The four faces of the environmental state: environmental governance regimes in 28 countries

The primary task for the environmental state is to address problems related to the market’s externalisation of environmental costs. It has four main resources at its disposal: regulation, redistribution, organisation, and knowledge generation. The way these four resources are deployed make up a state’s environmental governance arrangements. Using data on environmental regulation, taxes, public administrations, and knowledge production from 28 countries, and a hierarchical cluster analysis, four different types of environmental states are identified: established, emerging, partial, and weak. This is followed by some suggestions for further research on the environmental state in a comparative perspective.     

Greening Leviathan: the rise of the environmental state?

‘Bringing the state back in’ to research on comparative, inter-, and trans-national environmental politics and policy will contribute to better understanding of the limits and prospects of contemporary approaches to environmental politics and the overall evolution of contemporary states once environmental issues become central. The rationale for the state as an analytical perspective in environmental policy and politics is explained, and an empirically oriented concept of the environmental state is introduced, along with a tentative sketch of its evolution in historical perspective. A research agenda on the environmental state is mapped out, centring around variation and convergence in environmental states across space and time; the political/economic dynamics of contemporary environmental states; and inter-linkages among environmental problems, the constitution of political communities, and the functioning of the public power. In conclusion, the ways in which the contributions to this volume address that research agenda are introduced.     

The environmental state as a model for the world? An analysis of policy repertoires in 37 countries

Scholars have proposed the analytical concept of the environmental state, a state where government actively addresses negative environmental externalities of economic activities. The mapping of environmental regulatory expansion in Western countries has been central in recent attempts to identify the environmental state empirically. Surprisingly little is known, however, when it comes to the environmental regulatory expansions in non-Western countries. Are there similar trends towards the emergence of environmental states in the non-West as well? From analysing data covering 25 policies in 37 countries, it appears that regulatory expansion has also occurred in the non-Western world, and the distinction between the West and the non-West has been reduced over time. There are non-Western countries among environmental pioneers, and there is some evidence for the trend of global convergence. Future research on environmental states should take into account emerging environmental states in the non-West.     

Green states in Africa: beyond the usual suspects

Whilst the ‘green state debate’ has primarily focused on a narrow range of usual suspects in the developed world, the debate can be enriched and challenged by considering more diverse cases. Viewing African states from a green state perspective invites empirical reassessment of the geographical scope of the concept, and introduces a new set of conceptual questions about the political significance of transitions in environmental governance. Ecological modernisation theory has largely neglected African states because it is assumed that African states are weak, failing, or failed, and that environmentalism is a post-materialist phenomenon. Whilst both assumptions can be challenged empirically, a biopolitical perspective on the African environmental state, drawing on the work of Michel Foucault, can both position African state development within a longer-term context and challenge some assumptions of ecological modernisation. Examples from Egypt, South Africa, and the Kavango-Zambezi Trans-frontier Conservation Area highlight underestimated continuities in environmental state practices. The international and transnational drivers of the green state in Africa are emphasised, as well as the political dangers of a green ‘state building’ project.     

The environmental nation state in decline

The environmental nation state is not a formal category but a substantive one. The current set of national environmental state institutions originated in the late 1960s/1970s but has since changed in character. Many scholars note that since the new millennium, the environmental nation state in OECD countries is losing power and authority and is thus in decline, in line with wider concerns about the positions of states versus markets under conditions of (neo-liberal) globalisation. Assessing the decline of environmental nation state authority, three conclusions are drawn. States do not lose power in all sectors vis-à-vis markets. Hence, environmental nation state decline does not follow a general tendency. Second, the decline of environmental nation state powers cannot be equated with less effective or lower levels of environmental protection, as other environmental authorities have stepped in, and the jury is still out on their environmental effectiveness. Third, declining powers of environmental nation state institutions increasingly become a self-fulfilling prophecy of environmental policymakers, but non-state environmental authorities cannot take over all environmental state functions.     

