Potential barriers to the competence assessment of Offshore Installation Managers: A hermeneutic perspective.

The Offshore Installation Manager (OIM) performs one of the most critical roles within the UK offshore Oil and Gas Industry. The OIM is responsible for the safety and well-being of all persons on-board and within 500 m of the installation whilst operating within a complex environment where multiple organisations and stakeholders interact. The persistence of major incidents in the industry highlights the importance of OIM competence in controlling emergencies, consequently the research aims to identify the potential barriers that can limit or prevent the proficient competence assessment of an OIM in this situation. The OIM role is investigated by qualitative analysis of key documents using hermeneutics to interpret text and to identify the potential barriers to effective competence assessment. Such analysis has historically been used within the domains of theology, business and law. Hermeneutics takes into account the cultural, historical and social environment at the time of issue of the document, and semiotics, i.e. the study of signs and symbols, their use and interpretation.Analysis is ongoing, however the six potential barriers to the effective competence assessment of OIMs in controlling emergencies identified to date are discussed. These barriers are associated with the multiple definitions of competence that exist in the UK and worldwide; the current predominance of competence assessment by observation; the lack of definitive competence requirements for trainers and assessors; the complexity in UK legislation and the interaction between UK Government departments and concerns associated with goal setting legislation when applied to competence assessment.The output from the research will assist industry Duty Holders improve the competence assessment of their appointed OIMs and allow safety engineers to consider the probable competence of an OIM in a given environment at a given point in time.     

The oil and gas industry,the competence assessment of Offshore Installation Managers (OIMs) and Control Room Operators (CROs) in emergency response,and the lack of effective assessment of underpinning technical knowledge and understanding

Within the UKCS offshore oil and gas industry there exist key personnel who perform critical roles in an emergency as part of the installation's emergency response team (ERT), two of these personnel are the Offshore Installation Manager (OIM) and the offshore Control Room Operator (CRO). The OIM is responsible for the safety and well-being of all persons onboard and within 500 m of the installation. Should an emergency situation arise, the OIM performs one of the most critical roles in emergency response - management of the response to the emergency to mitigate and make safe the installation to secure a place of safety for persons onboard or organise their safe evacuation. Such emergency response shall also include limiting the loss of hydrocarbons to the environment. The CRO monitors and interprets the output from an installation's Distributed Control System (DCS) and Fire and Gas Panel (FGP), responding to alarms and deviations from steady state. In many instances, an offshore CRO's actions in response to these deviations can determine whether or not the situation deteriorates into a disaster. Should an emergency occur, the CRO will act in accordance with an installation's emergency response procedures and OIM instructions.The persistence of incidents, a number leading to disasters, in the industry highlights the importance of both OIM and CRO competence in controlling emergencies. Both positions require an effective system to assess the competence of job holders. Research at the University of Aberdeen identified potential barriers that can prevent the effective competence assessment of an OIM in emergency response. An extension to this research analyses the two offshore industry standards for competence in emergency response: OPITO 7025 – OIM Controlling Emergencies and OPITO 9004 – Control Room Operator Emergency Response, and associated documentation, applying a critical hermeneutic approach, focusing on the assessment of underpinning knowledge and understanding within the roles. The key findings are that there currently exists no effective means to assess the underpinning technical knowledge and understanding of either OIMs or CROs in emergency response within the offshore industry. Knowledge and, in particular, understanding are poorly defined within the relevant OPITO standards. There exists no validation of evidence collated to support an individual's underpinning knowledge and understanding and no truly independent audit of collated evidence or the process of assessment.The research is important to Duty Holders (see also OSD Installation Operators under UK Offshore Safety Directive Regulations) and employers within the offshore oil and gas industry, organisations associated with the offshore industry, safety engineers and UK Government departments with regard to the effectiveness of competence assessment of appointed OIMs and CROs. It is also significant to risk engineers when considering the probable competence of key emergency response personnel in a given environment at a given point in time. The research is not just applicable to the UKCS offshore industry but also to the global offshore oil and gas industry.     

