The limits of democracy in tackling climate change

Previous research has shown that democracies exhibit stronger commitments to mitigate climate change and, generally, emit less carbon dioxide than non-democratic regimes. However, there remains much unexplained variation in how democratic regimes perform in this regard. Here it is argued that the benefits of democracy for climate change mitigation are limited in the presence of widespread corruption that reduces the capacity of democratic governments to reach climate targets and reduce CO₂ emissions. Using a sample of 144 countries over 1970–2011, the previously established relationship between the amount of countries’ CO₂ emissions and their level of democracy is revisited. It is empirically tested whether this relationship is instead moderated by the levels of corruption. The results indicate that more democracy is only associated with lower CO₂ emissions in low-corruption contexts. If corruption is high, democracies do not seem to do better than authoritarian regimes.     

Oil and power industries’ responses to EU emissions trading: laggards or low-carbon leaders?

ABSTRACT

How have petroleum and power companies and their European industry associations responded to the EU emissions trading system (ETS)? Responses can be political, directed externally towards the initiation and reforms of the EU ETS itself, or internally and market-based, directed at low-carbon solutions. Proactive response strategies shape companies’ leadership potential. Variation in responses is explained by two models that differ in assumptions about corporate behaviour as well as the wider multilevel regulatory context in which companies operate. Responses are found to have converged within the two industries, with reactive companies following the proactive ones. Secondly, responses between the two industries increasingly diverge, with the power industry becoming much more proactive than the petroleum industry. The main explanation is found in the differing relevance of the two models and the wider regulatory context, particularly differing exposure to international competition and weak international climate agreements.     

Geoengineering and sustainability

ABSTRACT

Geoengineering is regarded by advocates as a creative and responsible technological option in the face of a climate emergency. Critics often see it as a hubristic attempt to play God, with disastrous consequences for the planet and humanity. These antipodal perspectives are represented by the ideal types of Prometheans and Gaians. Prometheans and Gaians typically talk past each other. The geoengineering debate can be made more fruitful by well articulating their respective positions and subsequently situating them in the discourse of sustainability. A sustainability orientation does not answer the troubling question whether geoengineering should be developed and deployed. But it can foster a ‘fusion of horizons’ between Prometheans and Gaians, providing common ground in an otherwise polarized debate and making a more productive dialogue possible.     

Do global climate summits influence public awareness and policy preferences concerning climate change?

A survey-embedded experiment implemented around the time of the 2014 annual Conference of the Parties (COP) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (N ≈ 1200) examined whether such summits are able to increase citizens’ awareness of climate problems. This study finds that exposure to positive or negative cues about the COP increases climate change awareness, particularly among participants who start out with a low level of awareness. Neither positive nor negative cues about the COP significantly affect people’s policy preferences. Our finding resonates with Bernard Cohen’s observation that the mass media may not often be successful in telling people what to think, but they are successful in telling readers what to think about.     

The EU effect: does trade with the EU reduce CO2 emissions in the developing world?

The European Union (EU) is an important destination for developing country exports. Has the EU’s commitment to the Kyoto Protocol induced developing countries to reduce their carbon dioxide (CO₂) emissions? Our analyses of 136 developing countries from 1981 through 2007 suggests that: developing countries’ export dependence on the EU is associated with CO₂ emission reductions post-Kyoto in relation to the pre-Kyoto time period; this also holds for SO_2, which, while not covered under Kyoto, is linked with CO₂ emission levels; this does not hold for PM₁₀, a pollutant which is not covered under Kyoto and is not directly associated with CO₂ emissions related to industrial activities; developing countries’ export dependence on non-EU developed countries and on the rest of the world is not associated with significant reductions in emissions between pre- and post-Kyoto for these pollutants . In sum, even in the absence of binding regulatory mandates, the EU appears to exert market leverage to project its regulatory preferences abroad.     