Welfare states and environmental states: a comparative analysis

A framework is presented for thinking about state intervention in developed capitalist economies in two domains: social policy and environmental policy (and, within that, climate-change policy). Five drivers of welfare state development are identified, the ‘five Is’ of Industrialisation: Interests, Institutions, Ideas/Ideologies, and International Influences. Research applying this framework to the postwar development of welfare states in the OECD is summarised, distinguishing two periods: up to 1980, and from 1980 to 2008. How far this framework can contribute to understanding the rise and differential patterns of environmental governance and intervention across advanced capitalist states since 1970 is explored, before briefly comparing and contrasting the determinants of welfare states and environmental states, identifying common drivers in both domains and regime-specific drivers in each. The same framework is then applied to developments since 2008 and into the near future, sketching two potential configurations and speculating on the conditions for closer, more integrated ‘eco-welfare states’.     

Compliance with EU environmental law. The iceberg is melting

ABSTRACT

The European Union (EU) has become the main driver for environmental policy output for its member states whose number has more than tripled over the past four decades. The EU’s deepening and widening has led researchers to expect more non-compliance with EU environmental legislation. In fact, however, the implementation gap has narrowed over the past 25 years. Except for Southern enlargement, taking on new member states has not exacerbated the EU’s compliance problem in the field of environmental policy. Nor has the expansion of the environmental acquis. This is explained by the European Commission’s strategies of managing and enforcing compliance. EU environmental policy has become less demanding on member states since it increasingly tends to amend existing rather than set new legislation. Simultaneously, the Commission has developed new instruments to strengthen member state capacities to implement EU environmental legislation.     

Globalization’s limits to the environmental state? Integrating telecoupling into global environmental governance

Globalization entails increased interdependence and interconnectivities among distal regions and social-ecological systems. This global interregional connectedness – telecoupling – gives rise to specific sustainability challenges, which require new governance solutions. Moving beyond ‘scaling-up’ governance to address global environmental problems, and exploring the implications of telecoupling for state-led environmental governance, ways the state can effectively address telecoupled environmental issues both within and beyond national borders are addressed, drawing on the example of soy trade between Brazil and Germany. This builds on recent contributions to the literature on governance of interregional ecological challenges to elaborate potential policy and governance options, ranging from classical bilateral, multilateral, and international agreements, to information-based, economic, and hybrid governance modes. While telecoupled environmental problems create governance challenges related to scale, knowledge gaps, coordination, and state capacity, the state has an important role to play. To explore this further, interdisciplinary inquiry is required that includes but moves beyond the state.     

The idea(s) of ‘valuing nature’: insights from the UK’s ecosystem services framework

The variety of ideas about ways nature is ‘valued’ in public policymaking are investigated. A theoretical ideational approach is combined with empirical analysis of the UK’s ecosystem services framework. Several types of ideas are identified, and how they interact is examined: ideas about nature itself; about the role that different research on the value of nature can or should play in decision-making; and about how policy decisions are made. In particular, the ways these ideas appear in academic debates, especially in ecological economics and philosophy, are confronted with how ideas appear in the policy practice of employing a ‘valuing nature’ concept. This reveals political dynamics sometimes missed by both advocates and critics of the concept of ecosystem services, such as the importance of promoting organisations and their agendas and activities, persuading different actors to change positions, and institutional commitments and sunk costs.     

Governance via persuasion: environmental NGOs and the social licence to operate

The ‘social licence to operate’ (SLO) concept is increasingly associated with environmental activism in nations with prominent resource extractive industries. Environmental non-governmental organisations (ENGOs) deploy it as a campaigning strategy to contest corporate activity, in particular, the environmental sustainability of existing or planned commercial projects. Drawing on two prominent Australian ENGO campaigns – against Seafish Tasmania’s Abel Tasman vessel and Tassal’s proposed fish farm operations on Tasmania’s east coast – the SLO strategy is assessed in the context of the governance literature, arguing that it constitutes ‘governance via persuasion’, a mode that incorporates appeals to normative values. Australian SLO campaigns are primarily directed at the state, promoting opportunities for ENGOs to shape reviews and revisions to environmental regulation alongside governmental and corporate actors. SLO campaigns are therefore a contemporary expression of environmental strategies seeking regulatory change in contrast to ENGO-led private governance initiatives that often bypass the state.     