Trends in accidents,disasters and risk sources in Europe

Most of the adverse impacts on man and/or the environment result from routine human activities such as the process industry, electricity generation and use, transport and agriculture (hazards, i.e. sources of risk). Apart from such essentially technological hazards, possibly resulting in “accidents”, human health and the environment can also be affected by natural hazards, possibly resulting in “disasters”, such as earthquakes or floods. This paper examines current trends in the risk sources and occurrences of four classes of such types of undesired events, entailing largely involuntary risk (e.g. neither car-driving nor smoking):

• •major accidents at fixed installations in the process industry,
• •incidents/accidents at nuclear installations,
• •marine transport and offshore installation accidents,
• •disasters caused by natural hazards and their potential exacerbation by human activities.

It aims to provide an integrated overview of such events in Europe (≡ 15 EU Member States, 4 EFTA, 13 PHARE, 7 TACIS and 5 other South and South Eastern European countries) during the last decade, estimating and interpreting trends in the number of risk sources and accidental events. For each type of event, specific “accident” definitions are given, illustrating the differences in the perception of the respective risk.     

Management of change: Lessons learned from staff reductions in the chemical process industry

Increasing global competition and shareholder pressure are causing major changes in the chemical industry. Over the last decade companies have been continuously improving staff efficiency. As a result, most modern chemical plants can be regarded as lean. Plans to further reduce the number of staff have come under increasing criticism by personnel for safety reasons, and there is strong resistance to further staff reductions. It is clear that management and workers often have conflicting viewpoints for more than just safety reasons; technologists and safety engineers also have different points of view. This results in complex decision-making processes and makes it difficult to realize changes.What can the chemical industries learn from their experiences of decision-making and management with regard to staff reductions?In our exploratory research that used four case studies, we were able to identify and analyse three distinct patterns, with some variations:

• •Fragmented and incomplete decision-making.
• •Unintended and undesirable side effects generated by the decision-making and management of change.
• •Development of difficult dilemmas and ambiguous issues.

In this paper, we present a conceptual model that includes factors important for optimizing shifts. This model can serve as a common frame of reference for all agents involved in the decision-making and management process with regard to staffing.The present study was based on four cases, which means our findings serve to form rather than test hypotheses. At this early stage it is not yet possible to generalize from or validate the results, but we plan to go beyond these preliminary results in future research.     

Investigations of flame front propagation between interconnected process vessels. Development of a new flame front propagation time prediction model

For the case where a dust or gas explosion can occur in a connected process vessel, it would be useful, for the purpose of designing protection measures and also for assessing the existing protection measures such as the correct placement, to have a tool to estimate the time for flame front propagation along the connecting pipe. Measurements of data from large-scale explosion tests in industrially relevant process vessels are reported. To determine the flame front propagation time, either a 1 m³ or a 4.25 m³ primary process vessel was connected via a pipe to a mechanically or pneumatically fed 9.4 m³ secondary silo. The explosion propagation started after ignition of a maize starch/air mixture in the primary vessel. No additional dust was present along the connecting pipe. Systematic investigations of the explosion data have shown a relationship between the flame front propagating time and the reduced explosion over-pressure of the primary explosion vessel for both vessel volumes. Furthermore, it was possible to validate this theory by using explosion data from previous investigations. Using the data, a flame front propagation time prediction model was developed which is applicable for:

• •gas and dust explosions up to a K value of 100 and 200 bar m s⁻¹, respectively, and a maximum reduced explosion over-pressure of up to 7 bar;
• •explosion vessel volumes of 0.5, 1, 4.25 and 9.4 m³, independent of whether they are closed or vented;
• •connecting pipes of pneumatic systems with diameters of 100–200 mm and an air velocity up to 30 m s⁻¹;
• •open ended pipes and pipes of interconnected vessels with a diameter equal to or greater than 100 mm;
• •lengths of connecting pipe of at least 2.5–7 m.