Divergent neighbors: corporatism and climate policy networks in Finland and Sweden

ABSTRACT

Previous research has suggested that corporatist polities tend to enact more ambitious environmental policies than others. Here it is argued that the macro concept of corporatism can be dissected into three components: inclusiveness, consensualism and strength of tripartite organisations. These components of corporatism can be measured at the meso-level of policy networks. It is proposed that inclusiveness and consensualism are related to ambitious climate policy but exclusive tripartite coalitions can be detrimental for the ambitiousness of climate policy. This argument is backed by evidence from policy network surveys in two similar corporatist countries where climate change policies diverge: Sweden, where policies are ambitious, and Finland, where they are less so. It is found that in Sweden the climate change policy network is more consensual and slightly more inclusive, while in Finland tripartite organisations play a strong role.     

Measuring and explaining the EU’s effect on national climate performance

ABSTRACT

To what extent has the European Union (EU) had a benign or retarding effect on what its member states would have undertaken in the absence of EU climate policies during 2008–2012? A measurement tool for the EU policy’s effect is developed and shows a benign average EU effect with considerable variation across countries. The EU’s policy effectiveness vis-à-vis its member states is explained by the EU’s non-compliance mechanism, the degree of usage of the Kyoto flexible mechanisms, and national pre-Kyoto emission reduction goals. Time-series cross-sectional analyses show that the EU’s non-compliance mechanism has no effect, while the ex-ante plans for using Kyoto flexible mechanisms and/or the ambitious pre-Kyoto emission reduction targets allow member states to escape constraints imposed by EU climate policy.     

“No fences make bad neighbors” but markets make better ones: cap-and-trade reduces cross-border SO2 in a natural experiment

The clean air interstate rule (CAIR) was a regional cap-and-trade program announced in 2005 which covered 27 eastern US states and sought to reduce sulfur dioxide emissions from coal-fired power plants. The rule was later vacated after a court found that the non-targeted design of the program did not comply with the Clean Air Act provision to regulate interstate air pollution. Using a custom air pollution dispersion model, I calculate the interstate SO₂ pollution from 493 coal-fired power plants across the United States between 1997 and 2020. In a difference-in-differences setup with plants not covered by CAIR in the control group, I estimate the treatment effect of the program on overall- and cross-border SO₂ emissions and find a 24% reduction in overall emissions and reduces the risk that a plant violates air quality standards across state borders by 2–4%. I report evidence of heterogeneous treatment effects where the reduction in overall emissions attributed to CAIR is lower among plants transporting SO₂ in excess of 1% of the National Air Quality Standards to another state.

     

Climate pioneership and leadership in structurally disadvantaged maritime port cities

ABSTRACT

Innovative climate governance in small-to-medium-sized structurally disadvantaged cities (SDCs) are assessed. Considering their deeply ingrained severe economic and social problems it would be reasonable to assume that SDCs act primarily as climate laggards or at best as followers. However, novel empirical findings show that SDCs are capable of acting as climate pioneers. Different types and styles of climate leadership and pioneership and how they operate within multi-level and polycentric governance structures are identified and assessed. SDCs seem relatively readily willing to adopt transformational climate pioneership styles to create ‘green’ jobs, for example, in the offshore wind energy sector and with the aim of improving their poor external image. However, in order to sustain transformational climate pioneership they often have to rely on support from ‘higher’ levels of governance. For SDCs, there is a tension between learning from each other’s best practice and fierce economic competition in climate innovation.     

The indecisive role of the market in China’s SO2 and COD emissions trading

Governmental intervention is essential to combat environmental pollution, a phenomenon classically explained as market failure, while market-based environmental policy instruments have provided cost-effective alternatives. By examining five pilot air pollution (sulfur dioxide) and water pollution (chemical oxygen demand) trading schemes in China through a market-based theoretical framework and extensive empirical analysis, this research analyzes where a state-market boundary is defined, whether the market is performing effectively, and, critically, what leads to underperformance. Constrained by policy design, policy conflicts, and excessive state intervention, the market has not played an effective and ‘decisive’ role, resulting in low market thickness for participants and transactions, market congestion on prices, and inadequate market safety for genuine emissions trading. Better emissions trading for conventional pollutants and CO₂ requires better market-oriented rules, improved policy coordination, and stronger implementation while minimizing state intervention.     