The states of public opinion on the environment

State-level public opinion on the environment within the US is examined, using data from the General Social Survey (GSS) from 2000 to 2010. A Multilevel Regression and Post-Stratification (MRP) approach is taken to estimate three different survey items on environmental issues at the US state level. This allows for a comparable understanding of state-level public opinion on environmental issues, which is then connected to economic, environmental, and political conditions, and representation in policy making. The findings indicate the MRP technique is a sophisticated way to make accurate estimations of state-level public opinion, and those estimates provide further insight into the shaping of public opinion and public policy.     

Environmental public opinion in U.S. states, 1973–2012

Partisan polarization of public opinion is a major trend in American environmental politics. While the national pattern is widely recognized, scholars know much less about the polarization of public opinion over time at the state level. This lack of knowledge is unfortunate because geographic variation in the polarization of opinion is essential for explaining the origins of partisan polarization and evaluating its consequences for policy. To fill the gap, the multilevel regression and poststratification technique is applied to provide credible estimates of state-level environmental public opinion for both Democrats and Republicans, 1973–2012. It appears that the growing partisan gap reflects increased pro-environmental opinion among Democrats across many states, whereas Republican state-level public opinion is converging toward a much lower baseline. Cross-state variation among both parties has decreased over time, contributing to greater partisan polarization in the aggregate. Changes in the sorting of voters in and out of political parties cannot explain these patterns of polarization.     

Tightening the grip: environmental governance under Xi Jinping

In the space of a few years, China’s global image with regard to environmental matters has significantly improved. Particularly since Xi Jinping’s coming-to-power in 2012 China’s reputation in the global climate change regime has improved markedly and it has gained accolades for a new determination to reverse environmental degradation at home. China’s incipient green transformation is partly due to a new actor constellation in environmental governance, a striking feature of which is the prominence of ad hoc campaigns that offer quick results but that may undermine the creation of law-based enforcement mechanisms in the long term. Another development – China’s increasing use of emerging technologies and big data analytics – has given rise to new forms of government-business alliances. These new players and innovative approaches have injected momentum into China’s environmental governance system and suggest that, contrary to conventional wisdom, authoritarian regimes can be responsive to citizen demands under certain circumstances. Yet it remains to be seen whether long-term environmental goals can be met, due to a pervasive lack of accountability, the weakening of civil society and heavy constraints on public participation.     

Environmental policy innovations in China: a critical analysis from a low-carbon city

The Chinese state is squarely ‘back’ in the business of environmental governance with an increasing number of policy innovations or experiments to resolve environmental issues. These have been mostly enacted through the ‘experimentation under hierarchy’ framework, undergirded by compensation-for-performance incentive structures for local agents. Based on on-site ethnography in local China, a critical analysis is presented of low-carbon city policy experiments – one of the most prominent environmental policies introduced in the past decade. Using lessons from the agency theory, it is hypothesized that outcomes of these policy innovations are contingent on different policy dimensions. Although a number of positive outcomes have been achieved in output-oriented dimensions, the fundamental difficulty of specifying all aspects of complex, multidimensional work tasks involved in low-carbon city development has frequently led to policy unmaking. The findings raise important questions about China’s tendency to rely excessively on compensation-for-performance structures to promote environmental policies.     

“No fences make bad neighbors” but markets make better ones: cap-and-trade reduces cross-border SO2 in a natural experiment

The clean air interstate rule (CAIR) was a regional cap-and-trade program announced in 2005 which covered 27 eastern US states and sought to reduce sulfur dioxide emissions from coal-fired power plants. The rule was later vacated after a court found that the non-targeted design of the program did not comply with the Clean Air Act provision to regulate interstate air pollution. Using a custom air pollution dispersion model, I calculate the interstate SO₂ pollution from 493 coal-fired power plants across the United States between 1997 and 2020. In a difference-in-differences setup with plants not covered by CAIR in the control group, I estimate the treatment effect of the program on overall- and cross-border SO₂ emissions and find a 24% reduction in overall emissions and reduces the risk that a plant violates air quality standards across state borders by 2–4%. I report evidence of heterogeneous treatment effects where the reduction in overall emissions attributed to CAIR is lower among plants transporting SO₂ in excess of 1% of the National Air Quality Standards to another state.