     

Human factors integration – Bridging the gap between system designers and end-users: A case study

Within any high hazard industry such as chemical, oil and gas, rail or nuclear, it is necessary to involve system end-users within the design process if system design is to be optimised. To facilitate the identification and assessment of end user requirements it is necessary to integrate human factors (HF) into design from the start of the design lifecycle.During 2004, the author facilitated the integration of HF into a development project being implemented at a major gas processing facility on mainland Britain. The approach taken to HF integration on the project is commonly applied across the high hazard industries. This paper will provide information on this process and the benefits that this provided to the operator. Details will be provided on the approach taken in terms of:

• –Liaison between HF and other design disciplines.
• –Analysis undertaken and tools used.
• –HF topic areas covered.
• –Specific issues raised and how these were resolved.

It will demonstrate the advantage of the early integrated approach as compared to the later auditing or assurance approach sometimes taken in relation to HF.     

How the management aspects can affect the results of the QRA

This paper describes a procedure to include into the quantitative risk assessment (and namely in the construction and solution of the Fault Trees) the Safety Management System (SMS) aspects.The parameters used for probabilistic assessment of the Expected Number of Failures (ENF) of a Top Event are parameterised depending on:

• 1.a weight assigned to each SMS section with reference to the parameter;
• 2.a judgment about the correct application of the same SMS section.

Each probabilistic parameter (e.g. failure rates, mean time to repair, and so on) is thus modified using a mathematical algorithm, where an overall parameter including all the SMS sections influencing each single parameter is defined.The application of the procedure to a formaldehyde plant allowed the validation of the method and is here entirely reported.     

Site managers and safety leadership in the offshore oil and gas industry

Management commitment to safety is recognised as a fundamental component of an organisation's safety culture (Reason, 1997. Managing the Risks of Organisational Accidents. Ashgate, Aldershot, UK). However, the role and experiences of site managers in relation to safety have rarely been examined. A survey questionnaire was conducted of 200 Offshore Installation Managers (OIMs) from 157 offshore oil and gas installations belonging to 36 organisations operating on the United Kingdom Continental Shelf. The questionnaire gathered data relating to OIMs' level of experience and style of leadership as well as their knowledge and experience of safety and leadership within the industry. The aims of the study are twofold. The first aim is to investigate the relationship between managers' level of experience and style of leadership with their safety attitudes and behaviour. The second aim is to investigate managers' perceptions of best practice in safety leadership and their beliefs about the key outstanding safety issues. Findings suggest that experience is not the dominant factor in determining leadership style or attitudes to safety, however, the less experienced OIMs and those with more directive styles of leadership were found to overestimate their ability to influence and motivate the workforce. It seems that although managers are aware of best practice in safety leadership, they do not always act in ways consistent with this. They report having considerable difficulty in motivating and controlling some safety crucial aspects of workforce behaviour such as getting workers to accept ownership of safety and getting workers to report near misses. In terms of outstanding safety issues, it appears that improvements still need to be made in a number of areas such as the standardisation of safety culture; the harmonisation of safety practices and procedures across the industry; improved workforce competency and increased workforce involvement in safety activities and decision making.     

Problems with identifiying a standard procedure for determining KG values for flammable vapors

Assessing the effect of potential confined fuel–air explosions involves the examination of several essential parameters. These include the limits of combustion, maximum pressure and the deflagration index or K_G. Accurate measurement of these parameters can be influenced by numerous experimental conditions. This paper describes the sensitivity of one of these parameters (K_G) to several experimental influences. The deflagration index, K_G, is important since it is the main design parameter for explosion protection systems. These studies used a highly automated 20 liter combustion sphere, with a 10 mm fuse wire igniter. Our results for methane combustion show that the deflagration index, K_G, is very sensitive to

• •the gas composition; a 1% change in nitrogen composition changed the index value by 12 bar-m/s along the stoichiometric line. Our studies also identified some problems with mixing gases to the desired composition.
• •the moisture content of the gas, which can change the index by 13 bar-m/s.