Does size matter? Comparing the party politics of climate change in Australia and Norway

ABSTRACT

The implications of state size for the party politics of climate change are examined, and in particular its effect in facilitating or impeding cross-party consensus on the issue. This issue is explored through an in-depth, qualitative comparison of Australia and Norway, which are shown to be comparable in important respects yet differ in terms of their size and climate politics. Original primary data is presented from 44 interviews with policymakers and policy-shapers in both countries, which shows that, to the limited extent that state size moderates the parties’ behaviour, it is the countries’ geographical – not economic – size that matters. Institutional factors are found to play a more significant role, however, and the corporatist features of state-business cooperation, strong ENGOs and compensatory welfare arrangements are highlighted as particularly important.     

Prospects for a multi-stakeholder dialogue on climate engineering

ABSTRACT

Lessons from the literature on multi-stakeholder dialogue (MSD) that are relevant to the debate on climate engineering (CE) are examined. MSDs have been used to prod slow-to-develop intergovernmental regulatory processes on a range of transnational and global controversies. A CEMSD might push forward anticipatory governance of CE by promoting social learning, sharpening and legitimizing governance norms, and starting to arrange the political space for governance by states. However, significant challenges and risks are also identified, including questions about the ripeness of the issue for stakeholder dialogue; difficult trade-offs in the design of dialogues, particularly around issues of participation and knowledge-power; and inherent tensions in the various purposes a CEMSD might serve. Given these challenges, steps forward that would better prepare a space for legitimate and effective dialogue are recommended.     

De-Europeanising or disengaging? EU environmental policy and Brexit

ABSTRACT

The European Union (EU) has had a profound effect upon its members’ environmental policy. Even in the United Kingdom (UK), the EU’s most recalcitrant member state (historically labeled the ‘Dirty man of Europe’), environmental policy has been Europeanised. As the UK moves to the EU’s exit door it is timely to assess the utility of Europeanisation for understanding policy dynamics in the UK. Drawing upon interviews and extensive engagement with stakeholders, this article analyses the potential impact of Brexit upon environmental policy and politics. The analytical toolkit offered by de-Europeanisation is developed to identify the factors that drive and inhibit de-Europeanisation processes, thereby providing insights that may be applicable in other settings. Disengagement and policy stagnation are presented as more likely environmental outcomes of Brexit, with capacity emerging as a central explanatory variable.     

Environmental,climate and social leadership of small enterprises: Fairphone’s step-by-step approach

ABSTRACT

Achieving sustainable consumption and production requires a break with current practices in many sectors, including the smartphone sector. Leaders are central actors in catalysing such change by developing, implementing and promoting innovative ideas, products and practices. Not only large but also small enterprises can aspire to assume leadership for sustainability. This contribution explores the environmental, climate and social leadership of the social enterprise Fairphone that seeks to start a movement towards a more sustainable smartphone sector. Endowed with barely any structural power, it relies on other leadership types, especially entrepreneurial leadership, which is based on dialogue, persuasion and coalition-building. Small enterprises can be leaders, but pursuing a goal such as transforming the smartphone sector takes a step-by-step approach targeting different follower groups from suppliers, competitors and consumers to end-of-life processors and policymakers. Those different follower groups are susceptible to different (combinations of) leadership types.     

Compliance with EU environmental law. The iceberg is melting

ABSTRACT

The European Union (EU) has become the main driver for environmental policy output for its member states whose number has more than tripled over the past four decades. The EU’s deepening and widening has led researchers to expect more non-compliance with EU environmental legislation. In fact, however, the implementation gap has narrowed over the past 25 years. Except for Southern enlargement, taking on new member states has not exacerbated the EU’s compliance problem in the field of environmental policy. Nor has the expansion of the environmental acquis. This is explained by the European Commission’s strategies of managing and enforcing compliance. EU environmental policy has become less demanding on member states since it increasingly tends to amend existing rather than set new legislation. Simultaneously, the Commission has developed new instruments to strengthen member state capacities to implement EU environmental legislation.     