     

Frame alignment and environmental advocacy: the influence of NGO strategies on policy outcomes in China

ABSTRACT

The link between environmental frames and policy outcomes in China is explored. Environmental nongovernment organizations’ (ENGOs) issue interpretation and presentation affect environmental policy changes. The notion of ‘frame alignment’ is introduced, and it is argued that it can serve to link ENGOs’ advocacy needs and frame resonance among different stakeholders, thus successfully promoting advocacy. Based on in-depth interviews and analysis of news reports over a span of 10 years, it is found that where ENGOs are able to align their issue frames with those of the central state and media, the resulting frame resonance smooths policy change. In contrast, where ENGOs adopt conflict frames critical of state authorities, the absence of alignment leads to a slim chance of policy change. The findings shed light on why some ENGOs successfully create linkage and achieve their desired outcomes while others fail to do so.     

Fifty Shades of Green? Political differences between elites,members and supporters of Europe Ecologie Les Verts

In recent years, many political parties have created new forms of affiliation and have justified the blurring of membership boundaries with claims that sympathisers would be more representative of the electorate and less radical. Such claims are based on ‘popular wisdom’ inspired by John May’s ‘special law of curvilinearity’, which states that activists hold more extreme views than voters and elites. When this expectation has been tested, results have been at best inconclusive; but testing has so far never used a single survey to compare different groups. Using an online survey of Europe Ecologie Les Verts party members and their extended networks (affiliated supporters, lapsed members, sympathisers), relationships between ideological differences and degree of investment in party activities and decision-making are analysed. The results, contradicting May’s special law along all ideological dimensions other than intra-party democracy, can be explained if May’s narrowly instrumental assumptions about preference formation are rejected.     

Metagovernance and policy forum outputs in Swiss environmental politics

Policy forums are lightly institutionalized and stable forms of governance networks that include administrative authorities, interest groups, and scientists. They are said to produce different types of outputs, from simple actor coordination to position papers and implementation documents, but their productivity has also been questioned. Metagovernance strategies can improve the capability of policy forums to produce outputs. To determine how different metagovernance strategies influence the capability of forums to produce joint position papers, 29 policy forums in the Swiss environmental sector are compared through a qualitative comparative analysis. Results indicate that metagovernance strategies such as state actors as forum members or majority decision rules need to be combined with small forum size or low actor heterogeneity. Furthermore, forum foundation by the state complicates the production of position papers.     

Public opinion on climate change: Is there an economy–environment tradeoff?

Does the state of the economy condition public concern for the environment? Scholars have long argued that environmental preferences decline during economic downturns as individuals prioritize short-term economic needs over longer-term environmental concerns. Yet, this assumption has rarely been subjected to rigorous empirical scrutiny at the individual level. The presumed link between economic and environmental preferences is revisited, using the first individual-level opinion panel (n = 1043) of US climate attitudes, incorporating both self-reported and objective economic data. In contrast with prior studies that emphasize the role of economic downturns in driving environmental preference shifts, using a stronger identification strategy, there is little evidence that changes in either individual economic fortunes or local economic conditions are associated with decreased belief that climate change is happening or reduced prioritization of climate policy action. Instead, the evidence suggests that climate belief declines are associated with shifting political cues. These findings have important implications for understanding the dynamics of political conflict over environmental policy globally.     

States,coalitions, and the legalization of the global climate regime: negotiations on the post-2020 architecture

Why do some states and state coalitions, acting within the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), support harder legalization of the global climate regime? In order to explain why, the effects of four causal factors are considered: climate vulnerability, the emission intensity of the national economy, a state’s power position, and socialization into climate norms. To identify the legalization positions of UNFCCC actors, an original content analysis is conducted of all the submission and meeting statements made at the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform during the years 2012–2015. Subsequently, a qualitative comparative analysis is carried out to find out which combinations of the causal factors offer a sufficient explanation for the analyzed outcome, leading to the identification of two causal pathways that lead states to endorse harder legalization of the climate regime.