For some combustion gas compositions, it was difficult to describe a K_G value due to significant fluctuations in the pressure vs time data. Finally, an extensive study of fuse wire igniter dynamics identified a means to provide a consistent energy delivery to the igniter. All of these problems contribute significantly to specifying a standard procedure for determining the deflagration index.     

The relationship between speeding behaviour (as measured by violation convictions) and crash involvement

While it seems rational to assume that crash involvement risk and outcome are influenced by the way one drives, nevertheless there is continuing controversy over the validity of certain categories of traffic law infractions as true measures of such behavior. Specifically, does the accumulation of tickets for speeding identify drivers as high risk for becoming culpably involved in speed-related crashes? Further, does a proclivity for exhibiting speeding behavior in the presence of police translate into a greater risk for involvement in high-severity collisions?The research reported in this paper attempted to address these issues. Several years of crash and conviction data were utilized to examine

• 1.(a) the risk of culpable crash involvement by severity of outcome during a 2-year period following 3 years of conviction record,
• 2.(b) the degree to which an increasing level of speeding convictions per driver relates to an increasing propensity for speed to be a factor in drivers' crash involvements.

The results of the research identified a clear distinction between the conviction categories of “exceeding the speed limit” and “excessive speed” in terms of these accident-violation relationships.     

Experimental and CFD-DEM study of the dispersion and combustion of wheat starch and carbon-black particles during the standard 20L sphere test

The 20L sphere is one of the standard devices used for dust explosivity characterization. One concern about the effectiveness and reliability of this test is related to the particle size variation due to particles' agglomeration and de-agglomeration. These phenomena are related to the turbulent regime of the dust cloud during the dispersion. This variable must be considered since it determines the uncertainty level of the ignitability and severity parameters of dust combustion. In this context, this study describes the influence of the cloud turbulence on the dust segregation and fragmentation through a study combining both, experimental and computational approaches. The behavior of the gas-solid mixture evidenced with the standard rebound nozzle was compared with that observed with six new nozzle geometries. Thereafter, the time-variation of the Particle Size Distribution (PSD) within the 20L sphere was analyzed for two different powders: carbon-black and wheat starch. On the one hand, the turbulence levels and PSD variations were characterized by Particle Image Velocimetry (PIV) tests and granulometric analyses, respectively. On the other hand, a computational approach described the dispersion process with CFD-DEM simulations developed in STAR-CCM + v11.04.010. The simulation results established that the homogeneity assumption is not satisfied with the nozzles studied. Nonetheless, the particles segregation levels can be reduced using nozzles that generate a better dust distribution in the gas-solid injections. Subsequently, an additional first-approach CFD model was established to study the behavior of the combustion step for a starch/air mixture. This model considers the gas-phase reactions of the combustible gases that are produced from the devolatilization of wheat starch ($CO,C{H}_4,C_2{H}_4,C_2{H}_6,C_2{H}_2,$ and $H_2$) and allowed to establish the approximate fraction of the particle mass that devolatilizes, as well as to confirm that the modeling of the pyrolysis stage is essential for the correct prediction of the maximum rate of pressure rise.     

Operator competence and capacity - Lessons from the Montara blowout

The blowout of the Montara H1 well in the Timor Sea off the northwest coast of Australia in August 2009 was the first such incident in Australian offshore waters for 25 years. This article seeks to draw lessons for management of complex hazardous activities from these events by analysing critical decisions regarding well control barriers. Concepts such as trial and error learning, sensemaking and the need for multiple barriers are used to demonstrate why the organisation was blind to the developing problems and hence why lack of technical competence alone is not sufficient to explain the events that occurred. Three organisational improvements are proposed - providing active supervision, improved technical integrity assurance and better use of risk assessment. The article concludes with an appeal for changes in regulatory policy regarding safety to include organisational issues in addition to the traditional technical focus.     

