing mechanism is presented inspired by the ratio equilibrium introduced by7. It is shown that the proportional solution yields a cost efficient allocation of abatement efforts and that the resulting utility imputation always lies in the stand alone core of the cost sharing game. In order to decentralize the proportional cost sharing equilibrium, a financial compensation mechanism implementing the proportional solution in complete information Nash equilibrium is presented.     

Uncertainty and the choice of pollution control instruments

This paper compares the relative efficiencies of pollution taxes, pollution standards, and the auctioning of pollution rights when the marginal damage function or marginal control cost are subject to uncertainty. In the first case, we find that all instruments yield the same expected social surplus. In the latter case, the choice of the optimal instrument depends, in general, on the relative elasticities of the marginal damage and marginal expected cost functions, on the way in which uncertainty enters the model, and on the distribution of the error term. Policy conclusions are derived.     

Green payments and dual policy goals

We use a mechanism design framework to analyze the optimal design of green payment policies with the dual goals of conservation and income support for small farms. Each farm is characterized by two dimensions of attributes: farms size and conservation efficiency. The policymaker may not be able to use the attributes as an explicit criterion for payments. We characterize optimal policy when conservation efficiency is unobservable to policymakers, and when farm size is also unobservable. An income support goal is shown to reduce the conservation distortion caused by asymmetric information. The cost of optimal green payment mechanisms is shown to depend crucially on whether large or small farms have greater conservation efficiency.     

Green payments and dual policy goals

We use a mechanism design framework to analyze the optimal design of green payment policies with the dual goals of conservation and income support for small farms. Each farm is characterized by two dimensions of attributes: farms size and conservation efficiency. The policymaker may not be able to use the attributes as an explicit criterion for payments. We characterize optimal policy when conservation efficiency is unobservable to policymakers, and when farm size is also unobservable. An income support goal is shown to reduce the conservation distortion caused by asymmetric information. The cost of optimal green payment mechanisms is shown to depend crucially on whether large or small farms have greater conservation efficiency.     

On the taxation of nonreplenishable natural resources

A resource constraint alters the profit maximizing decision rule for a natural resource producer. Stich a producer also responds differently to common policy instruments. For a zero rate of discount, it is shown that a franchise (lump sum), severance (ad valorem or unit), or profit tax result, respectively, is increased, unchanged, and unchanged output. These results are generalized to the case when the rate of discount is nonzero and tax rates vary over time. A tax-subsidy scheme for guaranteeing the equality of optimal social and private rates of depletion is presented for a case where these rates diverge.     

Sport and commercial fishing conflicts: A theoretical analysis

A recreational sector is added to a standard commercial fishing optimal control model to identify public decision variables which should be considered when determining optimal population levels and allocating harvestable fish between sport and commercial users. Both linear and nonlinear models are presented. A predator-prey relationship is also considered. Results derived from the models indicate that shortcomings exist with current economic inputs to policy making because of failure to consider relevant bioeconomic relationships. Future research topics to remedy this are discussed.     

Optimal harvesting of a plant-hervibore system: lichen and reindeer in northern Finland

The optimal harvesting policy for a plant-herbivore system consisting of lichen and reindeer in Finnish Lapland is investigated. Using a discrete time model with no age structure it is shown that the optimal procedure to reach target levels for lichen and reindeer involves a possible initial harvest of reindeer and then a sequence of no-harvesting years until the lichen has recovered. After two adjusting harvests the system will settle to an equilibrium. The optimal solution is compared with the fastest possible approach to the target levels. The two solutions coincide if future yields are sufficiently discounted. With a discount factor near one there will be a heavier initial harvest in the optimal solution. It is seen that allowing some harvesting also in the no-harvesting years has no marked effect on the total yield. The target levels for lichen and reindeer are not unique but depend both on discounting and on the length of the planning period.     

Municipal wastewater treatment cost

The cost of control for conventional pollutants at municipal wastewater treatment plants is examined. Empirical estimates of the effect of performance measures as well as the flow size of the waste stream are obtained for both the capital and the operation and maintenance components of total facility cost. These estimates are used to calculate the marginal cost per pound of pollution control over the range of effluent concentration beyond secondary treatment. The implications of the results for current environmental policy issues are outlined.     

乡镇企业污染集中控制的实践与探讨

石狮市对乡镇企业的污染集中控制历经了第５个年头，成绩是显著的。集中控制是遏制环境恶化趋势，推动经济增长方式转变的一项切实可行的环保制度，其优越性是显而易见的。本文就操作过程的实践与探讨加以总结，提出了推行集中控制应配套的环境政策，管理体制以及资金筹措和营运的调控措施。     

Control targets for the management of biological systems

Attention is focused on biological systems which are describable in terms of ordinary differential equations subject to human control inputs. The concept of an isochronal system is introduced in order to include systems for which the differential equations are valid only over regularly reoccurring time intervals.It is assumed that the control inputs are to be chosen so that an integral cost function of the state of the system, the control used, current time, and the time interval of the control program is minimized. Problems associated with minimizing this cost function over an infinitely long time interval is then considered. Difficulties inherent with minimizing a cost integral on an infinite time interval are shown to be avoided by minimizing an average of the cost function over an unknown but periodic time interval. Under proper circumstance, the optimal control program for the average cost function is either identical to or a good approximation to the optimal control program for the original cost function over an infinitely long time interval.Necessary conditions are obtained for minimizing an average cost function over an unspecified time interval subject to the system equations. For a given problem the necessary conditions will yield but a single system trajectory in the state space. For management purposes this trajectory may be thought of as a target to which the system should be driven and maintained.A number of examples illustrate the use of the necessary conditions to obtain control targets. Certain problems associated with the stability of the target solutions are illustrated with the examples.     

Welfare cost of pollution control

A model of joint-production of a conventional output and of pollutants is presented, within which continuous substitution between polluting fuels and nonpolluting inputs on the one hand and pollution control inputs on the other is allowed for. Using the steel industry as a case study, the welfare cost under an efficient policy to reduce particulate emissions is evaluated and compared with that under alternative inefficient policies. The results suggest that substantial cost savings can be made by following the “optimal” policy.