Assessing President Obama’s climate change record

ABSTRACT

President Obama’s climate change record is assessed by looking at his success in translating policy goals into policy outputs (laws or regulatory action) during his time in office. Obama’s campaign speeches are examined to identify specific promises to take action on climate change before proceeding to examine whether, how and with what success he managed to act upon these pledges. Obama is shown to have set out a multi-pronged approach to deal with climate change in his campaign speeches and succeeded in translating many of his goals into policy outputs. This finding contributes to debates about Obama’s ‘green’ credentials.     

Environmental decision-making: the influence of policy information

ABSTRACT

The success of technological development depends on citizens’ social acceptance, whereas several challenges related to the understanding of citizens’ reactions to renewable energy and its policies are identifiable. Most importantly, the gap between general attitudes towards the environment and specific voting behaviour regarding environment-friendly policy proposals calls for an explanation of how a policy’s design causes citizens who might otherwise support environmental measures to express opposition in direct democratic votes. Therefore, how policy design and policy information impact opinion formation is investigated. Salient aspects are identified, and the different types of information or qualifications that may cause opposition are considered. This new approach reveals that citizens, in environmental decision-making, do indeed consider policy design and policy information, which they regard as conditions for support, and that the type of policy information matters since citizens do not consider all of the policy details when they make decisions.     

Leadership and lesson-drawing in the European Union’s multilevel climate governance system

ABSTRACT

The important role that climate leaders and leadership play at different levels of the European Union (EU) multilevel governance system is exemplified. Initially, climate leader states set the pace with ambitious policy measures that were adopted largely on an ad hoc basis. Since the mid-1980s, the EU has developed a multilevel climate governance system that has facilitated leadership and lesson-drawing at all governance levels including the local level. The EU has become a global climate policy leader by example although it had been set up as a ‘leaderless Europe’. The resulting ‘leadership without leader’ paradox cannot be sufficiently explained merely by reference to top-level EU climate policies. Local-level climate innovations and lesson-drawing have increasingly been encouraged by the EU’s multilevel climate governance system which has become more polycentric. The recognition of economic co-benefits of climate policy measures has helped to further the EU’s climate leadership role.     

Conditions for successful environmental justice mobilizations: an analysis of 50 cases

ABSTRACT

The environmental justice (EJ) literature can benefit from comparative analysis that helps to identify conditions for more and less successful outcomes. A data set of 50 EJ cases in the U.S. was developed with high and low remediation as the outcome. Causal conditions were selected on theoretical grounds, and included five mobilizing strategies (local and state government coalitions, federal government attention, civil disobedience, litigation, and national NGO support) and three general conditions (absence of industry counter-mobilization, presence of water pollution, and proposed or new siting). Qualitative comparative analysis and other analyses indicated that all causal conditions were found in the high-remediation cases but that some conditions (water pollution and local–state coalitions) were more consistently associated with the high-remediation outcome. The analysis points to the value of systematic studies of the factors that affect local EJ outcomes and to the need for better case study collections.     

Mobilizing environmental sentiment through the media

ABSTRACT

Recent research into the best ways to mobilize people to act on climate change suggests that careful, and relatively positive, emotional framing is critical. However, environmental non-governmental organizations (ENGOs) need to not only mobilize publics, but also attract media coverage. If the media prefers negativity or is skeptical of ENGOs’ emotive appeals, are ENGOs’ emotional frames damaging their ability to gain media attention? Quantitative sentiment analysis is used to identify emotional framing in a targeted case study of 350.org’s public press releases and their subsequent media coverage. The results suggest that appropriate emotional frames for mobilization are not necessarily detrimental to gaining media attention, and that ENGO press releases influence media coverage, when they are used. Several concrete suggestions emerge for how ENGOs might use press releases more effectively, if they seek to influence the media’s emotional tone on climate change.