Driving while impaired by alcohol: An analysis of drink-drivers involved in UK collisions

Objective: Drink-driving represents a critical issue on international organizations’ agendas as one of the key behavioral risk factors in road traffic safety, alongside speed and nonuse of motorcycle helmets, seat belts, and child restraints. Changing road user behaviors regarding these 5 factors is a critical component in reducing road traffic injuries and casualties. The objective of this study is the identification of drivers who are more likely to contribute to crashes in the UK while impaired by alcohol to design targeted drink drive compliance campaigns.

Method: To profile drivers with the factor “impaired by alcohol” assigned in collisions, an extensive data set is used, including all reported injury collisions between 2011 and 2015 in the UK (police records), merged with the Experian Mosaic Database. A multilevel mixed-effects logistic regression is conducted, utilizing the hierarchical nature of the data (drivers within Mosaic types).

Results: Using multilevel mixed-effects logistic regression analysis, the finding is that some driver profiles are more likely to contribute to crashes and are assigned the contributory factor “impaired by alcohol.” Drink-related crashes are more common in some circumstances or for some crash-involved driver groups than others. For instance, alcohol-related crashes are more likely to occur on single carriageways and among males and 25- to 35-year-olds. Drink-drive-related crashes are found to be strongly associated with dark lighting conditions and, more specifically, with late night hours (the interval between 3:00 a.m. and 4:00 a.m. accounts for a third of the drink-drive-related collisions). Using the Experian Mosaic Database which divides the UK population into 66 types based on demographic, lifestyle, and behavior characteristics, the finding is that, among crash-involved drivers, some Mosaic types are significantly more likely (e.g., pocket pensions, dependent greys, streetwise singles) and others are significantly less likely (e.g., crowded kaleidoscope, cultural comfort, penthouse chic) to contribute to a drink-related crash.

Conclusions: The outcome is a more nuanced understanding of drivers contributing to drink-related crashes in the UK. The study concludes by discussing the implications for governments and other interested bodies for better targeting and delivery of public education campaigns and interventions.     

Risk assessment in the offshore industry

This paper describes the implementation and use of risk assessment in the offshore industry in relation to safety aspects — safety to people's life and health, as well as environment and property. Although risk assessments may be based on both qualitative and quantitative methods, the main focus here will be on quantitative risk assessments (QRA). The development of offshore QRA has been lead by a mutual influence and interaction between the regulatory authorities for the UK and Norwegian sectors of the North Sea as well as the oil companies operating here. The experience from this area has been the main basis during the writing of this paper.     

Safety in construction – a comprehensive description of the characteristics of high safety standards in construction work, from the combined perspective of supervisors and experienced workers

Introduction

The often applied engineering approach to safety management in the construction industry needs to be supplemented by organizational measures and measures based on how people conceive and react to their social environment. This requires in-depth knowledge of the broad preconditions for high safety standards in construction. The aim of the study was to comprehensively describe the preconditions and components of high safety standards in the construction industry from the perspective of both experienced construction workers and first-line managers.

Method

Five worker safety representatives and 19 first-line managers were interviewed, all strategically selected from within a large Swedish construction project. Phenomenographic methodology was used for data acquisition and analysis and to categorize the information. Nine informants verified the results.

Results

The study identified four main categories of work safety preconditions and components: (1) Project characteristics and nature of the work, which set the limits of safety management; (2) Organization and structures, with the subcategories planning, work roles, procedures, and resources; (3) Collective values, norms, and behaviors, with the subcategories climate and culture, and interaction and cooperation; and (4) Individual competence and attitudes, with the subcategories knowledge, ability and experience, and individual attitudes.

Discussion

The results comprehensively describe high safety standards in construction, incorporating organizational, group, individual, and technical aspects. High-quality interaction between different organizational functions and hierarchical levels stood out as important aspects of safety. The results are discussed in relation to previous research into safety and into the social-psychological preconditions for other desired outcomes in occupational settings.

Impact on Industry

The results can guide construction companies in planning and executing construction projects to a high safety standard.